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It would be different if it were given to us to live a second time through the

same events with all the knowledge of what we have seen before. How
different would things appear to us ; how important and often alarming
would changes seem that we now scarcely notice.

Fri ederich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom

Chapter One
The Millennium Closes
Where may the wearied eye r epose,
When gazing on th e great;
Where neither guilty glory grows,
No r despicable state?
Lord Byron

The proud, war-weary, mid-twentieth century country into which I was born has
become alien and distant from the one I now inhabi t as the third millennium A.D.
opens. Seventy-seven million of the Baby Boom generation made their bawling,
naked entries between 1946 and 1964--grateful for the prolonged, collective
spasm of amorousness that punctuated the end of World War II. My li fe began
three years before the mid-century mark. One power-worshiping mass murderer,
Adolph Hitler, was recently dead. A second, Joseph Stalin, would continue the
long reign over his Eastern European empire for another six grim years before his
underlings finally put an end to him . A third, Mao Zedong, stood in the epicenter
of the second major communist revolution of the century and on the brink of
supreme power in the world's most populous country. Decades of greater turmoil
and misery- fo rced collectivization, ceaseless political indoctrination and mass
starvation-awaited the Chinese. At mid-century, Americans looked upon large
portions of the globe where tens of millions of people had just been, or were about
to be, subject to tyranny, twentieth-century style.
By 1945, the Allied armies had crushed the forces of National Socialism
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in Ge rmany and Fascism m Italy. Communism by contrast appeared to be for
many, even in the West, the way of the future . Both National Socialism and
Communism , however, were massive social experiments launched by passionate
visionaries, men who possessed a swollen sense of their superiority. They
disdained the old order and those who ran it. "I have proved by my li fe," Hitler
fulminated in 1938 in Vienna, " that I am more competent than the dwarfs, my
predecessors, who brought this country to destruction." These visionaries claimed
a moral and intellectual superiority to their despised, effete predecessors. They
would do things differently. To thei r ambitions they recognized few limits, moral
or any other.
The

ational Socialists were supremely confident in the future of the

Aryan race and in the superiority of all things German- Deutsch/and iiber alles.
Cleansed like the Fatherland itself, they simply needed territory to grow and to
expand the boundaries of their empire.
The Bolsheviks, a minority party of resentful intellectuals, connived their
way into power. They were bolstered with an unshakable conviction that they
alone possessed the blueprint for the desi gn of the classless society- no poverty,
no exploitation, no inferiority, and no social and economic disparities. Everyone
would be a social equal. A socialist workers' paradise was to culminate in a world
revo lution, one the Bolsheviks would launch and oversee. This historically
determined conflagration would ultimately destroy the old order and with it the
bourgeoisie capitalist class, entrenched as it was in greed, corruption and
privilege.
The Communists and National Socialists took up methods that were age
old. These visionaries, however, employed them with greater boldness on a much
larger scale and with a more systematic and calculating ingenuity- lies,
manipulation, intimidation, and raw, brutal force. These were the most notable,
impressive features of the revolutions that they had furiously unleashed.
Unique to this age though, were the preoccupation with ideology and the
yearning to enact the complete restructuring and reordering of society. Millions of
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people became subjects for the Great Social Experiments, as they found
themselves reduced to the status of statistical means to achieve utopian ends. In
order to maintain ideological purity they had to endure relentless, crushing
pressures for conformity, a mindless cult of party leadership, the ceaseless
production of propaganda and manipulation of information, and the threat of
concentration camps. The goose-stepping armies and the ubiquitous secret
security forces must have made it obvious, even to the most casua] or naive
onlookers, that the pursuit and worship of unlimited power were what moved
these grand promise makers. Near the middle of the twentieth century, the
essential elements of the modem, ideology-driven police state came together.
Much of America's encounter with the world outside its borders since
1940 has been shaped by the threat or fear of totalitarians and their ideologies.
World War II, the Cold War, Korea, Vietnam, conflicts with Cuba and Nicaragua
were all theatrical productions in which the official scripts featured American
power and goodness resisting forces of aggression and domination. The reviews,
even from our own intellectuals, were mixed, and the stalemate of Korea and tbe
failure in Vietnam made it increasing ly difficult to view the international arena in
this way.
Hitler, Stalin and Mao were three of the most powerfu.l men who ever
lived. They were also among the world's greatest purveyors of resentment, the
supreme driving force behind their personalities and ambitions. This resentment
was searing, inflammatory, and highly contagious. Coupled with political and
military power it was translated into death and human misery on a grand scale-few at the beginning of the century could have imagined, much less predicted the
convulsions and the horror. No one now can ponder the tragic, sanguinary course
of events of the middle decades of our own century without turning over many
bitter and melancholy thoughts about the desolation they brought. Their lives have
been the subject of endless conjectures for biographers, historians and social
theorists with affinities for the elucidation of psycho-pathology and social
depravity. The number of books and articles on Hitler alone is staggering. Their
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careers were sufficiently Jong and despicable as to provide observers of the
human condition with copious materials for the exploration of human folly,
cruelty and degeneracy. These ranged from the famine Stalin engineered for
Ukrainian peasants in the 1930s, to Hitler's full scale mechanization of mass
murder for European Jews in the 1940s, to Mao's massively destructive "Great
Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution in the 1950s and 1960s. Such statesponsored "adventures" in advancing the superior race or building the socialist
workers ' paradise were beastly and sanguinary beyond normal comprehension.
From a retrospective view, these projects amounted to nothing more than what
Irving L. Horowitz recently called "the murderous pursuit of worthless
objectives." 1
Today, scholars and researchers who document and explain these
collective feats of the grotesque compute in units of millions the wreckage of
human life that was wrought. Le livre noir du communisme (The Black Book of

Communism) set off a firestorm in socialist-ruled France when it was published
near the end of the last century. (France has long been home to many of the
West's most articulate and fashionable intellectual apo logists for communism, the
most notable being the Existentialist philosopher, Jean Paul Sartre.) Stephane
Courtois, the chief edi tor of this remarkable work, estimates the number of
communist victims world wide fro m 1917 to 1989 to range between 85 and 100
million. The National Socialists with their much shorter time span of opportunity
dispatched "only" about 25 million souls. The most murderous years, with some
notable exceptions (Cambodia for one), were those early and middle decades of
the twentieth century. the "golden age" of sloganeering totalitarian ideologues and
goose-stepping soldiers.
For these builders of new societies, their own subjects on whose behalf
they claimed to rule were the principal objects of mass predation, degradation and
even extermination. Masters of self-deification and self-aggrandizement, these
despot-ideologues were assiduously abetted in the administration of their modem
tyrannies by preening, toadying intellectuals. The German universities in the
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1930s were run by enthusiastic Nazi professors: many intellectuals during the
1930s and 1940s in the Western democracies practiced the most servile forms of
Stalin-worship--permanent copious stains on twentieth-century intellectual
history. The intimate partnership between the ideological criminal and the
intellectual apologist became a common twentieth-century symbiosis. Its essence
was captured with prescience in an epigram by the great nineteenth-century
theorist ofliberty, Lord Acton:
The strong man with the dagger is followed by the weaker man
with the sponge. First the criminal who slays; then the sophist who
defends the slayer. 2
Now complete, the twentieth century recedes hauntingly into memory. Those of
us who were born in it, must, upon reflection, deem it in many ways a dark and
evil time. Much of the misery was enthusiastically wrought by our modem
revolutionaries, their utopian illusions and their worship of power. R. J. Rummel,
a political scientist and demographer, has devoted his career to the study of
genocide and other egregious abuses of political power by modem states. He
estimates conservatively that governments murdered almost 170 million people
during the twentieth century.3
The willful, brutal destruction of human life on a massive scale in this
century has occurred in Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, almost everywhere
except in our own portion of the globe, North America. In the twentieth century
America became the greatest industrial and technological force on the planet. But
it also became a haven for the persecuted. It was recognized as the most unique
and extraordinary place in the world for the stability of its institutions and for its
freedom from the ideologically motivated strife that brought such destruction to
so many other parts of the world.
The twentieth century dawned with confidence! "Progress" was ascendant.
Man' s future presented few limits. Contemplating that century now provokes
horror and revulsion. The barbarism of it gives confirmation to Edward Gibbon's
observation that history is " ...indeed, little more than the register of the crimes,
follies, and misfortunes of mankind.'"' In spite of magnificent inventions and
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discoveries, economic prosperity, the exploration of galaxies, and the many
spectacular advances in medicine, transportation, electronics and computing
technology, these last hundred years have been above all in history an orgy of
political mass-murder, enslavement and systematic annihilation.
Hitler and the National Socialist regime that ruled Germany for twelve
years and then left it in ruins have since been symbols of the most profound,
incomprehensible evil. The Austrian corporal has no apologists of significance, at
least in this country. The swastika arouses nothing but revulsion. The Fuhrer's
memory now excites the admiration only of a few truculent psychotics and other
alienated flotsam of the lunatic fringe.
Communism, however, is an ideology with a more enduring legacy. In our
victory over Hitler and his virulent ideology there was a sense that the universal
values of the open society and individual freedom, long acclaimed and cherished
in the West, had been vindicated. At the end of the war, however, we immediately
confronted a new, powerful ideological challenge. Our war ally, the Soviet Union,
had completed its transmogrification. The USSR's despotic resemblance to Nazi
Germany

was

unmistakable--another

menacing,

murderous,

relentlessly

expansionist dictatorship. Overnight, the United States and the Soviet Union
changed from all ies to the world's most formidably armed enemies. Stalin, so
often pictured in his drab grey military tunic with the pipe, the yellow eyes and
that stony, inscrutable visage, was a more complex, confusing and ambiguous
villain for us to fathom than the nervous, maniacal Hitler. Stalin had been our
ally, contentious and querulous though he was. His armies, with our generous
assistance, had defeated the Panzer divisions in the East and marched into Berlin.
Winners have greater opportunities to polish their reputations, and they get more
attention and respect than losers. The Russian people endured unspeakable
hardships from the invading Germans, and the Red Anny fought them desperately
and valiantly. How could we not be moved by that? Also, the Marxism that Stalin
so confidentiy professed remained enticing, here in the bastion of world
capitalism, to many of our own intellectuals who seemed to need a secular
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religion to replace the traditional ones they could no longer endure. Even those
who recognized and admitted Stalin's crudeness, deceitfulness and brutality
excused them glibly as the darker side of a great and determined man whose
better instincts were still directed toward advancing the well being of the toiling
masses he claimed to represent. Hitler's performance was complete. His exit from
the world historical stage was ignominious, and his evil clear and unan1biguous;
Stalin's was not. Neither was Mao's.
Chairmen Stalin and Mao, in spite of the extensive documentation of the
enormity of their crimes, still have their adulators in tow- many of them denizens
of the professoriate, the professional chatterers who reside in Western
universities. Academe remains the last friendly, natural habitat for Marxists. To
the many grotesque ironies of twentieth-century history, its residents remain
invincibly oblivious. Years of incubation in the protracted adolescence of
graduate school are required in order to absorb and master the rebarbative argot of
"social critique" and make the dialectical ascent to enlightenment. Born of the
professoriate's convulsions of theoretical agony are the abstruse vocabularies,
custom-designed to scourge the same ruling class that underwrites their sinecures
and yet pays no attention to their carefully crafted complaints. Their wisdom
unfolds these days

in the ceremonious production of arcana such as

deconstruction, eco-feminism, environmental Marxism, queer theory, animal
rights, and other resentment-laden mutations of what now carry the enigmatic
label of p ost modernism . Many of these cognoscenti, though, still portentously
enthuse about almost any dictator, no matter how brutal or homicidal, as long as
he remains staunchly anti-American and spouts edifying left-wing pieties.
The benevolence of the "Great Oarsman" Stalin and the Little Red Book
wisdom of Chairman Mao inspired a gruesome succession of post-World War II
imitators and emulators like Enver Xhoxa, Kim 11 Sung and, lest we forget, the
bloody Pol Pot, recently deceased and unrepentant to the end. The most notable
contributions of these luminaries to the elevation of the oppressed working class
were the proliferation of mass grave yards, state-enforced penury, and dreary,
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fatuous propaganda by the ream

prattle of the most revolting hypocrisy. ln our

own backyard as of this writing, the Maximum Lider, Fidel Castro remains as a
"revolutionary" fixture. As he hastens toward decrepitude, Castro still practices
his brutal routines on the shabby and impoverished workers' paradise of his own
creation. He bas oppressed the people of that unhappy island it seems forever,
outlasting nine American Presidents. Along with his homicidal associate from the
early days, the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentinean Stalinist, Castro
remains a romantic revolutionary hero, as Mao and Ho Chi Minh were for our
own left of the sixties. We have seen the "charismatic" Fidel run his course from a
youthful guerilla in military fatigues-trying to import his revolution worldwide-to an aged caudillo in a business suit. He remains in essence what he bas
always been, an egotistical, bearded gasbag, hanging on pathetically to an
incredible forty-four year despotism that bas ravaged a beautiful country and a
noble people.
We have passed the fin de siecle and ponder the dawning of our new
millennium . The sheer arbitrariness of the calendar and those curious ways in
which we measure and place our signature upon these fleeting moments of our
lives set up, however, a

profound, awe-inspiring sense of passing, a unique,

anxious feeling of momentous entry into a new era. Attached to this feeling is a
remarkable past that continually begs for interpretation. The history must be
sorted out and inspected as we make the crossing over that great but arbitrary
divide. With all of the indulgence in speculation and reflection that a hugely
symbolic time-bridge like the passing of a millennium brings to the fore, it is a
wonderful but daunting opportunity for turning over our collective memories,
attempting to make some sense of our tumultuous times, and for contemplating
the events and forces that have transformed our lives.
The mid-century years seem like a terribly long time ago. Yet, the many
catastrophic events of those times loom large in the recent historical landscape of
the just completed millennium. We are still captives of the ideas and emotions
they unleashed, perhaps more than we may realize. These events compel us to
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remember, re-remember, and somehow explain. The tragedies that we have
witnessed across the oceans and have been spared in our own land were the active
work of men and women, energized by ideas. Those people are dead, but their
ideas live. Others take them up: we encounter them here and now. What must we
make of them, and what threats, if any, might they still pose?
II

This book is a melancholy reflection upon the march of progress of the
twentieth century in America, mostly the second half of it, the part I have lived in
and about which I have thought most. That march involves dramatic changes in
our ways of thinking about ourselves, in the ways we treat one another, and what
we have come to expect from one another.
This march of progress is an important part of the story of personalism.
Personalism is a proto-modem perspective of human nature initially articulated by
J. J. Rousseau in the mid-eighteenth century, but intellectually refined and
expanded throughout the l 91h and 20th centuries. American traditional social
institutions, I believe, have declined, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth
century. This decline is due in part to the growing impact of personalism as it as
has insinuated itself into the secularized ideologies of modem life.
PersonaUsts evince a deep resentment of social hierarchy and are
enthusiasts of social equality. Moreover, personalists yearn for power to remake
the world to reflect a perfect social equality- hence, the personalist affinity for
revolution and the possession of political power. Power is what the personalist
craves. With it, be thinks, he can reshape the world. So ironically, personalism,
when put into practice, concentrates political power and produces even greater
inequality. The unintended consequence ofpersonalism is tyranny.
The twentieth century was a vast experiment in tyranny, much of it rooted
in ideologies of total revolution and revulsion with the social hierarchies of the
old order. In Stalin's Soviet Union, Hitler's Germany, and Mao' s China, that
tyranny was open, ferociously murderous and explicitly ideological. The
ideologue-revolutionaries smashed the old traditional order and ground it up. The
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discarded detritus were the millions of lives destroyed by the ideologues yearning
for life in completely new and "greatly improved" societies.
America escaped the upheaval and destruction that was visited upon so
many other portions of the world in the twentieth century by the ideologue newsociety-builders. In the latter part of the 20'h century, personalisrn has eroded and
corrupted American institutions, but in a manner oblique and imperceptible.
Instrumental in this erosion is the cultural domination of our institutions
by television, a medium whose fundamental ethos is amusement. The way in
which Americans experience the world and even themselves is increasingly done
through the mediation of television.
The amusement ethos, with its intense subjectivity, its focus on the
immediate present, and its preoccupation with the personal self, has insidiously
intensified the anti-institutional appeal of personalism. American life has become
de-institutionalized:

institutions

like the

family,

churches, schools,

and

universities have for decades been losing their character and identity. With the
weakening of institutions, we experience the unfolding of a tyranny different from
the kind expressed in Stalin 's gulags or Hitler's Kris/all Nachl. We settle under a
"velvet" tyranny that envelops us subtly and insidiously, but none the less is
inimical to the traditional ideals of American freedom .
This tyranny grows proportionately with the precipitous decline m our
willingness to hold ourselves personally responsible and accountable. The decline
of personal responsibility is the result of a profound change in our moral practice,
the medicalization of our morality. Wrong doing has become illness. Illness
requires treatment. Proper treatment must be done by specialists, experts who tend
to patients, formerly wrong doers. ln the 21 51 century, Americans face the specter
of universal patienthood. One observer of this phenomenon has recently written:
The extensive use of disease categories for a wide variety of
human behaviors is unique in human history; most of the many
mental illnesses that are now taken for granted as objective natural
entities are recent creations. 5
Indeed, those kinds of behavior considered now in the early 21st century as mental
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illness would have been incomprehensible to Americans only fifty years ago.
Many of the mental illnesses from which many of us suffer and for which we are
treated are recent inventions.
From citizens who rule ourselves we have become patients in need of
therapy. The reality of the perception of universal patienthood is matched by a
pervasive rhetoric of patienthood. In the wake of the Monica Lewinski scandal
and the ensuing impeachment of the President of the United States, President
Clinton repeatedly spoke of "national healing." In the aftermath of the September
I I"' murderous attack by Muslim fanatics, our elites were calling for "healing" in
America. When people now do immoral acts, like lying and betraying trusts, or
when they do evil, heinous things, like murdering thousands of people, why do
our elites talk of healing? Who are those in need of healing? Who are the healers?
What "treatment" do they administer? What is the cost?
Ill
In the brief period of time since the end of World War ll, it is difficult to shake

off an uneasy feeling that a profound alteration has taken place in the ways in
which we undertake and discharge our obligations. In entering into an obligation,
we bind ourselves. We commit ourselves to courses of action that we know may
be onerous. To repay the debts we incur, to keep the promises we make, to honor
our commitments, obviously means that we must be willing to bear costs that we
would, at times, prefer not to have to pay. However, the sense and feeling of
obligation is one, if not the most, distinctly human aspects of our communal life.
In one respect, the assumption of an obligation brings about a loss of freedom:
obligatfons bind. They shut off desirable or advantageo us courses of action we
might otherwise take and deprive us of comforts into which we might otherwise
happily settle. To a pleasure-maximizing, comfort-seeking, or power-worshiping
creature, reverence or respect for obligation can make no sense--to avoid them or
repudiate them if possible seems to be a natural and logical course of action. But
the willingness to submit to obligations is an indispensable condition for human
freedom . The acknowledgment of an obligation establishes mutual trust and
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expands cooperation. Mutual respect for obligations breathes life into institutions
and makes them human in the best sense of the term. Obligations also enable us to
think and act like moral, responsible beings, to transcend the immediate
circumstance and rise above our particular impulses and personal inclinations.
To be the kind of person for whom obligations have meaning, one must
somehow link the importance and value of upholding obligations to some source
of good beyond

~ne ' s

own self or immediate group. Typical.ly, people who keep

their promises, honor commitments and follow the rules, are grounded in some
objective norm or set of norms that extend beyond themselves, that is, they are
willing participants in a system of morality which commands at least the
recognition and generally the respect of most of the people, often though not
always, through the agency of religion. In the late-twentieth century, this
objective sense has unquestionably abated. In part this is due to the erosion of
transcendental preoccupations achieved by modernity. This erosion has made the
sense of obligation, which is always somewhat fragile and vulnerable to
attenuation or corruption, harder to develop and even more difficult to sustain. As
a consequence, social obligations of all sort

marital, filial, financial , parental,

professional, civic, and personal- have become viewed by many as unfairly
imposed fetters. It is increasingly common to disregard them, attenuate them or
rationalize them away. The wife has become disagreeable? Divorce her. Piled up
too much debt? Declare bankruptcy and stiff your creditors. Cannot get your way
at work? Sue the company. The norms that used to bind us exist now more as
irritants to be overcome.
Our great march of progress, I believe, has changed us in many ways,
great and small. The greatest change is the near extinction of a confident,
objective orientation toward the world involving fixed norms and beliefs, worked
out across the course of at least two millennia. Into its place has crept a
profoundly personal, shifting and relativistic view of reality and morality. This
relativism toward morality has shaped our thinking about what we ought to be,
how we ought to act, and what we ought to expect from others. We recognize the
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impact through its many insidious effects. They are steadily at work in almost
every region of our culture--our manners, morals and religion; our legal, political
and educational institutions. But most importantly, relativism has shaped our
assumptions about what it means to be human, that is, what sort of creatures we
ultimately think we are and what limitations, if any, we admit or acknowledge.
Such assumptions determine our aspirations and guide their pursuit and help mold
the character and structure of our social institutions. This relativism is profound in
both its effects and implications, yet its approach is largely imperceptible. The
effects of the changes are insidious, and we proceed unaware. At some point, the
bells go off. We suddenly recognize how far reaching the changes and what the
effects mean for our daily lives. We pause. We look back. Then with some
amazement and perhaps consternation the realization dawns: we are different
people from what we used to be; and we are not quite sure why.
The major ideologies that came into ascendancy and were put into social
practice during the early- and mid-twentieth century- National Socialism,
communism and welfare liberalism-had and have strong, relativistic components
or tendencies that produced,. in some cases, violent reactions against the objective
moral claims of both Christianity and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth
century. These

ideologies

also

have

a

doctrinal

underpinning- human

perfectibility and the necessity of a powerful state to achieve it. The relativism
that evolved through these ideologies freed many individuals from loyalties and
obligations that might compete with those to the state and inhibited them from
being the state' s unquestioning servants. 6
The National Socialists' obsession with race gave rise to the most
appalling characteristic of their political machinations- the subordination of all
judgment to stupid and bogus theoretical claptrap about race and its relativity to
things human. Hence their willingness, eagerness even, to abandon the most basic
and minimal standards of decency in their treatment of non-"Aryan" peoples, the
Jews particularly. "Conscience," remarked Hitler "is a Jewish invention. It is a
blemish, like circumcision." 7 The methods and practices that could be expected to
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follow from the lucubration of such a " moralist" with a propaganda machine,
powerful armies and secret police forces at his disposal, of course, did indeed
follow. These repudiators of such "Jewish inventions" transformed Europe al
mid-century from a civilized continent into a vast chamel house. The National
Socialists launched their war of extermination against the European Jews, and in
the process of murdering five or six million people they also drove many of the
finest and creative minds out of Europe and to America.
The communists made their crucial norm- and value-distinctions on the
basis of Marx's theory of economic-social class exploitation--another source of
murderous resentment, but decked out in different ideological garb. Morality was
relative to class. Lenin, responding to criticism that he was slandering his fellow
socialists who disagreed with him as traitors, proclaimed: "Everything that is done
in the interest of the proletarian cause is honest."8 Thus, for our historical
ruminations, is one more depressing glimpse of twentieth-century moral "insight"
from another terribly powerful man. Hitler denounced conscience. Lenin
proclaimed its irrelevance. Lenin had bequeathed the "ethical" foundations for a
program in which any conceivable barbarity can be justified, and waseffortlessly and arrogantly-

justified simply by announcing that it advances the

cause. For Lenin and his progeny, bourgeoisie "anything" was lo be justly plowed
under by the proletarian forces of the world revolutionary juggernaut- another
ideologically "innovative" perspective that would lead to astonishing dimensions
of state-sponsored barbarity and criminality. In this ideological script, members of
a social-economic class, rather than race, would be the object of extermination if
they were seen to obstruct the progress of communism. Stalin' s savage campaign
of collectivization against the Kulaks in the Russian countryside and his program
of deliberate mass starvation of peasants in Ukraine in the early 1930s illustrate
just how gentle the process of implementing the classless society would be.
Stalin also elevated an ignorant sycophant Trofim D. Lysenko to the
pinnacle of Soviet agriculture because he excoriated the "bourgeoisie" genetics of
Mendel and trumpeted the theory of acquired characteristics. Science, like
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everything else under Stalin 's sway, had to conform to his current ideological
impulse. Lysenko repaid his benefactor by wrecking Soviet agronomy and
agriculture for decades.9
Hitlerian and Leninist-Stalinist ideologies were extreme and their effects
nihilistic and destructive. But the cultural forces and ideological impulses that
produced them did not go away with their defeat.
The great expansion of the welfare stale in the United States, beginning
with the First World War and continued by the New Deal and the Great Society,
massively increased the power and authority of the federal government. The
phenomenal growth of the welfare state helped to enlarge and empower a cultural
elite that has grown overtly hostile to traditional norms, particularly traditional
Christianity. These elites have enthusiastically promoted a moral relativism
embedded in a personalist perspective of human nature that now dominates most
of our institutions, including the universities, the vast and powerful entertainment
and news industry, and virtually all of the organs of mass culture.
Contemplating the ascendancy of moral relativism and its implication for
moral practice, one is inevitably led to a difficult comparative moral and ethical
question: as a people, are we any better, any worse, or just different than we were
a half-century ago? In attempting to answer these kinds of questions we may risk
moral and spiritual disillusion. Have we lost sight of important ideals? If not, how
do we explain the changes?
Moral relativism is a part of the outlook of persona/ism . The part it plays,
we will see, is one of intellectual accommodation. But there is more. Personalism
is both an intellectual and emotive phenomenon. Personalism establishes the
center of human self-understanding and value on the person, and focuses human
moral activity on the creation and recreation of the subjective self. Hence, the
intellectual accommodation: with the self as life's center, what is good becomes
the good that is relative to my interests and inclinations, to my personal growth.
The "shoulds" for you are not necessarily the "shoulds" for me. The emotive
aspect of personalism centers on its quest for a persistent enlargement of self-
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esteem. Feeling good about one' s self is a major personalist preoccupation, and
for some, a fulltime occupation. Self-esteem, in spite of the enormous resources
and energy devoted to its promo6on, always seems to be deficient.
As it has advanced, personalism, with an inherent and acute subjectivity,
has produced an increasingly unbearable, adversarial tension which we experience
in several ways. That tension is expressed as a pull back and forth between the
quest for unfettered self-expansion on the one side, and the demands upon
individuals as members of communities on the other. Communities invariably
create differentiating roles, impose obligations and place limits on the individual
self. We express that tension in a deep conflict- the so-called culture warsbetween Americans who live by and endorse secular values and seem untroubled
by the loss of moral certainty that secularism brings, and those who embrace
traditional values of social morality and whom these events deeply trouble.
Personalism conflicts with what was once our dominant method of
preparing ourselves to encounter the moral world- the cultivation of virtue. The
powerful quest that drove our predecessors- to develop "good character"- has
given way to an even more overriding preoccupation in contemporary l.ifi

to

have a " healthy personality." Morality, in effect, has been almost completely
medicalized. Achieving a good character and ac6ng well and honorably is less
important than possessing personal self-esteem. "Virtue," a word of much import
in the moral vocabulary of eighteenth- and nineteenth- century individuals, is now
more of a linguistic object of historical and sociological curiosity. A search in the
on-line bookstore holdings of Amazon.com under the subject heading "selfesteem" yields approximately 1,700 items: "virtue" yields 123. "Being virtuous,"
a once highly desirable state of being that was connected to belief in objective
standards of conduct, has given way to the quest for "feeling good," a deeply
subjective condition of the personality.
The practitioner of virtue aspired to a perfection of character. This effort,
however, was always made against a dark backdrop of objectively defined, wellrecognized human lirnita6ons or shortcomings, particularly the kind that exerts
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itself in a powerful and persistent tendency for overreaching and for self-centered
destructiveness. The recognition of this natural human failing is a primary tenet of
the Christian and Jewish moral outlook and also played heavily in the thinking of
most modem philosophers from Hobbes to Hume to Kant. Thomas Hobbes
captured human nature in its unbridled manifestation of overreaching with that
terrible epigram "homo homini lupus" ("man to man is a wolf'). Without
intervening norms, constraints and prescriptions, human beings tend to prey upon
each other. History bears this out- modem as well as ancient. The process by
which virtue was inculcated in human beings was a remarkable piece of social
inventiveness. Through virtue an individual might curb self-assertion and impose
a disposition of self-restraint, achievements that are not easy or natural. Virtue is
necessary because the self needs boundaries and a method to impose them.
Montaigne referred to virtue as a "habit of steadfast resoluteness" with which one
could "make oneself impassible by one's efforts than to be so by natural
inclination."to Virtue was the means for developing and shaping one' s own
character and for resisting the vicissitudes of impulse. It is a quality associated
with being grown up, mature, responsible. Virtue does not fare well in a society
caught up with the exaltation of youth and obsessed with amusement. For people
given over to the avoidance of guilt and the compulsive need for self-realization,
virtue can be of little concern.
Inherent in personalism is an impulse for progressive self-expansiongrowth, emphatically not limitation, is the goal. Limitations represent for the
personalist not positive boundaries which enable a genuine moral self to come
into being, but obstacles to the development and reconstruction of self.
Constraints, especially those that are gradually built into tradition- social role,
acceptable conduct,

ethical prescriptions, conventions and

manners- the

personalist resents and will attempt to circumvent or destroy. Traditional moral
notions that have typically been associated with virtue like guilt, shame and
punishment, the personalist views as unnecessary and even pernicious. They limit
achievement. Shame and guilt are the products of ignorance and superstition and
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instruments of manipulation by the "privileged." They are integral parts of a
moral system that are linked to a belief in an objective moral order to which the
personalist can no longer give credence.
Personalism has imbedded itself into the moral perspective of early
twenty-first-century Americans. The medicalization of morality, a recent social
phenomenon, contributes heavily to this momentous alteration of perspective. The
insidious transformation of virtue into health, and vice or sin into illness, achieved
this strikingly "innovative" moral perspective. Human misconduct becomes a
problem for resolution, not through traditional social constraints- guilt, shame,
punishment in fact become separate problems- but by therapy. Sin has become
sickness, a temporary technical problem. Traditional problems of morality are
increasingly construed as technical problems of mental health. When people
currently do what we used to call "bad" or "sinful" things, we now find the fault
residing in some defective or deficient state of affairs that is the cause of the
malefaction, and then look for some expert whose credentials assure us that he
can correct the defect or remove that cause of the wrong doing. Edwin C. Boring,
a Harvard psychology professor of the 1940s, argued enthusiastically for the
reconstruction of the moral dimensions of human conduct into essentially a
framework of technical challenges with therapeutic applications. He had great
confidence in the science of psychology to solve the traditional problems arising
out of human conflict, which he saw as technical problems. "The psychological
point of view is, of course, the means of which social problems are solved and
social progress is engineered." 11 Engineering requires engineers. Morality, or
rather "social progress," as it is renamed under this technical orientation toward
living, is necessarily transformed into a specialty requiring experts who, first of
all, know how to read the social and psychological maps and determine what the
direction of progress is, and, secondly, know how to get the rest of us (nonengineers) on the right road, moving in the proper direction.
Personalists have always exuded great confidence in progress. Their
orientation is toward the future where the sweet fruits of progress will some day
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be fully harvested. The past by contrast is a barren, weed-infested expanse gladly
to be departed from . However, the past remains extremely important to the
personalists. They tend to regard the past as an object of resentment, a source of
grievances, oppressions and iniquities perpetuated by representatives of the
traditionally configured "power structures." History for the personalist is the story
of the wrong people with power. Over the last fifty years, the personalist has
formed a powerful alliance with the therapist. Together they struggle to overcome
impediments to progress and move mankind toward a destiny of self-realization
and freedom from all the restraints (the "hang-ups") of traditional society- the
personalist sings "Song of Myself' and follows any course that promises greater
fulfillment; the therapist seeks to heal temporary ruptures of the soul. The human
experience, thus conceived, becomes a road of liberation from the restraints that
our benighted ancestors visited upon us; the destiny is a state of wholeness that an
individual defines and creates entirely for himself. The psychologist, John
Watson, captured this notion of escaping the constraints of benighted tradition in
his seminal work on behaviorism in the 1930s.
l wish I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful individual
we should make of every healthy child if only we could let it shape
itself properly and then provide for it a universe in which it could
exercise that organization- a universe unshackled by legendary
folk-lore of happenings of thousands of years ago; unhampered by
disgraceful political history; free of foolish customs and
conventions which have no significance in themselves, yet which
12
hem the individual in like taut steel bands.
The thrust of personalism, carried forward by an expanding army of
therapists and counselors, is to identify the constraints that thwart the
actualization of self and, as much as possible, to be rid of them. These
"constraints" typically include the whole range of traditional moral and religious
norms and ideals, those conventions, which as Watson complains, are the
creations of fools, having " no significance in themselves."
Because an unimpeded, expansive, "guilt-free" self has become the
human ideal, the arts and technology of amusement take on an increasingly
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greater importance. Amusement provides an open-ended avenue for pursuing the
ex ploration of self without the danger of incurring obligations, the violations of
which might produce guilt. Personalism has developed a symbiotic relationship
with amusement in its sophisticated and expansive twentieth-century forms. From
its beginnings, personalism has set out to overthrow traditional social hierarchies,
including hierarchical systems of value. Value judgments have been rendered
highly personal and subjective. We thus have become accustomed to going about
our daily business, confronting life's choices with an almost natural, reflexive
orientation toward intensely subjective activities of self-exploration.
Amusement and self-exploration have been instrumental forces in the
emergence of the amusement state, the late-twentieth-century successor to the
welfare state. I will elaborate this notion of the amusement state extensively in
Chapter Six. In the welfare slate that developed across the course of this century
and in this country, the primary intention of the expanding government
bureaucracies has been to enlarge our individual expanse of security, to protect
us-oftentimes even from ourselves- and to ensure our sense of well being and
comfort. Amusement has become a predominant feature of modem institutional
life, thus the notion of the amusement state. Amusement is an intensely subjective
and fluctuating phenomenon, and we pursue it with passion. ls amusement
encouraged by our elites? Does our continuous immersion in it threaten
despotism?

Tocqueville

well

understood

the

threat

of amusement

to

democratically ruled societies, including ours.
I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may
appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is
an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, all
endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which
they glut their lives . ... Above this race of men stands an immense
and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their
gratification and watch over their fate. 13
The tendency of our contemporary political culture, with its growing
personalist hostility to tradition, is to hollow out the norms and ethos of our
institutions- government, schools, universities, and churches. Much of our
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institutional authority has been eviscerated by a withering skepticism of any
transcendental or universal purpose and a relativized view of their roles. Their
primary functions- government to protect us, schools to impart wisdom and
learning, churches to attend to our spiritual needs-have been adulterated by
amusement which has been constantly and insidiously expanding in importance.
Amusement by its nature cannot be boring; it must first please and foremost
satisfy. It requires an abundance of time in which individuals are completely free
from having to attend to obligations that might obstruct the pursuit of fun.
Amusement thrives on forgetfulness, and it is most effective when it can help us
to forget or suppress inconvenient realities that may intrude upon our lives and
trouble us.
We elect to office politicians whose carefully scripted presentations of self
are designed to make us feel good about ourselves. We send our children to
schools that compete with the amusement-oriented media of television and
movies. We deem the process a failure if it does not make them f eel good about
themselves and fails to rai se their self-esteem. We choose churches whose clergy
emulate the modem, poll-guided politi cians. They reassure us, make us feel
worthwhile and loved, and try not to tell us things we don't want to hear. ln the
televised church, one finds sophisticated amusement packagi ng. Moreover, a large
part of the electronic church 's appeal turns on the conveniences it offers.
Amusement is closely allied with comfort and indolence. Televised church, like
television in general, does not make strenuous demands. The only sacrifice is your
money. To be "there" you do not even have to dress up or leave your home. You
can eat and drink while you watch it and even get up and go to the bathroom.
Government, education, religion- all of these fundamental

social

endeavors now come to us with a large amusement dimension. The expansion of
amusement has also eroded the dignity of these institutions since dignity requires
a seriousness that is incompatible with the quest to make all activities amusing.
Amusement has become ubiquitous, and we can absorb our growing share of it
with greater variety, ease and convenience. Even an activity like shopping, which
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is now assiduously catered by television cable channels and vast amusement park
style shopping malls, has become a major venue of amusement, an end in itself
satisfying the growing need for more diversion, stimulation and escape.
Politicians and other celebrities now present themselves to the public and
attempt to secure their authority by enlarging their popularity- primarily through
television. Media, primarily television, drives the enormous price tags of
elections. Television thrives on the present. It operates primarily by stimulating
intense feelings or conjuring up programmed, manufactured emotions. The
primary instrument that television employs for conveying impressions and
influencing thinking is the ever moving, always mutating visual image, not logic
or rhetoric or even artful, subtle conversation. The dominant effect of this medium
of cascading images is the evocation of immediate emotional reaction. On the
occasion of national catastrophes, such as the September 11 th massacre, we tum to
the professional mediators, the talking, electronic heads, who inform us, interpret
the complexities of the events, and reassure us.
Television has become an important communication vehicle for
addressing issues of social policy and ethics. But it always tends to move away
from an appeal to established principle and constancy of purpose and toward the
measurement of immedi ately prevailing sentiments or current opinion: " who cares
more" as a maxim for decision-making will push out ''what is best." 14
A televised presentation of an event requires brevity most of all. Boredom
and frustration always threaten the viewer. Commercials compress further the
content of the programs. Conversely, a short, seconds-long video clip shown on
the news (such as the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles policemen) is
highly emotive and has the capacity to ignite massive riots that ravage
communities of tens of thousands of people. Telegenic and strong empathetic
qualities are those most likely to garner attention and ensure political success, and
the ability to project or manufacture certain kinds of pleasing or reassuring
appearances before a camera is the highest "art" in politics. Lyndon Johnson was

a far more adroit, experienced, and skilled politician than John Kennedy, but the
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television cameras captured his big ears, and his coarse, com pone manner which
compared invidiously with the tanned, urbane, and telegenic JFK.
Government officials, religious figures and leaders from almost all other
areas of our culture have over the last forty years been co-opted by the captains of
the amusement, television-modeled industry. That is, they must function by the
ethos of television and employ its methods of presentation or perish. They must,
in effect, submit to its cultural domination: there are few areas of social life that
have not been changed by it, and many of our institutions have accommodated
themselves to it in significant ways. Schools, as noted above, must compete with
television since the young spend so much time watching it and are so thoroughly
conditioned by its programming and its mentality. Schools have taken to
emulating it and have developed a television-style education quite suitable for
those who spend hours per day in front of it. Schools of professional education at
our universities have been most obliging in producing theories of "learning
styles" including the most important of them, the "visual learner." A visual
learning style would indeed seem to be appropriate for today's students who
spend far more hours before the television and movie screen than in study or in
classrooms.
Universities must pay homage to television. Large segments of the
curricula of many universities today are rapidly changing, smorgasbord, faddriven conglomerations of unconnected courses of passing interest, analogs to the
copious program offerings of cable television. Since young people are immersed
in television staples like situation comedies, police dramas and talk shows, the
trend for developing college courses that accord these shows the same intellectual
or aesthetic status as classic drama or literature is hardly a surprising
phenomenon.
The late-twentieth century witnessed the culmination of electronic
amusement as the dominant cultural preoccupation. The pervasiveness of
television in our lives is undeniable. Its enormous influence on our perceptions of
reality and its conditioning of our values- along with a steadily expanding
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subjectivity of values- has made amusement an alluring, irresistible force, since
it promises so many different ways to stimulate and enhance the self.

The twenty-first century has begun to unfold. We can readily contemplate the
remarkable, socially and morally transforming effects of these powerful,
intermingling forces that have come into ascendancy. Persona/ism pursues and
enlarges an unstable subjective self. Therapy seeks to nurture and speak
reassuringly to that subjective self and identifies what forces may impede its
growth, development and reconstruction. Amusement (particularly in the
electronic form) promoted by the amusement state stimulates the restless
subjective self. The temporary escape. from reality that amusement offers becomes
a permanent end in itself. The twenty-first century may become a nihilistic
journey from nowhere to nowhere.
In writing about a time like ours, with so many changes and so much
uncertainty, one discovers what seems to be a persistent, devilish play of the
ironic in human events. History is a perverse affair. It is also often cruelly ironic,
as Edward Gibbon, writing of the decadence of an earlier great civilization, the
Roman empire, brilliantly demonstrated over two hundred years ago. Human
beings, when they come to be measured against the goodness and greatness of
their Gods, can only be regarded as feeble, deluded creatures. Says Gibbon in one
of his bitterest, ironic musings:
The theologian may indulge the pleasing task of describing
religion as she descended from Heaven arrayed in her native
purity. A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian. He
must discover the inevitable mixture of error and corruption, which
she contracted in a long residence upon earth among a weak and
degenerate race ofbeings.15
Gibbon pits the theologian against the historian. These two classes of theorists
seemed to represent for Gibbon two perennial philosophical archetypes for
interpreting or understanding the deep complexities of the human condition.
Theology, understood in this context, is a theoretical dreaming, the corruption of
the Christian

faith

by metaphysics and superstition.

The "theologian"
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comprehends (or invents) and dwells upon the possibilities of perfection- hence
perhaps the delusion-based pleasure of believing that man can achieve something
approximating divinity and escape his limitations. Gibbon's dreamer theologian in
the twentieth century found himself secularized, transmogrified into the most
grotesque and dangerous of all creatures, the ideologue. The ideologue, through
total revolution, sought to recreate society and make man perfect.
The historian by contrast is a moral pathologist, a moral philosopher,
actually, grounded in the knowledge of the constraining realities of human nature.
He probes reluctantly, with a "melancholy duty," into the many human aspirations
that seem to descend into mischief and folly. He measures the expressed
aspirations against the actual accomplishments. In these investigations, he often
discovers the processes of degradation. The historian in a way has the worst of it
since what he must return to, again and again, is the stark, unavoidable reality of
hwnan arrogance, folly, and corruption.
History, therefore, must often become a mocking and deeply melancholy
scene. The irony of history thus is all too often cruel and wildly perverse. ln the
narratives of success and fa ilure, history captures painfully the disparity between
the reaches of human aspirations and the reality of their achievement, grotesque
applications of the law of unintended consequence--efficiency experts who
produce less work, social reformers who make people's lives even more miserable
than imagined, spiritual leaders who degrade their followers below the level of
beasts, utopias that tum into hells. History manages to highlight the dominance of
human pride and arrogance. Nowhere, I would suggest, does this observation
strike with more force and vivacity than in the contemplation of the events of the
twentieth century. Never has there been a time in which we have collectively
possessed such immense bodies of knowledge and so much material capacity to
advance it. Never before have the technologies been so powerful and so rich with
potential, and the aspirations so ambitious and full of confidence. Yet with all of
this, the ironic lesson is the danger of losing sight of our own limitations: and with
that vital loss of moral understanding we find ourselves on desolation's march.
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Chapter Two
From '50' to '00'Changes of Mind; Alterations of the Heart?
There is just something missing in everything, though you can't
put your finger on it, as if there had been a change in the blood
or in the air; a mysterious disease bas eaten away the previous
period's seeds of genius, but everything sparkles with novelty,
and finally one bas no way of knowing whether the world bas
really grown worse, or oneself merely older. At this point a new
era bas definitely begun.
Robert Musil

l am struck by the vast distance that lies between my own adult world and that of
my parents when they were young adults. The distance is more than simply the
measure of the temporal elapse of fifty years: it is a profound moral and social
distance. The lapse of those years, it often seems, is marked by a spiritual
disintegration, the effects of which are sadly apparent in an impoverishment of
human relations: higher crime rates, exploding illegitimacy, the normalization and
commercialization of vices such as gambling and soft-core pornography, the
appalling vulgarity and coarseness of popular culture, the destabilization and
disintegration of the family, and the destruction of manners and civility.
My own children are coming of age in a much different place than I did,
where the most distinctive sorts of changes and transformations have occurred
and are still happening. Roles are reversed and re-reversed. Judgments are
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overturned. Norms are dissolved. Institutions have been plunged into flux and are
on the defensive. Such a frenzied pace of change is a recent phenomenon-and
for that reason daunting and melancholy. For vast periods of history, life unfolded
generation after generation much as it always had. Customs, traditions and beliefs
were passed along with little reflection and largely intact. Sons and daughters
became what their fathers and mothers had been. They undertook the same tasks
and assumed the obligations that had bound their parents. They believed what
their parents had believed about themselves and the world. Of a much earlier
people, the Romans of the ancient Republic, historian Christian Meier, tells us:
[Their] guiding principles were always the same. No one was
relativized in temporal terms: the old could not be regarded as
superannuated, nor the young as modem. The young were at most
frivolous, the old at least authoritative and powerful. There was no
question of moving from a past that had been different into a future
that would be different again.1
Two thousand years later, we could not be more different from these ancient,
tradition-bound

Republicans.

Almost

everything

and

everyone

ts

now

"relativized" in temporal, as well as many other regards. For our young, we could
onl y wish that frivolity was the worst that we could say of them; and of our
elderly- what "authority" do they possess?
We are immersed in rapid change, social discontinui ty and dislocation. We
can expect even more of this in thi s new millennium. It will be our legacy. The
forces of momentous change swirl about us. Futurology and science fiction seem
hardly distinguishable. Customs, traditions and beliefs, insofar as they become
established at all, are now quickly discarded-iJften casually, reflexively, with
little understanding of what is being lost, what that loss means to us, and what the
promises of the new ways really mean. Each emerging generation, in what seems
to be a growing, collective narcissism, attempts to invent a new ethos and endows
itself with a unique identity (the "me generation", "generation X'') replete with a
unique form of angst to indulge and a compelling set of grievances to nurture and
refine.
It is difficult to imagine with anything but the most vague notions and
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uneasy feelings what the future holds for my young daughters as they make their
way and live out their lives in the third miJlennium A.D. What will they believe
about life's mysteries? Will there be any left to ponder? In what kind of work will
they engage? Wil1 they marry? Wi ll they stay married? What will their political
and social institutions be like? What will they expect from them and what will the
institutions demand from them?
The grandparents and parents of those in my own generation, despite the
cataclysms of a world-wide depression and two devastating global wars did not, I
believe, suffer this kind of uncertainty. Traditional marriage and families, jobs
and professions, and the traditional religious faiths were seemingly solid fixtures
of a social and moral landscape that provided a somewhat stable foundation for
hopes and expectations. But now for us, the graying baby-boomers, the very act of
directing our electronically over-stimulated imaginations toward the future and
envisioning a world of near complete uncertainty for our children in almost every
avenue of social and personal life makes us realize how profound and irrevocable
the changes in the last fifty years have been and how deeply in flux our society is
and will likely continue to be.
What a challenge it is to capture and describe the enormous dimension of
those changes I have witnessed even in my relatively short life time, particularly
as I recall my conversations from years ago with my father and grandfather about
the experience of their early years and their reflections on how different life was
in the America they experienced as young men. Many aspects of our Western
culture have been altered- some beyond recognition over just the last century. In
part, these changes come from the tremendous advances in technology as well as
from the transformations in our social and legal institutions: our families, schools,
universities and churches are profoundly different than they were fifty years ago.
Agriculture, medicine, education, and law have been drastically altered. The kinds
of work we do, the ways in which and the extent to which we entertain ourselves
have changed remarkably. Our institutions themselves have, even recently, been
reconfigured. Our social etiquette and our manners and even our religious
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practices have taken fom1s that seem to have little resemblance to those to which
our grandparents were deeply attached. In just fifty years we have witnessed the
most profound transformation in our social containment of sexuality- from an
implicit, inhibited activity focusing on procreation to an explicit engagement in
recreation.
The discovery of atomic energy and its app lication to the weapons of war
in conjunction with the development of computer technology in the middle and
late twentieth century also have helped to transform the nature of one of
mankind's oldest and most serious enterprises, armed conflict. But perhaps more
important is the impact of the recently advanced technology for the graphical
presentation of it, that is, the televising of it. By making the violent, gory realities
of war directly and immediately observable in the homes of the mothers, fathers,
and grandparents whose chi ldren and grandchildren may become its casualties,
the moral burden of justifying and waging it has become a much more formidable
political challenge than ever before. For modem states, the successful waging of
war now includes the daunting task of managing its visual and visceral impact
captured by television . Public relations failures in this arena may be more decisive
than military victories. The Tel Offensive in Vietnam, militarily a failure for the
North Vietnamese but politically a success, and Lyndon Johnson's abandonment
of the Presidency over thirty years ago made this quite clear.
We carry on our busy lives with a casual disposition toward change and
innovation that now makes incessant movement seem natural and compelling.
Movement and restlessness characterize much of our social existence. The quest
for self-transformation infuses almost all aspects of our social existence: the quest
is stimulated in large part by a mass-cultural immersion in a world of limitless
opportunities for consumption, many of them opportunities for amusement. The
diet and exercise industries, very young but now huge and enormously profitable,
thrive through the appeal to Americans to change themselves physically, changes
that are also often accompanied by adjustments in attitude, outlook, employment,
and personal life style. We are constantly encouraged to embark on the
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transformation of our lives. We re-engineer, retool, reorganize, and retrain.
This impulse for movement is evident in the accelerated career tracks that
take us all over the country, the long distances over which many people commute
to their jobs, and the rapidly shifting preoccupations of popular culture with its
endless, dizzying succession of celebrities, most of whom exist for us only briefly
as professionally marketed electronic images. Experts, who spare no efforts in
their attempts to anticipate what will please and stimulate us, mediate and purvey
the wares of popular culture.
Words that help convey sharp impressions of dramatic, spectacular change
like "revolutionary," "groundbreaking," "innovative," "unprecedented" and
"unparalleled" have become labels of high praise and affirmation in a society
where the ability to overturn a quickly stale status quo, to offer something new
and different, are the highest marks of achievement. Computing technology drives
much of our work and leisure and changes at a pace that constantly puts us up
against the barriers of obsolescence in our work.
"There are no revolutions," the astute French observer of American
society, Alexis de Tocqueville, had written over one hundred and sixty years ago,
"that do not shake existing belief, enervate authority, and throw doubts over
commonly received ideas." 2 Our time would perplex and perhaps alarm a man
even as thoughtful and perceptive as Tocqueville. The twentieth century has been,
above all, a century of revolution , and in the final years of our second millennium
we have witnessed a myriad of revolutions- political, social, technological,
educational, sexual, and artistic. These revolutions ushered li fe-altering change
into the daily arenas of our social existence. "Existing belief' is shaken to the core
by these revolutions, if, indeed, any recognizable, solid, unchangeable core can
actually be found anymore. As noted above, to be "revolutionary", to bring about
dramatic, observable changes in some institution or conventional practice, is the
path to acclamation and success. Revolution is what we now deliberately seek to
be a part of, to initiate, and what we praise: but with it, doubt invades and
authority does indeed crumble. "Commonly received ideas" become more

32

Desolation's March

illusive, more difficult to find and grasp hold of, and even harder to sustain. The
enervation of authority of all kinds- parental, political, religious, moral- and the
ubiquity of gnawing doubt are two of the destabilizing effects of revolution on
society. Modem life has, unquestionably, been pervaded by them. Late twentieth
century America, as a theater for revolution finds itself pervaded by the dismaI
dyad of effects that Tocqueville observed follow in the wake of revolutionenervated authority, and belief destabilized by self-doubt, anarchy wed to
skepticism.
A compulsive mobility has deeply imprinted itself on our persona.I and
professional lives. The ease and facility with which we detach ourselves from
friends, spouses, family members and communities is remarkable, and a.II of our
affective associations are weaker and thinner than they were even fifty years ago.
Social atomism grows. The state of human disconnectedness becomes normal.
We used to develop and sustain our personal and intimate connections in
concrete, enduring associations- friends, husbands and wives. These associations
had recognizable con.figurations. They carried readily accepted obligations and
were underwritten with the norms of constancy and fidelity . They now deteriorate
and give way to the pervasive and eu phemistic "relationship," a deliberately
vague and abstract, nearly meaningless term that refers to human attachments
with shifting expectations, impermanence and undefined or non-existent
commitment. Being " in a relationship," as it is commonly characterized now, as
opposed to being someone's friend or lover or husband or wife, captures aptly the
passive, amorphous, and ephemeral character of nearly everything it has come to
represent.
The traditional associations are more unstable and vulnerable than they
used to be. They are immersed in flux because the thought and value structures
underneath them have become like blowing, shifting sand, changing constantly
and carelessly with an impersonal, unpredictable force. Those "fixtures" of
belief--0ur articles of faith, attachment to moral principles, confidence in
ideals- have given way to a serial immersion in philosophies, religions,
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ideologies, or the zealous pursuit of stimulation in the form of private diversion
or amusement. "We are left, as the German social theorist Arnold Gehlen
observed, "with a variety of practical, theoretical, moral, and existential
viewpoints which can no longer provide a basis for mutual understanding."3 As it
is with our jobs, our communities, our spouses and our friends, we exchange our
"deep" beliefs for more stimulating, exciting varieties when the current versions
grow stale or fail to amuse or deliver the advancements we expect.
As we reconfigure our traditional institutions--dismantle them rn some
cases- and, as the exploration of self becomes the dominant focus of our moral
efforts, the connections that give sustenance and meaning rupture and break away.
We find ourselves alone. Loneliness--deep, pervasive, unshakeable-quietly,
surreptitiously engulfs us as those things that we once imagined to endure
dissolve under the corrosive acid of doubt, and as more of our endeavors are
turned into the ephemera of amusement. This loneliness is one of the indelible
marks of the desolation of our time.
The incessant movement means that more of us are from no place in
particular with no special identifying feahires. The leaders of our educational
institutions today proclaim their sincere intentions to educate and socialize the
young for what must be an inevitable participation in a "global society."
Globalization, for all of its advocates' good intentions, seems to press us ever
forward toward a social homogenization which will eventually extinguish many
significant cultural differences. "There is something protective about place,"
wrote Southerner Richard Weaver, "it means isolation, privacy, and finally
identity.'..i Insofar as we are shaped by and take a unique identity from the places
and surroundings where we are born and grow up and die, we become in our
growing mobility and in our irresistible participation in the voluble mass culture,
increasingly without uniqueness, interchangeable talking heads, who think, look
and even emote the same. We have forsaken Weaver's protective, nurturing
isolation of place, devalued our precious privacy and severed the connections to
those places and things that have given us an identity. Our identity, something
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other than simply a sociologically measured aggregate of current dominant
preoccupations and impulses we absorb from the vapors of the mass amusementculture, slips away.
The explosion of litigation over the last several decades suggests that our
capacities for sorting out and coping with the difficulties, complexities and
uncertainties of almost every kind of human relationship, even the most informal
and intimate, have atrophied. Into the center of a great social void has quietly
marched a permanently occupying army of lawyers and judges. Every
conceivable grievance and cause of resentment falls under some purview of
litigation and is a potential piece of legal grist to be slowly and expensively
ground out by our legal mills. Now for the courts to thrash out within the dense
and thorny thickets of legal arcana are the vagaries of personal injury, harassment,
discrimination in an endless number of permutations, each with its own
unfathomable configuration of penalties, settlements and payoffs. Judges and
lawyers have become the ultimate arbitrators on how we are supposed to treat
each other, a fact that is evidenced by their enormous proliferation and the general
and widespread resentment and distrust of the legal profession that seem to have
expanded in proportions equivalent to its phenomenal growth.
It has been observed that for civilization to endure there must be
obedience to the unenforceable. 5 This, I believe, is true and an important fact to
contemplate. For a good society to persist and maintain itself people must be
inclined, not coerced, to do what is right and proper and decent. Decency must be
a common, unspoken part of their daily routines and characteristic of their
dispositions. We have unfortunately moved toward the full legalization of moral
conflict, the result of which is the de-moralization of our culture. As a
consequence the rush to the courts is swift and predictable. Every "should" or
"ought" must now be enforceable by some law, regulation, or judicial decree.
This signals a terrible thing, a loss of confidence in public morality, conscience
and common decency. Every moral crisis now likely will explode into a long,
rancorous and indecisive battle of litigation .
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Our limitless engagement in litigation suggests the existence of a
pervasive state of mutual alienation. The expansion of lawsuits over the last
several decades has helped to concentrate substantial quantities of power in the
most formally coercive organ of our society, the judiciary- judges make their
rulings and render their decrees. The courts enforce them. We obey. The more we
call upon the robed ministers of the State to adjudicate our differences and
enforce their judgments, the more State power grows and intrudes itself deeply
and pervasively into our private lives. That power becomes nearly irresistible and
takes on, increasingly, an aura of naturalness and inevitability. Moral dilemmas
are resolved by legal rulings and decrees. Such an expansion of indecipherable
laws, statutes, rulings and regulations- measured literally in the powzds of paper
taken to print them, produced in numbers that stagger the imagination and defy
comprehension or mastery by any single individual- inevitably leads to
disaffection, cynicism and, worst of all, a rampant corruption of political life. One
recalls Tacitus' s observation of the fading ethos of the Roman Republic,
"corruptissima re pub/ica plurimae leges" ('when the republic is at its most

corrupt the laws are most numerous'). 6 State power, unlike the power that resides
informally

in

institutions

and

groups

like

famili es, churches,

services

organizations and the like, has a cold, pernicious anonymity about it. As it grows
and settles itself insidiously into every social crevice, it helps mightily to entrench
our mutual estrangement and makes us increasingly alone. We turn unhappily into
dependent, petitioning creatures vulnerable to the caprices of faceless and
bloodless bureaucracies, driven by legalistic and social scientific formu las.
Television in the course of two or three generations has achieved the
indisputable status of being the centerpiece of our mass culture-its driving,
sustaining force. Television is an invasive, ubiquitous medium of amusement and
information that swallows up huge quantities of that most basic and precious
substance of our existence-time. From its entry into our homes in ilie 1950s in
black and white, television has relentlessly, inexorably expanded its presence
from, initially, ilie living room into ilie kitchen, ilie bedroom, the classroom, and
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into many public spaces, now, of course, in color. fa airports, train stations, supermarket checkout lanes, lobbies and waiting rooms of every kind, television
screens occupy our attention and envelope us in a docility that diverts us from the
more active, individual engagements of our minds and bodies.
The extensive television watching of American children has the
unintended effect for many of contributing to obesity early in life. The richest
country in the world probably has the fattest children.7 The ingestion of junk food
naturally complements television watching. Television in fact is a major
propaganda vehicle for the promotion of high fat, high calorie, low-nutrition food,
and the phenomenal growth in the percentages of obese American children in just
the last two decades points to television watching as a major culprit.
Television is regarded as a basic utility much like heat and electricity:
legislators speak of regulating cable television rates. Its physical expansion is also
remarkable, another piece of limitless accommodation to the relentless pressure
for its greater presence and intrusion. One can now place a 54 inch screen in one's
home, completely dominating a normal size room, making the presences on the
screen ubiquitous, a palace of electronic amusement. Those feck less, characterless characters from Love Boat, Charlie's Angels, and Gilligan's Island live, llke
some inferior gods or spirits, foreve r, and now mutate only by becoming bigger
and more intrusive than ever before. The development of high density television
w111 increase its attraction and make it an even more compelling and irresistible
medium. The hours spent passively before the flickering, electronic tube represent
a draining away of large portions of the lives of millions of people, hours that we
once devoted to other interests and pursuits and to each other.
From television, a medium utterly devoid of subtlety and nuance, one that
thrives on immediacy, forgetfulness and discontinuity, many people gather most
or all of the "information" with which they form their opinions of and make their
judgments about the world outside their communities. What they think about
politics, science, art, international affairs, their very selves, is shaped by this
medium which operates with a complete orientation toward immediacy. Unlike
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fifty years ago when it was relatively new, television is completely intertwined in
our culture. It shapes in some way most of our vital enterprises. Our family life,
education, sports, politics, recreation, and even religion, are difficult to envision
now or to practice without the influence of, or mediation by, television.
Our work, health, education all have quite insidiously, but inevitably been
revolutionized by the computer and telecommunications technology. So powerful
are computers in their capacities to store, manipulate, process and transmit
massive amounts of information that the computer itself has become the dominant
model for human thinking and intelligence, i.e., information processing. Most of
the basic economic and social facets of our lives have become dependent upon
computers, another increased dimension of change added to our existence because
the changes in computer technology are so rapid and relentless. We plan and
organize our work around them . They are the major instruments of education,
medicine and of amusement. The sheer technical intelligence and knowledge that
supports the rapidly developing infrastructure of computing technology is far
beyond the capacity of any single individual, no matter how brilliant. The extent
to which the economic and soci al infrastructure of our society is organized around
computing and digital technology means that we are all as individuals more
ignorant and helpless in the presence of technology than we have been at any time
in history. Our individual capacities to maintain and repair for ourselves those
things upon which we depend, the machines which carry us along in our modem
existence, are diminished, leaving us more dependent upon experts and
technicians.
The

Internet

establishes

a

worldwide

communication

capacity

inconceivable only a few years ago, linking individuals, even continents apart, in
an instantaneous electronic connection. It provides an extraordinary capacity to
gain access to once remote locations of knowledge and information and to move
about massive and complex intellectual documents, as well as other digitized
material, and change and interchange them as never before. This capacity to gain
access,

manipulate

and

disseminate

information

and

knowledge

has
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revolutionized the relationship of individuals to institutions. Much of the success
that the mid-twentieth-century totalitarian regimes had in manipulating mass
opinion and controlling thought was due to their capacities to monopolize the
processes of disseminating information. "As in Lenin's Russia, the Fascist and
Nazi parties imposed governmental monopolies on information," writes historian
Richard Pipes. 8 Today's computing and telecommunications technology makes
such a direct monopoly and control, by governments intent on enforcing
ideological conformity, impossible. Information, particularly in its electronic
form, is diffuse and difficult to manage. This has enormous implications for
government, education, commerce, science and research that are just beginning to
unfold.
It is worth remarking that as we approached the end of the millennium a
preoccupation that generated considerable angst was with the "Y2K" problem in
computing. The billions of lines of computer code that were reviewed and revised
to accommodate the two digit values which represented the tum of the millennium
presented an overwhelming challenge, and the most catastrophic events were
predicted . The global interconnection of computing systems and its infrastructure
character means that the glitch threatened disruptions of world financial markets,
the delivery of basic services by governments and private enterprises and the
administration of basic human necessities- the failure of technology would spell
economic, social, legal collapse. The Y2K problem was the perfect combination
of technology and apocalyptic religion with considerably apparent irony. Our own
massive technology had become a powerful, global god that had seemed to sbp
out of our control.
II

The changes in early twenty-first-century America, however, that impress me the
most are the changes in our values, or if I may state it with hesitation in a
somewhat old fashioned way, the changes in our hearts. What is fundamental,
revealing, and I bebeve most interesting about people is what they value, that is,
what they appear to live for and what more importantly, if anything, they are
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willing to die for. One of the more remarkable and interesting facts of human
history- brilliantly observed and described by the eighteenth-century historian
Edward Gibbon is the extent to which believers have died for their religious ideas,
proof of a curious sort that human beings are not purely material beings. A person
who will die, who will sacrifice everything for an ideal or an aspiration must be a
strange contradiction for a materialist. The attack on America of September 11 'h
all of a sudden brought the American people and their shopping mall, designer
clothes, amusement-centered culture, into an encounter with fanatics who eagerly
embraced death in order to act out an implacable hatred inspired by afterlife ideas
of an ancient religion.
What ideas, religious or otherwise, are we willing to die for? For what
ideal mi ght we even temporarily interrupt the serious pursuit of the good times?
What aspiration would divert us off of the happy track of our careers? Would we
commit ourselves or our young people to any kind of sacrifice? Would we today
be willing to prosecute a war that would claim the lives of 600,000 of our men
and inflict unspeakable devastation, as did our own civil war fought to end slavery
one hundred and forty years ago? It is hard to imagine any cause sufficiently
compelling so as to make us risk shedding the blood of our youth.
The changes over the last fifty years in the justification for the conduct of
war have been enormous. Wars, to put it crudely, need to be sold: they demand
convincing rationales. In our doubt-ridden, authority-resenting society such
rationales are even more difficult to discover or invent. Moreover, in a society
where therapeutically assisted self-exploration and self-expansion are regul ar
pastimes and where passive amusement is ascendant, any course of action which
promises sacrifice and asks for selfless dedication is more difficult to envision,
much less pursue.
In the experience of World War II for Americans, despite the enormous

sacrifice of so many men, there was a consensus of deep, solid support, a belief in
the cause. When it was over there was a sense that we had done the right thing.
Decency had prevailed: we revered our war dead as brave and honorable. The
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sacrifice, we believed, was not in vain. The wars we have prosecuted since World
War Il have become in their rationales murkier and more confusing. They have
been, with good reason, harder to sell. The rationales have been less clear and
compelling. The ambiguity surrounding the conduct of the "police action" in
Korea presaged the ambivalent attitudes and support for later wars. The real
ambiguity and doubt descended upon us with the feckless Vietnam War. No
consensus ever materialized, no overriding sense of purpose was ever operative.
Those at the top who committed us to it were, we now know, liars and connivers.
The lies regularly dispensed by government officials and the violent dissent which
came from many of our most prestigious institutions helped make this tragic
conflict, with 58,000 of our soldiers who perished far from home on Asian soil,
one of the bitterest of American experiences. The politicians invoked the ideals of
fighting for freedom and self-determination, and fighting against tyranny, but
many saw the effort as nothing but arrogance, cynical manipulation and empty
words. Public support collapsed. We watched the evacuation of our troops on
television and let the country we had fought for over a decade to save disintegrate.
President Nixon had earlier invoked the final and most cynical of the official
Vietnam era euphemisms- " Peace with honor."
The military engagements of the nineties, however, were the culmination
of wars for which no convincing or believable rationale could be found . Neither
the President nor Congress gave a clear or consistent rationale for the Gulf War
even though it had the potential for escalation into a major conflagration. The war
was, all at the same time, the exercise of American self-interest, an act of
liberation (for Kuwait, that is), a protective action to guard the world's oil supply,
and a just confrontation with a brutal dictator, even though we co-existed, even
consorted with many other tyrants around the globe. None of the rationales that
were invented by the public relations experts and promulgated by the inarticulate
President Bush were particularly convincing, but it did not matter. The war was
easily won, and it turned out to be a grand opportunity to showcase our
sophisticated computerized weaponry on television. With the "smart bomb" we
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were able to destroy almost everything in lraq except the homicidal goon who ran
the place. The Gulf War was the first completely televised war, the first
"amusement war'': it was far away, few of "our guys" got killed, and the twentyfour hour CNN television coverage featured impressive American hi-tech
weaponry in action. In retrospect, it is difficult, in stark contrast with World War
11, though, to recall what it accomplished, what American principles or ideals it
upheld, or even what policy it advanced. But since this war was short,
technologically impressive, and fatal for few Americans, the President who
presided over it was wildly popular (a popularity in kind and duration analogous
to that of some hot teen rock star) for about six months until the economy
slumped.
As a result of the September 11th attack, we are now prosecuting a "war
against terrorism," a perfect post modem war to open the 21 st century. Unlike our
wars against Germany, Japan, and all of the others, this is a war against an
abstraction, an "ism." The "ism" is not confined to any particular place or group
of people. There is no country whose defeat promises an end to the fi ghting, no
tyrant whose demise will terminate the conflict. There are neither armies to
vanquish nor generals of enemy forces who will sign documents of surrender and
agree to terms of peace. It is a war than can never be concluded because we will
never know if we have won or lost: abstractions don' t surrender, sue for peace, or
give up and go home. The major sacrifices we will be called on to make to fight
this new kind of war will be the sacrifice of our liberty to our own State in
exchange for the increased security promised against a completely anonymous
enemy who may strike with ferocity anywhere.
We live in a society heavily dominated and interpreted by the medium of
television, one that now takes nothing but amusement seriously- witness the
enormous amount of attention devoted to, and the adulation heaped upon, athletes,
popular musicians and movie stars, not to mention the staggering sums of money
now commanded by rock singers and television actors. Even the late-night
television talk show host, whose singular contribution to air-way amusement is to
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preside over chatter- and gossip-sessions with current celebrities, makes huge
amounts of money. Indeed, the utter seriousness of the pursuit and practice of
amusement is one of the many ironies produced by the current hordes of earlytwenty-first-century antinomians, some of whom descended from Puritans.
Here is a question: are the fundamental values and aspirations of
Americans so much different now than they were even fifty years ago? And if so,
how? Edward Gibbon made the observation that:
There exists in human nature a strong propensity to depreciate the
advantages, and to magnify the evils, of the present times. 9
However, one way to grasp the profundity of these late-twentieth-century
transformations of the human heart is to draw some comparisons- to attempt to
recreate those attitudes, feelings, beliefs and dispositions of a mere half century or
so ago and hold them up against today' s spectrum of practices and ideals,
recognizing of course that our backward glances are distorted by our present
concerns. Such a comparison, though, might profitably unfold by reflecting upon,
then and now, the objects of approval and disapproval and the boundaries of our
toleration. What we approve and disapprove of is the real measure and reflection
of what we value. What we tolerate provides an indication of the boundaries and
limits of our values. By making that difficult comparison of approval and
toleration- merely fifty years apart- we begin to experience an uneasy,
unsettling sense of how much we have changed, how different our world is.
The end of the first half of the twentieth century coincided roughly with
the completion of a colossal military achievement- the defeat of Nazi Germany,
Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan. The Western democracies were victorious over
the forces of totalitarianism. This was the most massive, destructive and
mechanized war of all times, a war waged upon civilians as well as soldiers. It
was also an ideological war. The issues were, from the American perspective,
relatively speaking, clear cut, completely unlike the way it would be with
Vietnam a generation later. Fascism and Nazism were voracious, loaths.ome, and,
by open and boastful self-proclamation, hateful and menacing social philosophies.
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To conjure up the will and fortitude to resist the likes of Hitler, Mussolini and
Tojo was relatively easy to do. What we were fighting for, or at least believed that
we were fighting for, were basic, universal values. Germany and Italy were
atavistic, historical aberrations, large and grotesque in their manifestations, but
aberrations nonetheless. The mere existence of Hitler and his Nazi cohorts made

our notions of right and wrong, good and evil, clear and obvious and made it
easier to prosecute a long, massive and murderous war.
Well, almost. There was a dark underside to this. We had allied ourselves
with Stalin, who, we realize now with the benefit of historical hindsight, was a
most sinister creature with political and moral instincts equal to those of the Third
Reich' s chief Nazi . Stalin and Hitler had made their 1939 tyrants' pact that set the
final stage for the beginning of the conflagration. Secretly they negotiated their
deal so that between themselves they could ravage and devour, unmolested,
Poland and the Baltic states. In 1945, while Americans were contemplating the
smoking ruins of the Third Reich and just beginning to grasp the horrors of
Auschwitz and Treblinka, Stalin's Red Army was making the workers' paradise
of the Soviet Union a reality in all of Eastern Europe.
The U. S. emerged victorious from World War II over forces that were at
once barbarous, but militarily and technologically powerful. The victory was due
in part to American efficiency and technology but also, and more importantly
perhaps, to a perceived moral superiority. America was the destination for
millions of people who came to escape tyranny, restricted social caste systems,
poverty and other hardships. Moreover, America offered more opportunity for
freedom and prosperity than any other place in the world. We were a people of
common decency who embraced individual freedom and a sense of fair play- the
opposite of the ideologues we had just defeated.
America had proudly come to embody a unique social morality. It was a
composite of values that emerged from both Christianity and the Enlightenmentthe dignity of the individual and personal freedom and responsibility. Our history,

our traditions, our values had been vindicated at mid-century through our fight
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against a set of powerful but fundamentally benighted foes. From this vindication
came a kind of confidence we Americans had in our institutions and a belief in the
basic, fundamental decency of our peop le and of our society. In 1950, we believed
in and practiced a civic-religion that had taken its origins from two powerful
legacies that had made their way here from Europe, Christianity and the
Enlightenment. The New England Puritans, inspired by a belief in the truth of the
Bible and an unshakable conviction of their spiritual destiny, established our
earliest permanent communities and laid the foundations for many of the social
norms that would make the country free and prosperous. As Tocqueville
observed, they came here not in quest of material advance or wealth, but primarily
for spiritual reasons. They endured the hardships of leaving their homeland,
braving an ocean, and settling a hostile wilderness in order to be able to practice
freely a religion that was the center of their lives.
The Founding Fathers were impressed by the corruptibility of power and
the fragility of institutions. They envisioned in America a set of political
institutions that would somehow contain or offset that corruptibility. They wanted
America to be different and better than Europ

to be freer and less corrupt.

Those political institutions and the religious ideals of the people who came here
made this country a very different kind of place than anywhere else. The remnants
of that civic-religion that we seemed to practice until four or five decades ago
embraced the following ideas: the human individual is the ultimate locus of moral
worth. From the traditionally religious perspective like that of the New England
Puritans, it is the human soul, with a unique value endowed by the creator. In the
more secular vision of our own Enlightenment philosophes like Jefferson and
Madison, it is a free individual who makes moral choices and is accountable for
them, and functions within a social, political community. This freedom, however,
was primarily a negative one, a freedom from coercion, a prescription against
external, arbitrary constraint, neither a promise of personal fulfillment nor a
license for self-indulgence. Both the Christians and the American philosophers of
the eighteenth century saw human beings as perennially flawed, with inherent
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weaknesses and propensities for corruption and in need of the care ·and guidance
of social institutions to keep them from self-destruction. In Christianity this
flawed view of human nature came from the Fall; Madison's famous Federalist
Paper number I 0 was a written with this assumption.
Underlying freedom as a moral and political ideal was the notion that
individuals were capable of finding and understanding the moral truth that was
essential for guiding and disciplining one's life. This was reflected in the Biblical
prescription: "you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free."
Three values made up the core of our spiritual and moral world: truth,
liberty, and individual responsibility. These were the defining features of the
American eighteenth-century amalgam of Christianity and the Enlightenment.
They persisted into the twentieth century. They were central beliefs independent
of what any particular versions were of the religions we practiced: their
assimilating power was enormous. Indeed, these values- the legacy of the
previous three centuries-were those around which our social and political
institutions had been built. They came heavily into play in the debate over slavery
and the ensuing civil war. The moral revulsion with slavery in this country was
aroused by Christian impulses and moral ideals, particularly belief in the value of
all individuals before God. Our religious traditions stressed the moral primacy of

personal responsibility- accountability to each other and to God. Our political
institutions embraced the rule of law- the law was no respecter of persons or
classes. Our colleges and universities were attached to veritas, the notion of
objective truth.
The hold of these three values on our lives has diminished remarkably
over the last fifty years. Confidence in knowing and applying moral truth or
wisdom has given way to an intense subjectivism and moral relativity, a fact
reflected by and expressed in the vocabulary and the locutions we find in common
use whenever people talk now about moral and ethical issues. Our moral
vocabulary has undergone a remarkable and rapid metamorphosis-from a
preference for words that make reference to an external, even transcendental
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location of norms, to a lexicon of self-reference, an expansive psychologicallyoriented language of feeling, awareness and emotion, an idiom of the interior self
that well accommodates the corresponding growth of subjectivity. Basic, simple,
and direct moral words employed in the past like "right" and "wrong," "good"
and "bad," "guilt" and "punishment," have given way to softer, personally
reflective,

and

more complex

interpretive labels and expressions

like

"appropriate," "comfortable" and the reflexive and subjective, "feeling good
about yourself." Feeling good about ourselves is at the same time both a goal for
which we mightily strive and the final measure of our success in achieving it. We
likewise routinely hear expressions that emphasize the tenuousness and relativity
of opinion- "that is just your opinion of what is right or good; mine is different."
The emphasis is not on the substance of the opinion, but on the self, the subject,
who holds the opinion; the act of self-affirmation is supposed to be sufficient to
end discussion. An "opinion," it would seem, can and should carry no normative
weight: it has no real authority. And since morality resides entirely within the
subjective self, there can be no objective moral authority since such an authority
must transcend the self and appeal to some objective standard everyone, or most
everyone, upholds or acknowledges.
Even the forms of moral or prudential admonishment individuals may
offer each other today, whether to do or not do some particular thing, are likely to
be expressed in a highly subjective, personalized language-"You• shouldn't do
that because it makes others f eel uncomfortable." Note that the admonition does
not invoke a standard or appeal to a principle or a norm, but rather points to a
feeling, a personal and often shifting emotion. This steady envelopment of our
moral conversations by sheer emotion and subjectivity strongly suggests a loss of
confidence in any objective standard of morals and thus a growing need to
reformulate our discussions of moral and ethical conflict or disagreement in an
ambiguous, tentative and subjective way that evades any firm, assured judgment.
It also points to a major phenomenon in ascension in late twentieth- and early

twenty-first-century American

life-the therapeutic ethos

in which

the
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achievement of certain subjective states of mental comfort and satisfaction is the
chief standard of self-assessment.
Our attachment to political freedom is more tenuous than it used to be.
Since World War II, and especially since the late 1960s, America has come to
resemble the welfare states of Western and Central Europe. Comfort and security
play a much larger importance for us, as is evidenced in our willingness to trade
away more of our freedoms for them. The more we rely on others to do things for
us the more of our own power and control we must relinquish. Our institutions,
such as the family, have weakened and our connections to others and our
associations have thinned. We are thus left increasingly vulnerable and needy,
requiring the protection, guidance and, very importantly, the stimulation bestowed
by functionaries who operate the ever-expanding machinery of our amusement
state. Indeed, as our vocabularies insidiously take on the metaphors of medicine
(politicians promise "healing" and earnestly affirm their capacities to "feel the
pain" of others) and therapy (criminals are now "sentenced" to counseling and
therapeutic programs), moral and religious words like freedom, obligation, and
responsibility take on an archaic ring.
Individual responsibility has been the casualty of a moral subjectivity that
in the last fifty years has come to dominate our thinking and deeply affect our
moral practice. To hold ourselves morally accountable and to adhere to
interpersonal, commonly accepted standards of conduct becomes difficult, if not
impossible, when we don't believe in the objectivity of our standards. "Can
unbelieving men," asked Philip Rieff, "be civilized?" 10
Behavior and its consequences for the individual are presented less as the
result of moral character and the outcome of conscious choice than as the effect of
external psycho- and socio-pathological causes such as child abuse, patriarchy,
economic disadvantage, poor self-concept, and other disabling causes. People,
with copious encouragement from our intellectual elites ("the anointed," as
Thomas Sowell calls them 11 ) increasingly view themselves as victims of social
injustice. Solidly established, officially sanctioned victim-hood has become the
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key for unlocking and throwing open the doors lo the ultimate moral and social
entitlement- unqualified, non-judgmental sympathy, support, understanding and
care.
In 1950 we operated to some extent in our moral judgments about the

world around us with the notion of evil. That is lo say, evil was then a basic
element of our moral vocabulary and we were willing lo render confident
judgments about certain kinds of conduct and certain kinds of people as being
evi l. Hitler and his collaborators were generally regarded as thoroughly evil
creatures whose memories were painfully and rightfully the object of execration
and detestation. lmmediately concluding the war the contemplation of the horrors
wrought by the architects of the Third Reich and the "final solution" seemed to
make evil the most fitting category, indeed the only category, that could possibly
be employed to describe the National Socialists, their ideology, and the effects of
their programs.
Also, as we contemplated the rebuilding and reconstruction of war-tom
Europe, it became obvious that the people in those countries under the political
and military domination of the Soviet Union were subject to the same kinds of
violence and degradation

oncentralion camps, one party rule, lack of basic

freedoms, ethnic and religious persecution- that the National Socialists had
practiced with such systematic thoroughness and enthusiasm on any unfortunates
who became subjects of their reign. Winston Churchill in a small town in central
Missouri bequeathed the compelling and enduring metaphor of the "Iron Curtain"
that vividly symbolized the moral and political chasm that separated the
communist world from ours.
The policies taken up by the U.S. with the dawning of the Cold War were
based on a growing recognition that, despite the ceaseless rhetoric of liberation
for the toiling masses emitted from its leaders, the Soviet Union was another
totalitarian colossus .run by a clique of cynical, power-worshiping cretins whose
morals, mentalities and methods were indistinguishable from those of the
National Socialists. But there is another, perhaps, more fundamental explanation

From ' 50' to ' 00 ' Changes of Mind; Alterations of the Heart?

49

as to why evil was a part of our moral vocabulary at that time. Evil remains,
essentially, a religious concept. To say that evil exists in any tangible
manifestation suggests that there is some structure of reality in which evil resides
and out of which it resonates. Evil manifests itself in forces and agencies that
extend beyond those employed by human beings. Moreover, evil, in its
fundamental theological or religious form , forever remains an inscrutable given :
to explain it or interpret it in a form other than itself is to explain it away, that is,
to convert it to something less than or other than evil. To take evil seriously
requires of us a spiritual outlook or disposition. This disposition we have largely
abandoned. James Agee, writing in the Partisan Review in 1950, said that:
The modem mind denies its [evil 's) existence .... Many nonreligious people are convinced of the existence of evil as
something quite distinct from mere error, stupidity, unenlightened
self-interest, neurosis or environmental causality, and such people
cannot subscribe to the still popular assumption that all the wrong
in this world is only a little worse than a bad cold; but it appears
that only the religious are equipped to take the existence of evil
very seriously, or to act in relation to it very intelligently. 12
The managers and enthusiasts of the amusement state persistently
encourage us to relinquish the category of active, personal evil and to think of
human wrong doing as the result of impersonal causal forces, out of our
individual personal control, manageable or extinguishable by sufficiently
empowered experts and technicians.
Our moral vocabulary of a mere fifty years ago reflected, at least in a

remnant form, a religious, and specifically a Judeo-Christian view of the world.
Excluding a number of our intelligentsia, we viewed communism and Christianity
as antithetical moral realms, representing a basic conflict of moral forces in the
universe. In 1951, ex-communist-turned-Christian, Whittaker Chambers in his
book Witness, interpreted the time as a "turning point in history." We, as the
victors over fascism, as leaders of the free west were to determine,
whether all mankind is to become communist, whether the whole
world is to become free, or whether, in the struggle, civi lization, as
we know it, is to be completely destroyed or completely changed. 13

50

Desolation's March

Chambers presented his readers with a picture of a world with the starkest
of moral and spiritual contrasts, a picture that now must seem strange to us.
Witness was an extremely compelling, widely read, and highly controversial piece

upon its arrival in the early 1950s. Prominent American intellectuals such as John
Dos Passos, Hannah Arendt and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote reviews.14 Fifty
years after its publication the book has sunk sadly into oblivion, "a buried
classic," as Hilton Kramer has called it, 15 its compelling indictment of
communism having faded into a quaint, incomprehensible relic of American Cold
War ideology.
Both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon embedded Chambers' morally
antinomous view in their own political rhetoric a decade later in the 1960
Presidential campaign. In one of the Nixon-Kennedy debates Senator Kennedy
struck a stark moral contrast between " us and them."
We set a very high standard for ourselves. The communists do not.
They set a low standard of materialism. We preach in the
Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution, in the
statements of our greatest leaders, we preach very high standards;
and if we' re not going to be charged before the world with
hypocrisy we have to meet those standards. 16
Vice-President Nixon was even more emphatic and antithetical.
Also as far as religion is concerned, I have seen Communism
abroad. I see what it does. Communism is the enemy of all
religions; and we who do believe in God must join together. 17

These words near the end of 1960 must have sti ll resonated strongly with the
American people, even though the sincerity and integrity of the men who uttered
them is questionable. No main stream politician after 1970, with the exception of
Ronald Reagan on a few occasions, would or could talk like this. To those who
embrace the secular and relativist-conditioned perspectives that have been spun
out of the turbulent 1960s, such rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s would sound
parochial and completely unenlightened. Public figures have ceased to moralize in
such strong

~aditionally

religious terms because the ideas underneath the
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language are no longer meaningful to the public and thus make no moral
connection with the American people. Rightly or wrongly, our affirmation of the
values of individual freedom, personal autonomy, and responsibility had vital
linkages with our religion and the ideals of our Founding Fathe,rs-"the ashes of
[our] fathers, and the temples of [our] gods," to paraphrase Macaulay. We called
the Soviet leaders "godless communists," an epithet that by the 1970s would
become a piece of derision by our own anti-anti-communists who mockingly
recreated that declamation as the predictable uttering of a paranoid, nativist
bumpkin.
But the godlessness, from the perspective of those who uttered it sincerely,
was the real indictment of communism. It was the atheism and materialism of
Marxism-Leninism, the rejection of the transcendental and the arrogant disdain
for an objective moral order, that made it so evil, and that attested to the
benighted character of its proponents and the moral and spiritual desolation that
its enforcement and practice brought to large portions of the world. Communist
theorists since the middle of the last century bad been confidently proclaiming
socialism's inevitable triumph over a decadent capitalist order and with it the
extinction of traditional religion. Religion, Marx had announced and his progeny
still proclaim, is the opiate of the masses, a considerable irony in that Marxism, in
spite of its discredited predictive and explanatory apparatus and its grotesquely
failed practice, has long been the preferred ideological narcotic for many
twentieth-century intellectuals. Anti-communists were outside the new faith,
objects to be ridiculed and despised by the new believers. "An anti-communist is
a dog," Stalin-adulating Jean Paul Sartre proclaimed. "I don' t change my views
on this, I never will." 18
Many Americans at mid-century were keenly aware that communism
threatened us politically, militarily and ultimately physically. These threats
emerged from an ideology that was profoundly hostile to traditional religion.
When Stalin' s immediate successor and long-time understudy Nikita Khrushchev
visited the United States in 1959, he shocked and angered the American public
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with his statement that Soviet communism would "bury us," that is, the capitalist
West. He said later that he meant it only figuratively, as if that made much
difference. With considerable unintended irony Khrushchev denounced Stalin in
1956 before the twentieth Communist Party Congress for his terrible crimes
against his own people. Yet, he remained Stalin' s lieutenant and ideological heir,
and he well understood what many of our own progressively minded intellectuals
wanted to forget- that Soviet communism and the United States remained
enemies, and inevitably so. The premises upon which the moral and political
systems of both countries were based were antithetical.
The perception by Americans of communism as a fundamental evil,
however, gradually subsided for many as the Cold War ran its course. By the late
1960s anti-communism was being successfully sneered away as a politicalreligious residue of 1950s anti-Soviet paranoia and McCarthyist posturing and
bullying. Serious liberal anti-communist intellectuals like Sidney Hook and
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. dwindled down to a lonely few. The anti-communists
clerics who managed to build popular followings were bible-beating rustics like
Billy James Hargis, whose Oklahoma-based " America Crusade" played to the
yahoos out in the hinterlands, or clamorous "right-wing" radio preachers like Carl
Macintyre and Gerald L. K. Smith who excited the paranoia of the
Fundamentalists. Ronald Reagan had the bad form early in his Presidency to
castigate the Soviet Union in one of his speeches as an "evil empire," a remark
which gravely offended many of our illuminati and certified him as a hopeless unsophisticate and a panderer to the illiberal, benighted reHgious ri ght. But the
Soviet Union was an empire based on naked coercion, as the events of post-1989
have confirmed, and, if it was not an evil one (thinking of its concentration
camps, mass deportations, its systematic religious and political persecution, and
its single-party dictatorship), then evil was not to be found anywhere on this
planet. And that is the point: evil had been banished from our moral and political
vocabulary and our President was convicted by the sophisticates of slipping into
the old time religion and sounding embarrassingly like some parochial anti-
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communist poltroon from rural Indiana.
It was not because we in the West had come to see, somehow, that

communism was not really evil, although we had a highly articulate professoriate
that was largely successful in pleading the case that our fear of and antipathy for
communism was a kind of crude religiously-inspired paranoia. The prevailing
interpretation of that period is that anti-communism represented the ultimate in
irrationally-based fear, strongest in those who listed toward religious simplemindedness or reactionary authoritarianism, and that it was a perverse
overreaction to a political system that we did not understand and was just
different, and even in some ways better, than ours.
Subsequent history, however, belies the paranoid interpretation of anticommunism, particularly now that we have gained access to many of the Soviet
archives since the collapse of Lenin's seventy-year Great Experiment in 1989.
The Rosenbergs, we now know, were espionage agents for the Soviets, and the
dapper, urbane and well-connected Alger Hiss was indeed the liar and traitor that
the dumpy, corpulent and morose Whittaker Chambers accused him of being.
Alger Hiss's attorney employed a prominent psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Binger,
who personally observed Chambers during the two trials and then testified as a
defense witness in the second one. Chambers, he claimed, was a mentally
unbalanced man. (Dr. Binger on the witness stand : "I think Mr. Chambers is
suffering from a condition known as psychopathic personality, which is a disorder
of character, of which the outstanding features are behavior of what we call an
amoral or an asocial and delinquent nature." 19) Hiss embraced a strategy in his
defense early on in the Cold War that came to be frequently employed by antianti-communists to discredit anti-communism: anti-communism was unmasked
by doctors of psychiatry as a mental illness or derangement. This is a huge irony
in that the Soviet communist leaders used psychiatrists to silence dissidents.
Chambers was to be dismissed as a psychopath, a social misfit who was striking
out irrationally at a prominent figure in order to get attention and act out his antisocial impulses. Thomas Murphy, the government prosecutor, routed Dr. Binger
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under cross-examination. In the court transcripts of the testimony Binger comes
off as a fool. Murphy' s masterful cross-examination remains as a textbook
illustration for how to impeach the testimony of an "expert witness." Yet,
Singer' s clinically fabricated defamation of Chambers' character became the
post-war model for dismantling anti-communists and rendering anti-communism
pathological . It remains so. An added footnote of bitter irony: Alger Hiss's name
is attached to an endowed chair at Bard College. It is occupied by Marxist-Green
Joel Kovel.

1n 1966 another prominent psychiatrist, Dr. Jerome D . Frank, testified
before the Foreign Relations Committee of Senator J. William Fulbright. Fear of
communism and fear of the Soviets was, Dr. Frank opined, an irrational fear.
Anti-communism was a kind of collective sickness. 20 Anyone who showed
concern about the future that communists were openly planning to bring about
was obviously unbalanced and disturbed. Lyndon Johnson smeared Barry
Goldwater in the Presidential campaign of 1964 as an anti-communist extremist
yearning to plunge the world into nuclear holocaust. ("In your guts you know he ' s
nuts.") "Experts" subjected anti-communists to psychological analyses that
reduced their thinking, ideas and arguments to a mental pathology. From the
"proof' of the pathology of their personalities flowed the automatic nullification
of their ideas and arguments. The reasoning and emotion behind anti-communism
could thus be discarded as the worthless mental debris of psychologically
unbalanced cranks, delusional paranoiacs, or individuals who could never come to
terms with their fathers or mothers. The anti-communist messenger was sick:
therefore, the message was just another symptom of the psychic malady. The
content of the message could not be taken seriously. Here then was a medicalized
and devastating version of the ad hominem argument--diagnosis substituted for
argument.
The revulsion with communism, however, seems neither as irrational nor
as religiously bigoted as it was made out to be, considering the historical record of
communist atrocities. If the anti-communists were paranoid, the anti-anti-
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communists were naive. Lenin had always been open and vehement about his
detestation of religion and had made the extermination of it one of his highest
priorities immediately upon the Bolshevik seizure of power late in 1917. The
Russian Republic's Criminal Code of 1922 made the teaching of religion to
minors, whether in public or even in private schools and other establishments, a
crime which could be punished by up to a year of forced labor. 21 The exseminarian Stalin emulated his mentor and strove mightily to eradicate religion in
the Soviet Union-except for an interlude during World War II when Orthodox
Catholicism served to bolster the Russian people with greater nationalist and
patriotic energy to resist the invading German armies. Stalin's imitators in Eastern
Europe after World War II energetically followed his example, and Mao's Red
Guard mercilessly persecuted Christians and other religious groups in China.
It is an undeniable fact that everywhere in the world where communists
have come to power they have ferociously persecuted reli gious believers. Cuba,
North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia- everywhere communists have been in
charge they have sought to eradicate religion-directly and savagely, or more
indirectly and insidiously, depending upon the kinds of political and social
constraints they had to try to maneuver around. Can1bodia is perhaps the most
awful spectacle of communist hatred and persecution of religion. Of the 40,000 to
60,000 Buddhist monks in Cambodia prior to Pol Pot's ascent to power, it is
estimated that only 800 to l ,000 survived the relatively short but horrendously
murderous reign of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. The communists also
destroyed ninety-five percent of the temples in the country as well. 22 Thus, it is
quite easy to understand why religious Americans, in spite of the scoffing and
disdain of so many establishment intellectuals and sophisticates, were highly
distrustful and loathing of communism and all that it promised and represented.
The decline of belief in the reality of evil and the concomitant dissipation
of earnestness in resisting it are directly related to the vast expansion of our
practice of tolerance for many kinds of conduct heretofore proscribed. We tolerate
much more today than we did a short fifty years ago. Remember: what we tolerate
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defines the boundaries and limits of our values. The entire spectrum of personal
human expressiveness has opened up to a much greater span than ever before.
Morality has become, so to speak, more relaxed. It is now easier for the dissolute,
the betrayers and the predators to maintain or recover their positions in society
and go about their business, particularly if they enjoy some sort of celebrity
status.
One of the values we now treasure most as we open the twenty-first
century is toleration. We practice it assiduously. Toleration is an undeniably
important virtue, particularly for those in a highly mobile, heterogeneous society,
because it enables people who hold incompatible or mutually antagonistic moral
and religious values or ideals to coexist. Thus, expansive tolerance for us is now
virtually an article of faith, a given: intolerance is costly and often destructive,
and in many ways.
The elevation of toleration, however, as a primary value is necessarily
related to the decline of the notion of evil. Evil is a notion that gives rise to
conduct that is in fundamental conflict with the practice of toleration. What ideas
and

practices you believe to

be evil, you oppose categorically and

unconditionally. You do not tolerate evi l if it is within your power to resist it; not
resisting evil when you can gives you complicity in it. Proponents of liberalized
abortion laws, for example, want those who oppose them to be toleranttolerance is a fundamental element of their (those with the liberal) outlook. But
those who oppose liberalized abortion Jaws do so because, quite frankly, they
regard the practice as murder, as categorically wrong, as evil (no one in their ri ght
mind would ask anyone to tolerate murder): they cannot morally tolerate it
without changing their beliefs, without relinquishing their conviction that abort.ion
is an unmitigated evil. Toleration for them in this matter means moral abdication.
The appeal to toleration in this highly charged moral conflict has never worked,
and never will. This is why abortion is such a pivotal, volatile issue, and why it
has helped to launch what James Davison Hunter has called the "culture wars."
The culture wars are nothing less than a struggle to define and establish standards
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of public morality. These "wars" pit liberal, secular-oriented Americans against
traditionally religious ones. The two sides operate with incommensurable moral
assumptions.23
The more we regard the things and people around us as evi l, however, the
more inflexible and intolerant we must become. The logical and practical
corollary of evil is condemnation- what is judged to be evil ought to be
condemned and cannot be tolerated in any way. Toleration, however, moves
against the disposition of condemnation. Condemnation, with the ascendancy of
toleration, must give way to a softer stance of mere disapproval. Logically and
practically, we can only tolerate what we disapprove of, but toleration, if it is
sincere, commits us to the relinquishment of condemnation, to a disposition which
though disapproving of a practice, is yet willing to permit it. Toleration starts off
being very bard to do; with practice, it becomes easier. At some point toleration
transforms itself into something else. The two poles, pure intolerance and
complete toleration, are equally unacceptable. We have to be tolerant of some
things; intolerant of others.
Do we want to set ourselves on a course that will lead us to embrace
tomorrow (or someday) those beliefs and practices we can barely tolerate today?
What we tolerate, no matter how reluctantly today, our children or grandchildren
may embrace tomorrow.
Toleration, for as much as we may value and practice it, presents us with
two related problems. These problems are not obvious because of the fact that
enthusiasm for toleration has grown to a point where the word itself has become a
conversation-stopping incantation. Its mere mention bestows immediate sanctity
and virtue on the speaker.
The first problem is a practical one: how to establish the boundaries of
toleration? What, in fact, should we tolerate, and what shouldn't we? Simply put,
toleration as a prescription for the treatment of others provides no self-generating,
logically-driven formula for determining what should not be tolerated. Even the
most enthusiastic advocate of toleration does not and could not (morally and
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logically) argue fo r the toleration of everything, because that would involve the
embrace of a self-defeating paradox, namely the toleration of intolerance. A world
in which everything was tolerated would be grossly immoral.
Perhaps we should strive for a state of mutual tolerance, that is, we
tolerate everyone who tolerates us: others can do whatever they want as long as
they let us do whatever we want. This, however, does not take us far. The moralsocial world has never worked this way. As the philosopher Bernard Williams has
remarked, "We need to tolerate other people and their ways of life only in
situations that make it very difficult to do so. Toleration, as we may say, is
required only for the intolerable."24
Also, toleration remains hugely problematic with devoutly religious
people. Tolerance and deep moral and religious conviction are hard to reconcile.
This is true, and ironically so, even with the secularized religion of Marxism in
the twentieth century. The communist societies of Stalin, Mao, and Castro have
been one-party theocracies that tolerated much less religious and moral dissent
than any of their liberal western capitalist rivals.
ln our own hi ghly secularized society we strive to tolerate nearly
everything but strong, traditional religious belief- another huge irony which is
often lost because the enthusiasts of toleration fail to recognize the inherent
difficulties in finding the limits of toleration. Our secular culture rightly prides
itself on its open, accepting and inclusive character. Yet it finds itself at odds, at
war, with a large segment of its people who are believers in traditional religion,
people who take their religious beliefs seriously. These believers are, ironically,
intolerable to the tolerators, an observation which perhaps helps us to understand
where Chesterton was going with an observation on modem life that today sounds
quite shocking: "In real life, the people that are the most bigoted are the people
who have no convictions at all."25
The second problem is related to the first one and highlights the
paradoxical practical predicament of the advocate of toleration. It is a theoretical
problem, what I call the consistency-self-destruction problem. This problem is
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best illustrated by considering the formu lation of what logicians call a "selfreferential paradox," an affirmation of toleration in its most emphatic form: "I
will not tolerate intolerance," declares the advocate of toleration. The form of this
statement resembles the liar's paradox: "Everything I say," utters the liar, "is a
lie." Both statements are self-referentially paradoxical, that is, the speaker at the
same time seems to affirm and to deny what he is saying. The point of introducing
this paradox is to show that toleration is a problematic human value with practical
limits that are difficult to determine and with no easy theoretical solution. Bernard
Williams notes that, "All toleration involves difficulties, but it is the virtue that
especially threatens to involve conceptual impossibility." 26
Toleration, as noted above, has greatly expanded in just the last half
century: to be tolerant now means that one should approve of things he used to
disapprove of; toleration is approval. An intolerant person essentially has become
someone who disapproves. This expansion of meaning is reflected in a word that
has become over the last thirty or forty years, an indispensable piece of the
American vocabulary- "life-style." This well worn, much relied upon word is of
twentieth-century vintage. It was invented by Alfred Adler, the famous psychotherapist and disciple of Freud in the late 1920s to denote the basic character of an
individual as it was established in early childhood. (To Adler we are also indebted
for the greatly fertile "inferiority complex"- <mce a piece of technical,
psychoanalytic nomenclature, now a mass-culture cliche long past its technical
prime.) "Life-style," however, has become an extremely useful, malleable and
popular word. Its popularity of use began in the 1960s and has since come to
refer, as the Oxford English Dictionary states, to a "way or style of living." It cites
a 1973 usage from the London Times: ''The Council of Churches wants freedom
for students to create their own life-styles." What a superb, paradigmatic example
of usage! You had to have lived in the West in the 1960s and 1970s and
experienced the antinomian, nihilistic drive of the Cultural Revolution that
transpired to have a chance at figuring out what that insipid sounding sentence
really means and what enormous mischief it portends. The appeal to "freedom" in
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the sentence illustrates an insidious degeneration of moral language. Life-style is
a word behind which lies an inherently expansive concept, always running over
boundaries and constraints, as dimly suggested by the above example from the

OED.
Life-style is also the consummate expression of a society whose members
seek limitless toleration, toleration as approval. One' s life-style might be
appropriately characterized as the sum total of one's preference or tastes, all of
which are proper objects of easy, gentle toleration. But tastes and preferences
cover not just those things that these words used to refer to like one's affinity for
fashion in clothing, the choices in hair care or laxative products, or a favorite
baseball team or musical composer. Tastes have expanded to include almost all of
life' s decisions, including moral and ethical choices. What was once a rather large
moral domain- sexual morality, for exan1ple--has become the cheery matter of
"life-style," of taste or inclination, so to speak. So, if you live with someone " in a
gay relationship," or if you co-habit with someone you are not married to, or if
you have a traditional marriage, or if you just sleep with people you happen to
take a casual and passing fancy to and dispose of the coital residues in some
abortion mill- these are equally "valid" options, any one of which might
comprise your particular life-style. To express disapproval is to be intolerant.
The subjectivity of morality is obvious. The toleration in play is
consummate and represents a great expansion from just a few years before. What
used

to

be

regarded

as

objectively

immoral- promiscuity,

adultery,

homosexuality- are now "alternatives." Life-style also is a heavily resorted to
word in the contemporary world of advertising where refinements and innovations
in consumption are always in progress. Products and services are strenuously
pitched with great care and study to restless, fickle consumers primed with high
expectations. These products and services are presented to potential consumers as
the material reflections or expressions of their ever changing, personally unique
life-styles. All of life's choices are perhaps taking on an easier, morally neutral
character and coming to resemble a vast array of purchase-options.
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Ironically, questions of immorality in this more casual, flexible life-style
way of viewing human conduct arise insofar as they might pertain to expressions
of intolerance toward departures from what were once the conventional standards
of morality. Disapproval itself has become the object of condemnation, a
regression, if you will, to a pre- l 960s atavistic practice commonly referred to as
"being judgmental," an act of, well, near intolerance. Life-style is a vague and
elastic term, and perhaps purposely and happily so. Its chief utility is as a "nonjudgmental" piece of modem, value-free argot that can propel discussion
"comfortably" along without anyone having to render any problematical moral or
ethical assessments. Being non-judgmental also advances the now ubiquitous
quest for higher self-esteem since being judged and found wanting or culpable in
any basic way might lead to lower feelings of self-worth or a state of inadequacy
that needs to be rectified. For these reasons the word has become such an
important, frequently-resorted-to addition to our vocabulary.
The life-style notion also works well with the penetration of therapy into
almost every comer of our lives and with the concomitant medicalizing of our
moral perspective. Thus, one now frequently hears references to healthy or
unhealthy lifestyles, which make those who so opine, again, sound less
judgmental and moralistic. Such an understanding, sympathetic posture also
makes it much easier to open up and explore the many possibilities for the
application of counseling and psychotherapy.
Moral relativity and the expansion of toleration are indeed natural
complements, and over the course of the last fifty years what confidence, naive or
not, we had in our understanding and interpretation of an objective moral world
has evaporated. Belief in the objectivity of moral value or principle has been
exchanged for a new dogma of moral subjectivism. Our only "ultimate" value has
become tolerance itself, a paradox of considerable significance as we have seen.
Much of this is the result of secularization. Traditional religious ideas, for the
most part out of necessity, have softened. Even religious institutions, in
competition for members, have been co-opted by the behemoth amusement
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industry with its affinity for making us feel good, and religious passion has in
many ways declined or seeped away. It is argued, at least by many of our cultural
elite, that religious and moral values are and should be personal and private
because they are ultimately and radically subjective.
Inter-religious

marriage-Catholics

with

Protestants,

Jews

with

Christians- an issue of considerable interest and significance in the 1950s and
even into the 1960s is today of relevance to a few. In 1964 Time magazine
reported on what it called "the first officially sanctioned Protestant-Catholic
wedding in the United States." "Such ecumenical experiments," wrote the author
of the Time article, "may well prove one way to end a continuing source of
Catholic-Protestant conflict."27 What "conflict," thirty-some years later might
possibly remain between many Catholics and Protestants? From what "source"
would it emanate? Doctrine? Theology? Religious or ethical practice?
The mainline faiths are certainly less distinguishable from one other than
they once were. To distinguish yourself doctrinally or in creed from anyone today
openly is the ultimate social faux pas, an act of exclusion, a manifestation of
bigotry at worst, parochialism at best. The differences between the faiths are not
supposed to matter much anymore. Only Fundamentalists-Fundamentalist
Christians, Fundamentalist Jews, Fundamentalist Muslims, and so on, as they are
now characterized by the secularized elites- now make such invidious
comparisons. Moreover, for these elites who run the amusement state and
interpret and dictate the nuances of the prevailing secular ideology, it would be
difficult to find a more contemptible name to call someone than a fundamentalist.
"Fundamentalist" has lost most of its historical and descriptive meaning. It has
become primarily a derisive appellation for anyone who takes their religion too
seriously. Our amusement culture, for many, has ground the sharp edges off of
serious traditional religion.
A little over two hundred years ago a corpulent little Englishman, Edward
Gibbon, completed his life's work, a vast but entertaining account of the
melancholy spectacle of pagan Rome's demise. The Decline and Fall of the
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Roman Empire, a long, erudite book, incidentally, has never been out of print

since the first volume of it was published in the year of America's declaration of
independence, 1776; and it still intrigues to this day. Part of the intrigue, aside
from its literary delightfulness, historical richness and devastating ironical
insinuation, is that Gibbon's achievement set an inviting precedent for thoughtful
speculation on periods of decadence and collapse of great civilizations,
particularly for speculating on how the moral practices of people are related to the
overall fortunes of their society. Gibbon's artful depiction of decadent Rome,
under assault from barbarians, without and within, offers some awful, troubling
comparisons with our own civilization.
Like ancient Rome, our country threw off a king and became a Republic.
Our Republican ancestors of the Revolutionary period, like the Republican
Romans, attempted to practice republican civic virtue as a protective strategy of
social conservation and saw any erosion of it as a prelude to moral and political
disaster. Out of civic virtue came public morality and an ideal of political freedom
and independence. But our Republic, like the Roman one, has now become a
militarily powerful world empire with all of the countless affinities for decadence
that befall a people who live under a growing Imperiurn, governed by individuals
vainglorious and consumed, alas corrupted, by their worship of power.
The citizen of the Roman Republic inevitably became the subject of an
Emperor. Citizens are active, self-governing and self-supporting. Subjects by
contrast are passive. They require supervision and maintenance and are
perpetually, relentlessly needy- recipients of the largess of the emperor,
administered by his mandarins. Which of these two types do we in America
resemble most today, citizens or subjects? Which of these two types do we think
our children and grandchildren in a few short decades will be? Near the end of
The Decline and Fall, of an empire in dissolution, Gibbon muses:

In Rome the voice of freedom and discord is no longer heard; and,
instead of the foaming torrent, a smooth and stagnant lake reflects
the image of idleness and servitude. 28
Idleness and decay are Gibbon's evocative, still images of decadence and decay-
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a once active, energetic and virtuo us people were eventually content to watch
their freedom slip away, let their virtue deteriorate, and sink into their private
pleasures.
Gibbon did not dissimulate his lamentatio ns for the collapse of the Roman
civi lization, and he aroused the ire of his eighteenth-century readers by laying the
blame for it in large part upon the radical, destabili zin g faith of parvenu
Christians. Th eir unrestrained enthusiasm for a single faith had served to
undermine a society in which the pagan cults, with their own particular gods and
their own special rituals, had tolerated each other.
The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman
world, were all considered by the people, as equall y true; by the
philosopher, as equally fa lse; and by the magistrate, as equally
useful. And thus toleration froduced not only mutual indulgence,
but even religious concord.2
According to Gibbon, the early Christians were, above all, intolerant of their
pagan contemporaries. They were, to be blunt, religious fanatics of the most
uncivil, irrepressible sort. There was, as their version of spiritual reality would
have it, one true God, one true faith, and one true religion. If Christianity was
true, as they believed it surely was, then the religions of their fellow pagans were
false--peaceful co-existence was eschewed. The logic and the psychology of
monotheism were inevitably fatal to the "religious concord" of the paganism
eulogized by Gibbon. The Christians would neither countenance nor respect the
gods and rituals of their religious competitors. Gibbon's early Chri stians were
intrepid, inflexible universalist

spiritual truth was true for everyone or none.

This supreme, overweening confidence was what enabled an initially small and
almost powerless sect like Christianity to endure persecution and ultimately to
prevail over the traditional pagan cults in Gibbon's estimation and to emerge as a
world religion. Since the ancient religious practices were so completely
interwoven into the social fabric of pagan society, the Christians' fierce
antagonism for the traditional rites and ceremonies could not but be regarded as
an assault on the society itself. Christianity, Gibbon argued, was a large

From ' 50' to '00' hanges of Mind ; Alterations of the Heart?

65

instrumental force in the moral and political erosion of the Roman empire.
Two hundred years after Gibbon' s eloquent lament, we face a profound
and ironic reversal of his dramatic portrayal of paganism and Christianity in their
deadly conflict: an enervated, thoroughly modernized Christianity now confronts
a resurgent, invigorated modem paganism- new-agers, hedonists, sexual athletes,
animal rights activists, spiritualists of various stripes, eastern religionistsconfident in the particularity of religious and moral values and openly disdainful
of Christianity's imperial claims for the universality of its message.
Christianity's major rival for the last one hundred and fifty years has been
the secular religion of socialism. "Scientific socialism," wrote the Bolshevik
intellectual, Anatoly Lunacharsky, "is the most religious of all religions, and the
true Social Democrat is the most deeply religious of all human beings." 30 At one
time universalist in its own claims (promising a world-proletarian revolution
unfolding according to the objective laws of history, culminating in a workers'
paradise), in the late-twentieth century socialism has splintered into religious-like
movements such as radical feminism, environmentalism, and other particular and
specialized, collectivist, fanatical (true-believing) sects. Each of these sects, like
their Marxist parent, identify a decadent, corrupted oppressor class set against an
emerging oppressed class (possessed of a requisite superior virtue forged through
its suffering) that will arise, overthrow the oppressors and implement, at last, a
morally superior order. Marx's doctrinal promise of an end to capitalism and the
social evils it spawned- Marxism's primary energizing force--has undergone a
spate of ideological mutations. Each of these new sectarian collectives plans the
launching of its own society-transforming revolution and polishes its own
ideologically customized promise of delivery from the oppressors' chains- from
patriarchy, sexism, ecological destruction, etc.
With the ascendancy of so-called multiculturalism and the invincible
subjectivity in which it is ensconced, Christianity's once-professed universality
and its cultural dominance in the West are now considerable cause for
embarrassment and self-inflicted castigation. The doctrinal-moral "hegemony"

66

Desolation' s March

that it once imposed on the Western world, as well as other parts, is now held to
account for many of what are now characterized as social injustices, including
sexism, racism, and many other forms of domination, exploitation, and
oppression. European Christianity in its long, varied, and complex historical
unfolding, nevertheless, makes up the ideological wrapper for the Pandora's Box
of Western imperialism. Its virulence and rapaciousness express themselves in
various manifestations ranging from sexual repression and destructive self-denial,
to the destruction of the environment, to greed and compulsive accumulation of
wealth, and to the devaluation and degradation of women.
Christianity, on the brink of its th.ird millennia, finds itself falling on the
defensive against its modem pagan critics on the outside. From within, it is
eviscerated by a hedonistic amusement culture and a therapeutic ethos that find
the old operative notions like guilt and sin "uncomfortable" and unworkable. The
"old time" religion of Christianity that preached salvation and warned of
damnation and demanded repentance would be an impossible sell for most of
today's clerics-even if they had an interest or desire to pitch it- who have to
contend with parishioners who arrive at the chapels and churches completely
saturated with the secularized amusement culture of television and the movies, a
culture of relativism, hedonism and near limitless toleration.
Thus it would seem that Gibbon's horrendous epic of cultural cataclysmChristianity's conquest of pagan Rom

is replaying itself two thousand years

later, only this time with the tables turned, with the Christian culture crumbling
from forces within and without, sliding into the historical abyss. The conflict, I
believe, is every bit as historically significant and momentous as the previous
encounter which Gibbon characterized as the "greatest, and perhaps most awful
scene in the history of mankind." The universality of both Christianity, as well as
the Enlightenment that followed it, is embattled by the particularity of the modem
pagans. The believers in an objective universal order defined by eternal,
transcendental ideals find themselves in spiritual and moral warfare with the
subjectivists whose whole locus of moral reference is found either in the identity
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of some victimized collective, energized in its suffering and resentment, or in the
interior recesses of an illusive, ever-mutating self.
Perhaps, though, what we are observing is less of a battle or struggle than
the playing out of a moral and cultural end-game, the final death throes of a
decadent culture that has lost its dominance-its entrails devoured by parasites of
its own manufacture. The freedom and prosperity that for the last two-hundred
years were a legacy derived from the establishment of the rule oflaw and limited,
representative government have been a high, culminating point of Western
civilization. But out of freedom and prosperity themselves has come an erosion of
those sorts of virtues and dispositions that originally led to the building of
institutions that gave us freedom and prosperity. The great freedoms, of speech
and expression, that have for long been political and moral ideals in the West
have degenerated into institution-withering instruments of skepticism, license, and
ultimately of nihilism and hedonism.
We are now confronted routinely in public life, particularly in our venues
of amusement, with the most horrendous manifestations of coarseness and
vulgarity. The prosperity and affiuence generated by the rationalization of work
and the development of technology has stimulated a nearly limitless appetite for
amusement. Our technology has made it possible to serve that appetite, both in
scope and depth, in ways that were never before possible. Amusement, when it
becomes the ruling preoccupation, dulls the critical capacities and depresses
interest in work and self-sacrifice.
The attachment late-twentieth-century Americans once had to the values
of personal independence and self-rule-self-rule in both the personal and
political sense-seems to be greatly waning. Self-rule or autonomy has been
relinquished for the administration of specialists; self-reliance for other-reliance.
The specialists are the ones, the only ones who are supposed to be able to translate
their official "care" into action. The concession of the realms of moral life to the
specialists also helps to advance the exchange of a reliance on principle (the rule
of law) for reliance on benevolence, (the rule of compassion), ofresponsibility for
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victimization, of individualism for tribalism.
The late twentieth century with its immersion in the relativity of morals
and subjectivity of knowledge rendered agreement even on the basics of ethical
conduct and personal responsibility nearly impossible. From Roxana Ng:
Feminist scholarship has challenged the notion of objectivity and
demonstrated that so-called objective universal knowledge is
constructed by men for men. Adrienne Rich contends that the
' detachment' and 'disinterest' that constitute objectivity in
scientific inquiry are the terms men apply to their own
subjectivity. 31
Only in academe, where guaranteed lifetime employment is a major perk and
where seldom must one have to suffer any consequences from officially
promulgating personal stupidity, would we routinely find such absurd and
preposterous proclamations. But the subjectivity of this extreme nature has,
nevertheless, filtered down into the popular opinion- an indication that there
really is something to the theory of the "Big Lie"- and the result is the
disappearance of any chance of a public morality.
In our moral discourse we used to be inclined to say: ' x is wrong because
of y' (substitute for ' x' some kind of conduct and for ' y' some external standard
or reference point, such as the will of God or some such thing). Now judgments to
the effect that ' x is wrong' cannot be argued for but only felt or intuited. Moral
disagreements or differences tum into an ever escalating "emoting contest" with
the victory going to the one who evinces the most intense feeling, produces the
harshest invective or extracts the most pity. It often turns out to be a chaotic and
grimly disingenuous enterprise that is conducive to dissimulation, hypocrisy, and
the most wretched, detestable extremes of self-righteous self-delusion.
As a medium with a near monopoly for the presentation of public events
and issues, television plays almost exclusively to the emotive side of problems
greatly to the disadvantage of detachment, perspective and quiet thoughtfulness.
As an amusement oriented, visual medium, television is more effective- makes
more of an impression- in serving up the issues as personalized theatrics.
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Appearances of sincerity, depth of expressed feeling, attractiveness and
comeliness of course, are usually more compelling and influential than more
abstract considerations of consistency, cogency or integrity. Appearing to be
genuinely compassionate is a theatrical skill. Yet that appearance is a major
requirement for political success. The rhetoric of compassion drives the
therapeutic ethos, and the appearance of compassion, politically, indicates to the
potential voters how generously the entitlements will flow. Television, in its
aspiration to be a neutral presentation medium, can never effectively escape its
nature as a powerful vehicle for amusement. It will always be difficult to present
public issues in a way that will avoid the incoherence, superficiality and
emotionality that conditions almost everything that appears on television. These
limitations are imposed by the nature of the format.

The moral relativity in which we find ourselves thoroughly immersed promises to
bring even more uncertainly, tension and irresolvable moral tension and conflict.
What we believe about ourselves and the world determines our course in it. In this
modem secular society we cannot make do with the Christianity of our ancestors
any longer; but, alas, it also seems, we are unable to do quite without it either.
This ambiguity of belief creates an ever greater ambiguity of moral practice. The
philosopher Alasdair Macintyre made this observation some thirty years ago as he
reflected upon the impact in the West that the vast secularizing forces of
modernity exerted upon our religious thinking and, ultimately, our conduct. 32
Our confidence in making ethical judgments has been eroded by our
radical, reflexive subjectivity. The fragmentation of our institutions expressed in
greatly increased rates over the course of the last century of socially disintegrating
practices like illegitimacy (a ten-fold rate of increase since the beginning of
1900), crime (an eight-fold rate of increase in murder since 1920), and divorce (a
three-fold rate of increase since the beginning of 1900) reflects something that
might be called "moral fallout." We experience moral fallout when we cease to
believe in any kind of fixed and objective standards of conduct, when we can
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agree on no regular, consistent principles to govern our action.
The religion of our ancestors gave us fixed standards and regular
principles: its abandonment brings on a moral and spiritual crisis and inevitable
moral fallout. The loss of our religion impales us on the horns of this dilemma
described above- we cannot seem to live with it; but its loss plunges us into
chaos. Material comforts and high-tech diversions are insufficient to make that
brief span of our existence complete and significant. Without certainty on the
questions of how we should live and what ideals we should embrace, our lives
must remain empty and our actions futile. The rational, scientific and secularized
orientation of our daily existence puts us into conflict with the claims of
traditional Christianity for a transcendental reality in which human beings enjoy a
relationship to their creator and its priority over everything temporal. It is difficult
to discover and to cultivate that relationship in a modern, amusement-oriented
world. Our preoccupations and interests are with the things of this world. Caught
up as we are in a material world which offers so much, it is difficult to know what
to make of those once important spiritual beliefs that shaped the lives of those
from whom we inherited our institutions.
Yet, the denial of or indifference to a transcendental locus of meaning
beyond ourselves and our immediate material interests plunge us into an atomistic
and ultimately morally desolate state of affairs. Our moral world has indeed
become a bleak place. Facts and values have been split asunder: the former are
impersonal, inescapable building blocks of reality, the basis for scientific
understanding and explanation; the latter are personal, subjective forms of
experience that express only the self, a self that is always mutating and must
constantly struggle to acquire esteem. Once people cease to believe that there are
objective moral standards, against which they can measure their conduct and
judge each other, the edifice of civilization begins to crumble. Radical
subjectivity renders us unable to deal with each other morally since morality is
about determining what is right and wrong, and since subjectivity renders
agreement on how to make such determinations impossible. Each individual
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speaks for and, ultimately, to himself. The failure of such agreement means that
our efforts to create any such thing as a public morality or ethic will come to
resemble the construction efforts on the Tower of Babel. The practice of morality
requires a shared vocabulary which in turn appeals to an objective standard for
both the praise and condemnation of human conduct. Such standards are
increasingly difficult to find as the possibility of moral objectivity is plunged into
doubt. Radical subjectivity creates a moral vacuum into which unfettered power
asserts itself. Morality itself becomes tribalized. The attempts to sustain public
conversations in which individuals grapple with the complex ethical and moral
issues of our time seem destined to fail. Illumination and guidance, even from the
wise, are difficult to attain. Antagonism, resentment and cynicism grow.
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Chapter Three
Personalism: The Escape from Institutions
It's not going to be easy redefining who we are as human beings in
this post-modern world.
Hillary Clinton

At mid-20th-century, the objective notions of moral goodness, human decency
and personal responsibility that gave us guidance with the daily practice of our
lives were grounded in the vestiges of a two-thousand-year-old moral and
religious tradition of Judeo-Christianity and Classical antiquity. The forces of
modernity have ground up the fragments of this tradition-based moral and
religious framework. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that they have been
swept away by post-World War Il events, particularly by the Cultural Revolution
in the West ushered in with the fractious and nihilistic 1960s.
in 1968, new-left radical and counter-culture impresario, Abbie Hoffman,
published Revolution for the Hell of It, a title profoundly emblematic of the times
and a prognostication of a new mentality. It was an exceptionally dreary and
pathetic tract. However, this piece did showcase the author's one conspicuous
dimension of talent- a flair for vulgarity and exhibitionism. This vulgarity would
become the indelible signature of the 1960s counter-culture, an instrument
consciously developed to attack "the establishment." The penchant for vulgarity
percolated for a generation as the counter-culture began to exert its power.
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Counter-culture vulgarity seeped into a post-war middle class that lay in the
grip-soft though it was-of Victorian inhibitions still in place from the previous
century. The vulgarity of the mass culture reached full blossom in the 1980ssuccinctly expressed in the popular tee-shirt and scatological bumper sticker,
"Shit Happens!" Indeed! It did happen- nearly everywhere. The "counter" part of
the counter-culture was co-opted and commercialized, quickly absorbed as an
essential, dominating component of an amusement ethos which scorned inhibition
and restraint. The counter-culture in its early years was frisky and militantly selfindulgent, driven by aspirations of sexual liberation, the worship of youth, the
disdain for work, and reckless, chemically-assisted self-expansion that turned into
self-disintegration. In the late twentieth century it became the dominant culture
where the only "downer" was disapproval itself.
A quick note of the careers of two men, about thirty years apart, gives
some sense of how steep our descent into the swamps of vulgarity and scatology
has been.
Lenny Bruce in the 1960s was repeatedly arrested and prosecuted for what
local authorities judged to be the obscene and offensive material of bis nightclub
comedy routines. Bruce, to bis fans and adulators, was a creative, free-spirited
iconoclast, a rebel against the hypocrisies of middle-class American social life, a
"victim" of the pruderies and sexual inhibitions banging over from the 1950s. By
the 1990s not a trace of them would remain.
Lenny Bruce as professional vulgarian gave way to movie star, entertainer,
and political aspirant, Howard Stem. These, however, are challenging times for
ambitious iconoclasts. There are few icons left that are not already in pieces.
Nothing remains for Stem other than a seemingly persistent yearning to lower the
level of coarseness and vulgarity and to soil his surroundings. Unlike thirty years
ago, Stem faces no arrests, no proscription of any kind. He encounters no official
resistance to the purveying of the obscenities he invents and delivers as "shock"
amusement to millions over radio and television. Unlike Bruce who remains an
early counter-culture hero and martyr, Stern is solidly "establishment." He is a
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steady fixture of the large and profitable "vulgarity" wing of the amusement
industry which includes much of popular music, movies and television. His cable
television talk show features "conversations" with guests that are far more lewd,
debased and disgusting than any of the rather creative vignettes that got poor
Lenny Bruce hauled before the local magistrates. He is particularly crude with
women and appears to enjoy degrading them. Stem's public performances are
scenes, using Gibbon's language to describe the profligacy of the degenerate
emperor Com.modus of the 2"d century A.D. in which are scorned "every restraint
of nature or modesty." While Bruce' s "offensive" comedy was con.fined to
nightclubs frequented only by adults, Stem's flows into millions of households
via our main organ of cultural dissemination, television. Thus even our children
can easily contemplate his unique contributions to the growing number of obscene
and sexually debased programs that now pass for regular amusement and are
generally regarded as nonnal fare. Only in a disintegrating society where values
like honor, propriety, public decency and modesty are being completely emptied
of all significance could a moral degenerate like Stem operate with no social
impediments.
The 1960s introduced an era in wliich no experiments in perversity would
be untested, no rituals of self-degradation would be considered unfit to proclaim
as breakthroughs in amusement or as possible models for personal liberation or
affirmation. Firmly in place by the 1980s were government agencies staffed by
the culturally superior apparatchiks produced by the universities. They were
installed to elevate the "appreciation of the arts" by the hoi polloi and advance
other cultural imperatives. They handed out tax-payer subsidies to "artists" whose
creative endeavors culminated in masterpieces like "Piss Christ"- a plastic
crucifix placed in a jar of urine. For comparable State-sponsored acts of religious
sacrilege, we have the example of the mad Roman emperor Caligula ordering his
statue to be placed in the temple of Jerusalem so as to insult the Jews: but while
the ancient Jews exploded in riot against this mindless religious desecration,
modern Americans remained largely indifferent to this official soiling of their
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religious heritage. The few "puritans" who voiced objections to the government
subvention of the artistic march of progress were castigated by the elites as
religious extremists, censors, and dangerous narrow minded enemies of "artistic
freedom."
Inhibition has been routed. Lest there be any doubt one simply need turn
on the television. Daytime television talk shows have few limits placed on their
presentation of perversity and are completely immersed in vulgarity. The dregs of
the proles now parade across the studios. Obscenity-spewing freaks and
degenerates make their way directly into the living rooms of millions of homes
just in time for our children ' s after school edification. Herein lies a culmination of
our uninhibited quest for self-expression combined with a total eclipse of any
standard of public decency. Television, our major amusement and information
medium, has sunk itself lower than was ever imaginable even a short twenty years
ago.
The title of Abbie Hoffman' s book still reverberates with the insipid
nihilism that has subsequently seeped into so much of our current popular culture.
The opening sentences of this semi-literate, antinomian manifesto illustrate a
"mentality" of emptiness and shallowness.
Revolution for the hell of it? Why not? It's all a bunch of phony
words anyway. Once one has experienced LSD, existential
revolution, fought the intellectual game playing of the individual in
a society, of one' s identity, one realizes that action is the only
reality; not only reality but morality as well. One learns reality
only in a subjective experience. It exists in my head . I am the
Revolution.1
Spoken like someone locked in a permanently arrested stage of adolescence. Too
much free time. Too many drug trips. Too much Herbert Marcuse and Che
Guevara. Hoffman and his ilk were infected with a distinctive post-World War II
affliction, a weird miasma of boredom, angst and delusional self-importance that
plagued overindulged rich kids of the sixties who hung out at prestigious
universities like Berkeley, Columbia, and the University of Wisconsin. In earlier
times no one in any position of responsibility would have brooked this kind of
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nonsense. Had Hoffman taken refuge for long in any of those "People's
Republics" ruled by the sorts of revolutionary gods to whom he paid ceaseless
homage, his dope-ridden, self-indulgent anti-authoritarianism would have
probably gotten him liquidated.
However, Hoffman hit his prime at the right time and the right place.
Conventional restraints were falling away. The government was drafting scores of
young men to fight in an increasingly unpopular and perplexing war that
stimulated unprecedented youthful rebellion and defiance. In a society where
television had come to dominate the presentation and interpretation of national
and world events, student revolutionaries with their own unique talents for selfindulgence, obscenity and vandalism, made engrossing footage for the evening
news. The protests and disruption of university campuses provided shock
amusement for the incredulous midd.le class viewer. Hoffman and the others like
him- mugging it up for news crews in search of the sensational story-acted out
their fantasies of revolution. They played at radical politics, copulated
indiscriminately, and gleefully annihilated with powerful recreational drugs any
slight glimmers of reality that might have pressed in uninvited upon their
horizons. Also, they engaged in copious self-congratulatory, self-righteous
posturing declaring that they were "part of the solution rather than part of the
problem." This was the generation that would usher in a greed-free universal
reign of peace, harmony, and love. Yet when these "Woodstock Nation" nihilists
were done nothing of any lasti ng positive value survived- just a crude and vast
affinity for immediate, chemically-assisted gratification and a legacy of selfindulgence. Sex, drugs, and rock 'n' roll. Hoffman's subjectively defined
revolution culminated for him with a very personal action, a suicide drug
overdose at age fifty-two .
The stable boundaries of good and evil that were once in place have
shifted, collapsed even, over the last fifty years. The 1950s mark the end of an
era: the years that followed opened up many possibilities and expanded choicescopious sex, easy divorce, lots of dope, abortion on demand, and an explosion of
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social pathologies. With the yin of the exploding pathologies came the yang of
new therapies.
For the last four decades we have been carried briskly along in the steady
expansion and acceleration of the phenomenon of personalism, a term coined and
applied by the 1960s counter-culturalists themselves. Personalism is the quest for
the liberation of the individual from constraints-those primarily which take
shape in the development of social roles and conventions and in the submission to
obligations imposed by traditional institutions. The church, the family, the school,
all of these traditionally structured institutions have Jong been open to ideological
attack because of their hierarchical structures and the significant role
differentiation that flows out of them. Many of these role differentiations came to
be regarded as obnoxious and intolerable because they supported many social
relationships that were definitely unequal. These institutions and the hierarchies
they encompassed have been transformed, dismantled in some cases, over the last
forty years by personalist ideology put into action.
Theodore Roszak's popular paean to the radicalism of the 1960s, Th e
Making of a Counter Culture, stresses correctly the personalist features
characteristic of the many varieties of what came to be a religion of dissent that
were practiced during that time.2 Many of them were identified with the New
Left, the political vanguard of the social revolution of early 1960s.
The underlying unity of these differing styles of dissent is revealed
by the extraordinary personalism that has characterized New Left
activism since its beginnings .. .. By and large, most New Left
groups have refused to allow doctrinal logic to obscure or displace
an irreducible element of tenderness in their politicking.3
This personal ism that Roszak sees as so characteristic of the counter culture is all
of a piece with his observation of the refusal of the 1960s radicals to be bound by
any "doctrinal logic" or logic, period. Unlike their 1930s radical, leftist
predecessors who were steeped in Marxist dialectic and artfully interpreted the
major events of the times with it, these post World War-II enemies of capitalism
and bourgeoisie morals were more inclined toward group sex, campus vandalism,

Personalism: The Escape From lnstitutions

81

trips on LSD, and slogans. They preferred to be free of discipline, rules or
"doctrine" of any kind.
Comically emblematic of this deep difference in radicalism between the
generations was an event in New York City in 1970 featuring the aged Gerrnanbom leftist philosopher, Herbert Marcuse, who was addressing the Socialist
Scholars Conference. Abbie Hoffman crashed the convention and, dressed as a
cowboy replete with cap pistols, presented Marcuse with a joint. 4 Forget the
theory {"doctrinal logic" in Roszak's terms) and get on with the self-indulgence, it
would seem, was the point of Hoffman's stunt. Adds Roszak,
For most of the New Left there has ultimately been no more worth
or cogency in any ideology than a person lends it by virtue of his
own action: personal commitments, not abstract ideas, are the stuff
of politics.5
Personal

commitments

indeed- the

political

was

to

become

indistinguishable from the personal. The New Left was probably unique in the
depth of its subjectivity. Roszak here merely echoes the notes from Hoffman's
pied piper' s tune of moral solipsism cited above, and it is easy to understand in
retrospect why whatever serious political inclinations or aspirations that might
have energized the New Left quickly dissipated in the 1970s. The natural,
predictable political traj ectory of a mentality which focuses so exclusively on the
self ("I am the revolution", "the revolution is in my hea<f', etc.) is not likely to be
a movement which achieves its aspirations in a political revolution or coup and
the toppling of governments (Lenin and Mao never touted this kind of "tender"
solipsism), but rather in "creative" self-indulgence. The ultimate destiny of the
sixties American radical- fortunately, perhaps, for most of us-was not to be the
triumphant head of a "People's Republic," like Leon Trotsky at the Kronstadt
naval yards rounding up and shooting doubters and dissenters, but rather to be
soaking in the hot tubs at the Esalen Institute in San Francisco exploring the
psyche, or growing chemical-free vegetables and protesting at nuclear power
plants, or pitching paint on the fur coats of rich women. The revolution brought
by the sixties, subjective and personal to its core, was cultural rather than overtly
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political.
Political protesting and psychic exploration in various forms have been
intertwined since the , sixties. They are complementary activities. Also, they
combine the powerful impulses of self-assertion, under a confused impulse of
fanatical moralism, with the quest for amusement. One's political protest action
"makes a statement" that gives vent to strong personal feelings and opinions, and
the protest event itself becomes an opportunity for diversion, providing escape
from the routines and conventions that impose order and make social life boring
and predictable. Observing the confusion and the disarray that results from the
disruption can be exciting and fun, particularly if one can contemplate it in the
grip of an aggrieved sense of moral superiority. Many of the protests of the 1960s
had a bacchanalian component.
The growing number of Hollywood celebrities who have become political
"activists" illustrates the growing cultural pervasion of amusement. Celebrityhood
carries with it the privilege of being taken seriously as a social and political critic.
Politics is merely one more venue into which the "self" can be projected as an act
of personal expression.
Jane Fonda's long career is emblematic of what is now a fairly common
phenomenon- the "political activist" actor/actress. An extraordinarily talented
actress, in her youth she did glamour roles in the movies and played the hipradical in her spare time. Later she became a successful capitalist mogul and
reigned over an aerobics empire, selling millions of aerobic exercise and diet
books and videos. She shuffled off her aging and increasingly unglamorous, boyradical husband for an egotistical news-amusement colossus. Such was the career
of a radical entrepreneur- from cavorting on camera, cheerleading for the North
Vietnamese during the Vietnam war in Hanoi in the sixties, to doing the
tomahawk chop at the Braves games during the World Series in the nineties-she
always looked sleek and fit. No one could deny it. This was probably the natural
course of self-exploration that a thoughtful observer might have predicted for a
high-profile 1960s radical, a perfect narcissistic blend of celebrity politics, old-
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fashioned hustling and self-aggrandizement. The only consistency in any of the
many businesses and adventures was the pursuit and exaltation of the self. To find
that "irreducible element of tenderness" of Roszak would require a microscope of
infinite power.
The personalist evinces a faith in an unbounded abstraction known as
progress. This faith is conjoined with limitless confidence in the personalist's own
moral predilections and interior vibrations which he believes are far superior to
those held by his predecessors. For the personalist the future is the moral promiseland of self-fulfillment and self-realization, if and only if the constraints and
benighted practices of the past can be discarded or undone. Inherent in
personalism is a persistent, dominating aim: to escape the limits of traditional
institutions and conventions. The ties of these institutions to the past taint them
with the ignorance, the irrationality and the repressive and freedom-limiting
features that plagued our less enlightened ancestors. Personalism strives to break
profoundly with the morality and norms of the past and offers a radically different
conception of human aspiration and obligation. Historian and adulator of the
"spirit of the sixties," James J. Farrell, in a chapter entitled "Counter-cultural
Personalism," describes what he calls the "ethical core" of counter-culture
personalism.
Focusing on the inherent value of persons, and distancing
themselves from an authoritarian state and a capitalist economy,
people in the counter-culture criticized the impersonal institutions
of American society, and created communitarian enclaves that
prefigured the social and political order they hoped for. 6
There is, unfortunately, little of substance to extract from this ethical core other
than the adolescent-sounding declamation against the repressiveness of
" authoritarian" institutions and the ritualized castigation of capitalism. It is
difficult to see, as noted above, that anything unique or constructive survived the
introspection and the rebellion, so one is at loss to say exactly what moral or
ethical achievements they "prefigured." The communitarian enclaves seemed to
be little more than temporary escapes and came to nothing. The criticism of the
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"impersonality" of the capitalist-driven American institutions is strikingly naive
and ignorant given the evidence that was coming out, even during the 1960s and
1970s, of the effects of the massive, faceless impersonal bureaucracies created by
the socialist people's republics in Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere. Gifted
writers and heroic truth tellers from the Soviet block like Alexander Solzehnitsyn
and

Milovan

Djilas

exposed

the

hypocrisy

of the

l\.ventieth-century

revolutionaries and helped us understand the desolation that emerged from the
systematic efforts to dismantle the old order and to create a "new man." Yet
somehow "redefining" ourselves as human beings is, as Hillary Clinton seems to
suggest above, the daunting moral project for post modem Americans.
One significant effect ofpersonalism's advance over the last forty years is
the alteration of our view of the possibilities of self-perfection and our regard for
traditional institutions. Whether we believe that human beings are irrevocably
flawed and imperfect or are temporarily impaired, primarily by ignorance, but
possess the potential for limitless self-perfection, has enormous implications for
how we Live. Writes historian Richard Pipes:
Until the seventeenth century, the immutability of man's ' being'
was an unquestioned postulate of all philosophic thought, both in
the West and in the East. It was considered a mark of folly to
believe otherwise.7
This philosophical postulate has been overthrown- a casualty of a modem
"progressive" view of human nature. Recreating and reinventing ourselves
involves starting fresh and anew. We now conceive of ourselves as creatures with
unlimited potential for self-realization and self-discovery. Tradition, blind and
ignorant, places heavy constraints upon us. These constraints prevent us from
realizing our true human potential- they are de-humanizing. With the past so
conceived, our energies should be concentrated on escaping, evading, or best,
overthrowing those benighted constraints imposed by tradition and creating less
repressive, more humane institutions. This is no small point. The notion of human
perfectibility and the primacy of self-realization have exerted an increasingly
stronger force over the last l\.vo hundred years both in the unfolding of political
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history in the West and in the development of Western social and political
institutions. They are also, as we will see in the following chapter, instrumental in
the creation of a therapeutic approach to morality. To understand the appeal of
personalism, however, we must speak of its historical origins and its incorporation
into our modem, contemporary perspective.
II

The Swiss-born, vagabond-philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the originator of
personalist thought and may be the most influential individual of modem times to
theorize about the human social condition. In order to understand personalism,
one must at some point encounter Rousseau- for his life and thought remain its
embodiment. In fact, Rousseau with his enmity for social tradition and his passion
for social equality is still, two-hundred and twenty years after his death, the most
important precursor of late-twentieth-century political and social thinking and,
one should add, of emotion and attitude.
Rousseau's life was tumultuous. To his successors he bequeathed an ever
mounting enthusiasm for the ideology of social equality, an enthusiasm fused with
a heightened sense of his own moral superiority. His notion of the human
condition- sufficiently radical during his time to warrant official proscriptionhas gradually but inevitably wended its course, first capturing the hearts of
visionaries and revolutionaries, and utopian intellectuals (Rousseau was one of
the French-educated Pol Pot's favorite writers 8), impressing the enlightened elite,
and finally insinuating itself into the popular consciousness and firmly
entrenching itself there. This path has been traced in a controversial book by J. D.
Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. Social equality is an essential
element of the personalist outlook. It is now an unquestioned article of faith of the
modem mass culture. We are all in our late-twentieth-century pursuit of selfdiscovery and acclamation of equality, one might say, Rousseans now. The truth
of this and its far reaching significance for our mode of living becomes apparent
as we proceed.
Rousseau was a lonely, tormented, pathetically insecure man who spent
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his later years fleeing the authorities who sought to punish him for his subversive
ideas on politics, religion and education. The life of this petulant, self-taught
genius remains a fascinating study in itself of perpetual maladjustment and
unhappiness. In many ways Rousseau's career is personally emblematic of the
myriad forms of modem social alienation. Rousseau's own personal history,
brilliantly recreated in his Confessions, is a prolix but artful piece of selfdramatization and self-invention. It is a fascinating and absorbing personal
document. Indeed, Confessions established itself as a prototype of our modem
confessional motif in its prideful shamelessness and uninhibited self-revelations
of short-comings of character, particularly of sexual perversity. Rousseau claimed
that this confessional document was a daring and unprecedented piece of work. "I
have resolved on an enterprise," writes Rousseau in his opening sentence, "which
has no precedent, and which, once complete, will have no imitator."9 About the
lack of precedent he was probably right; but about the imitators, he was certainly
wrong.
I had always been amused at Montaigne's false ingenuousness, and
at his pretence of confessing his faults while taking good care only
to admit to likeable ones .... 1 knew that I was represented in the
world under features so unlike my own and at times so distorted,
that notwithstanding my fa ults, none of which I intended lo pass
over, I could not help showing myself as I was. Besides, this could
not be done without showing other people as they were, and
consequently the work could only appear after my death and that
of many others. 10
There is so much unintended irony in this, particularly in his smuggling in the
self-congratulatory advertisement that "l could not help showing myself as I was."
He could not indeed! The "honesty" and genuineness which Rousseau invented
and boastfully introduced to the world was not the kind that consists of adherence
to principle-keeping one's promises, honoring commitments, following the
rules- but rather one which has many modern imitators and which consists in
emotional evacuation and sensation-producing soul-baring. Indeed, it is an
honesty fundamentally connected with strong emotions (Rousseau speaks often
about his deep, intense emotionality) and the constant need to self-ventilate. It is
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measured by the willingness to express deep intimate feelings- to revolt (an
increasingly important and exalted modem social activity) against the hypocrisies
of social conventions, such as politeness, which requires at times dissimulation or
artificiality.
This emotive-based honesty of personal self-disclosure became the
prototype of conduct that is now a part of the common routines of our modem
twenty-first century amusement state. Shameless self-exposure is one of the
driving, pervasive forces of our modem, secularized confession-rituals: the
emotional, soul-baring dialogues of the encounter groups; the self-revelations of
vulnerability and wounded self-esteem extracted from the sensitivity training
sessions; and the emotional self-surrender demanded by the facilitators of group
therapy and recovery group meetings. 11 Self-exposure, even of the most intimate
variety, is also an essential, dynamic element of our amusement culture which is
geared toward the exploration of the intimate details of the lives of the celebrities
who are our objects of adulation and our sources of amusement.
Carl Rogers in one of the most popular books ever written on
psychotherapy, On Becoming a Person, made the honesty of self-revelation the
linchpin of his self-ameliorating psychotherapy. Rogers follows fai thfully in the
tradition of Rousseau. Essential to the success of the highly acclaimed Rogerian
therapy was the initiation of a liberating process of repudiating or discarding
conventional roles. Liberation, for an individual, was achieved by dropping "the
false fronts, or the masks, or the roles, with which he has faced life. He appears to
be trying to discover something more basic, something more truly himself." 12 The
socialized self for Rogers, as it was for Rousseau, is the problem. Those elements
of socialization regarded by some as part of a civilized order are too often
oppressive, pieces of disingenuousness, a pastiche of roles that one discovers
others have ·constructed and foisted upon him or her. Says Rogers,
One young woman student describes in a counseling interview one
of the masks she has been using, and how uncertain she is whether
underneath this aRpeasing, ingratiating front there is any real self
with convictions. 3
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The "real self" lies buried and suffocating beneath a false presentation by

an over-socialized, convention-bound creature.
Rousseau invented a fonn of honesty marked by an appeal to voyeurism: it
is a measure of one' s willingness to engage in self-exposure and self-disclosure.
In its fullness it is devoid of inhibition and shyness. Honesty of this sort, as we
often hear it lauded today- particularly in the context of moral or artistic
struggles--often comes qualified with terms like "brutally" or "ruthlessly" (e.g.,
"a brutally honest portrayal"), usually referring to the willingness of someone to
delineate upon or dramatize some unsavory, perverted, or base aspect of their own
character or personality, as well as to reveal the details of intimate private
moments of their friends and family . Honesty in this context also thus
comprehends the betrayal of friendship and intimacies. (In defense of Rousseau,
he at least arranged to delay the publication of his confessions until most of those
whom he told on were dead.) Thus, these qualifiers have an unintended ironic
significance. They suggest how devoid of decency and integrity the confessor
really is-brutality and ruthlessness in fact are the salient qualities of the
confessor's character. The confession is another piece of shameless selfindulgence.
Rousseau's late twentieth-century confessional imitators are in great
abundance. In fact they have come upon us in a deluge-aroused by the smell of
profit- and they possess not a modicum of their master's insight, originality, or
talent. They are happy to take the money and rat on their friends, families, and
associates while they are still alive. They tend to be celebrities of various
stripes-movie stars, politicians, sports figure

who, before descending into

oblivion, attempt to parlay their feckless moments of fame or notoriety into cash.
Assisted by ghost writers or television talk-show hosts, they "tell all" which
usually amounts to a compilation of sordid anecdotes and shameless
rationalizations with some sufficiently lurid details from the encounters with those
whom they screwed-literally as well as figuratively, often in great abundance-and why all the rotten things they did are really someone else's fault, and why we
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should in complete defiance of any standard of decency or reasonableness
somehow still think fondly of them or even think of them at all.
Incapable of forming normal, stable attachments to others---Rousseau
trundled the five children he fathered with his mistress Therese off to a state
foundling hospital. Nevertheless, this "philosopher of human misery," as the
intellectual historian Judith Shklar has called him, was a brilliant and compelling
thinker. He created a highly influential and empathetic view of human beings and
human society which became the ideological driving force of the French
Revolution that began some twelve years after his death. The enthronement of
equality by the French revolutionaries, the subsequent enthusiasm for it by our
own social theorists, and its ultimate achievement of moral orthodoxy in our own
time is in great part the legacy of J. J. Rousseau. Rousseau's famous oracular
pronouncement that opened his famous political work, On Social Contract, "Man
is born free but everywhere is in chains" is emblematic of a view of the human
condition that conceives of human beings as naturally good and benevolent,
confronting a society that represses that natural goodness, corrupts the
spontaneous benevolence of the individual, and ultimately ruins his happiness.
Self-righteous victimhood, one of the predominant themes that drifted out in the
turbulent ideological wake of Rousseau 's political and social philosophy, is now a
valuable sociological commodity, peddled to the masses by the organs of our
mass culture with a marketing language developed and refined by the illuminati
from our best universities. Rousseau 's name is unforgettably linked to his
philosophical fascination with, and elucidation of, the "noble savage," pristine
man, without the corruptive, inhibiting influences of society.
Rousseau' s social thinking challenged a concept in the West that was at
least as old as Aristetle: man by nature was a social and political animal. Social
and political institutions were necessary, primarily for coping with the perennial
shortcomings and imperfections of human beings. This traditional view in both its
classical and Christian manifestations saw human society as a web of potentially
supporting institutions, the chief value of which was to offset the naturally
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egoistic, overreaching tendency of individual human beings. The development of
social institutions and the growth of civilization were fundamentally humanizing
endeavors as they provided the tools to soften or attenuate the egoism and
constrain the inevitable tendencies for self-destructive overreaching. Without
restraints, powerful restraints, human associations present innumerable paths of
unimpeded descent into destructive chaos. Laws, morals, rules of etiquette, the art
of discipline are, all of them, imperfect but useful social inventions. The preRoussean view of civilization and social morality was, to put it somewhat crudely
and over-simply, a theory of "containment," containment, somehow, of a natural
and perennial human egotism and selfishness.
The insistence of Rousseau on the reality of an innate, natural human
goodness and the inherent repressiveness of traditional institutions with their
entrenchment of inequalities was, however, an exquisite creation of a protomodem mind. Rousseau was a thinker far ahead of his time. His ideas were
destined to be an energizing ideological force with unlimited potential for the
production of intellectual resentment- raw, festering, and intense--as the
inequalities come into view, and for the launching of total political revolution. For
the Roussean, the gross disparities, the innumerable inequalities, the invidious
comparisons that one inevitably finds separating human beings are the work of
inherently corrupt social forces. Truly creative, humanizing work expresses itself
in the undoing of the inequality and injustice ruthlessly established and cruelly
perpetuated by the agents of social institutions. "Liberty, fraternity, equality," the
famous slogan of the French Revolution, emanated from those whom Thomas
Carlyle called "eleutheromanics," philosophers infected with a passion for
freedom that was akin to madness. Our own Thomas Jefferson was by some
accounts much infected by this French "disease." The slogan captures the spirit of
Rousseau's profound opposition to and revulsion with the old order and led to the
call to overthrow the hated Ancient Regime ruled by a hierarchy of a king,
aristocrats and priests, agents of temporal and spiritual tyranny. The passion
expressed by the slogan became a fundamental enthusiasm of modernity that
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would be translated into revolutionary programs designed to carry out the
smashing of the old orders. The throne and the cross were the most obvious
symbols

of oppression

for

the

French revolutionaries,

corruption

and

immorality- the last priest was to be strangled with the entrails of the last king.
Here, late in the eighteenth century, was the terrible birth of total
revolution , a new, totally modem phenomenon. Total revolution would become a
large part of the twentieth century ' s legacy of mass murder and systematic
enslavement. One of the great ironies of Rousseau is that his reaction against the
crushing of the authentic self by a false and hypocritical society unleashed a
subjective and emotive orientation steeped in self-righteous resentment that has
only increased the alienation associated with modem life.
Though an eighteenth-century philosopher, Rousseau' s view of human
nature and the relation of the individual to the community has flowered in a
powerful, infectious ideology which dominates the social thinking of the West in
the early-twenty-first century. Rousseau' s passionate theorizing has become a
familiar underpinning of our contemporary efforts at social critique. It inverts the
traditional conception of individual-to-institutional relationship. ln both the
traditional conception, and the modem inverted version, the theme of constraint
vigorously asserts itself- the radically different interpretation of its role and
effects creates this all important inversion.
With the containment view of civilization, constraint is understood to be
an inevitably necessary evil because of the persistence of human egoism, which
has never been naturally self-limiting or self-policing and which remains a
perennial centrifugal force on human association. Egoism always lurks, and
unchecked or un-moderated it threatens to pull almost every kind of human
community and association-large or small- into pieces. Institutions are by their
nature rule-creating and rule-enforcing social entities that take the rough edges off
of human beings and make social life possible-at some costs (as Freud argued).
The costs are much greater in some societies than in others. The constraints may
take a terrible toll. To the extent that a civilization progresses, the toll diminishes.
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The underlying assumption, though, is that human beings are fundamental and
irremediably flawed- hence always the need for containment. For Christianity
that flaw is expressed in the notion of sinfulness. An institution that makes the
assumption of some inherent imperfection--sinfulness, or weakness, or similar
notions of that sort- must develop and reform with that imperfection in view. The
containment view imposes upon us an abiding humility. Institutions should
develop so as to compensate for a natural human vulnerability and a propensity to
self-preference and self-exemption from the rules that limit our tendencies to
overreach. The constraints are supposed to be ameliorating and constructive. The
great seventeenth-century political philosopher, monarchist and theorist of power,
Thomas Hobbes, put it artfully with a metaphor of optics.
For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses,
(that is their passions and self-love,) through which, every little
payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those
prospective glasses, (namely moral and civil science,) to see a far
off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such
payments be avoided. 14
With the inverted modem version, constraints (Hobbes's "prospective glasses" of
"moral and civil science") are not a necessary instrument of social stability. (For
Hobbes, misery of the worst sort is the consequence of the failure of constraint.)
lnstead, constraints have come to be viewed and resented as the embodiment of
something quite nefarious-engines of social exploitation and sources of social
inequality. The reason for this is that the constraints, the laws, rules and norms
that are in effect in society may in their abstract form appear to be necessary or
fair or reasonable. But constraints, alas, are ultimately linked to constrainers, to
individuals- real people hiding behind the abstractions- who enjoy the benefits
that accrue from their socially or politically advantaged positions, while avoiding
the constraints themselves- gross hypocrisy at the core, always! This is most
certainly the view of Rousseau and of all his ideological progeny; it is a seductive,
troubling perspective that has traveled for over two hundred years far and well
into the twenty-first century.
Institutions, upon the careful critical scrutiny of the Rousseau-inspired

Personalism: The Escape From lnstitutions

93

critic, emerge as surreptitiously coercive human organizations. Though they may
initially establish themselves through open force, they do not perpetuate
themselves by naked coercion, but by means of authority perceived to be natural.
Institutions are sustained by belief-systems, ideologies, if you will, in which lie
much of an institution' s power and efficacy. The strength and credibility of an
institution depends heavily upon

its believability, that is, whether its

representatives are thought to deserve to hold and exercise the power they actually
do. Authority rests upon respectful opinion, a belief in the legitimacy of the
institution. It is more than simply the threat of or the application of power: a
gunman after your money, thrusting his Luger under your chin, threatens and
exerts for the moment a terrible power over you; but he has not a shred of
authority and certainly commands from you no respect. Respect creates authority,
confers credibility upon institutions and their representatives, and legitimates their
power. For institutions to endure, their representatives must be accorded respect.
That is why one of the best ways to attack an institution is to undermine and erode
its respect, and hence the authority and ultimately the legitimacy of its
representatives.
Aristocratic authority and power were illegitimate in the eyes of Rousseau.
Whatever respect there was for the ruling class was fraudulent and undeserved.
Rousseau's oracular proclamation that "Man is born free but is everywhere in
chains" is deliberately ironic and deeply provocative. It represents the core of
Rousseau's subversive sentiments and suggests the orientation of his theorizingthe instruments of civilization, ironically, are the instruments of oppression. The
authority behind the civilized structures of authority is fraudulent, deserving of
repudiation.
Delegitirnization remains the senous business of our own intellectual
elites who follow Rousseau's call to expose the illegitimacy of the old order.
Their motto is ecraser l'infame. Their vocation is the systematic dismantling of
traditional institutions. These institutions reveal their moral bankruptcy and their
origins in the corrupted exercise of power. The Rousseans proceed by attacking

•
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the hypocrisy of the institutions, by showing that the ideals of the institutions"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," as stated in our own Declaration of
Independence, for example-are belied by historical practices that exclude all but
a select few from the enjoyment of the institution's benefits. No critique of an
institution renders a more withering and morally deflating verdict than when it
exposes a base hypocrisy; and no institutions exist without hypocrites. Delegitimation springs from basic impulses of personalism. It proceeds with the
moralistic cry of J' accuse. The moral prosecutors are everywhere, examining
everything, finding grievances and filing their briefs: many institutions now in
defensive, apologetic postures typically find themselves accused of pervasive,
systemic forms of collective culpability. The practitioners of J ' accuse are full of
the deepest and most enduring forms of resentment.
Ronald Takaki is one of the more articulate masters of delegitimization.
His work on American history is a first rate example of this type of activity in late
twentieth-century America. Takaki 's America was and is a brutal place run by
ruthless, morally defective hypocrites. He sees racism as a pervasive feature of
modem America and as the malignant legacy of the country's founders. Takaki ' s
aim is to expose the fundamental iniquity and hypocrisy at the base of American
institutions revealed in the lives of its "great" men.
The American Revolution for Americans long has been understood as the
embodiment of a noble quest for liberty and self governance. The colonists,
against remarkable odds, threw off a tyrannical king, separated themselves from a
world empire, established a limited, republican form of government- unique to
the world- and most importantly, set the foundations for a society that abolished
privilege and committed itself to the rule of law and the ideals of freedom and
opportunity. The men who laid these foundations and articulated the ideals, for all
of their imperfections, were of heroic stature, men of character and immense
historical understanding and insight who had the wisdom to create great and
enduring political institutions.
The American Revolution set the stage for the acculturation of republican
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virtue, which was supposed to shape the character of a people such that they were
fit to rule themselves. This ideal of self-rule was not just political but moral as
well. Republican virtue was the guarantee of freedom.
All of this for Takaki is a self-serving fabrication. Behind Republican
virtue was an ideology that unleashed a voracious capitalism, which was
particularly cruel in its dehumanization of non-white peoples. For moral
excavators like Takaki, archetype republicans, like Thomas Jefferson, were in fact
pathologically divided human beings (men whose lives reveal a terrible
"fragmentation of self'). Fearful of normal passions and of the sensual dimension
of the self, they projected their self-hatred onto non-white peoples. Their
constricted visions of what civilized human beings should be like and their
dehumanized recreations of people different than themselves would be translated
into practices which would bring about the most ruthless treatment of Blacks and
lndians. 15
Republican ascetic self-control and individualism isolated people
from each other and helped to make possible the ascendancy of
bureaucratic corporate capitalism; both, in turn, in their domination
of the instinctual life and their denial of human completeness
generated the discontent and rage which gave power to the
demonic ' iron cage'. 16
The real American history of Republican virtue at its core unfolds as a history of
capitalist oppression by self-hating, puritanical, avaricious white Europeans over
people of color. This self-hatred was projected onto Native Americans and
African Americans with the most ferocious consequences. Those founders who
resisted and overthrew British rule and built the republic were not admirable at all
and worse than flaw ed; they had fewer moral and humane qualities than those
they resisted.
All of Takak:i ' s representative American figures- Thomas
Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, Andrew Jackson, and George Custerappear as classic degenerates, sexually twisted and driven by dark
obsessions and profound psychological weakness. 17
Thus, for Takaki, by demonstrating the complete corruption of personality and
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character of those historical figures who have been held up as exemplary, the
history and value of those institutions they shaped significantly changes.
Takaki's delegitimization of American history is emblematic of the broad
sweeping condemnation routinely performed by our intellectual class. As the
outrage against the old order intensifies, the corrupted, reactionary modes of
thinkjng and the offensive practices that have produced the oppression become
more apparent, pervasive and egregious. The condemnation rendered is terrible
because it is provoked by the discovery and contemplation of injustices that have
been long sustained, and are particularly gruesome in their dimensions of
brutality, hatefulness and inhumanity. Consider, as another, even more sweeping
example of condemnation Susan Brownmiller's declamation about men-women
relations in her work, Against Our Will: Men, Wom en and Rape, was a widely
read and much discussed book in the mid- l 970s.
Man's discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to
generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of
prehistoric times, along with the use of fire and the first crude
stone axe. From prehistoric times to the present, I believe, rape has
played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all
women in a state of fear.18
Here is a monumental display of "grievance-in11ation," a key part of the J ' accuse
strategy of our present day Jacobins. Grievance inflation transforms a particular
kind of crime or evil piece of conduct into a primal or central event, a pivotally
defining factor in human relations, an interpretive key to unlock understanding of
the exploitative processes at work in world history. Rape, therefore, is not simply
one of many terrible crimes that some individuals over the course of history have
committed against others. Rape is not, in Brownmiller's characterization, even an
act of an uncivilized man (she puts it in the category of technological innovation,
a curious Roussean interpretation of sorts). Rape down through history is the
favorite handyman's tool for building and keeping the civilized house in orderhis house and his order- a powerful instrument of oppression that all men use

against all women- by design, that is, it is "a conscious process." All men, in

Personalism: The Escape From Institutions

97

what must be some fundamental, insidious way, are rapists, at least potentially.
Rape, as Brownmiller insists, is at the cold-dead center from where all malefemale relationships originate and ultimately develop into social reality. The
practice of rape is historically pervasive and absolutely definitive of the character
of men and the power they have always collectively exerted over women.
Catherine MacKinnon puts it in a similar vein but adds an explicit political
dimension that makes rape an even more sinister and conspiratorial phenomenon.
In feminist analysis, a rape is not an isolated event or moral
transgression or individual interchange gone wrong but an act of
terrorism and torture within a systemic context of group subjection,
like lynching. 19

Just as the Stalinist mode of social explanation typically began with ... "It is no
accident that...", meaning that there were always capitalists somehow operating
behind any scene of human misfortune conniving and manipulating, so in the
MacKinnon-feminist interpretation of social reality, there are always men with
institutional power plotting in camera to demean and degrade women and to
perpetuate their status of subjugation- rape is just one of the many strategies of
domination and exploitation. The evi l in an act of rape cannot be understood
simply as the reprehensible work of a corrupted human being, an assault by one
person upon another, deserving of harsh condemnation and the severest
punishment: it is rather a collective and "systemic" evil intrinsically linked to a
social order and power structure that is fundamentally at fault, and egregiously so.
As an "act of terrorism," rape for MacKinnon must be ultimately a
political act. Behind rape there lurks a collective will that employs "torture,"
violence in its ultimacy, to execute a broad social purpose, the imposition of an
insurmountable group domination, a domination of gender. Rape as a violent act
is thus to be compared with lynching. It is a comparison that has potential for the
creation of some very powerful sociologically-based condemnations. Women in
this society, to follow the theory carefully, have a social status accompanied by
modes of degradation and oppression analogous to those suffered by American
Blacks under the worst periods of apartheid or Jim Crow. This degraded social

98

Desolation's March

status is not just a mark of the past: it is a condition of the present. For
MacKinnon, as for Brownmiller, all men are engaged in a dark, collusive effort to
exert social control over women by whatever means it takes, including systematic
violence and the crime of rape.
From the degradation of women to the relations of race in America, the
sweeping condemnation is no less severe. This consummate expression of the
most "violent indignation" comes from the mid-twentieth-century Americadespising, French intellectual, Albert Memmi. Memmi explicates James
Baldwin's view of racism in the United States with the most reprehensible
possibilities and calamitous predictions.
There is no reason why Americans should not one day attempt
against their blacks what the Germans, another white, Christian
nation, attempted against the Jews. Once again the reader is bound
to protest when he reads this pitiless indictment. I believe, on the
contrary, that Baldwin had glimpsed here a terrifying truth: just as
pogroms were no accident in Jewish history, but the sign of an
endemic disease, exacerbated and coming to a head, so lynchings,
hangings and bonfires are the final explosion of true sentiments of
the white man with regard to the black man.20
Just as all men are rapists in some basic way for Brownmiller and MacKinnon, all
American whites for Memmi are murderously hateful of their fellow Black
countrymen. There is "no reason" Memrni knows why American Blacks do not
meet the same dolorous, collective fate as the European Jews did under Hitler and
the Oberm enschen of the SS. Memmi, like MacKinnon, plays the "it is no
accident" Stalinist. What clever dishonesty. The American racial holocaust never
happened, and never will. The " lynchings, hang.ings and bonfires" were not the
"final explosion of true sentiments of the white man" but rather the dying gasp of
American segregation.
But Memmi's ''there is no reason" creates the implication of an ever
present potential for genocide. The system itself is unfixable and should be
overthrown-revolution, the twentieth-century remedy for all of our social ills.
Memmi sees nothing redeemable in the American character and American
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institutions, nothing that might help us understand why the gas chamber-showers
have not yet been built and put into twenty-four-hour-a-day production. The slim
moral difference between the Nazis and the American whites for Memmi is that
the former actually carried out the mass killings- yet genocide lives and thrives
in the hearts of both groups. The two essential elements for carrying out a "final
solution" are in place on both sides of the ocean- being white and being
Christian. And to make certain that no one falls prey to any false or naive
optunism and supposes that the intense hatred and bigotry so identified might
some day abate, Memrni does not hesitate to affix the familiar pestilence
metaphor, "endemic disease" to the whole business. Thus he overlays with great
heaviness a particularly ominous and hopeless tone upon this horrible description
of America' s worst malignancy.
American intellectuals are also on record in the production of this sort of
self-loathing: Susan Sontag in 1966 had said that "the white race is the cancer of
history." 21 This radical and racist moral pronouncement, of course, was offered up
before the non-white, non-Christian Pol Pot carried out the ideologically-

motivated mass murder of his countrymen-wiping out a percentage of the
population of a nation unprecedented in history, and before the non-white Hutus
were committing acts of genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda, but well after the
non-Christian Stalin had murdered tens of millions of people in Eastern Europe
and the non-Christian Turks had murdered hundreds of thousands of Christian
Armenians. Such sweeping, categorical judgments, as we see above with the likes
of Takaki, Brownrniller, MacKinnon, Memmi and Sontag, are neither provable
nor dis-provable: they are, in my view, more akin to articles or tenets of a
powerful religious faith, one albeit that overflows with the most intense, bitter
emotion and the deepest conviction.
Bitter and implacable resentment fueled by the imagery of persecution and
personal violation lies beneath these kinds of denunciations. It is this sort of
impassioned, embittered definition of self, engulfed in a suffering that others plan
and maliciously perpetuate, that attempts to convict the institutions of the most

100

Desolation's March

egregious crimes, and that sees in them nothing but oppression, exploitation and
criminality.
Once accused, the institution itself becomes an object of unappeasable,
relentless execration and assault. Once convicted, the institution finds itself
undergoing a transformation in its character. It becomes virtually unrecognjzable.
The language and accusations, as we see above, do nothing but execrate and
condemn. They point to what Matthew Arnold in an earlier age called "the ways
of Jacobinism." His words remain a perfect description of this late-twentiethcentury phenomenon. These "ways" are a
violent indignation with the past, abstract systems of renovation
applied wholesale, a new doctrine drawn up in black and white for
elaborating down to the smallest detai ls a rational society for the
future. 22
Special note should be made of just how "violent" this indignation with
the past" really is. Traditional institutions are, upon the critical scrutiny of the
above de-legitimizers, arbitrarily-established orders of inequality. This is in spite
of any rhetoric of legitimacy that presents them as natural or inevitable.
lnstitutions protect the interests of some, usually the few, to the detriment of the
well-being and happiness of others, the many.
The task of uncovering the surreptitiously coercive character of traditional
institutions bas become a regular occupation, indeed a profession with a unique
social-occupational role taken up and expanded by our intellectual class.
Intellectuals, another group of specialists bequeathed by late modernity, specialize
in the invention and refinement of "social critique": they design and wield the
theoretical apparatuses fo r exposing the unjust and coercive character of
traditional institutions that might be hidden away, as we have seen with the above
examples. They are the vanguard of what Lionel Trilling has called the "adversary
culture."
Any historian of the literature of the modern age will take virtually
for granted the adversary intention, the actually subversive
intention, that characterizes modem writing- he will perceive its
clear purpose of detaching the reader from the habits of thought
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and feeling that the larger culture imposes, of giving him a ground
and a vantage point from which to judge and condemn, and
perhaps revise, the culture that produced him.23
The intellectual specializes in the discovery and articulation of grievances and, as
Richard Pipes has pointed out, unlike people generally, tends to conceive of
grievances as pervasive, universal, and on a grand scale, rather than specific and
limited. Modern revolutionaries, like Lenin, Hitler and Mao, have always spoken
in the most violent of ways of the old order, of "destroying" it, "smashing" it or
"sweeping" it away, including its representatives. The violence of language has
always been followed by an even greater violence in practice. The old order, its
authority and its works, have to be cleared away, like so much rubbish, and a
brand new one, free from any of the corruptive elements of the past, should be put
in its place.24 Many of the crimes against humanity committed in the twentieth
century by the likes of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot were atrocities that were
justified under moral abstractions, the products of fierce intellectual hatred and
revulsion with the status quo. The "intellectual" aspect of the intellectual hatred
helped to create the rationalizations for the acts of wiping out millions of people
connected with or in any way representing the status quo.
Rousseau was th e intellectual' s intellectual. As the philosopher of misery
and the original theorist of socially determined victimhood, he cast the original
molds for the production of the "socially conscious" moralist. These were the
theorists, richly infused with the indignation that the contemplation of social

misery arouses, and the revolutionary--Leni n, Mao, Castro, Pol Pot, who could
fan the white-hot coals of long-smoldering moral outrage into the blazing fires of
an ideological conflagration. Liberation is the intellectual 's elixir. Alienated and
detached from his own institutions, impressed with his own infallible moral
insights, he remains the solidly self-righteous, resentful agent of social
insurrection.
Liberation has been an ideological chimera in constant expansion
throughout the twentieth century. The quests of liberation cover an extraordinary
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elf-realization, authenticity, rights for animals, saving the earth.

Whatever these causes or programs of liberation are, they are held to be ultimately
and fully self-justifying. They sanctify the personalities and characters of the
individuals who embrace them unconditionally. That is, their personal qualities of
character, their methods for attaining their objectives, and their conduct are
morally and ethically secondary to the moral purity of their aspirations, the
loftiness of their ideals and the nobility of their intentions. Wrongful conductlying, manipulation, theft, murder- is justified if it somehow serves the aims of
the sanctified individual who embraces the cause of liberation. Just societies for
the personalist are led by people who direct their energies and resources into
projects which completely dismantle hierarchy, overturn traditional norms, and
eliminate all forms of social inequality.
The primal, rock-bottom embodiment for Rousseau of inequality, the basis
for civilization, was the invention of the institution of private property. This
would be a terrible event in the history of the human race. The convention of
property, the invention of "mine and thine," turned out to be a perfidious act that
would thrust upon an originally happy and pristine world the most profound
source of human divisiveness- an institutionally-sanctioned, class-defining
partition of haves and have-nots. Thus, as he states in hyper-dramatic fashion in
his Discourse on the Origin and Foundations ofInequality among Men.
The first man who, having fenced off a plot of ground, thought of
saying 'This is mine,' and found people simple enough to believe
him, was the real founder of civil society. 25
The institution of private property erupted as a primal force that introduced those
impersonal, socially-sanctioned forms of cruelty that formed the jagged edged
reality underneath the gentile facade of a so-called civilized order. From the
gradual imposition of private property and all the material advantages property
conferred were derived those social cleavages in which some rule or enjoy
advantages over others- not by virtue of any inherent qualities of personal
goodness or character, but by luck, cleverness, or by force. There is, as Rousseau
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suggests with his reference to the simpletons who passively and lackadaisically
assent lo this sinister symbolic act of appropriation, a huge, treacherous fault line
of falsity and delusion that runs through the bed rock of norms that established the
basis of civilized institutions and the foundations of inequality.
The enemy of all human happiness and well-being, quite clearly for
Rousseau, was social and political inequality, and thus only associations
voluntarily entered into and fully participated in were for him legitimate. The
ideal of full , equal, voluntary participation in all associations has made itself
strongly felt: it continues to have enormous potential for expanding the ranks of
the oppressed. Applied universally and literally, even the most open, democratic
society disguises an abundance of individuals who, temporarily or permanently,
and for many different reasons, are unable lo participate fully or equally in many
social functions. Children, the physically, intellectually and emotionally disabled
find themselves in positions of inequality, unable to work or learn or play or
function in the same way, on an equal level, as others-the potential
circumstances for inequality are innumerable. Such inequalities, whatever their
cause and whatever the circumstance are, for the equalitarian, the basis of moral
claims to be pressed against the "advantaged." Robert Nisbet has suggested that
the passion for equality as an energizing ideological force may likely result in an
unlimited assault against institutions.
[O]nce the ideal of equality becomes uppermost it can become
insatiable in its demands. It is possible to conceive of human
beings conceding that they have enough freedom or justice in a
social order, it is not possible to imagine them ever declaring they
have enough equality- <mce, that is, equality becomes a
cornerstone of national policy. 26
When the quest for equality becomes unlimited, those with power often
see themselves as no longer bound by any existing conventional constraints in
attempting to achieve it. Laws, conventions, morals- all of these represent
impediments to the achievement of liberation and full equality. To Edgar Snow,
Mao was reported to have said, "We don' t know really know what is meant by
law, because we never paid any attention to it."27 Law for Mao was merely a
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hindrance to the attempts of the party to implement its programs. The benevolent
intentions- again, intentions reign supreme and become self-justifying-<Jf the
party leaders were not to be thwarted by conventional impediments. Law, with its
impersonality and impartiality, must give way to a very personalized order. The
rule of law is an obstacle to the personalist.
Monarchies became the first institutions to run afoul of the personalistsillegitimate and unjust orders. Rousseau deemed them illegitimate because
monarchs rule without the formal consent of all those who are under their
dominion: they were unjust because they imposed arbitrary, social orders of
inequality. The tremendous, religious-like passion of the French revolutionaries
for the Republic found its deep roots in a Rousseau-inspired moral revulsion with
monarchy and its trappings of power and privilege. But formal political inequality
is only one piece of a much larger, complex social picture. Equality can be
envisioned across the entire spectrum of human association. Inequality remains
the ultimate iniquity for the Roussean, and it is particularly virulent because it
pustulates in all traditional social institutions and in many different contexts. It
assumes many invidious forms and many different groups suffer its effects. A
great portion of political history in the West since the French Revolution has been
the ongoing discovery of inequality in ever expanding social arenas, and a
morally-inspired organization of rebellion against it.
The twentieth century was vigorously Rousseau, distinguished by an
obsessive pursuit of equality. Ironic in all of this is that the most passionate
theoretical espousers of equality, when empowered, often turn into the cruelest
and most malignant of despots. Why? Because relations of inequality are, as
suggested above, discoverable everywhere. The discovery process becomes an
end in itself, exalted and sacrosanct. It always finds more inequalities to be
addressed. Once uncovered, these relations of inequality invite vigorous, largescale modes of redress, which in turn require enormous and continuous
applications of power. Resistance, for whatever reason, simply inflates the
resentment of those in power and intensifies the ferocity of their retaliation
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against the resisters. The history of the communist revolutions in the twentieth
century confirms this. The link of despotism to an unlimited quest for equality, so
conspicuous and manifest a political phenomenon in the twentieth century, is also
due to the fact that unconstrained power in the hands of passionate moralizers
breeds, with credit to Lord Acton, a particularly virulent, self-righteous corruption
of character and degradation of the personality.
The corroded mummy of Lenin, still stretched out for public veneration
eight decades after his expiration, is perhaps the twentieth-century's most
grotesque illustration of Acton's profound observation. (The irony of this intense
hater of Christianity turned into a religious relic, ensconced saint-like in the
Stalin-built shrine to his militantly atheistic communism, has been noted by
numerous observers.)
Lenin overflowed with a vehement detestation of all the traditional
hierarchies, particularly the church. His hatred for the capitalist exploiting class
and its "enslavement" of the workers was deep, cold and boundless. Hatred and
resentment, to purloin one of Gibbon's oft-employed, elegant expressions, were
the "ruling. passions of his soul." Yet, when he finally wielded the power he had
strnggled so ruthlessly to possess, the attainment of his driving, life-long ambition
for a classless society with full equality took shape in the largest and cruelest
police state in the history of the world. Secret police with arbitrary life and death
powers, concentration camps (a Leninist invention), mass deportations, and the
purposeful savage destruction of an entire economic, social class of people were
the main contributions of this great equalitarian. 'The whole of society,"
predicted Lenin for the aim of his revolution, "will have become a single office, a
single factory with equal work and equal pay."28
With monumental drama on a world historical scale, Lenin's career
demonstrated what many social theorists have long understood: that a vigorous,
full throttled drive toward the realization of equality often produces a grotesque
irony in an application of the law of unintended consequences. The pursuit and
maintenance of equality requires near limitless coercion with the result of the
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most unequal order of all- the coercers, unrestrained and determined to impose at
any cost whatever measures their current ideological vibrations dictate; the
coerced, defenseless and passive, hoping that the coercers will discover within

themselves some hidden vein of benevolence or forgiveness.
Indeed, in reading of the early years following the Bolsheviks ' seizure of
power, it is astonishing to observe that Lenin believed that he could create his
new, greed-free society and get rid of human exploitation and material disparities
by passing decrees, giving orders, expropriating property, and imprisoning and
shooting those people who were insufficiently enthusiastic about obeying his
commands, endorsing his ideas, and embracing his policies and programs.29
Rousseau 's political philosophy left posterity with the design for an
ideological engine with enormous power; power to dismantle traditional social
institutions. To the extent that they confine or suppress individuality, impose
authority through hierarchically defined roles, institutions must be resisted,
rebelled against, and perhaps even rightfully destroyed. This is a Roussean
perspective that has insidiously pervaded our mass culture. But it is not simply
political institutions or governments that should be resisted. All social institutions
insofar as they constrain and confine are benighted and outmoded. They require
the attention of experts who know how lo properly reconstruct, or, if necessary,
simply dismantle them. Examples of this destructive impulse will be explored
below.
The language of the intellectual critics who make up the adversary class,
particularly the more recent ones of the last several decades like those quoted
above, betrays a deep and abiding hostility toward traditional institutions, one
with an ideological linkage to Rousseau. This is evident in part both from the
language that is used and the denunciatory, Lenin-like style in which the criticism
is often cast. The critiques that examine our past and whatever remnants of earlier
tradition govern our modem life are dominated by verbs like "unmask," "expose,"
"uncover," "confront" and similar morally denuding locutions that suggest the
most extreme and insidious designs of domination, exploitation and oppression.
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"Feminism," exclaims Catherine MacKinnon, "has unmasked maleness as a form
of power that is both omnipotent and non-existent, an unreal thing with very real
consequences."30 The mechanisms of oppression- hidden and awaiting discovery
and exposure by the theoretical denouncers- are identified sometimes as
economic (as m capitalist exploitation), gender-based (as in patriarchal
domination), race-based (as in racial discrimination and oppression) and
sometimes as combinations of all of these and more.
This social criticism displays a character that is fundamentally ad
hominem, attacking the moral character and motives of those who in any way
represent or defend the status quo. This ad hominem style of criticism always
seeks to expose the real, social bedrock coercion behind the false appearance of
cooperation. It identifies the reality of carefully veiled power structures behind
which privileged beneficiaries hide and impose inequalities and ruthlessly
perpetuate them. The unmasking always points toward the motives of the
members of the ruling classes. Their hypocrisy and their iniquity can, in ways
both subtle and obvious, be discovered in those things that they hold up as their
most important accomplishments, what they value. The cultural artifacts- works
of art, religious ideas, educational practices, even scientific theories, when
carefully and critically examined, reveal underneath vested structures of privilege
and power. Those engaged in activities like art, religion and science are,
ultimately, discovered be practitioners of social domination. Art's efforts to
express beauty, religion's promise of forgiveness and salvation, and science's
quest for truth can be dismissed with a sneer; they are nothing but surface,
fraudulent poses. Social criticism politicizes all of these cultural endeavors,
reducing them to their essential true nature, instruments of social power and
exploitation.
The quest for the expansion and expression of self, late twentieth-century
style, has long been popularly conceived as a process of personal liberation,
primarily a freeing of the individual from social constraints imposed by traditional
institutions. There is a popular term from the 1960s that conveys the gravity of
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this impulse for liberation- "consciousness raising." This remarkable metaphor
suggests that the process itself moves toward a morally enlightened ascent- from
a lower immersion in shadows to a higher, illuminated plane.
Charles Reich in his popular book of the early 1970s, The Greening of
America, schematized in religious terms this spiritual ascent, demarcating three
levels of consciousness, I, II, and ill, the last of which he describes as a full
dramatic "conversion." "In contrast to consciousness II, which accepts society,
the public interest, and institutions as the primary reality,

m

declares that the

individual self is the only true reality." 31 This is essentially the same theme
expressed more bombastically by Abbie Hoffman, above. The reality of "society"
and "public interest" that have been superseded in this ascent are seen to be
repressing and limiting. Consciousness raising, as the metaphor of implied
bondage seems to indicate, is a process of escape, a move toward a higher plane
of reality. It usually requires the assistance of another, someone who has made the
journey, some self-proclaimed member of the cognoscenti who has already
escaped from the institutionally-created cage.
Consciousness raising has a philosophical and ideological linkage to Karl
Marx' s scourge of the bourgeois for their "false consciousness." Marx, living in
poverty and translating his moral rage into many volumes of economic history
and political economy amidst the squalor of the mid-nineteenth-century London
slums, became the great avatar of modem day intellectual resentment. Marx was
able to make sophisticated theory out of raw resentment. His writings gave
philosophic articulation and systematical application both to Rousseau's innate
and deeply felt misery and his intuitive sense of social class victimhood. From the
caustic and irascible Marx there emanated his social-economic critique, a
distinctive and highly imitative mode of analysis and interpretation by which the
direction of human history and the nature of social interaction could be fathomed.
All of human history, understood in proper Marxist dialectical fashion, must be
seen in its ultimacy as the playing out of the effects of class domination. History
is in fact a kind of grand morality play, a dramatic struggle which leads to the
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domination and oppression of one social-economic group by anotherdomination is the quintessential theme of Marxist historical-social analysis;
resentfulness is the distinguishing affective mark of the analyzers.
Marx's living, enduring legacy was the establishment of this infinitely
expandable and highly flexible system for analyzing and explaining nearly every
kind of social relationship. Almost all human interaction, by this compelling
interpretive approach, gets turned over, dissected and scrutinized until there
emerges right at the vital center a power relation by which the stronger or the
advantaged party manipulates and exploits the weaker or disadvantaged party.
This is, perhaps, the major reason why Marx has been always been, and still is, so
seductive for representatives or spokesman of the legions of the dispossessed.
And it is why capitalism (ever since Marx identified it as such) is so often blamed
for the far flung miseries of the human race even though oppression and
exploitation persist in every social-economic system there is. Human social
interaction for Marx and his progeny operates with a large component of
exploitation-rationalized or covered up or ignored, depending upon which
strategy at any given moment works the best. The mark of a sophisticated
understanding is the capacity to penetrate through these veneers of rationalization,
ideology and the various strategies of domination, and move to the rock bottom of
human interaction where the mechanisms of social conflict operate and determine
the structure and context of human relationships as well as all of culture.
While Marx proclaimed with his customary vehemence that his theory of
dialectical materialism was scientific, its extraordinary nineteenth- and twentiethcentury career seemed to resemble more closely that of a prophetic religion.
Marx's followers acted more like religious disciples and zealot-evangelists than
scientists. Marx's thought rapidly turned into Marx-ism and then fatally
burgeoned into a Great Orthodoxy owing much of its success as a system of
explanation to the energy and inspiration of the originating Prophet. Everything
necessary for propagation of the Word was in place-an inspired, infallible
scripture, from which explanations and rationalizations of nearly everything could

Desolation 's March

110

be conjured by the Priest-Interpreters, and a fanatical, true-believing corps of the
faithful who engaged in vigorous proselytizing, conversion, and war against the
non-believers, and who busily readied themselves for the arrival of the eschaton.
In those places where the priests of dialectical materialism actually found
themselves in possession of political power (as in the Soviet Union, China, North
Korea or Cuba) heretics, imagined or otherwise, were routinely carted off to the
slave camps, gulags, and prisons, forced into exile, or just put to death.
The practitioners of official, orthodox Marxism were enthusiastically self
assured in announcing their discovery of the exploitation of the workers by the
capitalists. They were also most assiduous in their preparation for the inevitable
collapse of capitalism and confidently awaited the dawn of the classless society.
The day would indeed arrive when all the material resources of modem
production would be equitably distributed, everyone could reach their full human
potential, and no one would be taking unfair advantage of anyone else.
Like most orthodoxies over time, however, its categories of thought
became duly calcified, and its explanations of reality strained and implausible, no
longer convincing or believable. Marxism as a secular, state-sponsored religion,
particularly in comparison with world religions like Christianity and Islam, has
had a phenomenally short life. In those final dreary years of Eastern block
communism where Marxian theodicy had been fully institutionalized, no one with
a fully functional brain could possibly take the promise of a world revolution, the
immanent demise of capitalism, and the withering away of the state seriously, not
even the nominal Marxist mandarins who wielded power and enjoyed the perks of
party membership. This is one reason why the whole edifice collapsed as quickly
and bloodlessly as it did. Not so much as a shadow of an ideal or principle could
be found to operate behind any official thought or action. No powerful symbols
were guiding the party elites that anybody believed were at all worth fighting to
advance or even preserve.
Few serious thinkers today, even Marxists, give credence to Marx's
grandest piece of prophecy, his prediction of the overthrow of capitalism; but
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Marxism is very much alive. His theory of exploitation and domination remains
with us as the powerful, driving force of contemporary social critique. Even
though Marxism as a political philosophy and a social experiment has failed
miserably, Marx's vision and language of exploitation- most efficacious for
stirring moral outrage-have proved to be extraordinarily resilient. Not only are
they infectious, but also expandable, malleable and very insidious. Social
relationships of all sorts are now run through the hermeneutical mills of twentiethcentury-customized Marxism and emerge revealing the existence of hitherto
unknown or unrecognized agencies of exploitation and domination. They exact,
we are brought to understand, a terrible de-humanizing toll.
Exploitation, or, "strategies of domination" in the more contemporary
expression thus, if one pays any attention to those who produce the theory and
make comment on such matters, would seem to be in place and at work in many
or most of our social institutions and relationships. Exploitation is at the core of
most human relationships: it is the force that conditions many of our basic social
practices and institutional norms. It is difficult it seems now to look anywhere in
modem society and not find some form of social exploitation.
Hilton Kramer, reflecting on the careers of the prominent New York
intellectuals of the 1930s like lrving Howe, Irving Kristo], Sidney Hook, and
Mary McCarthy, wrote that,
The issues that were of primary concern to the New York
intellectuals from the Thirties onward- namely Marxism in
politics and modernism in culture-are still, in one form or
another, the central political and cultural issues of the present day,
and they affect a larger part of our society than ever before.32
Kramer wrote this in 1986. It still holds. The minds, or what today's
Marxist critics say, the "value-systems" of the dominant groups, are inherently
disposed to universalize (to "totalize" in the current argot) and thus impose their
values on everyone else.
Marx, of course, identified the politically and culturally dominant group as
the bourgeois, the exploiter of working class. Its members go about their lives
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confidently self-deluded, carried along by the support of ideals and values that are
ultimately class-determined rationalizations that protect the exclusive, vested
interests of the privileged class. Every bourgeois value and ideal is camouflage
for some form of advantage or privilege. Every virtue is a class-interest-motivated
social construct plastered over with a practical veneer of hypocrisy and perhaps
some high blown religiosity to make it seem objective and eternal. "False
consciousness" was Marx's term for the inherent illusory character of one's
thinking and valuing, illusions derived from a failure to recognize the determinacy
of those values by the interests and advantages conferred by social-economic
class. Thus, the bourgeois operated with an entirely false set of values: religion,
morality art, scienc

all cultural endeavors- are activities conditioned by the

economic relations of production which in tum are the infrastructure of class
domination. Just how these cultural activities might be articulated, explained and
justified in their own terms is irrelevant to their fundamental existence as classconditioned realities. There is no such thing as a purely disinterested search for
truth (pure science or philosophy); no pure love of and devotion to one's fellow
creatures (pure religion); no unsullied quest for beauty and form (pure art). An
appeal to logic, facts, consistency, or principle can never be successful in
establishing the u.ltimate worth or autonomy of these enterprises because the
whole social edifice which supports them is undergirded by class-determined,
bourgeois assumptions.
Consciousness raising as it has emerged from the 1960s and developed
over the last several decades is a radical response to the Marxian-posited "false
consciousness" that dominates the corrupted social order. The experience has
affinities with the expe.rience of religious conversion. Through its operations one
comes to the acceptance of a profound truth to which he or she was previously
resistant or blind. Overcoming false consciousness is an act of removing moral
blinders; it requires the repudiation of the things that one once believed were
important. MacKinnon writes that:
Consciousness raising is a face-to-face social experience that
strikes at the fabric of meaning of social relations between and
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among women and men by calling their givenness into question
and reconstituting their meaning in a transformed and critical
way.33
Thus conceived, consciousness raising 1s a life altering, socially
transforming process. One's understanding and conception of social reality
profoundly changes- meanings are reconstituted or re-invented. In this process is
a release from the bonds of 'x-induced' ignorance-substitute for 'x' gender,
economic class or whatever one determines is the defining characteristic of the
dominant group, that is, its basis and rationale for power.
This process of conversion one undergoes is holistic in its overturning of
basic assumptions and predilections. Often it is accompanied by bitterness,
resentment and hatred. Marx himself was an angry, hate-ridden man, who heaped
scorn and ridicule upon those with whom he disagreed and with whom he
contended for power. Lenin was equally, if not more, accomplished in the arts of
vituperation. The reason for the rancor and resentment that comes with the raising
of consciousness is due to the painful awareness of massive exploitation and
manipulation by the dominant class or group. Behind this quest for relief from
repression is a perspective on human nature and social institutions that descends
over the last two hundred and forty years from Rousseau. The spirit of selffulfillment is the now ubiquitous ghost of Rousseau who speaks eloquently in
many tongues for the individual who has been trampled upon by the agents of
traditional institutions.
The self-fulfillment and self-awareness of a raised consciousness is more
than the improvement of one's character or the attainment of one's individual
potential. It is a "self-re-defining," revolutionary process, a career of selfdiscovery through liberation from benighted assumptions about how one is
supposed to live and to act. With the overthrow of the "old" assumptions comes
the freeing of one's self from traditional restraints and obligations that flow out of
these assumptions; for these can only bind

if one

believes in the value and

essential worth of the institutions behind them. Being a Catholic and being a
father, for example, are only important if Catholicism and fatherhood stand for
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important, valuable things. Self-fulfillment is, again to use the idiom of the day,
an act of liberation--liberation from the constraints imposed by social
institutions. Self-fulfillment is an escape from the repressiveness of social
institutions-the "dogmas" of the church, the confinement of family roles and
their demands and sacrifices, the inhibitions of middle class moralityparticularly the long-standing ones that are shaped by "blind" tradition. The
achievement of self-liberation and self-fulfillment comes out of the throes of a
struggle that pits a vulnerable individual, with his unlimited potential for
expressiveness and expansiveness, against social groups with ruthless, wellrefined capacities for devouring that individuality and for imposing a stifling
conformity to their norms of behavior.
Traditional institutions work their mischief through an illicit, unjust
imposition of authority. For Rousseau' s early epigones, a hereditary monarch was
both a symbol and an incarnate embodiment of oppression, a man who imposed
his will and authority over others without their consent and their authority.
Political authority could be legitimate only if it was fully, universally
participatory. From the monarch, who inherited (again that nefarious notion of
property at work) his throne and his power, flowed the other evils of the

traditional role, that is, the subordination in the form of hierarchical ranks of
people with differentiated roles. For the initial followers of Rousseau, the ancient
regime symbolized everything evil and oppressive. It was a corrupt social order
that ought to be overthrown; total revolution was a moral as well as a political act.
Rousseau's

original

critique of the

ancient regime

became

an

extraordinarily expandable tool of criticism. His arguments, and more importantly
the strong sentiments behind them, have proved to be compelling and addictive
and have, in their application during the course of two centuries, expanded far
beyond formal political institutions. Almost every power and authority structure
in the West, including the family, the church, educational institutions have been
subject to the critical, egalitarian ideals proclaimed by Rousseau and have
undergone radical changes that reflect in some way his original passion for
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equality and his disdain for traditionally formed institutions.

In order to understand how pervasively the eighteenth-century Roussean
critique of inequality has insinuated itself into the early-twenty-first-century
pursuit of equality, it is appropriate to examine our own social institutions, note
their linkages to traditional religious notions of morality, and observe how
Rousseau-style thinking over the last fifty years has challenged and fundamentally
changed them. I will consider the impact of personalism on institutions such as
the marriage, the family, the church, and education. Consider first the most
intimate, personal and basic of our traditional institutions, marriage.

III
The institution of marriage, particularly in its traditional reli gious and moral
trappings, has undergone the most remarkable transformation during the last fifty
years. Many Americans, as recently as at mid-century, still embraced marriage as
a social bond with a transcendental origin and purpose that endowed it with
meaning and importance beyond that of other human relationships. Marriage was
supposed to be a life-defining moment. It brought unique responsibilities and
obligations, and it established new and important social roles. So important was
this institution that it had the support of most .o f the other institutions such as the
church and the state and was solidly and staunchly upheld by conventional
attitudes and religious prejudices. "What God hath joined, let not man put
asunder", enjoined the minister at the end of the wedding ceremony. Marriage,
until very recently- forty or fifty years ago-- was an institution with essentially
religious roots. For Catholic Christians, marriage was (still is even) a holy
sacrament.
Until the 1960s, traditional marriage was relatively stable and, even with
its obvious role differentiation, was generally accepted. By generally accepted I
mean that couples tended to stay with the marriage even when it was far from
fulfilling; divorce rates were low. Unhappy marriages were endured for the sake
of the children. Once married, one remained married. Divorces were hard to get
and their effects were often nasty. A social stigma was attached to them. During
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the early 1960s, one might recall the intense scrutiny from the national press to
which Nelson Rockefeller was subjected over his efforts to shed his first wife so
he could marry Happy, his mistress. It was, though it is hard to imagine now, a
major production for Rockefeller- such was the newsworthiness of the whole
business. In New York only adultery and cruelty were grounds for divorce, a
dilemma for a nationally prominent politician like Rockefeller who badly craved
the Presidency. For divorcee Ronald Reagan in 1980, a dissolved first-marriage
which would have probably seriously impaired his chances a generation earlier
was no longer a problem politically. The voters themselves, including many
Roman Catholics by that time, had become quite regular practitioners of "putting
asunder" what God originally had joined. Reagan, a divorced movie actor with a
long career in the "Sodom and Gomorrah" of Hollywood, was the favorite in the
1980s, ironically, of conservative Christians. Even more ironically, as Governor
of California, he signed the first no-fault divorce bill in the country into law.
A generation ago marriage was still vested with some religious meaning
and transcendental significance: its dissolution signaled a serious moral and
spiritual failing. A divorce was still a social anomaly and something to be
ashamed of and to regret. Over the last fifty years however, marriage, like many
other practices of our post-World War JJ culture that were once shaped and
guided by a religious understanding of human existence, has been thoroughly
naturalized, that is, separated from supernatural moorings.
Between the mid- l 960s and mid- l 970s came the veritable explosion of
divorce. It was during this period that the moral view of divorce drastically
changed for many Americans-from an anomalous, disturbing event signaling
shame and a sense of failure to a relatively normal occurrence. All of a sudden it
seemed divorce was all around us--our friends, ourselves, even our parents were
routinely detaching and reattaching themselves. Books like Creative Divorce,
Surviving the Breakup : How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce, and
Leaming to Love Again began to appear. Productions like these tapped into the

rapidly expanding psychological "self help" genre of publishing- almost non-
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existent prior to World War II- and encouraged Americans to look at divorce as
another difficult but normal phase of life that, with the appropriate therapeutic
conditioning or life-style rearrangement, could be an important "lea.rrllng
experience" and one more opportunity for personal growth and self-expression.
Now, some thirty years after that remarkable social revolution and its own unique
"enervation of authority," couples enter into marriage with the complete
normalization of divorce in the background. The dissolution of a marriage is more
akin to the failure of a business venture, a deal gone bad, a miscalculation of

material

circumstances-a common occurrence but while disappointing,

completely unremarkable, and understandable and frequent.
Traditional marriage imposed gender-defined obligations for men and
women. These have become increasingly onerous, and it has been impossible for
traditional marriage---defined by religious ideals-to withstand a withering
critique whlch is driven by the aspiration of complete social equality.
Critics of traditional marriage are often indifferent, if not hostile, to
traditional religious ideals. If marriage has an institutional foundation of archaic
religious obligations and aspirations, then escape from it should never be a
stigma. Traditional marriage was binding. Many of the norms imposed by the
institution became impossible to justify in a purely secular context and in secular
terms. Being bound is, again, inimical to the personalist ideal of development and
self-expansion.
In 1972, Nena and George O'Neill published Open Marriage: A New Life
Style for Couples. This widely read, much commented-on book was so popular, I

suspect, because the "new life style" into whlch traditional marriage was to
evolve was the culmination of the personalist quest for personal growth and selffulfillment. "Open marriage" was the circle squared: commitment with no
constraints or inhibitions. The Preface and Acknowledgement section of the book
clearly and succinctly states the personalist ideal of marriage.
Two consistent threads ran all through our interviews: one was the
desire for freedom, and the other, a longing for relatedness to
another-a search for a deeply personal and mutual commitment in
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a relationship that would not bind. 34
A relationship that would not bind- the cake that one could both have and eat.
Open marriage, of course, was not marriage at all, but merely another post-1960s
"life style" variation that attempted to capture the dominant theme of the new
age, self fulfillment.
Traditional marriage formed a relationship, in some important respects, of
subordination and thus, judged by the norm of full social equality, unjust. The
beginning of the end for marriage as it was viewed and practiced up to the 1950s
came in the 1960s with the major assault launched from the growing feminism
movement, aided by other social forces such as the development of low cost and
highly effective birth control methods which made sex more easily detachable
from marriage, and a rapidly expanding consumer-oriented economy in which sex
itself became a highly marketable commodity.
The family of the 1950s was ruled by what Barbara Ehrenreich has called
the "breadwinner ethic." Men were supposed to provide for their wives and
children. Not to do so was to fail in being a man. 35 The following decades have
eroded that ethic as men too have been liberated from an "oppressive" role
defined by traditional marriage.
Feminism opened an attack on traditional marriage, and the movement
was carried along with what was essentially a Roussean-revulsion with the social
hierarchy it imposed. Marriage, as the now-familiar argument unfolds, is a
repressive, patriarchal institution that degrades women, presses them into service
in confining, male-defined roles, and ultimately devalues their unique character
and essence. Patriarchy, represented officially and essentially in the structure of
authority in traditional marriage, is indeed, illegitimate, a usurpation of power and
an abominable celebration of male-privilege. A 1970s feminist, Shulamith
Firestone, presents an implied critique of marriage and a proclamation of
revolution in her Dialectic of Sex. Marriage is fully equated with tyranny.
[T]he new feminism is not just the revival of a serious political
movement for social equality. It is the second wave of the most
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important revolution in history. Its aim: overthrow of the oldest,
most rigid class/caste system in existence, the class system based
on sex- a system consolidated over thousands of years, lending
the archetypical male and female roles an undeserved legitimacy
and seeming permanence.36
Such are the judgments and sentiments of a late twentieth-century gender-Jacobin
reflecting upon the rigid caste system of which traditional marriage is an essential
part. The iniquities which are protested are most egregious and of long duration.
The only remedy is "revolution" (again, that often prescribed twentieth-century
moral-political cure for social ills) a total dismantling of the completely rotten
system. The patriarchal husband is fully analogous in political and moral terms to
the hereditary King (the object of Rousseau's animadversion) with his duplicitous
practice and iniquitous celebration of undeserved authority and his exercise of
arbitrary power. The legitimacy of the patriarchal family, like that of the King, is
false. The apparent naturalness of marriage as a permanent, enduring institution is
an illusion, an important element of a false consciousness in which most of us
have long been trapped.
Marriage, that is, traditional marriage as it was generally practiced and
understood until mid-century, was thus, under the feminist-Roussean critique, an
institution that ensured the subservience and detriment of women in much the
same way that monarchy worked against the lower classes- lashes and gruel for
the oafish serfs, exaltation and roast pheasant for the king; corporate presidencies,
professorships and country club outings for the man, housework, unwanted
pregnancies and dirty diapers for the little woman.
The norms and the values that were embraced even fifty years ago that set
up the boundaries of traditional marriage have now been removed. They are an
outmoded expression of benighted patriarchy. Women, under the patriarchal
forms of authority imposed upon them, without their consent, suffered. They were
reconstructed creatures, assigned subordinate roles, duped, coerced, intimidated,
seduced, in many diverse and degraded forms, subjected to the authority and
ultimately the domination of men.
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For the last forty years or so, the feminist-Rousseau attack on patriarchal

marriage has unfolded in a manner somewhat analogous, though considerably less
dramatic and violent, to the Jacobins' overthrow and execution of Louis XVI. The
central vehicle of assault has been through divorce. The traditional institution of
marriage for women was a clever, male-designed trap. Its divine and religious
sanctions- ideological cover for the oppressors-gave it a transcendental
authority that made it seem that it ought to be natural and permanent. From what
God ordains there must be no escape. Women were bound ideologically in
marriage by spiritual and religious fetters riveted by theologians, men who had
made God in their male image, a God whose will just happened to work to
advance the interests and desires of men.
Traditional marriage had to be ideologically challenged and politically
overthrown much like the traditional monarchy of the eighteenth-century in all of
its decadence and corruption had to be discredited and ultimately toppled.
Political society in Roussean ideology could establish its legitimacy only on the
basis of pure consent, and so marriage, where it was entered into at all, was to be
reconstructed as a fully and completely contractual relationship with simple and
easy cancellation rights. Marriage as a historical institution, rich with religious
and mystical trappings, had to give way to a lean and legalistic ,"relationship."
With the recreation of what was once a "holy union" as a purely secular and
contractual relationship, marriage became an arrangement, pure and simple, of
mutual convenience, and most importantly, easily undoable.
Divorce equaled liberation-escape from an oppressive institution, a blow
against twentieth-century tyranny, Western-style patriarchy. Marriage has thus
become a radically transformed institution, the "archy" of patriarchy completely
dismantled. The roles and responsibilities offered in the traditional marriage were
barriers to the expression of the genuine self of a woman. The husband
tyrannized. The children constrained. The wife, powerless and compliant, obeyed.
The woman, as wife and mother sacrificed herself, chained by duty to an
institution that denies her herself.
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Essential to the contractualist reconstruction of marriage and the
destruction of patriarchy was the legalization of abortion. Pregnancy, childbearing, and all the risks, obligations, and constraints these things brought into
play were essential pieces of the traditional marriage, and fetters exclusively
binding upon women. The criminalization of abortion that had long been in place
was discovered to be an insidious maneuver, one of the most debilitating effects
of the reigning ideology of the patriarch, an effort, legally as well as morally, to
make biology into a prison for women. Illegal abortion was a key component in a
coercive, male-designed apparatus that helped maintain the subjugation of
women.
The legalizing of abortion by the Supreme Court in 1973 might be viewed
symbolically as a "storming" of the male-guarded, biological Bastille, an escape
from the "prison" of reproduction, and in part a further dismantlement of the
traditional institution of marriage and a repudiation of the ideology behind it.
"Choice" relative to the continuance of pregnancy was another key element in an
expanding repertoire of personal freedoms, an equalizing move of the wi fe
relative to the husband, ifhe was deemed to be even necessary anymore.
But the legalizing of abortion meant much more than simply decriminalization. The new freedom to abort had to be tied to an ideology with a
cluster of moral and political arguments sufficiently compelling and energizing so
as to appeal to a broad spectrum of the American people who might still be
inclined toward the acceptance of more traditional norms and thus troubled and
even resistant to their overturning. The legalization of abortion, most importantly,
required its moralization-its vital, instrumental linkages to personal liberation
and reproductive freedom- and thus the enormous and still unresolved conflict
with all the intense, turbulent emotions that issued from it in the wake of the 1973
Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. Roe v Wade, as both sides came quickly to

recognize, was about more than just the legality of abortion: it represented a most
profound shift in moral outlook and orientation, behind which had taken place a
major rethinking and reordering of the most basic social relationships.
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The legalization and moralization of abortion as a revolt against a

traditionally religious view of marriage and reproduction and as the central socialethical issue of our time thus was to be argued with the language that emerged in
the 1960s of expansive individual rights- another aspect of the Roussean legacy
of personalism. The option to obtain an abortion was to be constructed as a legal
and moral right to an essential kind of freedom that had long been arbitrarily
denied. Legal abortion enabled women to protect themselves, expand their range
of important life choices, and extend their control over their own bodies. The
arguments follow logically from the assumptions and are, of course, all of a
complete piece with the Roussean-personalist view of society which pits
individuals against institutions and seeks to realign the balance of a secularized,
personal freedom against social obligations and social roles that appeal to
traditionally religious concepts. The woman's legally recognized "right" to
control over her body became another move toward the complete secularization of
American society and a concomitant enlargement of the subjective self as the
primary moral entity.
Whether or not one believes that liberalized divorce and legalized abortion
have been good for women, it is undeniable that these developments have
transformed the institution of marriage. Marriage in its late-twentieth-century
form has been reconstructed as a formal equation with a predominately
individualistic-utilitarian measure of a frequently shifting balance. The equation
operates according to a complex system of cost-benefit analysis: the costs and
benefits on each side are added up, and if they do not equate, by either partner's
calculation, then the lawyers step in, draw up the divorce papers and take their
twenty percent. The judge and the court-appointed social workers consort and
advise the de-coupled couple on how to reconstruct the broken lives of the
children. Then the partners go their separate ways. Often they try it again with
about the same failure rate. Moreover, the evaluation of the costs and the benefits
has increasingly been extended into the highly subjective, introspective plane of
self-realization and self-fulfillment such that the failure of either partner to
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establish, maintain, or recreate the unique conditions for self-expansion, 1s
sufficient grounds for dissolution.
For men, liberalized divorce, according to the utilitarian calculus, has also
proved to be self-enhancing. It has provided more opportunities for sexual
exploration and adventure and made it easier to shed or dilute the onerous
responsibilities (financial and otherwise) of fatherhood . When a man's wife of his
youth gets older and begins to lose her physical, sexual allure, it is now easier and
more socially acceptable for him to dump her and get a younger, prettier one-the
proverbial "trophy wife," a nicely dehumanized trope of late-twentieth-century
sexual liberation.
The liberalized norms of divorce are also more compatible with the
ascending ethos of amusement. It is now considerably easier to rearrange partners
in whatever temporary configurations are sufficiently appealing so as to attain the
maximum consumer level of sexual pleasure and satisfaction. Boredom, the arch
enemy of amusement, can now be more easily evaded than ever before by
divorce. In a way, divorce has become a major modem solution for boredom.
Marriage is now an individualistic, atomistic institution, if it can be
considered an institution at all, completely naturalized with little religious
significance beyond that of self-affirmation. That process of affirmation takes
many different forms at different times of life, and therefore requires that one
match up with different consorts at the different stages in order to extract the most
personal fulfillment and meaning out of life's personal, individual journey.
Marriage is just one more modem means for self-enhancement.
This contractualized, de-sacrilized form of marriage, with the easy
cancellation clause, has firmly established itself: marriage is something far
removed from its traditional, religiously-guided form . With what will soon be the
legal sanction of gay marriage, most of the traditional remnants and trappings wiU
be gone and marriage will be little more than a pairing off, or perhaps even, a
"grouping off' of individuals based upon whatever particular need or inclination
happens to draw them together. If marriage need not be between members of the
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opposite sex , as is argued by gay rights advocates, if it is primarily an expression
of commitment, then why does it need to be limited even to two people? The logic
behind the arguments for gay marriage can with little contortion readily be
applied to arguments for the legal and social sanction of polyandrous and
polygamous marriages.
Marriage, twenty-first century-style, will at some point in the West have
ceased completely to be a religious institution. 1n fact, it will hardly exist as a
non-legal institution at all, since "marriage" will be invoked legally to
characterize almost all social-sexual arrangements, no matter how temporary or
unconventional. At some point, probably in California, someone with the
assistance of an animal rights advocacy group will file a suit to obtain legal
recognition of a union with their pet Chihuahua. Insofar as it exists formally at all,
marriage's purview will belong to the State and will be a purely legally defined,
bureaucratically managed set of social relationships that exist for the
administration and regulation of health insurance, social security pensions and
retirement benefits, and other material social benefits and necessities. This is the
case now in Canada where the legal concept of marriage includes homosexual
couples: the Canadian Supreme Court in 1999 struck down the heterosexual
definition of the word "spouse" in a suit involving alimony claims by two
lesbians.
Traditional marriage has been the moral and social foundation for the
family for hundreds of years. The family was the vehicle for transmitting the basic
moral and social values across generations. The contractualization of marriage in
its late-twentieth-century form, of course, has enormous implications for this
important cultural process. The traditional family was a hierarchical structure with
layers of authority and a significant differentiation of roles. Wisdom and authority
were vested in the parents, and the children were subject to the constraints and the
discipline of their mothers and fathers. The conduct of the parents toward their
children presumably was governed to a large extent by a natural disposition of
benevolence. The age and experience of the parents were supposed to be the
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foundation of a practical, common sense wisdom that provided the basis for
guidance, and the constraints they imposed upon their children, constraints
motivated by their natural love and affection. The family was supposed to protect
children, to care and nurture them and to impart to them, primarily by example,
the accepted and appropriate norms for behavior as adults. Only children were
supposed to act like children. When the children grew up they were supposed to
assume responsibility and be decent and honorable just as their parents had shown
them. This presumed a traditional differentiation of roles out of which derived an
authority to which some members of the family would be subject. And it placed
expectations on the part of the parents to act decently and responsiblyexpectations to talk, dress and behave differently than their children.
Under the pressures from the ascending ideology of social equality and its
move against hierarchy in all forms, these differences have inevitably diminished,
and it is sometimes difficult, aside from physiological marks of appearance, to
distinguish children from adults.
The popular late nineteen-fifties television show, Father Knows Best,
captured, as best a television show could, an idealized traditional fifties notion of
the American family with all of the strengths and weaknesses of its middle class
character. Robert Young as Jim Anderson symbolized the traditional fathergentle but firm, practically wise and benevolent- imparting to his children
standards of integrity and basic decency. His wife, played by Jane Wyatt, was, of
course, a fine 1950s graceful model of subdued femininity, respectful and dutiful.
The three children were stereotyped, "goodie two shoes" middle class youths,
growing up in an idyllic, convention-bound middle America, learning and
yearning to be just like mom and dad.
Young's character is now a joke, a sappy parody. The show, forty years
later, provides a great target for later-day critics who can feast on the many now
obvious "sub-texts" of its 1950s themes of patriarchal conformity and selfsatisfied middle class insularity. As one critic disdainfully notes:
Father Knows Best preached many basic lessons: Fulfill your
promises; respect others; don' t lie to your parents; always do your
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best work. But if it had one driving theme, it was this: Learn to
accept your role.37

Promise-keeping, mutual respect, honoring your parents-all of these apparently
good things seem for the critic to be less important as positive values than the real
ugliness and deformity lying underneath the happy appearances-the oppressive
conformity that this idealized family represented and held up as a model. The
criticism rendered is relentlessly personalist- those constraints that operated on
1950s family, no matter how idealized, took their toll on those who learned to
accept their confining "roles." Fortunately, for the critics, the 1960s followed and
opened the gates for personal liberation. Those constraints, we can see, were some
of the more benighted features of the times, happily now overcome. The years of
the 1950s in the minds of today's critics represented a post-War recrudescence of
an earlier American Puritanism, a tyranny that repressed the mind and the spirit.
The wise and benevolent father figure that Young so compellingly
developed in Father Knows Best is, from today' s personalist-oriented critic, a
naive piece of fifties patriarchal, middle-class mythology belying the ugly
realities of the American family- the ubiquitous wife-abuser, the dead beat exhusband who refuses to pay child support, and the sexual predator who molests
his daughters. The strong and decent man that the television audience was drawn
to in Jim Anderson was a typical 1950s bourgeois fraud, a patriarchal cover for
undeserved, and often abused, power.
In contrast with the mid-twentieth-century television father who possessed

some wisdom, a generation or so latter, comes the late-twentieth-century one,
represented by the character Al Bundy on the show Married with Children , a
crude, foul-mouthed cynic, besieged by a nasty, prurient wife and surly,
disrespectful children. No moral authority, or authority of any kind, is to be found
in this late 1980s and early 1990s family . No one in this family "knows best" or
even pretends to-"knowing best" is, after all, a subjective "value judgment."
Knowing anything does not even seem to count for much. Everyone looks and
talks the same-sneering, contemptuous, blase and disaffected. Even the titles of

Personalism: The Escape From Institutions

127

these two television shows betray the steady drift toward the "social realism" that
dominates the presentation of human relations and social interaction on
contemporary television-Father Knows Best being homiletic and prescriptive
in its tone, in comparison with Married with Children which was obviously
supposed to be sociological, descriptive, and, of course, "more realistic." The
social-aesthetic equation that drives the critics is the following: the more vulgar
and base the portrayal of human beings, the better. Human beings stripped of their
social conventions are more "genuine."
We now observe the emergence of a social life that increasingly seems to
imitate the "art" of television. No moral, intellectual differentiations prevail in the
emblematic television family of the Bundys-certainly no pretense anywhere of
ideals to be shared or wisdom to be handed down from one generation to the next.
Who, within the Bundy family, would want to be like any of the others? Each
family member amounted to little more than a gross caricature representative of
some bundle of social pathologies or sociological stereotype that the television
audience could easily pick up on and apply with a coarse cynicism that matched
those of the television characters. The predominant mode of interaction between
these family members was a contest of surly put-downs, embedded in crude,
relentless sexual innuendos- sullen and usually mean-spirited, always unfolding
with the same predictable bleakness and stultifying vulgarity.
Marriage, over the last forty years, has been an institution subject to the
most intense criticism directed at its imposition of traditional roles which
perpetuates a status of subordination and conditions of inequality for women. The
relationship of marriage partners bas come increasingly to be normatively
reconstructed entirely in contractual terms. A contract is essentially a legal
construct. The legalization of marriage marks an evolution of marriage from a
moral and spiritual institution to a purely legal one. This is also the case with the
entirety of traditional family relationships. Childhood, just like marriage and
motherhood, has been revealed to be a patriarchal contrivance, invented to gratify
the adult male ego and make the physically weaker family members easier to
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manipulate and control.
Shulamith Firestone' s contempt for the traditional family is consistent
with her repudiation of marriage----the work of self-serving patriarchy, benighted
and unredeemable.
[T)he power hierarchies in the biological family, and the sexual
repressions necessary to maintain it- especially intense in the
patriarchal nuclear family-are destructive and costly to the
individual psyche. 38
All the personalist elements of a Roussean style social critique are once more
apparent. The traditional family as an institution is judged to be thoroughly
corrupt; and its dismantlement follows as a moral imperative. The family and its
traditional roles are of real benefit to no one but the husband whose usually
superior physical strength was the original basis for a coercive mode of social
control that enabled him to impose upon the weaker the various levels of
subordination that fit his particular needs and gratified his ambitions, however
peculiar or self-serving they might be. This subordination inhibits the possibilities
for personal growth and individual self-fulfillment by other members of the
family, particularly through the systematic repression of sexual expression.
Children have thus taken their necessary and rightful place in the rapidly
growing "community of the aggrieved," another constituency for which "rights"
must be created that are enforceable by courts in this case against adults, most
likely the parents, who, like the king animadverted by Rousseau, abuse their
traditional, undeserved power.
During the 1960s and 1970s we saw a rapid and promiscuous growth of
myriad constituencies, including animals, to which were attributed specially
tailored and refined legal and moral rights. Article 24 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights even affirms the "right" to relaxation and

time off of work with pay. "Everyone has the right to rest and leisure,
including ...periodic holidays with pay." 39 Such claims may strike one initially as
bewildering or even ludicrous: inflating rights, like inflating anything else, results
in devaluation.
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The substantial inflation of rights that has occurred in the twentieth
century is part of a shifting propensity for making good intentions the entire
measure of moral action. Thus, proclaiming the possession of something that
many or most people regard as good or desirable as a "right," regardless of
whether such goods can or should be delivered to everyone, becomes a means for
establishing impeccable moral credentials. It is the intention or good will alone
that counts. "[I)n the prosecution of a favorite scheme," says Gibbon, "the best of
men, satisfied with the rectitude of their intentions, are subject to forget the
bounds of moderation."40 Little moderation can be discovered in the modern
rhetoric of rights. The proliferation of rights helps the personalist's aim to achieve
the de-legitimization of traditional institutions. How? The newly created rights
come with a rhetoric of justification and the legal means and resources for
enforcement. Moral rights and obligations imbedded in traditional institutions like
the family- accumulated conventions that have glided parents in the treatment of
their children, each other, etc. -become inimical to the rights defined legally by
the State and enforced by its representatives. Thus, the expansion of rights has
enabled the personalist to displace the traditional moral rights and obligations that
might compete with the State-assisted "new rights" accorded to the various
disadvantaged constituencies.
The morally instructive role of the family has faded. This is both a logical
and sociological consequence of the complete subjectivization of morals which
rules out appeals to traditional authority structures to justify norms or to impose
conformity. The moralists representing the State have moved in to fill the vacuum
created by the disintegration of traditional values. Family members now are often
pitted against each other like injured parties in a contract dispute. Officials
representing the supposedly neutral State enforce the "rights" invented by the
modem Roussean moralists . Children, of course, with the destruction of parental
authority and the atomization of the family increasingly, need the formal
protection of the State. Works such as Children's Rights: Overcoming ihe
Oppression of Children, published in 1977, presented the case for the
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condemnation of the traditional family as an oppressive institution, fundamentally
inimical to the well-being of children.
Here again, Rousseau emerges as an early modem prototype of a 1970s
mode of social enlightenment. The depositing of his five newborns mothered by
his mistress Therese in State-run orphanages was, as he presents it to his readers,
the ultimate paternal act of altruism. Rousseau rationalizes this act of
abandonment, late in his Confessions, seeming somewhat uneasy about having to
account for this embarrassing piece of his past:
I will be content with a general statement that in handing my
children over for the State to educate, for lack of means to bring
them up myself, by destining them to become workers and
peasants instead of adventurers and fortune-hunters, I thought I
was acting as a citizen and a father, and looked upon myself as a
member of Plato's Republic.4 1
What a proto-modern rationalization this is with its begg.ing off of responsibility
by an appeal to his self-produced penuryl "Lack of means" indeed. One must be
struck in considering this amazing comment about his own children by how little
fatherhood must have meant to him. Was Rousseau completely immersed in selfdelusion, or was he, with this fatuous invocation of Plato as philosophical cover,
simply trying pathetically to slip this shameful, widely known business past the
reader? It would be difficult to find a more self-serving, disingenuous act of
"confession" than this.

This rationalization endures as one of the more

indigestible, vintage pieces ofRoussean "honesty."
The prevailing motif surrounding the American family of the last three
decades has been abuse: husbands abusing their wives; parents abusing their
children; adult children abusing their elderly parents; physical abuse, sexual
abuse, psychological and emotional abuse. The family, once an affective
institution that taught and transmitted social and moral values, is now a milieu of
social pathology and physical predation. As a nurturing, instructive socializing
institution it has been displaced in many of its functions by a constellation of
government subsidized professional organizations and services. The well being of
family members has now become a professionalized set of concerns, the business
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of social workers, psychologists, counselors, divorce court personnel, professional
educators and government policy-makers, all devoted to helping protect family
members against each other and against themselves. The social role that the
family carried out in "normalizing" the behavior of its members-helping them to
cope with the stresses of daily life and make their way successfully in the worldhas been taken up by State functionaries who operate largely with a therapeutic
model of human behavior. These functionaries attempt the normalization with
coercive apparatus of the State.42
With its traditional configurations and practices, marriage was an
institution intended in part to restrain and control sexual conduct, hence the
Firestone accusation of sexual repression. Marriage served formally, often with
religious sanctions, to legitimate sexual conduct: thus sex was reserved, that is,
legitimate in both a social and legal sense only for those who were married.
Viewed from the perspective of one who conceives of absolute equality as a
social ideal, the institution of traditional marriage, like the institution of private
property, unjustly created classes of "haves" (those for whom sexual conduct is
socially approved, namely married men and women) and "have-nots," (those
whose sexual practices or indulgences incur social disapprobation which in tum
causes them suffering). The traditional have-nots-fornicators, adulterers,
homosexuals-endured in the past severe sanctions: adultery was a capital crime
for the ancient Hebrews and the Puritans, and homosexuality in many cultures,
including our own, bas been severely proscribed . Those who were born of unwed
parents carried the stigma of illegitimacy. More recently in the West, however,
the punishment has steadily faded into varied intensities of social disapproval.
Today, however, even most of these practices of expressing disapproval are either
completely gone or very faint. Fornication, a dominant motif and preoccupation
of our massive, ubiquitous amusement industry, has been rendered as just one
more lifestyle option, and in mainstream America carries no social disapproval
whatsoever. Adultery, while always common, now bears few public sanctions of
any kind- witness the complete indifference of general public reaction to the
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behavior of national level politicians and other high level figures of authority. The
category of unwed motherhood has undergone what has now come to be a
familiar, self-esteem-enhancing fiat of linguistic de-stigmatization, re-christened
as "single motherhood" or "single parenting." No shame exists now for out of
wedlock childbearing- the effects of its absence are now glaringly apparent in the
extensive proliferation over the last four decades of single mothers. Homosexual
marriage, as noted above, will, I believe, most likely be legal everywhere in the
United States within five to ten years.
Sexual norms and standards of personal behavior were once the
prerogative of the family, supported by teaching and sanctions of the church. No
longer. Secularization and the television-based amusement culture have nearly
completed the route of religious- based sexual morality that was already
underway in the 1950s.
Gradually, over the last forty or fifty years, sexual norms have become the
professional concern of various and sundry experts, many of them employed by
the state. These experts- social workers, counselors, professional educators, sex
therapists--often have relatively high levels of formal education with extensive
formal credentials, and are compensated and regarded as professionals.
This cluster of helping professions- a high employment growth area in
the last forty years- is a locus for an unprecedented concentration of social
power, power to intervene in and determine the course of lives, power to enforce
State-sponsored values and to entrench at as many social levels as possible
representatives of the official ideology. Their jobs are primarily to do what family
used to do, but now cannot, that is, look out for the well-being of their children
and advance their interests. They offer scientifically-based, enlightened advice
and council- with the assistance of the coercive arm of the State. Moreover, they
combat the old-fashioned, benighted mores of tradition that are heavily
determined by the real enemy, namely traditional religion.
Practitioners of traditional religion tended to regard sexuality, particularly
with its great enticement for the young, with some apprehension and suspicion.
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Underlying this reticence was a notion that sex was a vastly powerful and wildly
irrational business, a potential threat to the stability of all sorts of social
institutions and conventions. Without regulation or containment it was dangerous
and unpredictable-control and circumscription were essential. Childhood,
particularly early childhood, was a period in which children were to be protected
from knowledge of advanced sexuality and discouraged from the early practice of
it. Sexuality was supposed to be constrained by the family.
The traditional practice of imposing restraint comes into conflict with the
personalist view of human behavior which generally eschews such proscription of
human impulses and whic)l views the activity of traditional institutions as
repressive, manipulative exercises of power. Traditional constraints on the
expression of natural inclinations, especially ones of sexuality, are like other
traditional constraints, namely instrumentalities of oppression.
The level of restraint to be placed on sexuality- the degree to which
sexuality should be free and expressible--is, of course, a major point of
contention in the consideration of whether the changes in our institutions,
particularly the changes brought about by the "sexual liberation" of the sixties
have always been for the best. It is a huge issue because for one reason of the
enormous potential motivating power and force of sex to subvert conventions,
such as marriage, that offer long-range benefit. And two, the limitation of sexual
impulses and inclinations is linked in much modem psychological theorizing to
the potential damage to one's psyche--the repression of sexual impulses is
considered to be unhealthy.
Freud was one of the first to theorize about the damage, in the form of
neurosis, that sexual restraint, in his terms, "repression," did to the individual
personality. But in some ways, the Viennese neurologist remained true to the
tenets of his nineteenth-century, bourgeois Victorian sexual morality. Civilization,
he theorized, could only be built by confining- repressing to a great extentsexual impulses. Freud argued that uninhibited sexuality and a civilized order
were incompatible. Also, Freud possessed a rather dark view of human nature--
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civilization was at war with, and barely able to prevail over, the instinctual,
sexually-driven forces of human nature, which unchecked were powerful and
destructive. Freud's successors liberated themselves from this unduly restrictive
perspective of negativity both in theory and practice. The psychotherapeutic
trends of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers
and Abraham Maslow, and their positive conceptions of an essentially benign
human nature, were major social forces in the overthrow of constrictive, Victorian
sexuality and its less sanguine view of human nature. As Ellen Herman notes,
The bulk of twentieth-century psychological thought hypothesized
a malignant psychological interior, an awful place where
destructive instincts and monstrous terrors lurked, threatening to
rip through the veneer of Western civilization. 'There is no beast in
man,' Rogers wrote defensively in 1953. 'There is only man in
man .... We do not need to be afraid of being ' merely' Homo
sapiens. ' 43
In the post-World-War-Il period Americans underwent a general conversion from

a heavily conditioned Christian view of sex- a mixture of suspicion and awe--to
an understanding and affirmation of the essential goodness and wholesomeness of
the practice of unfettered sex .
The personalist affirmation of the ultimate natural goodness and
wholesomeness of sex, the driving view of the sexual revolution of the 1960s,
opened up sexuality to a much greater degree than in the past to children.
Children are no longer sheltered from knowledge of the details of advanced
sexuality. Television is a major preoccupation of the typical American family.
The average American watches four to six hours of it per day. Moreover,
television has swept aside the post-Victorian taboos on the public discussion and
display of sexuality. It is difficult to overestimate how profound the effect of this
change really is. The examination of many aspects and details of sexuality on
television, once reserved for adults in all of their prurient and voyeuristic
dimensions, is commonplace, and children are exposed to the casual presentation
of sexual deviation, excess and pathology. Every conceivable sexual perversion
and debasement is now accessible on the Internet: communication technology
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makes available in an unprecedented fashion the full spectrum of sexual
perversity and degradation.
With the spectacular unveiling of President Clinton's own dissolute
affinity for sexual adventuring, the most intimate sexual details of the unseemly
conduct of the President of the United States became the subject of intense
examination and discussion on television. Many pundits evinced resentment
toward the President because the revelations of his conduct had introduced oral
sex as a regular topic of the evening six o'clock news. How was this to be
explained to the children? The resentment, however, was misplaced. Television
itself has reconstructed, overturned rather, the norms and conventions surrounding
the public discussion of sexuality. Television has invaded every aspect of cultural
life. It has swept aside long standing limits governing public discussion, making
the both the grotesque and the intimate the subject matter for intrusive public
inspection, comment, interpretation and speculation. In a pre-television era, such
behavior by a high official would either have been covered up or, if the person
were a regular practitioner as our forty-second President appeared to be, he would
have eventually been removed from office under some other pretext. But we are
now "television-people." Television goes everywhere, looks at everything, knows
everything, and tells everything about everyone to everyone. Nothing and no one
is exempt from its probing or intrusion. No topic is untouchable. Every event is a
potential topic for discussion, ultimately a piece of amusement, diversion, or
voyeurism.
Not only is this the case on the programming side of television, but on the
commercial side of it as well. There is no distinction between the public and
private side of life when it comes to the subject matter for advertising. Every
bodily part and function, insofar as some product can be applied to it is a topic for
open discussion. Medication for hemorrhoids and drugs for sexual impotence are
purveyed by former Vice-Presidents of the United States just like any other
product. "Sure [announces a smiling, attractive young woman in a television
commercial] I may have genital herpes, but I don't let it get me down." Of course
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it doesn't get her down: And, why should it? Why should anyone feel bad about
anything? "Feel good about yourself' is the categorical imperative of the mass
amusement culture. No constraints or barriers of modesty should intrude
particularly when the constraints might impose some inhibition over any endeavor
of self-expression or in anyway diminish self-esteem.
Neil Postman has with great acuity observed that one of the most far
reaching effects of television has been the destruction of childhood, a protective
social creation by bourgeois culture that began over 300 years ago. Children were
treated differently than adults-sheltered and protected to a certain extent from
the social demands and realities imposed on grown up people. This sheltering was
achieved through the creation for and by children of their own unique set of
shared symbols. These symbols represented the world differently: by means of
them children operated in the world differently. Television has broken down that
symbolic world of childhood and pushed children earlier toward operating as
adults.
Commercial television is a medium that does not segregate its
audience, and therefore all segments of the population share the
same symbolic world. You may find in the end the line between
adulthood and childhood has been erased entirely.44
Television, as Postman argues, is a great leveler, erasing or obliterating
social hierarchies, centuries in the creation, which operate with different sets of
symbols. The attempt to rate movies by assigning age-appropriate categories (G,
PG, etc.) is a feeble, token gesture by the amusement industry toward the
protection of children. Video and digital technology makes access to movies at
home by children unlimited. One might also note the irony of the ratings: PG
equals "parental guidance," which in a television culture saturated by a near
complete reflexive subjectivity begs the question. The parents who are supposed
to do the "guiding" were themselves a short time ago children immersed in an
amusement medium that has for the last thirty years relentlessly rolled back
standards of restraint- more explicit sex, more violence, more vulgarity. Viewing
the television shows oftbe 1950s makes this apparent. What the typical parents of

Personalism : The Escape From Institutions

137

today let their twelve year-olds watch on television or at the movies would have
probably appalled the typical parents of 1950.
The ascendancy of personalism has deeply effected the institutions of
marriage and the family in America: it has also changed the institution of
education. In the traditional family, the elders commanded respect: they possessed
a certain authority by virtue of their age and experience, and it was considered
natural and appropriate for children to be subordinate to them. Likewise, the
practitioner of education in its more traditional forms operated with the
assumption that the teacher possessed a rightful authority. Indeed, the teacher was
a central authority figure who, ideally, carried out the most important of our
cultural labors- helping to transmit the knowledge and wisdom accumulated
from the past to future generations. By virtue of that cultural authority, the teacher
commanded a certain kind of respect. The subordination of students was regarded
as natural and appropriate. But as it is with many other institutions, the authority
has been subjected to skepticism and the respect has gradually and inevitably
eroded.
One reason why the authority of the teacher has fallen into decline is
because the traditional hierarchy of teacher-student subordination has become a
suspicious relation of inequality and because the authority was also based on the
assumption that the teacher knew something the students did not. But
personalism, with its relentless subjectivism, has always resisted the notion that
there exists an objective body of knowledge that with confidence can be imparted
to others. Again, the thinking of Rousseau is prototypical in its hostility to
traditional institutions, in this case traditional education. "Man's wisdom is but
servile prejudice," says Rousseau in his work on education, Emile, "his customs
but subjection and restraint. From the beginning to the end of life civilized man is
a slave.'"' 5 The authority behind the supposed "wisdom" to be passed on to
students by the elders is like the political authority of the monarch who rules, a
fraud . Following the inspiration of Rousseau, education has come to be conceived
as liberation from traditional wisdom and traditional constraints. Education is now
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supposed to be less a communication of knowledge or an imparting of values and
ideals which have more than a passing or immediate significance, than it is a
creative social process of self-affirmation and self-discovery.
Education,

like other institutions

in the twentieth century, has

accommodated itself to the subjective and self-exploratory aims of personalism.
For the professional educational establishment, one of the major goals of teaching
is to provide for the students assistance in the production of self-esteem. It is the
self, the subjective element that has become dominant. What the teacher knows
about a given subject seems to be less important than the facility he acquires with
the processes of teaching, the processes function ing primarily as methods of
liberation.
The traditional student-teacher relationship from the perspective of the
personalist must be regarded purely as one of power, a relationship necessari ly of
inequality and thus suspect. Contemporary educational theory has moved
prescriptively against this traditional relationship of subordination: the teacher is
supposed to be a " facilitator" and "guide" for supporting the many different
" learning styles"- again more subj ectivity and relativity. The movement of
education as an institution, as it is with the development of many of our
institutions, has tended to be away from formal relationships, particularly
expressed in hierarchically defined roles, to informal, so~ca!led collaborative
relationships.
The "lecture" as a pedagogical tool has an obsolescence status analogous
to the "horse and buggy" as a means of transportation, in large part because
traditional lecturing competes at an obvious disadvantage with modem
technology. Lecturing is purely verbal and in a society where the visual has risen
to ascendancy, words alone are no longer interesting, moving, or influential. But
the lecture as a major pedagogical tool also bas fallen into disfavor because it
prevailed in a social setting rife with traditional hierarchical associations. A
lecture is properly delivered by someone who speaks with knowledge and
authority: thus in a society where knowledge is relativized and authority is viewed
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as a cover for naked power, lecturing, as an educational method, represents
dogmatic and authoritarian ways of the old order. Lecturing, more generally, also
carries disagreeable moralistic connotations- someone having to endure
unwanted advice or instruction.
Technology develops an increasingly important role in education, and
while it offers enormous possibilities, its expansion at the same time, creates more
interconnections and associations with the world of amusement. Disappearing is
the 10le model of the teacher as an embodiment of something he or she teaches.
College and universities are inhabited by a cynical professoriate who
initiate the unsuspecting students in the ways of anti-wisdom commonly known as
post modernism . Post modernism, with much fanfare, has arrived in full force and
with the fullest enmity toward everything traditional. The term itself has invited
derision. The philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski says that:
I do not know what postmodern is and how it differs from
premodern, nor do I feel that I ought to know. And what might
come after the postmodern? The post-postmodern, the neopostrnodern, the neo-antimodern?4 6
However, post modernism mi ght best be characterized, as the most fully
articulated, openly personalist form of reaction lo the traditional authoritative
structure of the academic world. It represents yet another social revolution, this
one against traditional scholarship, conducted by the students in the 1960s, who
are now the professoriate. And this revolution leads us once again to recall
Tocqueville' s maxim that "there are no revolutions that do not shake existing
belief, enervate authority, and throw doubts over commonly received ideas."
Traditional scholarship in both its humanistic and scientific manifestations was
guided by certain assumptions, methods and ideals. The assumption operating in
traditional scholarship, naive, from the post modernist perspective, was that there
was an objective order that could be known, albeit in some imperfect way, and
which could be truthfully described and characterized. Evidence that related to the
subject matter of inquiry or a point of theoretical contention could be gathered
and evaluated and arguments advanced, established or refuted. Detachment from
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self-interest, objectivity, and impartiality were the moral and intellectual ideals
surrounding what was believed to be an activity through which human beings
could produce objective knowledge about their own condition as well as the
actual constitution of the world.
Post modern theorists have devoted their energies to assaulting these
"foundationalist" assumptions and values. For the post modernist, the moral and
methodological ideal of detachment and the goal of objectivity are ruses used to
dissimulate the undeserved possession of power and privilege that is inevitably
linked to officially certified domains of "knowledge." The ideal of objectivity is
at the same time a fraud- perpetuated by the dominant group--and an illusion, a
particularly cruel one it seems for the members of the non-domjnant,
"marginalized"

groups.

Knowledge-claims

from

a

personalist-Roussean

perspective should be understood as an attempt to create what might be called
intellectual property: and property, we know from Rousseau, is an arbitrary

contrivance used to make invidious distinctions between people and create unjust
hierarchies. What was for centuries an expanding, objective body of knowledge,
open for exploration to anyone who would take up the methods and undergo the
discipline, under the post modem critique has been revealed to be a domain of
ideology, a massive social edifice of privilege and prejudice. Scholarship in the
tradjtional sense of objectivity and detachment is thus a reactionary pretense, and
the course of action for the post modem theorist would be to demonstrate the
power-corrupted features of all purported objective knowledge, to "deconstruct"
all knowledge and truth claims into revelations of relations of power and
exploitation.
French feminist Luce lrigaray asserts in proper post modern parlance that
logical precision, objectivity, and clarity of thought are aspects of a "phallocratk"
imposition. The rules of grammar and of logic, she argues, have always been a
patriarchal trap for women. To escape this trap women should:
[t]urn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it
with radical convulsions .... Overthrow syntax by suspending its
eternally teleological order.. .. It is still better to speak in riddles,
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allusions, hints, parables. Even if asked to clarify a few points.
Even if people plead that they just don' t understand. After all, they
have never understood.... So why not double the misprision to the
point of exasperation.47
Indeed, why not? Again, we have a theorist prescribing revolution as the normal
mode of operation-¢e "overthrow" of syntax and a deliberate strategy of chaos
and confusion at the intellectual level analogous to upheaval and destructiveness
one would find during the course of a political revolution- and for what purpose?
Political revolutions in themselves are usually violent and destructive. Purportedly
they are conducted either to return to a legitimate order of the past or to lead to
something better, in either case something that in the future becomes established
and non-revolutionary. But for the post modems, revolution, subversion, and
destruction seem to have become ends in themselves-"revolution for the hell of
it," as Abbie Hoffinan quite properly understood and to which he gave his apt
expression for the sheer nihilism underlying the whole project. lrigaray also
seems to propose a revolution for the hell of it.
Traditional scholarship, with its constraints, its norms of objectivity and
evidence, and its insistence on clear and precise expression is another
convention- hypocritical at its base--that must be dismantled and exposed as a
self-interested instrument for the perpetuation of inequality. The post modem
critic has mastered the ad hominem attack. The traditional scholar himself must
be brought to the dock and prosecuted- his interests, his motives, his methods are
revealed to be part of the typical repressive apparatus of those who make up the
existing power structure.
For the eighteenth-century Roussean proponents of equality, the church
was the enemy. The priests were in league with the kings: religion was a
reactionary cover to celebrate undeserved authority. It is impossible to deny that
the traditional church has historically been an institution that has both created and
at times vigorously defended many different forms of inequality. Clearly, the
traditional church is fundamentally incompatible with the modem ideals of
personalism and the open hostility it bears to all forms of"social inequality." For
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the personalist the traditional church is an out-of-date, reactionary corporate body,
a striking exemplar of an institution that constrains, and that divides the world
into spiritual classes of haves and have-nots. A church is by its nature a highly
exclusive community. The generally pervasive practice of religious persecution
throughout history, upon reflection, makes it obvious how much the church as a
community of believers turns out be a corporate entity that self-consciously,
pridefully, sets itself apart from others. The history of religious and ecclesiastical
persecution bears this out. Gibbon's Christians were persecuted by the pagans
because of their disdain for the traditional gods and their deliberate acts of setting
themselves apart from the social community.
It might therefore be expected, that they [the non-Christian

Romans] would unite with indignation against any sect or people
which should separate itself from the communion of mankind, and
claiming the exclusive possession of divine knowledge, should
disdain every form of worship, except its own, as impious and
idolatrous.48
The Christians had incurred the resentment of their fellow citizens by setting
themselves up quite conspicuously as a class of ' haves', claiming, as Gibbon puts
it, in the property-terms of ' mine and thine' , " the exclusive possession of divine
knowledge."
A church is a community of believers. Yet more than belief holds the
community together and keeps it intact. Such a community is also strongly
affective. The church unites around a set of beliefs or ideals that affords its
members moral and emotional sustenance for enduring life's adversities and
provides them with important guidance for making life's decisions. Even the most
non-sectarian churches affirm some action-guiding beliefs or ideals. Unitarians
enthusiastically espouse the practice of tolerance and open-mindedness and reject
Fundamentalist notions of religion expressed in creed and dogma. Unitarians
would also be reluctant to include in their midst those who themselves were not
inclusive, tolerant and non-dogmatic. They would not tolerate the intolerant.
Religious belief advances a doctrine or creed, or a set of principles or
ideals which affirms certain spiritual or moral truths and realities. Not believing,
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not affirming what the church doctrine or creed affirms has always been the basis
for exclusion. If you do not believe that what the church says is true or espouse
the principles it proclaims, then you cannot or should not be one of its members.
The compulsion here is both logical and moral. It makes no sense to aspire to
membership in a community of practicing believers and not share the basic
beliefs, just as it would be hypocritical to espouse the beliefs and not observe the
moral practices that follow from the beliefs. In a word, the institutional church as
a community of believers puts a constraint on belief. The constraint is not just
limited to belief. This by itself grossly violates the spirit of personalism with its
high value on personal expression and personal freedom. Belief, however, entails
practice. Practice is linked to virtue or at least an exemplification of the ideals and
an affirmation of the principles. To the extent that one puts into actual practice the
beliefs of the faith, one supposedly emulates God and achieves a certain
saintliness or moral goodness. Both of these, belief and practice, must be in place
and in some way evident or demonstrable. Rejection of either places one outside
of the church, outside the reach of salvation, enlightenment, blessedness or
whatever may be the ultimate spiritual goal that the church holds up for its
members.
Thus as modem day Rousseans, we observe yet another profound
manifestation of life's inequalities created by, or acknowledged and perpetuated
by the church- the spiritual orders of the saved and the damned, sinners and
saints, orthodox and heretics, the enlightened and the unenlightened. Given the
profundity and suggestiveness of the inequality, one can understand why so many
ferocious wars of religion have been fought and why so many people have been
killed contending over spiritual beliefs and ideas. One, of course, could not
conceive of a more invidious set of have and have-not classes, especially when
these spiritual states of being are linked to a future state of eternal existence or
spiritual rewards and punishments. This is deeply troubling for the personalist: the
"saved" person turns out to be the analog, in the spiritual-moral realm, to
Rousseau's property owner in the material-economic order- someone who
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possesses something of immense value (salvation) that someone else does not,
and for fortuitous reasons. There but for the grace of God go I! A gross inequity!
A completely egalitarian God would be the only kind acceptable to the Rousseau.
The moral and spiritual gulf between the saved and the damned, the sinner and the
saint, the enlightened and the benighted, remains every bit as incomprehensible
and deplorable as the terrible distance we all see that separates the rich from the
poor. If material poverty is wretched, unfair, and a driving force of despair,
spiritual disparities must be even more so.
Such invidious, gross inequalities are unpalatable for the late-twentiethcentury church that has assimilated the personalist perspective and orientation and
a completely subjective view of moral and spiritual reality. Doctrine, refined by
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the actual substance of belief and affirmation, is
scarcely worth contending for. Materialism and skepticism have eroded the
creedal importance of church teaching and whatever confidence there may have
been in spiritual truth and reality. And, with the creed weakened or dissolved, and
with the spiritual realm cast into fleeting shadows, it is increasingly difficult to
defend any sort of traditionally established inequalities that might in any way
appeal to or be supported by, explicitly or implicitly, the creed.
What remains for the twenty-first century church? Perhaps to purvey
values that have gained ascendancy but are essentially secular: toleration,
inclusion, and acceptance are widely, embraced values but are doctrinally neutral.
Not only that, these values are formal rather than substantive, that is, they provide
a general guide on how we usually ought to act- we should generally be tolerant,
inclusive, and accepting, etc.- however, they provide no substance or specific
direction since we can never be nor would we want to be completely tolerant, and
cannot include everything in our registry of moral approval nor accept just
anything as permissible. The destiny of the church, perhaps, is to become a
another social service agency that will combine therapy with some soothing,
hollowed-out rituals to administer to the abounding social pathologies in the last
forty years that have beset so many individuals and families.
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Unfortunately for our hedonistic, amusement-oriented society, religion in

its most vital manifestations is militant, with a streak that is both self-denying
and/or dogmatic. Because religion for millennia concerned itself at least in part
with the immaterial, with the larger concerns of life, death, meaning, and all the
abstract, spiritual issues, its practitioners must be passionate, intense and
committed in order for the religion to be attractive and compelling. Tepid, timid,
qualified religion fails to move people. It lacks appeal, which is probably why
membership in mainline churches has declined so precipitously over the last thirty
years. Military religion assaults, confronts, conquers. The devout, politically
powerless Christians, as Gibbon told us, eventually with their great zeal and
conviction helped to topple the empire of pagan Rome, an empire in which they
began as an invisible minority. Muhammad's impassioned followers swept across
three continents in less than two hundred and fifty years and established the sign
of the crescent that symbolized a great world religion. When a religion becomes
completely tolerant, accepting and inclusive, what serious attraction can it hold?
What makes people and institutions interesting and alluring is what sets them
apart from others.
What militancy remains m Christianity, apart from the despised
fundamentalists, comes mainly from the from the personalist egalitarian critics
who are often explicit and open about their intentions to dismantle or completely
restructure the traditional church. In a recently published volume From Queer to

Eternity, self-described "queer theorist" author, Peter Sweasey, in his discussion
of gay worship within traditional, that is, orthodox religious settings, expresses
these intentions openly.
Although these queers are worshiping within orthodox religions,
they are not even taking orthodox positions. They are not
following orders, nor turning a blind eye. Their presence does not
validate the mistakes and prejudice of those in power. Instead,
queers are a thorn in their side--and a catalyst for change. Queers
are reformin~ them from the inside; or maybe even detonating
from within.4
Note the thematic continuity of Sweasey's language with Irigaray's, above.
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Sweasey urges the "detonating" of the churches; lrigaray calls for "radical
convulsions" in our uses of language. The desire for deliberate, wholesale
destruction drives these writers. One is struck throughout these post modern
critiques by the violence of the language and the motivations of moralistic
resentment and aggrievement behind it.
It would be difficult to find a more clear and direct summary of a

personalist view that states how the traditionally "disinherited" are to play an
aggressive,

adversarial

role

directed

toward

dismantling the

traditional

institutions. In this case the feat is accomplished by a kind of guerilla action from
the inside against the spiritual establishment- riddled and thus de-legitimized by
its "mistakes and prejudice." From the tendentious tone of the observation one
would gather that the preference is for "detonation" of the orthodox religions over
the "reforming" of them. Difficult to imagine, though, is what structural or
authoritative apparatus could be in place in most any church today such that its
members would even find themselves in the position of not wanting to be
"following orders." Is he joking here? Where, given all the choices available and
the general skepticism of any kind of authority today, are the churches in which
orders are barked out to submissive parishioners by the elders or the clergy? We
have traversed light years from Calvin's Geneva or New England Puritan
Congregationalism. Sweasey continues:
'Lesbians and gay men, together with feminists, liberation and
black theologians, are reclaiming the Christian tradition from the
underside,' believes Eric Bond, an Anglican. ' I believe the
outcome will be invigorating. It may lead to the death of the
Church as we know it and that may be no bad thing. What will
replace it will be exiting, nurturing and subversive.' 50
One notes the casual, ''who cares?"prediction for the destruction of the traditional
institution, "the Church as we know it." But that "death" is for Bond and
Sweasey, just as well because the church is obsolete and repressive and whatever
it becomes will be much better anyway. The old, the traditional seems flat and
dull--certainly not "stimulating." The successor to the traditional church is also
"subversive," although once the subversion completes the destruction that it has
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so diligently sought it is not clear what is left to subvert. Subversion, consistent
with the post modem radical stance, appears always to be an end in itselfrevolution for the hell of it. An institution, however, cannot remain perjietually
subversive: it must at some point attempt to affirm, uphold and defend something
as well. The claim that the overthrow of the old Church will be "nurturing" is a
piece of self-congrat~lations that is thrown in to help affirm the moral selfsuperiority of these ecclesiastical guerillas. These nurturing subversives stand in
sharp contrast against the oppressive, obsolete enforcers of the old order and
make obvious the necessity for its overthrow. Sweasey's posture toward the
church with all of its revolutionary elan is just a particular instance of what is a
general perspective of personalism and its reflexive affinity for the destruction of
what is old and established.

Thus, as we step into the twenty-first century and begin making our way in the
third millennium A.D., we survey our institutions- families, schools, and
churches-and come to realize not only how much they have been transformed in
just the last forty or fifty years, but what moral and spiritual effects this
transformation has brought and what it portends for the future. These momentous
changes, as we have seen, have their roots in social and technological
developments, but also, and more importantly, in ideas that are religious and
philosophical. For whatever reason, human beings need in a most basic, primal
sense to possess some central moral or spiritual principle that enables them to
give order and purpose to their lives and to make sense of a short, precarious span
of existence that culminates in physical dissolution. What can a human life be that
goes nowhere and is merely a succession of diversions, inclinations, re-inventions
and acquisitions; and how can it go anywhere without some guiding principle or
ideal? Nihilism presses in on us. Modem existence (the last three or four hundred
years) with the fragmentation and compartmentalization of life and with the
specialization and professionalization of knowledge, has made it difficult, perhaps
impossible, to find and sustain such an organizing principle or system of belief.
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But it has been especially the last fifty years, with the ascendancy of

personalism and its exaltation of the mutating self against the authority of
traditional institutions that the dismantlement of belief in the true and sacred has
occurred. In 1948, Richard Weaver lamented that modern man:
is in the deep and dark abysm, and he has nothing with which to
raise himself. His life is practice without theory. As problems
crowd upon him, he deepens confusion by meeting them with ad
hoc policies. Secretly he hungers for truth but consoles himself
with the thought that life should be experimental. He sees his
institutions crumbling and rationalizes with talk of emancipation.51
Practice without theory- in just three words Weaver captured fifty years ago
what would be the unintended social culmination of the personalist quest- a
descent into enthusiastic but meaningless self-assertion. He clearly recognized
how destructive of our institutions the deep subjective forces of personalism
would be, how the "talk"- the ceaseless propaganda of revolution, subversion,
liberation, and the "ad hoc" invention of social policies would become an
essential part of our frantic social and political routines. Underneath all the usual
commotion, however, is a corrosive, unremitting nihilism- "Revolution for the
hell of it"- brash, vulgar words from a passionate, theory-less practitioner of
destruction. These words betray a wild, angry and desperate need to do something
important, to remake the world, but with no ultimate reason why. Practice without
theory indeed! Revolution has become the way of modem life, ironically ordinary
and routine as it reaches everywhere and touches everything and turns it over. The
" liberation" that we have come to embrace with so much enthusiasm over these
recent decades has turned out to be a stepping out into a free-falling "abysm."
With the inward tum and the restless quest to discover the essence of our deep
subjective selves, we have become human beings caught up in a furious process
of endless experimentation, inventing, reinventing ourselves, tearing apart our
institutions and then decrying the desolation that must inevitably follow.
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Chapter Four
Sin into Sickness: The Triumph of Official Benevolence
If every action which is good or evil in a man of ripe years were

under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue
but a name, what praise should then be due to well-doing, what
gramcrcy to be sober, just, or continent?
John Milton

The personali st fervently advocates liberation, the liberation of the individual self
from traditional institutional and conventional constraints. The unshackling of the
personal self from the constraints of convention moves us toward the deliberate
abandonment of self-restraint. Self-restraint has long been encouraged by ancient
and modern moralists: the personalist, however, equates self-restraint with
repression and judges it to be unhealthy. The desolation of our modem times is in
part an unintended consequence of the destruction of self-restraint in the name of
personal growth and self-development.
With the increasing bureaucratization and rationalization of modem life
and its resulting fragmentation, the appeal and attractiveness of personalism has
intensified over the last two hundred years. Personalism has restlessly expanded its
reach and both broadened and refined its applications. It permeates our thinking
and conditions many if not most of our assumptions about how we should give
order to our lives, discharge our obligations, and develop our expectations of
ourselves and others. It has deeply affected in numerous ways many or most of our

154

Desolation 's March

social institutions, as the previous chapter attempted to show.
Personalism has also changed our moral point of view. As proof one can
point to a radical shift in the way in which we talk, and thus ultimately think
about ourselves and our actions, specifically about our personal accountability for
the things that we do and the kinds of people we want to become. The shift in
vocabulary is an important measure of a basic transformation in the way we think
about what principles we should live by, in the assumptions we make about how
we ought to act as human beings and as members of communities bound by moral
obligations. Our ethical figures of speech, our basic tools of moral articulation, if
you will- applied to matters of individual accountability and moral characterhave changed remarkably over the last fifty years and reflect what is a relatively
new but increasingly dominant perspective of human conduct in our society.
This perspective is one of the most distinctive marks of our age. Tt rests
upon an understanding of human behavior that regards conduct considered by our
predecessors to be vicious, immoral or sinful , as a manifestation, more precisely,
a "symptom" of sickness, illness or disease. This view of behavior reflects the
outcome of perhaps the most important of the many twentieth-century
revolutions, the medica/ization of morality-morality overthrown by therapy. The
entire sphere of human conduct to which moral evaluation and judgment have
been applied (that sphere of human conduct in which the freedom of an individual
to make choices and to be held accountable for those choices), bas increasingly
become subjected to evaluation by experts who employ a normalcy-pathology
perspective of behavior. Human conduct under a medicalized view is regarded as
a causally determined phenomenon: the method for dealing with problematic
conduct, given this view, is a therapeutic one.
The science of medicine and the related practice of the therapeutic arts
have been applied to problems of human conduct once considered as moral ones
engaged in by beings once considered morally responsible and personally
accountable. Thus, the sorts of deeds that traditional moralists have been usually
disposed to consider as "immoral" conduct are now understood as the behavioral
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effects of pathologically induced causes. As the med.icalized perspective of moral
conduct comes to dominate our thinking, the notion of immoral or sinful conduct
upon which blame is properly directed and upon which punishment is justly
applied must give way to the recogn.ition that human wrong doing is ultimately a
symptom of mental illness to which treatment must be given.
Late-twentieth~century America has witnessed the transformation of its

social fabric through the medicalizing of morality. We view the moral core of our
lives differently, and we act differently than we did before. Medicalizing the
assumptions about human behavior de-moralizes our notion of moral conduct.
This de-moralization process is captured in a vocabulary in which important
moral words that have been traditionally applied to human wrong doingirnmoral, evil, reprehensible, blameworthy- are conspicuously absent. The
removal of the words that prescribe blame and punishment for wrong doing brings
the disappearance of the notions behind the words. Then there follows the decline
of the practice of blaming or punishing people for wrong doing. A medicalized
approach to morality prescribes treatment rather than punishment for people who
do things that they are not supposed to do. Punishment deliberately inflicts pain.
Treatment, on the contrary, attempts to minim.ize pain and to change behavior that
we disapprove of into behavior we approve of: so why intentionally inflict pain
when it is unnecessary to do so? Such is the logic and the ethic ofmedicalization.
The medicalization of morality creates a dramatic turning away from our
traditional moral practice of holding individuals accountable for their actions and
the kinds of people that they become. One important and specific concrete
measure of the extent to which the medicalization of morality bas been successful
in transforming our attitudes towards certain kinds of behavior and our practical
responses to them can be seen with the passage by Congress of the Americans for
Disability Act of 1990, a m.ilestone in civil rights federal legislation signed into
law by President George Bush. The ADA put the official and legal stamp of
medical "disability" on many kinds of behavior that used to be commonly
regarded as vices under the old nomenclature, such as habitual drunkenness and
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gluttony- now a.lcoholism and eating disorder

along with a whole host of other

addictive and compulsive "disorders" such as drug addiction and compulsive
gambling. Institutions are responsible now not only for relinquishing any
attachment to ''.judgmental" or moralistic views of these sorts of behaviors but,
more importantly, must provide those who "suffer" from them with what the law
makers have called "reasonable accommodation." Sorting out the meaning of the
highly disputable "reasonable" in a society already immersed in moral
subjectivism and relativism and its implications for the obligations imposed upon
institutions, of course, must ultimately be done by means of litigation with all of
the attendant social and financial costs and with an enormous shift of formal
power to the adjudicating legal system.
The permeation of the collective psyche by a medicalized view of human
conduct is well underway. Evidence for this is the fact that the psychotherapeutic
perspective has been taken up by so many of the cultural elite as the primary way
to explain and interpret their behavior. When Anita Hill was attempting to explain
in her testimony before a Senate committee why she continued to initiate friendly
contact with Clarence Thomas long after the alleged episodes of sexual
harassment had taken place, she responded by saying that, "It takes an expert in
psychology to explain how that can happen, but it can happen because it happened
to me." 1 Her behavior, even from her own perspective, she seemed to suggest,
was inexplicable, or worse, inconsistent with how one would usually expect a
person to act in such circumstances. But such behavior could, presumably, only be
explained by an expert, someone capable of discerning the causal factors at work.
None of her interlocutors, it seemed, found this confession at all peculiar or
unsatisfactory and no one recognized how mysterious or evasive this response
really was. Nor did any of them appreciate how tendentious this explanation for
her behavior really was: the "it" that "happened" was some behavioral facet of her
past that was dictated by the sexual harassment that must have occurred- a
psychologist, and only a psychologist, would be able to confirm this.
The public has long been subjected to a privileged "theorizing" of
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behavior by specialists and experts which makes vice into an "addictive behavior"
that requires "treatment." No single event late in the twentieth century better
illustrates this phenomenon, perhaps, than the explosive sex scandal near the last
century's end that came to define the character of Bill Clinton and his Presidency.
The case is profoundly emblematic and for several reasons. First, the lead
man in the production was the most politically prominent and powerful man in the
country, our elected national leader. Second, the man himself was our first postWorld War II-born President and, in some disturbing ways, a vintage "child of the
sixties." In his personal history with the rumors and questions that permanently
floated around about his draft-dodging, war protesting, dope smoking and
womanizing, there were large illustrative elements of the hedonistic, protest and
anti-establishment ethos of the sixties which he seemed to personify. Third, and
most relevant here, Mr. Clinton's own political and rhetorical style has been
heavily emotive and conspicuously, emphatically therapeutic. "I feel good
about..." was one of his most resorted-to pieces of phrasing for describing and
evaluating his work. He was often given to this kind of emotive self-referencing
so characteristic of a therapeutic orientation.2 Much of Clinton' s appeal to voters
in the 1992 campaign over the out-of-touch appearing George Bush came from
his ability to project his message of "I feel your pain," an empathetic, trademark
which eventually became a target for parody and even ridicule. Clinton conversed
fluently in the language of twelve-step recovery, and with no self-consciousness
as he drew from his own personal experiences with an abusive, alcoholic
stepfather and a drug addict brother. Clinton' s own family was text-book material,
the paradigmatic "dysfunctional" family, composed of addicts, abusers, and
enablers.
Clinton also made the therapeutic orientation which was so obvious in his
political campaigning into an essential part of his governing style, an inevitable
consequence, I would speculate, of the domination of it in his own outlook and
personality. As James Nolan reports, shortly after Clinton became President, he
brought his cabinet together for a professionally facilitated group meeting that
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resembled an "encounter" session with an intimate sharing of personal histories
where Clinton spoke of the trauma he suffered as an overweight child.3 Also, one
of both Bill and Hillary Clintons' "spiritual" advisors was psychotherapist
Michael Lerner. Lerner was rich with therapeutically-oriented advice for the
President and the First Lady. The consequences of following much of it would
further extend the reaches of the therapeutic state. For example, Lerner proposed,
that the government,
create a program to train a corps of union personnel, worker
representatives, and psychotherapists in the relevant skills to assist
developing a new spirit of cooperation, mutual caring, and
dedication to work.4
Soon after the details of the President's proclivities for deceitfulness, recklessness
and deviancy became public knowledge, there came the lucubration of our
popular medical-moralists who produce the "real" explanations for this kind of
"inappropriate" behavior for the benefit of those of us who might be disposed to
be a bit judgmental and somehow not able to "feel" the President's pain. One of
the best productions of such privileged interpretation was The Clinton Syndrome:
17ie President and the Self-destructive Nalllre of Sexual Addiction. In this work of

clinical psychology Jerome D. Levin writes that: "[s]exual addictions," such as
that we see so luridly with Mr. Clinton,
are not about sex . They are about insecurity, low self-esteem, and
the need for affirmation and reassurance. At the bottom, the sexaddict feels unloved and unlovable, and so looks obsessively for
proof that this is not so. 5
Thus, as the American people attempted to comprehend this sex scandal
that was not really about sex, a number of things seemed to follow from this
"explanation" of the President's misconduct, or rather, addictive behavior: Mr.
Clinton, one of the most powerful, prominent men in the world, in spite of his
political achievements and all the honor and esteem of the office he held,
apparently suffered (note the pass{vity) from an insufficient level of self-esteem, a
deficient condition that would likely worsen without the intervention of a
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therapist, like Mr. Levin. (If someone like President Clinton was short on selfesteem, what must that mean for the rest of us?) Once assured that he was
"loveble," the President might then desist from cavorting with his underlings and
lying to and manipulating the people around him. That the elected leader of the
most powerful country in the world felt so unloved and inadequate, Mr. Levin
argues, should have aroused our understanding and sympathy.
These are the kinds of responses from the public President Clinton, with
the assistance of his courtier-experts, skillfully sought to arouse with the
contrived, highly attenuated expressions of remorse accompanied with the
obligatory pronouncements about the necessity for "healing" for everyone. Since
everyone needs healing, then it followed happily for the President that no one is to
blame- really. In fact if, "at bottom," one does come to share this perspective of
personality deficiency on this matter, it would be hard to do other than to feel
deeply sorry for the President and wish him the very best therapist be could find .
"Sexual addiction," affirms Mr. Levin, "is an illness, and its sufferers deserve our
compassion.'.6 Compassion must trump moral judgment: sufferers should not be
blamed.
Mr. Levin's diagnosis (rendered incidentally without any personal contact

whatsoever with the President and based entirely from the journalistic writings
about him) is a not an uncommon sort of explanation for despicable conduct
advanced by the more sophisticated observers these days. Thus we begin to
understand bow radically a therapeutic interpretation of behavior departs from a
tradition moral one. With the former, the interpretation of the events and the
assessment of the individual focus not upon the resources and strength of an
individual's character-or their absence, as with the traditional moral
interpretation- but upon a pathological configuration of forces that affects and
afflicts the personality. Moreover, the therapeutic interpretation of behavior has
enormous implications for how an individual who does things he should not, like
Mr. Clinton, ought to be regarded by others. Sympathy, understanding, and

support are in order; blame, condemnation and punishment are not.
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This remarkable and near complete metamorphosis of outlook- vice into

sickness; virtue into health- has been under way for a long time and has moved at
a highly accelerated pace in the last fifty years. The displacing of virtue by health
has its origins in part in the late nineteenth-century expansion of confidence in the
capacity of science to explain, and ultimately produce the technology to
manipulate and control everything, including human behavior. The ugly, seamy,
corruptive sides of human conduct and the human personality, regarded by our
ancestors as the predictable works of sinfulness or the effects of vice, have come
to be seen not as perennial manifestations of weaknesses or limitations inherent in
human nature, but as technical problems that can be eliminated with the
application of the right kind of technical knowledge. Vice, which is, and always
has been, considered a perennial human propensity, becomes a "social problem"
for which "cures" can be discovered and applied by social science experts.
Perhaps no better articulation of this "social problem" view of vice-<:urable by
enlightened, empowered, informed expertisc--is the following, written in the
1980s by Berkeley sociologist Neil Smelser.
[A]nother necessary part of what defines a social problem is that
we believe we can do something about it. It has to be something at
which we can successfully throw resources; something we can ease
by getting people to shape up; something that can be cured through
social policy legislation and decisions and the application of
knowledge; something that can be ameliorated. Otherwise it is seen
as one of those ineradicable scars on the social body that we have
to live with, a necessary evil, one of those inevitable frailties of
human nature.7
This summary is superb--succinct but completc--not only in content but in tone
as well. Social problems--Smelser cites as examples crime, violence, alcohol, and
drug abusc--are manifestations of human behavior that can either be viewed as an
inevitable consequence of limitations of human nature ("frailties") or as failures
of social functions remedied with the enlightened application of "resources".
"Human nature'', with recognized moral and social limitations, is a notion
that Smelser desperately resists. Containment or correction is unacceptable when
the problems can, in his words, "be cured." The medical metaphor of the "cure"
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he invokes, with all of its positive, healthful connotations, however, quickly gives
way to the more literally-expressed means of practical application, which is
political action and legal coercion, that is, "social policy and legislation." The
cure, in effect, for social problems becomes the right dosage of social policy: the
real cure will be the direct result of incorporating social science research into law,
a translation of social science theory into public policy. Coercion plays a large
part in the cures.
Smelser's declaration exudes enormous confidence, considering that it
appeared in the late 1980s when the author had ample opportunity to observe how
little so many of these social problems (crime, drug abuse, etc.) had yielded to
decades of enlightened social policy. In almost every category in which "social
pathology" could be measured, such as violent crime, juvenile delinquency, teen
suicide, drug use, illegitimacy, divorce, etc., rates since 1950 have gone up
drastically at the same time the government began, with the advice of policy
makers informed by social science, to stand back and "throw resources" at the
problems in copious amounts. Much of the theoretical support for the
redistributionist policies that began with the 1960's War on Poverty programs and
the Great Society came from the mental health experts and policy makers.8
Moreover, when one contemplates the vast sums of money spent in attempting to
apply the knowledge of social science to social problems and at the same time
surveys the social desolation of the last thirty years, how can there be so much
confidence in what it can do for us? Andrew Polsky asks,
How it is that the therapeutic apparatus has established itself so
firmly that, despite substantial opposition, it can continue to
expand even when its ineptitude is starkly evident? 9
Forty years earlier this confidence in the capacity of social science to solve
social problems was at a supremely high level, and there were many sanguine
predictions for its possibilities as a technology that would generate mental
health- a healthy society would be an orderly society. Andrew Polsky notes that:
As an ideology, science gave rise to the conviction that objective
knowledge could fundamentally reshape both society and human
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Human behavior could be engineered, making it sufficiently rational,

predictable, and orderly so that "undesirable" activity could be greatly reduced or
eliminated. "Social and political psychology will become a psychology of social
order and social control," predicted Gardner Murphy in 1945 at the war's end.11
Gardner, like many of his colleagues, recognized that the academic discipline of
psychology had a destiny far beyond the confines of university campuses and
classrooms. The discovery of the science of behavior brought enormous
possibilities for extensive public policy applications. Psychology could be a
useful tool of the State--social order and social control are, quite understandably,
desired ends for the wielders of political power. Gardner accurately predicted the
alignment and integration of psychological research and social science theorizing
with governmental policy making, legislation and judicial decision making. The
theorists of social and political psychology did in fact quickly seize the
opportunity and make the most of it. They provided the agents of the State with
both an ideology and technology of social control in exchange for the rich
subsidies offered by a booming post-war economy and a share of their growing
power and prestige. The history of this period is richly documented and carefully
described in a book by Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology.
Ellen Herman points out that Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the
landmark court case that resulted in legally ordered desegregation of American
schools was the first Supreme Court judgment that made psychological evidence
and argumentation a centrally determining factor in its decision. 12 The Court
rendered its judgment in part on the basis of clinical evidence produced by social
scientists that demonstrated the devastation of racial prejudice and segregation on
the formation of the personalities of African-American children. This evidence
was compiled by a team of psychologists led by Kenneth B. Clark, the first
African-American to obtain a Ph.D. in psychology at Columbia University, and
who was instrumental in introducing Alfred Adler's concept of the "inferiority
complex" into the litigation.' 3 Clark also testified some years later before the
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Kerner Commission in 1967 about the causes of inner-city rioting. In his
testimony Clark referred to himself as a "social diagnostician," and affirmed that
psychologists well understood the causes of rioting and knew precisely what sort
of "treatment" the inner-cities required to "cure" them of the violence and
destructiveness with which they had been plagued.14
Chief Justice Earl Warren's desegregation-ordering decision of Brown
contained the famous "footnote 11" which cited a number of social scientific
studies used to support the court ruling to integrate the public schools. 15 Herman
also points out that this initial celebration of the authority of social science in the
Brown case later turned sour as the confident predictions of social repair made by
the social diagnosticians failed to come to pass. Moreover, Black separationists,
like Malcolm X, later came to reject the so-called evidence of low self-esteem in
black children.16
So what the integrationists, in my opinion, are saying when they
say that whites and Blacks must go to school together, is that the
whites are so much superior that just their presence in a Black
classroom balances it out. I just can't go along with that. 17
Malcolm X echoed a growing . suspicion that all of this so-called scientific
theorizing about the psychological makeup of black people was a patronizing
manifestation of white liberal ideology. Any research produced by white social
scientists that purported to explain the experience of minorities was suspect
because conditioning the selection and interpretation of the data were invalid
"Eurocentric" assumptions.18 The theoretical apparatus of social science did not
travel as well across social, cultural boundaries as did that of the natural sciences.
It was, however, in this area of the psychological investigation ofrace and

race relations, and the impact of prejudice on the formation of the personality, that
social-psychological concepts such as self-esteem, self-identity and self-worth
began to acquire their theoretical-explanatory muscle and also began their course
of "intellectual trickle down" making their way into and establishing a permanent
home in the "psychological" vocabulary and perspective of the general public.
These ideas first entered into the collective psyche as psychological explanatory
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concepts advanced by experts- social science researchers and theorists. Then
they became a standard subset of the vocabulary of the social reformer and Lhe
socially conscious intellectual, making their arguments with scientific support.
Finally they achieved full normalization and were established as an enduring part
of the general and widespread language of social discussion and evaluation. From
discovery, or invention, to complete orthodoxy; these concepts were moved
quickly into social reality and are firmly embedded in the assumptions that
underlie even the most popular discussion of social issues.
For classical philosophers and Christian theologians "human nature"
remained for centuries a fixed point of reference for deriving prescriptions for
human conduct. It has become increasingly regarded as an outmoded, moralizing
religious-philosophical notion used to rationalize the arbitrary configuration of
status quo power relations and to resist stubbornly the progress of human
understanding. (This is what Smelser is about, above, when he expresses his
reluctance to regard social problems as the "inevitable frailties of human nature."
The notion of human nature itself turns out to be a constraint that can be scrapped
given the enlightenment and understanding gained from the technologists of
human behavior.) One considerable ironic consequence of this is that the result of
a scientifically-inspired abandonment of the concept of human nature as a
normative foundation for prescribing human conduct and ordering society has
helped to create an orientation toward moral and social values which is
relentlessly and thoroughly subjective.
G. K. Chesterton in the early years of this century had already observed
with considerable apprehension and some irritation this important tendency of
"enlightened"

thought,

indicated

by

the

vocabulary

shift,

toward

medicalization of human behavior already in the making.
[T]his is the real objection to that torrent of modern talk about
treating crime as disease, about making a prison merely a hygienic
environment like a hospital, of healing sin by slow scientific
methods. The fallacy of the whole thing is that evil is a matter of
active choice whereas disease is not. If you say that you are going
to cure a profligate as you cure an asthmatic, my cheap and

the
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obvious answer is, 'Produce the people who want to be asthmatics
as many people want to be profligates.' ... The whole point indeed
is perfectly expressed in the very word which we use for a man in
hospital; ' patient' is in the passive mood; 'sinner' is in the active.
If a man is to be saved from influenza, he may be a patient. But if
he is to be saved from forging, he must not be a patient but an
impatient. He must be personally impatient with forgery. All
moral reform must start in the active not passive will.1 9
Moral reform or regeneration, argued Chesterton, must be self-initiated, and any
such process presupposes the existence of individuals who possess at least some
capacity to recognize and to feel troubled by moral transgressions, to
acknowledge responsibility for them and to be willing to make acts of restitution
or atonement. Patients are not properly the subjects of blame. Vice or sin,
however, brings down blame upon the sinner, and blame is supposed to induce
feelings of guilt. The conviction of guilt is supposed to motivate the wrong doer
to take action to change. Becoming a patient enables one to evade the effects of
blame. Never does he have to feel the pangs of guilt and the compulsion to atone.
Nor does he have to try to change. Sin and blame and guilt and atonement- all of
these are necessary, interlocking pieces of a moral system and a moral
perspective: when any of the individual pieces is practically discounted, theorized
away, or socially hollowed out, the system eventually ceases to function. The
system ultimately dies or atrophies, and the reality which the perspective captures
and reacts against is no longer recognizable; only the words remain, empty of
meaning or incapable of inspiring action or guiding practice. Indeed, the strange,
somewhat old-fashioned manner with which Chesterton's words probably strike
us is an indication of how much "progress" in the medicalization of our morals
has been made in recent decades, how firm and unquestioned its assumptions are,
and how normal many of its practices now seem to us.
Chesterton was prescient. He understood that a moral view of human
beings in which disapprobative conduct was regarded as sin, and a medicalized
view for which it was illness, were utterly irreconcilable. Behind these
irreconcilable concepts are incommensurable normative models of human
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conduct. Each of them carries quite different implications for our basic
understanding of personal responsibility, ethical accountability, and culpability
for wrong doing and moral character.
This tendency to medicalize vice, which Chesterton lamented, however,
has not been the result simply of accumulated empirical discoveries about human
beings and human conduct. This is an extremely important point to comprehend.
Medicalized vice is rather the effect of a gradually altering, imperceptibly
changing philosophical perspective about what kind of creatures human beings
are and what levels of responsibility and accountability they ought to impose upon
themselves. Chesterton anticipated the trend. He grasped its essential meaning. He
recognized what a colossal moral transformation it would bring.
One of Chesterton's contemporaries, Cesare Lombroso, a physician,
stirred up the Italian medical and legal establishment with his book Criminal Man
(1876) which argued for the notion that crime was determined by physiology.20
Lombroso regarded crime as a medical problem, to be addressed by medical
procedures. Lombroso's theories, notes Arthur Herman, "became an obsession
among progressively-minded politicians and intellectuals in Italy, England, and
particularly the United States." 21 Chesterton may have had Lombroso in mind
when he penned his thoughts. Enrico Ferri, Lombroso's disciple, helped to write
the legal code for Mussolini's regime that viewed crime as a causally determined
phenomenon that was best dealt with by treatment and rehabilitation rather than
by punishment. 22
The traditional moralist, like Chesterton, who resorts to the notions of sin
and vice, operates arguably in a much larger and flexible moral universe than the
medicalizing moralist. The traditional moralist can exercise compassion and
forgiveness , levy blame and guilt, and even demand punishment because he views
human beings as active, choice-making, imperfect moral creatures, free and in
some measure accountable for their actions and the formation of their characters.
Also, the traditional moralist, as one can see with Chesterton, proceeds with a
conviction of the reality of evil and views human beings as possessing a natural
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inclination to participate actively in it but yet having a capacity to resist it as well.
Evil is chosen, but the choices are not inevitable.
The moral universe of the medicalizing moralist is a more constricted
place: blame and guilt, for him, are largely worthless and unproductive as moral
or psychological forces. Forgiveness is unnecessary (illness is to be cured or at
least treated, not forgiven), and punishment is ineffectual because the active, free,
choice-making nature of a human being that might respond to punishment,
affirmed by the traditionalists, is an illusion. And evil, which is the concern (or
invention) of theologians or traditional moralists, does not, cannot, exist as a
medical category and so a consideration of it cannot function in making
judgments about the causes of human behavior. Compassion, in the medicalized
view, must be the dominant moral disposition, because the kind of conduct that
was in times past judged to be sinful or vicious or immoral, is really the
manifestation of sickness. Sick people suffer. They deserve compassion. Patients
should receive the attention of experts who act competently, compassionately and
provide relief, which is what any patient, anyone who suffers from any form of
illness or disease, morally deserves.
The efforts to medicalize morality, Chesterton suggests, are the work of
propaganda ("a torrent of talk"). To be effective propaganda requires repetition.
Propaganda is not about truth. It is about action. The propagandist seeks to alter or
overturn perspectives and attitudes that are contrary or resistant to the officially
propagated ones by habitually talking differently, by insidiously imposing a new
vocabulary that will redefine and redirect the discussion of human interests and
ultimately redirect human action. Different vocabularies express and reflect
differing philosophical outlooks and orientations which may be in direct conflict.
Moreover, the capacity to formulate, control and disseminate a vocabulary which
shapes and articulates moral ideas forms a crucial dimension of institutional
power and political authority. Different vocabularies prescribe and proscribe quite
different modes of conduct as well as describe them in a radically different
fashion. This is apparent in Mr. Levin's characterization of President Clinton 's
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conduct, cited above. As we begin to make the vocabulary which Levin uses to
discuss human action our very own, we begin to think of and evaluate the way
people act differently as well.
Propaganda has become one of the most powerful ways to maintain the
control

and

domination

of vocabularies:

sophisticated

electronic

and

telecommunications technologies developed and refined in the twentieth century
have made it even more powerful. Propaganda as a sophisticated instrument of
human control has played a much larger role in the twentieth century than ever
before in human history. Its prominence in the history of the last century's
totalitarian regimes can hardly be overstated.
Leonard Schapiro, historian of the Soviet Union and perceptive observer
of one of the master propagandists of the era, Joseph Stalin, defined the goal of
propaganda as that which intends "to produce a uniform pattern of public
utterance in which the first trace of unorthodox thought reveals itself as jarring
dissonance."23 Shapiro expresses this notion in religious ("unorthodox thought")
terms. Successful propaganda does in fact have the effect of making one who in
any way departs from the uniform utterances of orthodoxy sound quite odd and,
most importantly, appear conspicuous. The medicalization of morality, for good
or bad, has been the work of extensive propaganda, much of it by the government
and government supported agencies, an effort that was greatly accelerated after
World War II with overwhelming success. Many forms of conduct that were once
regarded as vices are now considered diseases.
The psychiatrist Thomas Szasz became prominent, or notorious,
depending upon your view, in the 1960s and 1970s, because he wrote powerfully
and critically of his own profession, modem psychiatry. Szasz was an articulate
critic of the moral medicalizers. Psychiatrists, he argued, had become moralists
fronting as doctors. The conversion of vice or sin to disease was a political and
rhetorical act, not a scientific advance, but one that traded on the commanding
prestige and authority of science and medicine. Medicalizing human conduct
produces the desired effect of subjecting it to the expert authority of the
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medicalizers. Medicalizing conduct, in effect, achieves a massive transfer of
social power- from the theological-moral establishment (the traditional guardianelites) to the medical establishment (the doctors and therapists). Szasz states that:
[I]f we now classify certain other forms of personal conduct as
psychotherapy, it is because most people believe that the best way
to legitimize ~hese activities is by authenticating them as medical
treatments.24
The point that Szasz drives home with great force is that these classification
activities are essentially political and rhetorical acts, not scientific ones.
Medicalizing moral notions thus confers considerable power upon the experts
who claim the expertise.
Classifying human acts and actors is political, because the
classification will inevitably help some persons and harm others.
Categorizing religion, rhetoric and repression as psychotherapy
primarily helps physicians and psychotherapists. 25
Medicalizing does not necessarily provide greater insight: it is a power-motivated
change of nomenclature.
If, however, our aim in classifying psychotherapeutic interventions
is to help others- in particular those who want to better understand
the world they live in- then we shall categorize such interventions
as what they are- religion, rhetoric, and repression. 26
One human reality that should never be forgotten is the extent to which any
group, no matter how benevolently motivated they appear to be, can be trusted
with power. Anyone who might be tempted to imagine that doctors, because their
professional reason for existence is to heal and because they are scientifically
trained to do it, are more to be trusted with great power than members of any
other group would do well to remember the history of the twentieth century,
particularly the extensive and notorious collaboration of the German medical
profession with the Nazi regime and the criminal medical experiments that were
performed. Psychiatry in the Soviet Union willingly served the Communist party
and gave it medical cover for the suppression of political dissent and the
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persecution of members of religious sects.
The extent to which untoward conduct has been exculpated by syndromes,
disorders and addictive diseases is remarkable. I remember in the 1970s listening
to public affairs messages on the radio by the National Council on Alcoholism
that stated: "alcoholism is a disease." These gave me pause. The American Cancer
Society never devoted any of its resources to convincing anyone that cancer is a
disease. No one thought differently, or, more importantly, was in the slightest way
inclined to think differently. Not so with alcoholism. There were doubters, some
who persisted in looking at the phenomenon of excessive drinking moralistically
by judging or blaming the excessive drinker, which was, of course, the reason
why the NCA ran the messages. The message by the NCA was not intended to be
purely informative. In fact, little if any information was provided . The purpose
was persuasion-many people had a different, "old fashioned" view and had to be
convinced to think about the issue differently. That persuasion was done with the
invocation of the substantial formal authority of a prestigious agency of the State.
One does not hear such ads today- they were part of a completely successful
campaign. We now believe: the conversion has been achieved. The propaganda
was effective. Any residual doubt that might be publicly expressed today does
indeed reveal itself, as Schapiro said, with a "jarring dissonance." It was after
World War II in 1956 that the American Medical Association first declared
alcoholism to be a disease. With the official "diseasing" of the conduct came the
demand for "treatment" which exploded in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1977
and 1987, AA membership doubled. Between 1978 and 1984, the number of forprofit treatment centers for alcoholism in the U.S. increased by 350%. 27
During this same period, it was discovered that not just the alcoholics
themselves, but the people close to them--<:hildren and spouses- needed
treatment. Entire families were enveloped by the addiction and became the objects
of professional attention and care. "Children of alcoholics," writes the founder of
the National Association for Children of Alcoholics, "deserve and require
treatment in and ofthemselves." 28
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The American Disabilities Act of 1990, as mentioned above, helped to
ensure that the medicalized vocabulary in which all the "public utterances"
relative to alcoholism, drug addiction and many other addictive behaviors were
discussed, would be official, pervasive and dominant. The view of them as
certified diseases, addictions, or medical afflictions of some sort, became
irrevocable.
The "talk" Chesterton complained of dominates. The perspective behind
that talk has achieved orthodoxy. The domination of that perspective is what
Philip Rieff has called the "triumph of the therapeutic." Evidence for this triumph
is apparent in the pervasive application of that cluster of normative terms we
routinely employ to give a context and meaning to various aspects of human
conduct and to make sense of moral character. Our normative language used to
turn around the concepts of virtue and vice. These have been abandoned for

therapeutic terms. Vice has always been understood to be a failure of character, of
self-governance, ultimately. Thus, the moral terms that compose the vocabulary
of virtue and vice have also been used in a legal and political context. Plato used
the State as a larger model for the human soul in his proposal in The Republic to
develop his philosophical theory of justice as a virtue of the human soul.
Governance, as a "ruling" moral metaphor, has remained with us for nearly two
millennia. The language of traditional morality employs notions of culpability,
judgment and punishment, notions that often have legal as well as moral
applicability and meaning. Morality and legality have long possessed a large
intermingling sphere of interaction with a shared or overlapping vocabulary. Both
necessarily operate with an assumption of personal responsibility and
accountability.
Sickness is a failure or an absence of health. Thus when our conversations
about human conduct are dominated by terms which are medical (such as illness,
disease and suffering) our prescriptions for misconduct are inevitably
therapeutic-illness calls for treatment. Along with treatment go understanding
and compassion, not blame, and certainly not punishment. Treatment and
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compassion are natural corollaries as are guilt and punishment; and the two sets
are themselves morally antithetical. The shift in application over the last fifty
years has been from the latter to the former. Our social institutions, particularly
our legal and educational ones, in the standards they have set for conduct and the
measures of accountability they have imposed, reflect this orientation toward a
health model of human behavior with many of its therapeutic assumptions. These
changes of assumption in turn bui Id the foundation for different norms of conduct.
When the application of compassion and treatment to human misconduct
supersede judgment and punishment, the expectations that arise are for quite
different, more humane responses- for the better, many think and argue. But
compassion is not omnipotent.
The most obvious and most remarkable measure of the strength and
dominance of the therapeutic perspective is the phenomenal growth rate of the
therapeutic profession itself, particularly psychology and psychiatry, since the end
of the World War II . Ellen Herman in The Romance of American Psychology
documents the veritable explosion in size and influence of this profession in the
second half of the last century. In a little over fifty years, from 1940 to 1993
membership in the American Psychological Association climbed from 2,739 to
approximately 75,000. The membership of the American Psychiatric Association
in the same period of time grew from 2,423 to over 38,000.
It was World War II, with the initial deployment of psychiatrists and

psychologists in mental testing and measurement and in developing and testing
theories applicable to the morale and mental hygiene of soldiers, as Herman
argues, that helped to establish a vast, post-war mental health industry. This
industry became the recipient of enormous professional encouragement and
financial and political support from the federal government, and in tum has
exerted a powerful influence on the development of social policy and legislation
as well as on public perceptions of mental health and mental illness. The National
Mental Health Act of 1946 was a major piece of legislation that reflected the high
priority of mental health issues for the federal government backed with material
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resources. The National Institute of Mental Health came into existence at about
this same time. Its budget history, an 8.7 million dollar budget in its opening year
of 1950, to 315 million dollars just seventeen years later, indicates how serious
was the commitment of tax support and reflects the importance of the issues of
mental health at the federal level and the public confidence in the expertise to deal
with them. This increase is all the more impressive in light of the fact that the
total budget for health related research of all kinds had in 1947 been only twentyseven million dollars. 29
Herman quotes a prominent psychiatrist of the World War Il period,
Henry Brosin, brimming like many of them with a limitless optimism for the
profession' s future and the benefits it could deliver, in some ways analogous to
the delivery of consumer goods produced by the revitalized post war economy.
"Good mental health or well-being is a commodity which can be created under
favorable circumstances."30 He could not have been more prescient, at least about
the future commodity-nature of mental health. The favorable circumstances were
the tremendous financial and political support from the government which in tum
helped to create a widespread transformation of attitudes and to stimulate a high
demand for services. Mental health has indeed become a highly marketable
commodity for which demand has steadily escalated. Counseling is now almost a
basic staple. Herman also cites a National Science Foundation projection that
estimated a twenty-seven to thirty-nine percent increase of civilian employment in
psychology by the year 2000, rates that far exceeded those for any other
occupation.3 1
These numbers, as noted above, are just one substantial indication of what
has emerged as a revolutionary change in the orientation of Americans toward
ethical life in the late twentieth century. That change is one which can arguably be
characterized as a mass conversion in world view (Weltanschauung), akin in some
important ways to that of the overturning of the pagan religious cults by the world
religion of Christianity in the first millennium A.D. That epical change of world
view took several centuries to occur- the great advance of the technology of
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telecommunication, however, with its vast powers for achieving mass
communication and technologically crafted propaganda, makes it possible for one
religious or ideological system to challenge and overthrow another much more
quickly. This is what happened over the course of the twentieth century with
particular acceleration in the latter half of it. Also, the high sophistication of
information technology and the great refinement of the arts of communication
have enabled that revolution to take place in an imperceptible and non-violent
way-

unlike the overthrow of paganism by Christianity which was accompanied

by great persecution. As Herman herself says,
It no longer suffices to think of psychology as merely one category
of expertise among others. Psychology in our time is a veritable
world view.32

It is indeed! Moreover, it represents a triumph of modem, secularized
thinking over a religious perspective of the world. This confidence in psychology
as the basis for a new world view was exhibited by at least some of the great
therapeutic practitioners of the post-World War II period themselves. With a
conspicuous absence of modesty, Abraham Maslow referred to the popular
humanistic psychology of his own creation as offering "a new and general
philosophy of life." 33
Sigmund Freud, more than any single individual, stands as an agent of this
change in world view. Freud is the most famous psychologist of all times, one of
those great theorists of the human condition whose ideas, for good or evil, really
did change the world because it changed the way we thought about the world. As
W. H. Auden rhapsodized of him:
To us he is no more a person
Now but a whole climate of opinion ....
Indeed, psychoanalysis lives for us today not as a theoretical construct but as a
perspective, a general, philosophical interpretation of daily experience. 34 Freud's
personality and career in many ways resemble more those of great religious
founders than scientists or medical people. His theories of the unconscious and

Sin into Sickness:
The Triumph of Official Benevolence

175

the primacy of sexuality were initially taken up by his chosen disciples and they
filtered their way over a few decades down into the genera.lly educated lay
population. Freudian psychological terminology, brought to the United States by
his immigrant disciples like Alfred Adler and Karen Horney in the early and
middle part of this century, began to enter the popular domain after World War ll.
Freudianisms- "neurosis,''

"superego,"

"id,"

etc.-are

now

relatively

commonplace expressions and still occasionally appear in our characterizations of
one another. 35 Many of these have reached the full level of cliche: people use
them who never heard of Freud and do not have a glimmer of what they mean in
the context of Freud's system or what the implications are behind them.
Freud created and articulated a revolutionary interpretation of human
ex perience. Part of his genius, as one of his severest critics, Thomas Szasz, points
out was to present his insights as scientific. Freud well understood that science,
not religion, was "the great legitimizer of the age,'' and thus his discovery of
psychoanalysis was to be presented as a science, and those who criticized it, antiscientific, thus backward and reactionary. 36 The scientific status of psychoanalysis
was discarded, however, a long time ago. One, I believe, would be about as likely
to find an orthodox Freudian today rattling on about penis envy and oedipal
complexes as an orthodox Calvinist theologian holding forth on God's
foreordained damnation of the souls of the non-elect. As the philosopher of
science, Karl Popper has pointed out,
as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the Id, no
substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it
than for Homer's collected stories from Olympus. These theories
describe some facts, but in the manner of myths. They contain
most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable
form.37
Like other great religious leaders and prophets, Freud had considerable
talent for attracting capable and zealous followers who participated in the initial
establishment of an orthodoxy under the leadership of a charismatic founder. The
inevitable defections ensued. Freudianism gave way to neo-Freudianism and the
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Great Inspiration splintered into Great Apostasies and lesser ones in their wake
with the predictable sectarian divisions and the accompanying doctrinal squabbles
and intense animosities. Psychoanalysis begat many variants and mutations.
Freud himself bas long been passe: too patriarchal for the feminists, too
Victorian for the sexually liberated secularized hedonists of the post-sixties, too
dark and theoretically mechanistic for the self-actualizers, not rigorously
empirical

and

scientific

enough

for

the positivists and

bebavioralists.

Psychoanalysis-expensive, protracted, and for many, valueless- spun off many
trimmed down, no-frills, cheaper models for the less sophisticated, less leisurely,
less well off masses.
The inhabitants of the expanding consumer society of the 1950s found
Freud to be far too gloomy and pessimistic. Abraham Maslow 's psychology of
self-actualization, and Carl Roger's quest for personhood both operated with more
sanguine views of human beings. They were much better suited for the throngs of
middle class Americans about to seize upon late-twentieth-century opportunities
in consumerism and amusement and soon to invade the wide-open prairies of
sexual athleticism and adventuring opened up by the invention of effective birth
control technology and the legislation of easy divorce in the 1960s.
In the 1950s, Barbara Ehrenreich observes, psychology discarded maturity

as the ideal for the healthy self and went for growtb. 38 Part of "growth" in this
context meant, ironically enough, stepping out of the shackles of conventional
adulthood. Adulthood could bring an unhappy forfeiture of the diversion and
amusement to which youth was naturally inclined . Thus commenced the rush
toward all things youthful and the manic pursuit of an idealized freedom and
spontaneity that culminated in the 1990s with the wide popularity of therapists
who helped troubled adults to discover their "inner child."
Psychiatrists in the 1940s and 1950s applied their therapeutic arts to the
upper middle class sophisticates suffering from boredom and angst or to patients
in state-run hospitals. By the 1990s psychologists, counselors, psychiatric social
workers and pastoral counselors were out navigating the open seas of
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psychotherapy battered by the high winds and waves of all the new and fearful
psycho-pathologies affecting the masses. Compulsive shopping, addiction to
video games, sex, exercise and work were just some the afllictions for which
Americans began to seek "professional help." Eating disorders galore-bulimia,
anorexia, etc.- made their way into the repertoire of addictive and compulsive
"behaviors," with extensive media coverage. The whole of human behavior was
caught up with behavioral and addictive pathologies and pathologists to deal with
them.
The onslaught of addictions, disorders and syndromes was also a direct
consequence of the growing, post-World-War II orientation toward medicalizing
every aspect of human behavior, in part an aftermath of the antinomian 1960s.
When the social constraints melted away like a late spring snow, and deviancy
and excess came to be embraced as

experimentation, exploration and self-

expression, virtually every aspect of life was thrown open for growth and
development, or, rapid descent into excess or perversity, depending on your
perspective. In full creative deployment was an ideology that would help us to
think of the dissipating and dissolute effects upon people of all of these
"behaviors" as manifestations of illness. The fallout was enormous. An epidemic
of "dysfunction" was unleashed with hordes of addicts and abusers swarming out
of the middle class, each one usually with an enabler or two in tow, in quantities
so vast that the phenomenon-dysfunction-could become the fifth horseman of
the apocalypse; and professionals were needed to deal with all of it.
Therapies have come and gone like fad diets- primal scream therapy,
existential therapy, nude therapy, transactional analysis, rational psychology, and
a host of now discarded treatments for the soul and mind. John Bradshaw, a selfproclaimed spiritual and psychological healer, has achieved a popular following
by helping people to alleviate their psychological suffering by the recovery of a
lost "inner child." Psychological growth, ironically, takes one back to early
childhood.
The recovery and self-help movements became the do-it-yourself attempts
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to apply psychological technology to the problems of life. The genre of the selfhelp book was a post-World War II invention: "self-help" and "recovery" now
comprise major browsing sections in book stores. The event-calendar section of
most any local newspaper lists the meeting times of enormous numbers of support
groups-alcoholics anonymous, gamblers anonymous, overeaters anonymous,
etc. The large numbers of the groups make one wonder how far into the
community dysfunction reaches.
What consequences for moral and political conduct the triumph of the
therapeutic approach to human conduct would bring were recognized at midcentury by a constitutional scholar, F. D. Wormuth. In a book, The Origins of
Constitutionalism, published in 1949, he wrote:
It is doubtful that democracy could survive in a society organized
on the principle of therapy rather than judgment, error rather than
sin. If men are free and equal, they must be judged rather than
hospitalized.39

Making judgments, moral judgments that is, about large areas of human conduct
fifty years later, are just what we have largely given up doing. These areas have

been deeded over to the therapists. Wormuth recognized the implications of
Chesterton's observations about the jettisoning of a traditional moral vocabulary
that carried the important assumption of human beings as active moral agents. Are
there not some things, Chesterton asked, we want everyone to do for themselves,
even if they may do them badlyr'0 Andrew Polsky in The Rise of the Therapeutic
State points to the collision between the ethos of therapy and individual freedom .

Therapeutic intervention rests upon the premise that personal
autonomy must be invaded to create a more desirable kind of
autonomy. In a democratic society, such a move must be regarded
as suspect. 41
A therapeutic relationship by its nature is a power relationship. That is, for
therapy to be conducted, those who are to benefit from it must acknowledge the
professional expertise of the therapist and submit to his or her authority. To get
well, the patient must do as be or she is told. Ideally, that submission is self-
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chosen and remains voluntary: one is supposed to be free to reject the instructions
of the therapist and withdraw from the relationship whenever one so desires.42
However, to the extent that therapy becomes institutionalized and a
fundamental, integral part of the way institutions actually deal with individuals
and typically form their expectations of them, submission becomes less voluntary,
and voluntary withdrawal more difficult. When the State itself becomes a
massive, powerful apparatus with heavily therapeutic aims as it has, and when its
agents talk therapeutic talk and implement therapeutic solutions, the therapeutic
relationships it imposes become insidiously coercive and, for most people, nearly
irresistible. When therapy reaches deep into the core of the soul or personality as
is its goal and as it in fact does, the power of the State over the individual has
become pervasive and virtually unlimited. What is left of the individual or person
that cannot be attended to, reformed or reshaped as a normalizing, health
requirement of the State and its agents? When the State itself becomes
therapeutic, as Andrew Polsky says,
we embrace an exercise of power by the state that is at odds with
our belief that some aspects of a citizen 's life should lie beyond its
reach.43
What Wormuth warned against a half-century ago has happened. Therapy
rules. Therapeutic concepts and the vocabulary to articulate them have seeped into
almost every level of discourse, public and private, and are especially pervasive in
the bureaucratic segments of our public life in areas such as politics, education
and law. Its assumptions are embedded in our everyday speech; its practices are
visible in the routines of our elites. Individuals in public life of prominence and
power actively promote the broadening of therapeutic measures. The wife of
former Vice-President Gore, Tipper, was a strong advocate for the mental health
provisions of President Clinton's national health care plan. She claimed that 50
million Americans suffered from mental illness, a figure that included 14 million
children. 44 The Center for Disease Control has declared hand gun violence an
"epidemic," one of the more extreme examples of the medicalizing of crime and
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deviant behavior. One of Newt Gingrich's firs t official acts after he became
speaker of the House in 1995 was to bring to Capitol Hill a "corporate
psychotherapist" to dispense advice to his Republican colleagues on "how to
forcefully

articulate the

insensitive."

45

Republicans'

social

agenda without

appearing

These few of many possible examples give a sense of the extent to

which therapeutic thinking and conceptualizing of basic human interaction has
become a regular feature of our institutions.
Even traditional religion has been co-opted by therapists or therapeutically
oriented leaders. James Dobson, who heads Focus on the Family, a radio and
television

broadcasting

empire

that

enthusiastically

promotes

"biblical

Christianity," is a professional marriage, family, and child counselor and a
licensed psychologist with a Ph.D. in child development from the University of
Southern California. He was also an Associate Clinical Professor of Pediatrics at
the medical school at the University of Southern California.
What is especially remarkable about Dobson's work, and somewhat
bizarre even, is the prescriptive mixture he has put together of Christian biblical
moral teaching with the full blown therapeutic apparatus of contemporary
psychology and counseling. He has published numerous books related to
counseling and therapeutic aspects, including at least one on self-esteem m
children. In this curious merging of contemporary counseling theory with
traditional Biblical teaching, Dobson has achieved spectacular success in
promoting his religious message and creating a massive following. His radio and
television broadcasts are heard or seen by millions of people a week, and he has
sold millions of his "Christian psychology" books to his many devoted listeners
and viewers. Much of Dobson's success, I would heavily wager, is due to the
weight of his credentials and experience within the modem Christian community
as a professional psychologist and counselor. The language of therapy, which he
speaks quite well, no doubt, strikes a resonant cord with an audience that though
in some important ways is traditionally religious, is already completely immersed
in our late-century ethos of psycho-therapy. Dobson has managed, in effect, to
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invest his enterprise with high credibility and authority in the employment of what
would seem to be two incommensurable normative models of human conduct.
Rendering evaluative judgments about human conduct in the medicalized
setting we now live in has itself become morally opprobrious. Making moral
judgments requires from us moral certitude and confidence. These have been
gradually eviscerated by doubt and skepticism. Fixed standards are illusive. The
dominance of the therapeutic ethos and the cloud it has thrown over traditional
moralizing, however, has created a kind of incongruity or dissonance precisely
because of its incompatibility with pre-theoretical or practical moral notions that
are almost impossible to dispense with, notions of moral choice, personal
responsibility and character. The medicalizing of morality has opened up a moral
fissure of sorts, out of which both ambiguity and hard conflict must occasionally
develop between practitioners and advocates of the therapeutic who constantly
push to expand the boundaries of mental disability and illness, and the rest of us
who, at least in some instances, find ourselves in opposition, or at least with some
doubts-another skirmish point of the culture wars.
As the twentieth century moved restlessly toward its progressive
conclusion, the traditional moral assumptions came increasingly under attack.
One of the arenas of direct assault was in criminal law where notions of individual
responsibility had long been in place as bedrock assumptions. Introduced into the
procedures of criminal law has been a subversive theoretical apparatus that works
by excusing individuals from the legal and moral responsibility of their actions.
This apparatus wielded by the therapists has produced some high profile cases
that have attracted enormous attention and comment precisely because the
outcomes tum on the acceptance or rejection of the traditional assumptions. A
kind of moral alchemy has been put into practice that attempts to make the
theoretical gold of excuse (and exemption from blame) out of any and every
possible contemptible act. A moral dissonance has thus developed because of
attempts by the alchemists to excuse or attenuate acts of villainy by draping them
with the mantle of victimhood. Some of these attempts have taken place in the
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fomm of the criminal trial, although they employ therapeutic assumptions and
argumentation. In the trials the specialists-<lefense lawyers and psychiatristsjoin forces to convince the non-specialists, ordinary people on juries, that
individuals accused of vicious or depraved acts should be excused because of
injuries, abuses, or indignities they (the accused) have suffered earlier in their
lives.
The Menendez brothers trial in California in the early 1990s is one of the
most salient examples and is in many ways emblematic of the way in which
traditional moral assumptions have been disregarded and replaced by therapeutic
ones. This sensational murder trial drew nation-wide attention precisely because
the lawyer for two brothers (Eric and Lyle, ages eighteen and twenty-one at the
time of the crime) who slew their parents with shotguns while they were watching
television (fifteen shots at close range), launched a legal defense of their client's
action based on the so-called "battered child syndrome," a variant of the "battered
wife syndrome." The "battered x" syndrome is essentially a "psychological"
defense that is, built upon legally accepted "expert" testimony of psychologists
who argue that the pro longed effects of abuse impair the mental state of any type
of individual 'x' (child, spouse, etc.) who endures it, and hence the level of legal
responsibility and culpability is diminished. With the assistance of a battery of
experts who testified to the damaging and traumatic psychological effects on the
Menendez brothers' experience of child abuse, the defense lawyer was able to
produce enough ambiguity in the minds of the jurors to produce a hung jury in the
first trial. The parents of these brothers had mistreated them as boys, and
therefore, so the Orwellian-nature of the argument went, their calculated,
murderous actions were so conditioned by these patterns of childhood abuse that
they could actually be legally construed as a form of self-defense. Thus, argued
their attorney, these two men were neither morally nor legally responsible for
pumping, reloading, then firing more shots into mom and dad at close range.
While Eric and Lyle seemed to show little remorse for the slayings (they had gone
on a $700,000 spending spree with the insurance money), they were quite adept at
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showing great emotion over their abused childhoods.
That such a defense by the experts, the elites, would even be
contemplated, much less partially successful, in complete arrogant defiance of the
most elementary common sense and the basic concepts of decency and
responsibility, is in large part the effect of a substantial erosion of confidence in
moral judgment. We now face off against all of the perennial human evils with
severely diminished means to combat or resist them-a kind of insidious moral
disarmament.
The last half-century has nearly completed what is a moral and ethical
revolution with the most staggering consequences: the overthrow of the regime of
"virtue" or "constraint" and the subsequent installation of the regime of health.
Under the regime of health, a person's character- his moral habits and history of
conduct, if you will-is changed into something that resembles a medical history,
a mental health history. Thus, if someone does something vicious, now
"abnormal," his past is inspected by experts. If the discovered biographical events
are sufficiently traumatic (for example, abuse, poverty, etc.) and are considered
sufficient to prevent that person from developing into a normal person, then these
events are judged to be "disabling" causes, that explain, and ultimately excuse the
person in question for the abnormality. This manner of thinking inevitably leads
one into a quite different moral universe (perhaps an a-moral universe), one in
which blasting your parents with a shotgun- firing lots of shots at point blank
range just to be absolutely certain of the outcome-might be excused or mitigated
if you could show that they mistreated you as a child. There is a clear, simple
logic at work: the suffering that you inflicted was ultimately a result of the
suffering that earlier was inflicted upon you. All wrongdoing is, with sufficient
psychological excavation, ultimately the effect of some form of suffering and
should be regarded with compassion.
This kind of moral universe, as it expands and envelops us, is one in which
our social expectations and ethical standards must be attenuated and continuously
adjusted. Also, it is one where we must be extremely flexible, ready to apply
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radically different, or minimal standards of responsibility and decency in our
moral judgments or evaluations, depending upon what sorts of evidence of
material or psychological deprivation or conditions of social pathology from the
past can be produced and what effects might be theoretically conjectured from
their presence by the ex_pert interpreters.
The well-being of a person, from the perspective of one who operates with
a virtue model and thinks primarily in terms of the overall benefits of constraint,
depends on the inculcation of habits and dispositions that involve the fulfillment
of obligations (e.g., keeping one's promises and honoring commitments), the
application of forbearance and restraint (e.g., controlling one's temper, restraining
one' s sexual impulses), and the development of various states of character such as
ki ndness, benevolence, trustworthiness, fidelity and the like. To be a good person,
to be successful in life, to be admired or well-thought of, one must seek to
cultivate these dispositions and acquire the character that results from the
fo rmation of such habits. Virtue comes in the form of habits or dispositions. It is
inculcated through practice. If one is successful, virtue becomes a mantle of selfprotection against the temptations to excess and the ravages of vice. Success and
happiness in life, in short, are directly the result of a virtuous character that
fo llows from the practice of virtuous conduct.
Virtue has always been closely and consistently linked to patterns and
practices of restraint, that is, controlling one' s desires and impulses, submitting
one's self to what are sometimes onerous obligations. Also, virtue involves
training and disciplining the self not to overreach, to subordinate immediate
satisfaction to long term goals, and to consider respectfu lly the feelings and well
being of others. That virtue is a necessary component of a good life rests upon an
assumption, supported by experience, that without habits of restraint, without
discipline, human beings come at best to little account or little good. At worst
they become vicious and predatory. For one who affirms and espouses a virtue
model of human morality and well-being, there is Little natural or innate goodness
to be regularly found in human beings; goodness is artificial, the imperfect
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product of human conventions. Virtue comes from training and practice. For both
the pagan Greeks and Romans, as well as the Christians, the acquisition of virtue
was an extremely important aspect ofliving.
No longer. The demise of virtue as a normative ideal is in part obvious
from the simple fact that virtue does not seem to be important to many people. It
has become a meaningless or antiquated notion. The term itself is eschewed and
has quietly dropped out of daily conversation. The entire constellation of virtuetem1s has nearly disappeared from popular use, superceded by an abundance of
fertile health metaphors expressed in an explicit, elaborate therapeutic vocabulary
beneath which is an array of therapeutic assumptions. Virtue is an unworkable
and unwelcome notion for the personalist who judges the life of an individual by
its capacity for personal fulfillment and self-actualization. Constraints produce
inhibitions. Inhibitions are "unhealthy." They are directly inimical to personal
growth and the pursuit of self-actualization and the achievement of authenticity in
the proto-modem Roussean sense. Virtue, unfortunately, produces many
inhibitions. It has an archaic, old-fashioned ring to it and rubs a pleasure-loving,
youth-oriented, amusement-pursuing people the wrong way. Virtue is often
associated with benighted religious authority, harsh and puritanical clergymen,
priests or rabbis who seek to repress the expression of the natural human
functions and proclivities, particularly sexual ones, as wicked and sinful.
The notion of social or mental "health" not surprisingly has a much greater
appeal for the personalist than virtue. It turns out to be extremely useful for
dealing more affirmatively and humanely with what were once considered flaws
or natural shortcomings of human nature, the personalist would argue. Moreover,
the notion of "health," understood in a metaphorical sense of mental or social
well-being, can be readily applied to almost everything of interest and importance
to human beings including personal interaction with others, feelings of
accomplishment and success, career satisfaction, and sexual satisfaction. Health in
its many non-physical, non-literal permutations becomes an extremely vague and
conveniently open concept, and by virtue of its vagueness and openness, can be
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applied to almost every imaginable feature of social and personal life. Mental
health professionals have no arena of life upon which they cannot stake out their
expertise and into which they cannot seek to intervene.
Sexuality, because of its primal place in human experience, has always
been a major battleground of social power and control. Religion, though long an
agency of management and control of sexual impulses and conduct, has been
displaced by the therapeutic manipulators. Sex, for time immemorial , the most
personal, intimate and mysterious of human experiences, now has its advicedispensing, technique-purveying, mystique-dispelling therapists. One of them in
particular, who has long disseminated her insights and advice in newspaper
columns, has achieved a kind of celebrity status, appearing on television talk
shows and visiting on university campuses where she makes lively and humorous
presentations. Her popularity is, as it is with many of tl1ese media produced
celebrities, due in part to a combination of brazen self-assertion and a quirky
personality, and in part to her ability to make the discussion of sex into another
venue of amusement. Thus, two important modem elements of the demystification and naturalization of sex are at work with this person's presentation
of the subject: the reduction of it to therapeutic technique (lots of frank, matter of
fact talk about penises, vaginas, clitorises, orgasms and the like, and how they
ought to be handled and manipulated), and making the theme of sex itself into a
non-taboo topic of family or youth amusement through a kind of comedic style of
discussion. The operative notion seems to be that if you can dispense with the
mystery that has long haunted sexuality, any attendant "dysfunction" can then be
dispelled.
Sex, in fact, becomes nothing but sheer technique (proper manipulation)
because it has no location or designation within a larger framework of meaning or
human significance. This is fully emblematic of our times: that realm of human
experience, at once subterranean and heavenly, so full of darkness and mystery,
with many antinomies and inexplicable features, has become just one more
everyday topic of casual therapeutic-style chit-chat, another routine human
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preoccupation that is best pursued as an exercise in technique or amusement. The
efforts of the therapists related to sex have been to attempt to de-moralize its
practices, to detach them from the religious and institutionalized norms that have
so long governed them. What has come to be a wide-spread acceptance of
abortion as a form of birth control is probably one of the more notable
consequences of the this modern day de-mystification of sexuality via sex
therapy, that is, the reduction of sex to a category of mental health.46
Health in the broad, metaphorical sense can be conveniently and more
happily applied to the matters to which virtue once applied, and more-more
happily, because it is, compared with virtue, free, ostensibly, of subjective
conditions and inclinations and moralizing impulses. Health as a basic normative
ideal would seem to be non-controversial. No one wants to be unhealthy, whereas
morality has always been a matter of considerable dispute and contention, in large
part because morality has been so closely tied to religious beliefs which have
historically been the object of great dispute and controversy. Mental health, as an
overriding social value, promised an escape from the constraints imposed by
religious doctrines, an opportunity to evade the pious moralisms of the priests,
rabbis and ministers. But health is also preferable to virtue because the methods of
inculcating virtue also necessari ly include the attribution of blame and the
dispensing of punishment which, by intent, inflict pain. Pain, of course, is the
nemesis of medicine and, rightfully, the object of reduction for all therapeutic
endeavors.
It is obvious now that sin and vice have come to be viewed as illness.
Virtue as a moral ideal, in the face of a dominant, therapeutic-oriented way of
thinking about human conduct, has given way to health, more precisely, mental
health. But what does it really mean to be mentally healthy? Or, to reformulate the
question with a more operational thrust: how do we know when therapy (in
whatever form it takes), applied to a mentally ill person, or applied preventively
to a healthy person, has restored them to health, or has been effective in the
prevention of mental illness? More generally, how do we recognize in any of
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these therapeutic endeavors, success and failure? One small piece of the early
post-World War II history of the mental health industry helps to give a sharp
accent to this question. In 1949 a National Institute of Mental Health grant
sponsored a conference in Boulder Colorado where seventy-one psychologists
from the United States met to discuss and analyze the need to train individuals for
careers as clinical psychologists, and the future of graduate school clinical
training in psychology. This was a time, relatively speaking, early in the
development of the modem mental health profession. What is particularly
remarkable about this conference is the lack of any clear notion of what a clinical
psychologist was or what he or she was supposed to do. As Ellen Herman says,
Although no one present at the conference seemed to know exactly
what a clinical psychologist was or what a clinical psychologist
did, they quickly agreed that a doctoral degree was necessary to do
it.47
This conference, Herman points out, occurred during that early post-War period
during which there was an enormous amount of public interest in and enthusiasm
for the possibilities for psychotherapy and an obvious desire on the part of
psychologists to deliver it to the public. But exactly what psychotherapy was and
what it did for the public was not easy to say. She provides a telling observation
recorded from one of the cynics at the conference. This person reported that from
the conference it was apparent that,
Psychotherapy is an undefined technique applied to unspecified
problems with unpredictable outcome. For this technique we
recommend rigorous training.48
Pointing to the general and basic uncertainty from the beginning of what
psychotherapy was supposed to achieve raises what amounts to a perennial
question: what is it that can be clearly recognized as success in the production of
mental health? When stated in general terms like this, it is more obvious that the
question being posed is a philosophical one with moral and religious implications:
How ought human beings to conduct their lives? To consider the issue in this way
suggests that this recent phenomenon of the medicalizing of morality has been a

Sin into Sickness:
The Triumph of Official Benevolence

189

monumental revolution, not simply one more piece of the modem march of
progress.
The promotion of health, with its linkages to modem medicine, is backed
with all of the considerable prestige of natural science. Modern science has
enormously extended our understanding and, more importantly, our control of the
physical world. And, since human beings are natural creatures then it would seem
to follow that those same methods should enable the scientist to understand, and
control or manage the entire scope of human concerns, not just their physical
well-being or health but their psychological or moral needs as well. Science bas
long replaced theology as the paradigmatic form of knowledge. Ignorance, not
vice, is the enemy of mental well-being. In its application to human behavior, the
corollary of science is therapy . Medicine applied to the body is the model to be
applied to the mind or to behavior. When our bodies are sick or injured, the
proper approach is to understand- in natural causal terms- what the problems are
and then apply the appropriate therapeutic remedies. When human beings fail in
the social arena of behavior, it is more useful to determine what the causal forces
are that determine the behavior, than to attribute the behavior to the absence of
personal self-restraint or the presence of a moral defect. The aim and practice of
science is to describe and to understand, not to pass moral judgment. With the
physical sciences this is relatively easy.
But when we apply the methods of science to the study of human beings,
it becomes much more difficult since so much of human behavior has evaluative
consequences and because knowledge applied to human beings has an important
reflexive component. In those very acts of studying and learning about ourselves
we cannot but help change ourselves. Yet insofar as any method that studies
human beings claims to be strictly scientific it must be morally neutral or value
free. Science at its core is limited to describing and explaining, not prescribing,
praising or condemning.
Thus we have observed the establishment over the last forty or fifty years,
in the name of compassion and in the pursuit of tolerance, the full therapeutic
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appropriation of vast regions of our moral conduct. It is extremely important to
stress, once again, that this phenomenon represents a moral or philosophical
revolution, a major overturning of assumptions about human nature, not a
scientific discovery nor an accumulation of scientific knowledge about human
behavior. The shift, for example, from regarding drunkenness as a sin or vice that
is to be disapprobated, to a disorder or disease that is to be treated-alcoholismfrom viewing overeating as a sin- gluttony- to, again, a disorder or disease,
reflects a moral rejection of the practice of characterizing excessive drinking or
overeating as activities for which people should be judged. Moral judgment
applies only to those dimensions of conduct for which people are to be held in
some way accountable. Condemnation or judgment has nothing to offer us in
dealing with illness or disease, and therefore are wrong, both morally and
prudentially wrong, if they are applied to people who are really sick or disabled.
And, so the ascendancy of the medical model over virtue model is not so much of
a scientific "advance" as it is a profound change of basic moral orientation.
Mental, psychological and psychological disorders have greatly expanded
over the last forty years. Or, perhaps it might be more accurate to say that
behavior that was once subject to moral evaluation has come under medical
jurisdiction and is subject to therapeutic treatment. This expansion of mental
illness occurred not so much through the process of investigation and discovery as
through the imposition of definition. It is a process that seems in many ways to
resemble more the activity of corporate mergers and takeovers than anything
scientific or medical.
The implicit moralizing component of mental health and illness is evident
in the definitions of "disorders" cited below from The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-JV), the diagnostic manual of the American

Psychiatric Association. The DSM-IV for example, describes something called
"Conduct Disorder"- the label itself carries some unintended irony.
The essential feature of Conduct Disorder is a repetitive and
persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of others or
major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated ..... The
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behavior pattern is usually present in a variety of settings such as
the home, school, or the community.49
Closely related, it would seem, is "Oppositional Defiant Disorder" which,
is a recurrent pattern of negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and
hostile behavior toward authority figures that persists for at least 6
months.50
Also, there is "Borderline Personality Disorder,"
a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships,
self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins by
early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts ....
Individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder... may display
extreme sarcasm, enduring bitterness, or verbal outbursts. 51
Finally, there is "Antisocial Personality Disorder." The essential feature of this
disorder,
is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights
of others that begins in childhood and continues into adulthood ....
The specific behaviors characteristic of Conduct Disorder fall into
one of four categories: aggression to people and animals,
destruction of property, deceitfulness or theft, or serious violations
of rules. 52
Most remarkable of these definitions is that the actual language which
describes the phenomena of these mental illnesses-apart from the "disorder"
labels attached to them- is largely devoid of medical or clinical terms. Common
to these disorders is a focus on conduct that is assigned to what are traditional
moral and legal categories, for example, "disobedience and opposition to
authority figures," "destruction of property," "deceitfulness," "theft," etc. The
terms employed are those of the traditional language of moral discourse-"deceitfulness" and "disobedience," etc. The categories themselves--dishonesty,
theft, violence, rebellion- are so primary and basic to our understanding and
characterization of human conduct that they simply cannot be recast in any other
comprehensible terms. Individuals who violate societal norms and act
irresponsibly or viciously have, of course, always been with us and have always
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presented those who must bear their abuse with the challenge of how to deal with
them and how to limit their damage; so also those people who resort to sarcasm,
make verbal outbursts and feel great bitterness. The notable difference now is that
this kind of conduct has been medicalized, that is, made into the object of
therapeutic intervention: the descriptions of vice and misbehavior now make their
appearance in medical diagnostic manuals in an elaborately categorized system,
with clinical-sounding labels attached to them- as if these were reports of
medical discovery rather than acts of social appropriation- which makes the
behavior described the specialty of doctors.
One may be tempted to view this phenomenal growth of mental disorders
and diseases as part of a predictable course of a high growth industry, one greatly
assisted with the discovery of extremely powerful pharmaceuticals. The
reconstruction of the moral realm into the medical enlarges the social expanse
over which medical professionals can claim expertise and increases the
possibilities for the accretion of power, prestige and authority. This is the Thomas
Szasz political interpretation of psychiatry. Whether one accepts it or not, it is
indisputable that the influence and authority of mental health experts, particularly
in the latter half of the twentieth century, has expanded greatly, particularly, as we
will see below, in the area of criminal law.
For one who might be inclined to resist the political-moral interpretation
of psychiatry' s expansion, a brief mention of the history of the American
Psychiatric Association 's (APA) handling of homosexuality as a pathological
form of human behavior provides an extremely interesting and challenging case
with which to consider this perspective. Psychiatry, for years, certainly for most
of the twentieth century, had regarded and treated homosexuality as a behavioral
abnormality, a fairly severe one at that. A "disease" classification and attribution
for so personally basic a thing as the conduct of one's sexual behavior would, no
doubt, be painfully felt as a stigma and bitterly resented, even more so, maybe,
than having it called a sin. Sin, in our modem, secular times is less of a problem
than disease: theology, which deals with sin, has less power and prestige than
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The APA, however, in 1974 reversed its professional judgment and
declared officially that homosexuality was no longer to be regarded as a disorder.
This was after a long period of various "disorder"-characterizations such as
homodysphilia,

dyshomophilia,

homosexual

conflict

disorder,

amorous

relationship disorder or ego-dystonic homosexuality. The actual process by which
this de-classification event took place is interesting and, it would appear, was
driven primarily by moral and political considerations. In 1970 the AP A came
under siege from members of well organized, highly militant gay activist groups
who were demanding that homosexuality be dropped from the DSM, the APA's
official diagnostic manual of mental illnesses. The AP A professional conferences
and conventions in the early 1970s became subject to many of the same tactics of
protest and disruption that were used with such great success by the anti-war
movement in the 1960s against the Federal government in its prosecution of the
Vietnam War. For the gay activists and protesters, the chief issue of contention
was neither medical nor scientific: it was a moral and political issue of civil
rights. The labeling of homosexuality as an illness was regarded as an unjust
stigmatization. The long time condemnation of homosexuality as a sin by
medieval Christianity somehow got smuggled into modem psychiatry and was
conjured into a medical disorder. Homosexuality as an illness really reflected a
prejudicial disposition of psychiatrists: the practice of homosexuality was a moral
not a medical affair.
After years of militant confrontation, highly controversial discussion and
emotional debate and conflict within the AP A, this professional organization of
physicians in 1974 voted to drop homosexuality from the DSM. And, off it went.
Of the approximately 10,000 AP A members who voted, only slightly more than
half cast their votes for the change in status. The vote was close.53 Thus by fiat or
declaration, behavior that at one moment was reflective of mental illness or
disorder, became normal behavior the next. The "patient'' was instantaneously,
collectively cured, or more accurately, rendered by 51 % of the doctors who
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attended to this sort of thing, certifiably non-i ll. Their affliction was dropped from
The Book, the DSM, that is. Moreover, this medical ukase descended from a
controversial process that turned more on political and moral considerations and
arguments than on medical or clinical ones. The corporate behavior of the APA in
dealing with this issue seemed to resemble more the hierarchy of the Catholic
Church in disposing of limbo or affirming the doctrinal infallibility of the Pope
than a body of physicians.
But since 1974 an even more remarkable shift in the medical classification
of behavior pertaining to homosexuality has occurred- namely, the heterosexual
disapprobation of homosexuality has itself become a disorder, and a well known,
widespread one--"homophobia". Homophobia is defined in the Psychiatric
Dictionary (7'h ed.) as,
negative attitudes to homosexuals and homosexuality, reflecting
both conscious and unconscious fears. ... Religious and other
cultural taboos against homosexuality are a part of early learning
and are reinforced by experience.
It should be noted that this long standing disapprobation has been completely

medicalized, that is, it has been characterized as a "phobia," a baseless, irrational
fear that requires some kind of professional assistance or intervention. A
homophobe, by definition, is a sick, irrational person.
This clinical rendering of moral disapprobation as a sickness does,
however, create a bit of a dilemma for many traditional practitioners of Judaism
and Christianity. These religions have long traditions of morally proscribing
homosexual conduct and official teachings against it. Practitioners of traditional
religions, under the late twentieth-century medical interpretation, thus become
homophobes, psychologically abnormal individuals who require correctional
treatment- traditional religious teachings and mental health norms thus come into
hard, direct, and open conflict.
Nowhere is the moral and philosophical polarity between the norms of
traditional virtue and traditional religion and the modem standards of mental
health more starkly and painfully apparent than with this clinical rendering of
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traditionally religious views as a pathological aberration of the psyche or
personality. Traditional religion, with its moral teachings about sex, marriage and
human sexuality finds itself pitted against a modem self-realization model of
human morality that is backed by the enormous prestige and authority of modem
medicine. The conflict reflects a broader, monumental moral-philosophical
contest, a culture war, with the odds of prevailing heavily in favor of the
secularists.
This momentous conflict, like many of these kinds, exudes great irony.
The traditional religious moralist highly disapproves of homosexuality, but
tolerates it (even the most conservative Christian sects condemn the sin but preach
love, forgiveness and acceptance for the sinner). Remember: toleration logically
implies disapproval. The secularist finds the "mere tolerance" for homosexuality
by the traditionally religious absolutely intolerable; toleration is not sufficient,

only full approval and acceptance ("inclusion") will do. For the gay militant, any
expressed disapproval of homosexuality equals homophobia. Everything short of
affirmation and endorsement must be interpreted as a blow against gay selfvaluation and self-esteem. Homophobia should not be tolerated and ought to be
eradicated. By equating disapproval of homosexuality as a phobic, hateful,
irrational reaction, religious attitudes and rationales can be dismissed as
pathological and requiring counseling to cure. Social equality for gays means not
just tolerance but complete acceptance and approval. Thus, of course, the irony:
the traditionally religious person is tolerant of homosexuals (disapproves but
tolerates); the "anything goes" secularists refuse to tolerate the traditionally
religious. Homophobia must be eradicated; homophobes must not be tolerated.
The traditionally religious, thus, are judged to be inherently bigoted, and their
teachings must be controverted, their doctrines ridiculed, and their attitudes
suitably adjusted by professional therapists and sensitivity trainers.
This conflict between doctrinal teachings of traditional religion with the
norms advocated by the mental health profession is full of major moral and
political dilemmas, one of which is to determine the amount of power the medical
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establishment should derive from its alignment with the State and its proper limits
in enforcing standards of "normalcy" that are supposed to govern human conduct.
There are copious examples in our own time of egregious abuses of medical
power for ideological purposes. Psychiatry in the post-Stalin Soviet Union was an
instrument of State power in service to the official ideology and used coercively
against dissidents, especially religious ones. Psychiatric confinement was used by
the Soviet government to punish and control those who were critical of or
unenthusiastic about the regime. Soviet Jews, particularly, were the compulsory
beneficiaries of Soviet psychiatry. 54 Andrei Sakarhov, one of the great latetwentieth-century exemplars of courage, heroism and principle, was subjected to
all of the rigors of Soviet practitioners of mental health. One might be tempted, at
least from the perspective of the traditionally religious, to see some parallels in
the United States. The mental health industry sets the standard of normalcy
employing the secularized moral assumptions of the elites who run the
amusement state. The traditionally religious who might dissent or are not
sufficiently compliant are thus stigmatized as mentally sick.
Under the therapeutic model of morality, the primary emotive force that is
supposed to be at work in human relations and form the basis for action is
benevolence. But it is a benevolence of a special character- not that of a natural
or spontaneous type such as a motherly or fatherly love, or the affection that
fami ly members or friends might feel and demonstrate for each other. The health
model operates with an official, disinterested and "enlightened" benevolence, one
that only members of a special professional class possess and dispense to those
who come under their charge.
Two things are distinctive about this kind of officially dispensed
benevolence. First, it has a virtually unlimited scope for expansion and
application. Almost any aspect of an individual' s social and personal life, as noted
above, may fall under its purview. Sex therapy, art therapy, music therapy, dance
therapy, recreational therapy, family therapy, pre-marriage counseling, marriage
counseling, divorce counseling, grief counseling- nearly every imaginable aspect
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of modern life admits of a potential therapeutic component with its own specially
trained "expert" who possesses a specialized knowledge and wields a unique
therapeutic apparatus that applies to particular sets of pathologies, syndromes or
disorders. Therapy or professional counseling has in fact become, as Andrew
Polsky notes, a

kind of social utility which "pointed ... to an unbounded

therapeutic sector, one indifferent to traditional notions oflimited govemment." 55
Grief counseling is one of the more salient examples of this phenomenon
of a recently professionalized human communication and interaction. Whenever
tragedy strikes or misfortune occurs, grief counselors are officially and
ceremoniously ushered to the scene where they apply their talking arts of
"healing." In the immediate aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of a
Federal building, they descended in mass and remained for months. All of this
assumes that people lack the resources of knowledge, character and personality to
deal with life's adversities without the help of some talking expert. A stranger,
with "expertise" in sympathy, is superior to a friend .
Second, as noted, this benevolence is the product of enlightenment. It is
the benevolence of the trained professional, one that is conditioned and defined by
the power that comes from the professional relationship. The professionals who
dispense the benevolence are experts and possess an authority and respect that
derives from the acknowledgment, the authority, of that expertise. They know and
understand more about the particular area of difficulty than the patient. They are
like physicians who heal, eliminate or reduce pain, and control or cure disease.
Benevolence is also a major component of the virtue model, but it 1s
profoundly different in scope and application. It is limited and specific. Normal
people, that is, most people, love their families and friends more than they love
casual acquaintances or strangers. Only fanatics, demagogues, poseurs and saints
possess, or claim to possess, unlimited benevolence for everyone. The television
evangelist and political candidate running for office may tell us how much they
love us, but only fools believe them.
Under the virtue model, the primary operative force at work is constraint
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through rules and roles. Virtue is in fact an instrument of restraint. Virtue has
almost always been an essential part of a traditionally religious perspective which
itself has operated with some notion of sinfulness or inherent corruptibility. From
this perspective, most of the tension, conflict and destructiveness that comes out
of human interaction is the result of some kind of overreaching or disregard for
others or selfishness, actions or omissions that involve a moral failure, and
primarily a failure to constrain one's desires or appetites. Moral failure is
blamable. Individuals who morally fail must be regarded as moral agents who are
supposed to be held accountable for their failures.
This contentious issue of personal accountability is a pivotal one between
the traditional moralist and the therapist. The heart of the contention and the
significance of it for understanding the therapeutic moral point of view can be
grasped by considering briefly the work of one of the last century's most
prominent and influential representatives of the therapeutic point of view. The
Kansas psychiatrist and social reformer, Karl Menninger, was a successful highly
regarded and widely published advocate for the health model of behavior from the
1930s through the 1960s.
The Menninger family was a major force in the advancement in this
country of psychiatry in its application to many issues of public and social policy.
William Menninger, Karl's brother, was an influential advocate for extending the
use of psychotherapy into the military and was the first psychiatrist to achieve the
rank of brigadier general. 56 Karl Menninger's long and productive life spanned
most of the twentieth century. He died in 1990 at the age of ninety-six. He was
described in Time magazine at his passing as the man "who brought mental
therapy into the medical mainstream and transformed the nations' way of thinking
about the mentally ill and criminally disposed." Indeed. Instrumental in this
transformation of thinking were the many books Menninger wrote, including the
first best seller ever on psychiatry, The Human Mind, in 1930, and a number of
other popular and influential titles such as Man Against Himself (1938), Love
Against Hate ( 1942), The Crime of Punishment ( 1968), and Whatever Became of
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Sin (1973). These were non-technical productions crafted primarily for a lay

readership. They were intended to enlighten publjc opiillon on matters of mental
health, particularly as they related to the formation of public policy.
The zeal and ardent moralizffig characteristic of the reformer are probably
the most salient features of Dr. Menrunger's books. The presence of these are
particularly iroruc in Menrunger' s case since he manages to sustain throughout his
work a patronizing tone of self-righteous indignation toward the traditional
moralizers, especially the religious ones, whom he ilisdains as ignorant and
benighted. The reader is frequently remmded that the author is a merucal doctor
and thus, one is to understand, motivated by pure benevolence, informed by a
scientifically-based understanding, and far removed from the ignorant superstition
that has so determined the practices and institutions of the past.
Menninger's works are probably little read today, in large part because
they were reform-oriented pieces that completely achjeved their purpose. As the
Time obituary noted, he really did help to transform the thinking of the American

people about mental illness and its relation to criminality. The interest these books
hold for us now and any current importance they have are as examples of
successful mid-century propaganda that helped .to establish the perspective that
would embrace a fully meilicalized view of morality and personal responsibility.
Though he wrote branilishing his meilical credentials, Menrunger emerges
from his writings as a full-fledged moralist, with hls chums and arguments aimed
primarily at promoting social and political goals. Consider this declamation,
written in hlgh dudgeon, from The Crime of Punishment, published in the late
sixties. Here he urges the adoption of a public policy that treats law breakers as
patients with medical treatment, rather than treating them as crimIDals with the
traditional application of punishment.
I suspect that all the crimes committed by all the jailed do not
equal in total social damage that of the crimes committed against
them. In our vengeful ferocity toward this miserable minority of
offenders, we overlook the major contributors to crime who
operate openly, successfully, and undeterred.57
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In tone and content this statement captures Dr. Menninger's central theme: the
traditional criminal justice system that both holds individuals responsible and
punishes them for the crimes they commit is a fundamentally benighted institution
that embraces practices that ought to have long been discarded. Punishment, he
passionately argues, is itself a useless piece of vindictiveness, the social,
pathological residue of atavistic, barbaric impulses harnessed to outmoded
religious moralizing. Behind the practice of punishment is this barely disguised,
beastly "vengeful ferocity," which it is important to note, is "ours", that is, gentle
reader, yours, mine, everyone's. Menninger's affinity, when he bombards with his
heavy moralizing guns, is for the collective, "we," "our," "us," a tiresome piece of
his rather condescending style, that means that society at large is the social entity
responsible for the "social damage" done both to and by criminals or other
malefactors. His is a notion of collective responsibility or no personal
responsibility- they amount to the same thing. We are all, Menninger argues,
criminals, if not actually then potentially. Any disdain or contempt we might be
tempted to exude for those felons that our criminal justice system has managed to
convict and incarcerate is, for Menninger, merely a self-deluded expression of
collective hypocrisy. The murders, rapists, embezzlers, child molesters and drug
dealers who populate the jails and penitentiaries are the ones who in life's game
of chance got the bad roll of the dice that society had thrown for them. They are
society's lowest and most unfortunate who just happened to fall, or more likely
were pushed, into the maw of an impersonal, arbitrary, cruel system of
"justice"- victims, if you will, of an uncaring society that really does not know
what to do with them or to them.
Instead of morally judging and legally punishing these unfortunates, we
should instead pity them and attempt to address the causes, such as poverty and
ignorance, that produce the criminality into which they become immersed. Again,
the problem from Menninger's point of view is the lack of benevolence.
Benevolence combined with psychological insight will remove the problems.
Criminals-this is the key point- are, above all, victims: punishing them merely
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inflates the pain, suffering and destructiveness that their activities inflict upon
society. Punishment just stupidly adds more pain to the gross aggregate of human
suffering-nothing constructive or worthwhile, just more needless, pointless
agony.
This point is readily illustrated in his remarks about Lee Harvey Oswald's
slaying of President Kennedy, an event that was recent when Menninger wrote the
book.
The public still thinks of it as Lee Harvey Oswald's crime (with or
without accomplice). Respected and dignified authorities solemnly
accumulate volumes of evidence to prove that he, and he alone, did
this foul deed. Our part in it is rarely, if ever mentioned.58
Again, the long, bony finger of accusation swings deliberately around to
point directly at the poor reader: here is the ominous, collective "our part" in this
terrible crime. All of us who were around at the time, from the school teacher in
Minnesota, to the insurance salesman in Florida, to the grape picker in California,
apparently, had some complicity in the assassination of our thirty-fifth President.
What was it? Menninger continues:
By our part, I mean the encouragement we g.ive to criminal acts
and criminal careers, including Oswald's_, our neglect of preventive
steps such as had been recommended for Oswald long before he
killed President Kennedy, and our quickly subsiding hysterical
reactions to sensational cases. I mean our love of vindictive
'justice,' our generally smug detachment, and our prevailing public
apathy. 59
Menninger's therapeutic perspective here, again laden with his usual reformer's
outrage, could not be more clear and unambiguous. He is convinced that
contemporary society itself is in some way disordered or diseased. Oswald, or any
criminal for that matter, ultimately was sick, his crime an individual personal
manifestation of the larger social disorder. Punishing an individual is merely
mistaking a cause for a symptom. John Kennedy's murder was not just "Lee
Harvey Oswald's crime." The responsibility for it is collective, attributable to a
system rife with indifference and ignorance ("the encouragement we give to
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criminal acts" and "our neglect of preventative steps") which cannot apply the
appropriate treatment that would prevent crime.
Menninger says that we should call the crime problem a "social safety
problem.',60 In the course of his campaign against punishment and against the
criminal justice system, Dr. Menninger had developed a strong aversion even for
the term "crime," perhaps in part, because crime is so naturally and so long
associated with punishment. Also the term carries too much moral and punitive
baggage: the morally neutral sounding "social safety problem" would suggest that
the problem is more of a technical nature, one that should be handled by the
appropriate technicians- in this case psychiatrists and other mental health
experts. Crime, like small pox or polio, is preventable if the right kind of
prophylactic methods are applied by the medical experts who know who to
administer them. Crime comes out of ignorance; it is not a consequence of
immorality or vice. When it does break out, the right kind of therapeutic
prophylactic is the only appropriate response. Menninger's sarcastic reference to
the Warren Commission's report, with its "solemnly accumulated of volumes of
evidence," seems to suggest, dismissively, that this effort might not be, as many
thought, a government cover up of a conspiracy, but rather just a plain waste of
time and energy. Since we were all guilty of the assassination, why invest a lot of
activity and resources to fi gure out who might have done it? This actually seems
to be Menninger's point of view.
As remarked above, Menninger' s works are little read today, in part
because they accomplished their revolutionary purpose---to help bring about the
complete medicalization of social morality. Nowhere, perhaps, has the
medicalization of morality made a more dramatic and remarkable impact than in
the criminal justice system, one of Karl Menninger' s greatest professional
interests, as we have seen.
Of all the areas of human endeavor which have been turned over to the
arts

of the therapeutic, the medicalization approach to the treatment of criminals

may be the most significant. Why? Because it brings about a such radically
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different moral stance and attitude toward individuals who have been traditionally
viewed as enemies of society, those who attack society and its members in the
most basic and primal way- the murderers, rapists, thieves and the predators of
the weak.
The profundity of this conflict is particularly well articulated by the
philosopher, Robert Musil in his novel, The Man without Qualities. The central
character of this book at one point finds himself struggling with one of those hard
moral questions. Should he affirm the punishment of death for a murderer of low
intelligence, a man whose capacity for fully understanding what he did is
questionable? The philosophical crux of the problem turns on whether we can
determine that the man has any real capacity for choice-making and whether we
proceed with the assumption of the existence of a responsible subject who is
morally and legally accountable for the his choices. Punishment makes practical
and moral sense only if we believe that human beings really possess that capacity
to make choices in their action.
It is this ability to choose that makes a person liable to punishment.
His liability to punishment makes him legally a person, and as a
person in the legal sense he shares in the suprapersonal benefaction
of the law. Anyone who cannot grasp this right away should think
of the cavalry. A horse that goes berserk every time someone
attempts to mount it is treated with special care, given the softest
bandages, the best riders, the choicest fodder, and the most patient
handling. But if a cavalryman is guilty of some lapse, he is put in
irons, locked in a flea-ridden cage, and deprived of his rations. The
reasoning behind this difference is that the horse belongs merely to
the empirical animal kingdom, while the dragoon belongs to the
logical and moral kingdom. So understood a person is
distinguished from the animals- and, one may add, from the
insan(}-in that he is capable, according to his intellectual and
moral faculties, of acting against the law and of committing a
crime. Since a person' s liability to punishment is the quality that
elevates him to the status of a moral being in the first place, it is
understandable that the pillars of the law grimly hang on to it. 61

Musil's artful rendering of Immanuel Kant's two "kingdoms" in which human
beings reside conveys a deep intended irony. The treatment of the unmanageable
cavalry horse resembles closely the treatment of a medical patient- the softest
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bandages, the choicest fodder and the most patient handling. This "treatment" is
intelligent, methodical, calculated and enlightened, a benevolent practice designed
to get the most possible out of the horse. Punishing the horse, Musil 's character
seems to suggest, is futile. Punishment as we know from Dr. Menninger is stupid,
pointless and a waste of resources. By contrast, the punishment meted out to the
dragoon with its severity and cruelty, and incidentally mightily offensive to our
twentieth-first century sensibilities, is a profound measure of the recognition of
his ability to make free choices, of his conscious participation in a moral order
where he is bound by obligations. He is unique from of all other creatures. This is
a uniqueness based upon moral and spiritual assumptions, assumptions rejected
by the thoroughly naturalistic orientation of the secular society. Without this
assumption of the existence of that active moral agency the institution of criminal
law collapses ("the pillars of the Jaw grimly hang on to it").
There is, I am afraid, something terribly grim about all of this. Human
beings are flawed and at times act badly: yet they have the capacity to recognize
their shortcomings and attempt to be better than they are. In this tension between
the capacity to recognize and repudiate his own evil and the inclination to do evil
lies the tragic reality of man's status as a moral creature. Evil cannot be
repudiated without personal accountability, without some strong way to remind
individuals when they are culpable of wrong doing. Punishment- the deliberate
infliction of pain- is the most efficacious way of achieving this reminder. Thus,
the grimness of it all. By following Menninger and the medical moralizers in
renouncing punishment, we try to free ourselves from the tension created by the
assumption that we are inherently flawed yet responsible for our misdeeds. We
take up a confidence, embedded in illusion, in a technology of human behavior
presided over by technologists who will make us better.
While the traditional notion of legal guilt and punishment was built on the
assumption of the moral responsibility of the criminal and his ability to make free
choices, the rites of punishment are not simply a recognition of the this reality and
the practice of it is not just to exact restitution from the criminal or to deter others
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from crime. Punishment is also a richly symbolic act, employed by human beings
who are creatures with a great and natural affinity for symbols. The suffering that
punishment brings, it brings deliberately. Within the human frame there is an
emotional need for balance and restitution that punishment satisfies in a basic
way. Moreover, punishment as a collective expression of moral outrage may help
to clarify and focus certain basic moral impulses. The fact that most people are
loath to inflict pain deliberately on others would seem to suggest how important
those norms that have been transgressed and rules that are violated really are and
that such transgression and violation are wrong and execrable. Punishment
symbolizes, in a way that nothing else can, moral outrage. If the public standards
of morality in a society collapse, then punishment ceases to symbolize anything.
This notion is well articulated by David Gelemter, who was a victim of
one of the late-twentieth-century America's more notorious, peculiar criminals.
Gelemter is a computer science professor from Yale University. He was badly
injured by a letter bomb that was intended to kill him mailed to him by the
Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski. One of the more interesting of the many
murderers in our country, Kaczynski was a brilliant mathematician (degrees from
Michigan and Harvard) who withdrew from society and over the course of many
years inflicted- with a most remarkable symbolis

his intellectual rage on

arbitrarily selected strangers. Kaczynski, Gelemter persuasively argues, was and
is not insane: he is, rather, a fanatic, knowing exactly what he was doing and
perfectly willing to conduct his cowardly executions in the service of his
ideological fanaticism. For what he did Kaczynski deserved to be executed. ln
considering what kind of man Kaczynski was and what he was about Gelemter
argues for the rightness of executing murderers.
Why execute murderers? To deter? To avenge? Supporters of the
death penalty often give the first answer, opponents the second.
But neither can be the whole truth. If our main goal were deterring
crime, we would insist on public executions- which are not on the
political agenda, and not an item that many Americans are
interested in promoting. If our main goal were vengeance, we
would allow the grieving parties to decide the murderer's fate; if
the victim had not family or friends to feel vengeful on his behalf,
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we would call the whole thing off. ln fact, we execute murderers in
order to make a conununal proclamation: that murder is
intolerable. A murderer embodies evil so terrible that it defiles the
conununity. 62
The application of punishment, particularly, severe punishment for severe

crimes, is thus supposed to be a powerful indication of the existence of a
communal moral self-confidence reflected in the willingness to inflict pain in
order to affirm the importance of the norm which has been violated by the
criminal. This kind of moral self-confidence has been fatally eroded by the
subjectivity of late twentieth-century moral life. Gelemter makes this clear:
[T]he death penalty represents absolute speech from a position of
moral certainty, and doubt is the black-Jung disease of the
intelligentsia- an occupational hazard now inflicted on the culture
as a whole.63
Indeed. The debilitating doubt and lack of moral self-confidence of which
Gelemter speaks is one of the conspicuous, dominating features of our
contemporary social landscape. This absence of self-confidence is particularly
apparent in the criminal justice system where punishment has been superseded by
treatment. The doubt and lack of confidence are also apparent in the protracted
time now which it takes to conduct the trials and carry out the sentences even for
mass murderers. The people of the State of Illinois had to wait about a decade and
a half for the legal appeals and delays to be exhausted before officials were finally
able to put an end to a man (John Wayne Gacy) who had murdered thirty-three
people.
The traditional practice of punishment carries with it the assumption of the
reality of deliberate wrong, of sin and evil in some basic, irreducible sense.
Gelemter invokes the notion murder as an "evil," a defilement of the community,
not the sort of language typically found in capital punishment discussion these
days. This way of talking and looking at the phenomenon are what we have
largely given up. A fully medicalized social world of the kind sought after by Karl
Menninger where everybody is considered a criminal of some sort, where
individual responsibility has been theorized away, and punishment itself is
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regarded as an act of collective criminality is our own early twenty-first-century
society. The "moral kingdom" spoken of so eloquently by Musil has been
gradually, imperceptibly evacuated.
If one were to envision this discussion as the consideration of a conflict or

a battle between the medical and moral view of law, the victory would appear to
be going to the medicalizers. James Nolan Jr., in The Therapeutic State, has
extensively documented how the therapeutic approach has, with support of the
federal and state governments, become a part of the criminal justice system with
its rapidly expanding clientele. In 1962 the Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California ruled that in itself drug addiction was not a crime and that drug

offenders could be compelled by the state to participate in drug treatment
programs.
In 1966 the U.S. Congress passed the Treatment and Rehabilitation Act

which gave the courts power to compel drug offenders to enter drug treatment
programs as an alternative to incarceration. As Nolan points out, these actions
helped to set up an essentially therapeutic model for dealing with behavior that
was once considered criminal activity. He quotes from testimony given to
Congress by Matthew Cassidy, executive director of T ASC, Treatment
Alternatives to Street Crime, a Nixon White House sponsored entity that sought to
link medical treatment processes with judicial processes.
TASC provides an objective and effective bridge between two
groups with differing philosophies: the justice system and
community treatment providers. The justice system's legal
sanctions reflect community concerns for public safety and
punishment; whereas the treatment community recommends
therapeutic intervention to change behavior and reduce the
suffering associated with substance abuse and related problems.64
The two "philosophies" referred to by Cassidy are more than "differing": they are,
as discussed above, completely incommensurable. The therapist attempts to
manipulate ("change behavior"}-here we have Musil's "empirical animal
kingdom" in place. In fact there is no " bridge" between these differing
philosophies: the therapeutic supersedes the judicial, that is, the judicial
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institutions (institutions which render legal judgments) have come increasingly to
resemble medical institutions (institutions that dispense medical treatment). This
is quite obvious from Nolan's discussion of the development of "drug courts"
originally in Dade County, Florida, now in Michigan, California, Texas, and
several other states, where an individual charged with a drug crime has the
opportunity to avoid going to prison ifhe is willing to undergo a court-monitored
treatment program which includes extensive counseling. Counseling is the main
component of the program. The "treatment" approach to crime is also,
predictably, expanding beyond drug offenses. Nolan quotes a Los Angeles judge
whose considerable enthusiasm for this type of approach stems from his view that
the criminal offenders are such because they suffer from "low self-esteem.'.65
The drug court, therapeutic model of "treating" criminals rather than
punishing them represents a profound transformation of our traditional institutions
of criminal law and justice and points toward the culmination of a trend that has
been underway for a long time. The depth of this transformation becomes
apparent when one considers the major changes in the relationships and
interaction of the principal parties involved in the formal legal process: the
traditional adversarial relationship of the prosecutor and defense attorney who
contest the criminal guilt of defendant has become a collaborative project of
helping the defendant "recover" from his illness. The defendant is now, fully and
completely, a patient, not an accused citizen who must, by an impartially applied
set of rules and procedures, be proven guilty by the State and who employs
someone whose job it is to defend him against the State. Criminal behavior, as
Nolan observes, has been redefined in pathological terms as illness.66 The
prosecutor, whose role has traditionally been to represent the interests of the state
by convicting law breakers, now works collaboratively with the client's (no
longer called a defendant) attorney to move him into and through a recovery
program. The role of the judge has changed profoundly as well, from a detached
figure of authority who makes impartial rulings on the basis of legal rules and
principles to a sympathetic, involved professional who embodies many aspects of
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the therapeutic ethos.
The more personal Drug Court judge has been variously described
as a therapist, a social worker, a counselor, and a psychologist. The
judge often engages the defendant directly, while the attorneys
literally and figuratively take a back step. 67
The defendant, once confronted by a representative of the state who attempted to
convince a jury of his guilt, is now enveloped by a system of officially directed
benevolence. The reduction in the limitation of power in the latter case is quite
dramatic. Each of these roles, the defense attorney, the prosecutor, the judge, has
been radically transformed: they are all, collectively, agents of a therapeutic State.
The "drug court" therapeutic approach to crime represents a profound
moral change in attitude, one which Karl Menninger would enthusiastically
endorse. Moreover, given the general tendencies and directions of the therapeutic
industry, one could be confident in predicting that this movement would
eventually pervade the criminal justice system such that what has been dispensed
as criminal justice would eventually become criminal treatment,

that is, the

whole criminal justice system would become a gargantuan enterprise of Statefinanced, State-imposed and State-applied therapy. One of the ironies of the
treatment over the punishment approach is that its efficacy is probably no greater:
treatment programs do not lower recidivism rates any more than conventional
approaches. 68 (Parenthetically, and more broadly, the efficacy of therapeutic
programs, generally, has been thrown into question by long term studies by
researchers such as Herbert Fingerette and Stanton Peele.) The irony, of course, is
that the therapeutic approach is compelling and is embraced for reasons that are
largely independent of how the outcomes compare with those of more traditional
practices. Therapy has become an end and value in itself. It provides an
opportunity for self-understanding and self-awareness. Whether or not one
actually succeeds in getting off of drugs or alcohol, or changing criminal or antisocial behavior, the activity of undergoing a therapeutic experience is an
intrinsically valuable experience, a self-affirming act of personal exploration and
discovery.
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Self-esteem

has

been

a

pioneer

concept

m

our contemporary

understanding of mental health. ln a relatively short time the term "self-esteem"
itself has become a necessary element of psychological and therapeutic discourse
and is frequently invoked in serious normative discussions about how individuals
ought to function in modem society. It has, of course, become a familiar idiom
and durable notion, a seemingly indispensable element of our current
psychological and sociological landscape and vocabulary. Self-esteem is a
primary concept in current educational theory, and it has even become the central
value of a massive social movement. In 1986 the Assembly of the State of
California authorized the creation of the California Task Force to Promote SelfEsteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, an event that at first impression
sounds like something out of a Kurt Vonnegut novel. The bill's sponsor was John
Vasconcellos,

a

friend

and

disciple of Carl

Rogers,

the

well-known

psychotherapist. In Rogers' personalist, psychotherapeutic conception of human
relations, Vasconcellos saw a socially transforming political philosophy, calling
his approach "ultimately political in nature .... [providing] a totally new, faithful,
and hopeful basis for public-policy decision-making."69 Vasconcellos firmly
believed that the California state government should sponsor a tax-payer funded
program to promote self-esteem.
In light of the emerging evidence, it seemed both morally and
fiscally responsible to create a formalized effort to explore whether
in fact self-esteem might be a social vaccine, a quality capable of
strengthening people, making them less vulnerable to problem
behaviors.70
Note of course, again, the familiar resort to medical metaphors ("vaccine") when
the real subject matter is actually social policy-making. The feat of raising selfesteem, assuming that there are people who know to produce and administer this
vaccine properly, is proposed to be something analogous to an inoculation
technique that protects society, just like smallpox and polio vaccines protect us
from physical disability and disease. "[T]he major problems plaguing society,"
says Neil J. Smelser, a University of California, Berkeley sociology professor,
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"have roots in the low self-esteem of many of the people who make up society."71
With this insight into the causes of social evils, it certainly does not take a
Berkeley-affiliated sociologist to figure out what the general solution must be:
raise the low self-esteem of the "many." We must employ experts who possess the
knowledge to identify those who suffer from this malady, and who know how to
raise them to a level sufficient to alleviate the problems. With so "many"
suffering from low self-esteem its elevation requires a transfer of power and
resources.
How would it be possible to determine when the self-esteem of the
populace ("the many of the people who make up society") was raised? In short,
how is the success of the self-esteem raisers to be measured or judged? When
everybody acts the way they should. When everyone has everything they need,
and society is perfect. The language and metaphors of the self-esteem advocates
are medical, but the impulses, emotions and thinking are more analogous to those
that impel religious and political movements. The self-esteem campaign seems to
be a kind of secularized, evangelizing movement with the psychologists and other
mental health related experts playing the part of the preachers and priests. "ln
religious verbiage," writes James Nolan Jr., "the self is the new sacred, the new
object ofworship."72
Exploitation and self-esteem as social concerns have become causally
linked by social science, a particularly powerful partnership in generating a kind
of moral-political pressure to change social institutions. The instrument of change
is social science technology via social policy. When Matthew Dumont, a high
level National Institute of Mental Health administrator, reported to the Kerner
Commission, set up by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the causes of the
urban rioting in the late 1960s, he delivered his characterization of this
phenomenon completely in social-psychological terms, replete with a final
"diagnosis" and implications for aggressive therapeutic redress. The language and
the ideas are much the same as those of Kenneth Clark.
This, then, is the diagnosis. A riot is a symptomatic expression of
deficits of stimulation, self-esteem, a sense of community, and
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environmental mastery. The treatment of the condition is no secret
and in inadequate dosages it has already been administered.73

Again, for the benefit of the legislators, is a fully "medical" -sounding "diagnosis,"
even with some quantitative language of "deficits" and "dosages." Could any of
these things of which there were supposedly deficits and dosages be satisfactorily
quantified or measured? Could any direct causal relations be established between
the rioting or non-rioting conduct of individuals and their sense of community and
levels of self-esteem?
This notion of "deficits" may be important, central even, to understanding
both the therapeutic and the moral implications of this way of thinking. The
purpose of introducing such a notion is to convince everyone of the quite dubious
proposition that people who act in undesirable, lawless or destructive ways should
really be thought of as deficient or Jacking in something they ought to have.

74

The

reasoning behind this notion is that when they ("they" being those who break the
law, do bad things, etc.) get what they really need, what they are in deficit of, then
they will cease to do what they should not do. They will be healthier, happier, or
whatever we want to call it, and will no longer need to be criminals. They will act
normally, at last.
Moreover, the fact that criminals don ' t have what they need to be
"healthy" must be someone' s or some group' s fault, not theirs. The work then of
getting them what they need to be happy, healthy, and full of self-esteem- which
will in tum alleviate the need to burn, loot, pillage, take drugs and beat their
wives-does not simply involve getting them to change by persuasion or coercion
or by whatever means works. Society itself must be completely restructured and
overhauled. All of the essential social goods need to be redistributed so as to erase
the deficits that lowered the self-esteem which in tum caused the social problems
in the first place. "Rights" to resources must be legally created with the assistance
of propaganda as moral support for the social and political restructuring initiatives
that aim at eliminating the deficits and ultimately the lawlessness. What someone
has a right to, someone else has an obligation to provide. This "deficiency"
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assessment delivered by a high level representative of the federal government
completely and radically reconstitutes the fundamental normative thinking that
bas long been applied to the behavior of those who conduct a riot- the most basic
and open lawless attack on the social order there is- as symptoms of an illness.
Such a judgment illustrates not only the extent to which the medicalized
model of behavior has come to govern the mentality of the ruling elites, but how
the practical application of that mentality turns traditional moral and political
norms completely on their heads. Riotous behavior, because it is a "symptomatic
expression of deficits," is to be understood, even sympathized with as a
predictable response to adverse conditions-"a cry for help," as it has often been
characterized. But rioters should not be condemned and certainly not punished.
Low self-esteem, as the "diagnosis" indicates, is declared to be the major cause of
the riots. Exploitation causes low self-esteem. Exploited groups, particularly,
suffer from it, and the forms of this deficiency are varied and many.
The diagnostician's reference to "inadequate doses" of the obvious
"treatment" seems, however, self-serving. What exactly was the treatment?
Government programs created and sponsored by the elites, paid for by taxes. But
since these programs had not yet worked, the only way they could not be regarded
as failures was to pronounce them to be too tittle, in effect underfunded and
deficiently administered "in inadequate dosages." The failure, as they view it, is
not with the social clinician who perhaps made a bad diagnosis; rather it lies with
someone else's lack of generosity and compassion. An assessment of this kind, of
course, will always provide perfect insulation from having to consider the
possibility of a failed diagnosis.
One wonders, barring the unlikely event of a complete disappearance of
all the pathologies in question, how the diagnostician would determine that an
adequate dosage had been administered. More to the point, why, given their
therapeutic assumptions and their reputations, would they be inclined to make
such a determination? How would it ever be possible to distinguish between an
"inadequate dosage" and a failed diagnosis?

2 14

Desolation's March

At the beginning of the twenty-first century we find that our traditional moral
concepts have been theoretica.lly pushed aside, but with enormous practical
consequences. The medicalization of morality unfolded as the quietest but most
society-altering revolutions of the twentieth century. It would be difficult to argue
the contrary. Our moral world has been medicalized. We find ourselves fully
immersed in a therapeutic view of social reality. This new mo.ral world is filled
with dependent people, co-dependents, enablers, the dysfunctional, and those who
are "in recovery." Patienthood is a rapidly growing condition of the American
people. It is a natural complement to the pervasive condition of social victimhood.
Our traditional institutions themselves have long been accused of churning out
innumerable victims, individuals who have been fed into an uncaring, impersonal
"system" and have emerged somehow psychologically or emotionally damaged
and socially incapacitated. These victims are of various kinds, their suffering
manifested in every pathology, inadequacy and dependency imaginable. Some of
them are unhappy and unfulfilled. They may feel bad or inferior most of the time.
Some cannot manage their own lives and must rely on others to maintain them
and care for them. They eat or drink too much or submit themselves to some other
debilitating forms of excess or indulgence. Many of the victims produced by
society are abusers of some sort. They perhaps abuse themselves or they may
abuse others either psychologically or emotionally or physically.
Criminals too are victims, as we learned from Dr. Menninger. They prey
upon others in society, inflict incalculable harm, drain off resources, and create
fear, mistrust and loathing. What they have in common, though, is their
victimhood. They have become what they are and do what they do because the
society in which they live either has not given them what they need to be normal
and healthy, or has permitted them to be mistreated, abused or neglected. Such
individuals require professional intervention: they have entered the greatly
enlarged world of patienthood. In their residence there they will encounter an
officially dispensed benevolence that will "heal" them. This is the vision of Karl
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Menninger, a harbinger of the therapeutic mentality and one of the early
American theorists and advocates of universal patienthood and the continuous
enlargement of therapeutic benevolence. He argued passionately throughout his
long life that society itself was sick and everyone in it was in some way and to
some degree infected. With sickness everywhere, the ubiquitous presence of the
therapist is natural and necessary.

No resistance to the therapist is to be

permitted.
While patienthood may seem now to be a natural or inevitable state for us,
one only has to think of an earlier time, when our orientation was quite different
and we thought of ourselves as citizens, in order to get a sense of the profundity
of the change and just how revolutionary it is. Citizens in contrast with patients
are active. They take responsibility for themselves. They hold each other
accountable for the decisions they make and the actions that follow from them.
Most importantly, citizens act as morally independent creatures. They prefer to
make their own life-decisions, carry out their plans, and submit to the
consequences without resorting to excuses. As much as possible, they want to
maintain their own lives and cope with life's ambiguities and adversities without
professional assistance and supervision.
In the vocabulary of citizens, important words now fade from use, words
that articulate the values of independence and responsibility- honor, virtue,
integrity and duty. Citizens have no desire to return to childhood or behave like
adolescents once they are adults. They recognize life's moral as well as physical
limitations and submit to them. They disdain the rationalizing and the pseudotheorizing away of wrongdoing and malevolence. By vivid contrast, the important
words ofpatienthood- recovery, co-dependency, twelve-step programs, treatment
needs, self-esteem deficiency, negative self-concept, and negative self-worthreflect a profound sense of moral passivity, ethical helplessness and social
dependency. It is a language that reflects our current march of desolation.
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Chapter Five
Shame Extinguished
While shame keeps its watch, virtue is not wholly extinguished in the
heart.
Edmund Burke

One of the most remarkable effects of the expansion of personalism and the
medicalization of morality in late-twentieth-century America is the eclipse of
shame, or at least a notable diminution of many public manifestations or
expressions of it. Casual, uninhibited openness about what were once private
matters is a notable feature of our modern America, a society which strives for the
commu11icatio11 of information---and whatever that information is about, no matter

how personal, it must indeed be communicated. Everyone is entitled to receive the
communication. One of the myriad rights that came into being in the latetwentieth century is the "right to access information." Like many of our latetwentieth-century rights, it is tendentious and an interpretational quagmire.
Television thrives on personal self-exposure. Indeed, one can easily see in
television a technology, assisted by the personalist impulse to uncover and expose
even the most unsavory aspects of the self, that makes voyeurism a large feature
of everyday life. It enables us to peer into the lives of anyone and everyone.
"Reality television" is the elevation of voyeurism into a unique amusement
genre--people eagerly seeking self-exposure on camera for the amusement of
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millions of onlookers. The now ubiquitous, commonplace impulses of selfexposure are stimulated and sustained by the collective assurance of toleration:
tell us all about yourself- how you feel, what you think, what you did, what you
hope for and fear- and we solemnly promise we won' t be judgmental. Just open
up and tell us everything. We will understand.
Many of us today are more open to others about the details of our personal
lives. The destabilization of the family and the devolution of marriage into
"relationships" of various and precarious sorts leave us more inclined to reveal the
private, intimate details of our lives to casual acquaintances or strangers than were
our parents and grandparents. Self-revelation, a la the narcissistic Rousseau, has
emerged as a norm. The therapeutic ethos with its rituals of self-divulgence and
its pressures to bare the soul has helped to break down the barriers of the private
and intimate. The expectation is to tell all. Thus, it is considerably easier now for
one to admit to one' s sordid or sleazy deeds from the past since they can either be
passed off as "mistakes" or excused as a natural consequence of victimization.
Therapists insist upon self-revelation. Without it treatment cannot be properly and
effectively dispensed. Self-revelation provides the therapists with the details they
need to play their role effectively as aggressive procurers of compassion. Conduct
or habits or dispositions that once were considered to be disgraceful or shame ful
can now be positively presented for public inspection and comment in a
therapeutic context that renders them expected and understandable.
Our amusement industry thrives on the seamy, intimate details of the lives
of celebrities. These details are in great supply, and the celebrities are not
reluctant to provide them. The revelation intensifies interest by the public and
increases popularity. No serious penalties or sanctions follow. Less shame now
attaches to conduct such as declaring bankruptcy, going on welfare, having a child
out of wedlock, seducing someone else's spouse or being convicted of a crime
than in earlier times. Professional athletes, particularly, seem to be exempt from
censure of any consequence: they can commit rape and assault, and after a short
hiatus, resume their celebrity status. The base and perfidious conduct of public
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figures and celebrities is becoming flagrant and shameless: betrayal, profligacy,
dishonesty and criminality are routine. We watch the celebrities as they recycle
their way through life.- through the courts, the rehab programs and clinics, and
through spouses and assorted self-images on the endless quest to feel good about
themselves. The clinic named after President Ford's wife, Betty, became in the
1980s, a popular destination for celebrities to recompose themselves. A visit
there was just a standard entry on the average superstar's resume.
With the past so easily shed, shame has less of a bite. The word itself,
"shame," like "virtue", is becoming less a part of the everyday working moral
vocabulary than it once was: it is now a term that appears to be more of interest to
social historians, moral philosophers or clinicians. As the twentieth-first century
opens up to us with so much therapeutic assistance in the exploration of our
feelings, the promotion of our self-esteem, and the reduction of any acquired
tendencies for acting judgmental, we discover that there are now many fewer
kinds of actions for which we need or ought to feel any shame. Being shameless
has become a state of being for which we strive and for which there is
considerable professional support.
The personalist seeks to eliminate shame because it is so inhibiting of the
self and because it is driven so much by traditional norms and standards of
conduct. The deep subjectivity of our moral orientation makes the kind of
personal constraint that shame is called out to exert highly problematic. From the
therapeutic perspective, shame is a potentially powerful social force that inhibits
or warps the development of a completely healthy self. Moreover, shame carries
so many long, close associations with traditional religious beliefs and practices,
particularly those related to matters of sexual conduct. Shame is the enemy of
healthy sexuality. Insofar as sex is regarded as natural and good and wholesome,
there must follow a therapeutic imperative to reduce whatever shame there may
be associated with sexual matters. This imperative will, of course, be powerful,
clear and legitimate. This has been the dominant trend in our society for many
years. Thus, shame in our modern society turns out to be an enormously
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ambiguous phenomenon. It can do terrible things to people who are engulfed by
it. Yet, if one looks about and observes how people without the constraints of
shame are typically disposed to act, it does not seem to be something we would
want to relinquish. Shame may be painful to experience; shameless behavior is
revolting to contemplate and hard to endure.
The experience of shame has been closely bound up with feelings of guilt.
Shame and guilt are closely related things, and I use the terms in a non-technical
way, without any pretense to clinical precision, recognizing that psychologists
make important theoretical distinctions between them. With guilt, says
psychologist Donald Nathanson, we experience punishment which follows
because of some action we have taken: with shame, "we are punished for some
quality of the self, some unalterable fact." 1 With this distinction in mind, shame is
probably more relevant to personalism than guilt because it has more direct
bearing upon the moral composition of personality and ultimately the formation
and strength of an individual's character. The complete absence of shame in a
person would be evidence either of self-perfection-no qualities of character
would be lacking

r a signal of fundamental amorality, that is, the total absence

of a capacity to feel pained by one's own short-comings or misdeeds or failures.
It seems that shame does have a more visible social quality, while guilt
appears to render its effects more privately in a quite individual, personal way.
Shame carries certain nuances of meaning that suggest more public or physical
implications of the effects of the emotion such as the flushing of the face-being
"shame faced"-or the disgraceful withdrawal of someone from public office or
public life after the exposure of some shameful deeds. Vice-President Spiro
Agnew, for example, retreated in shame to his private life (and it seems a quite
comfortable one, too) after his long and sordid personal history of corruption and
graft was exposed by a battery of criminal investigators. His fall was a decade or
so too early, one might conjecture with just a touch of cynicism. He missed out on
the various opportunities for enrichment that would be open to unrepentant
"celebrity" felons just a few years later-opportunities to cash in, to publish a
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self-serving, self-pitying memoir about his difficult "ordeal" and the pain it
caused him and his family, and to assign all the blame for his fall onto others- all
with an aggrieved self-righteous air. We never saw the ex-Vice-President making
his way through the television talk show circuits, chatting with the reptilian Larry
King on CNN, exploring his inner-most thoughts and feelings for the benefit of
on-looking millions, unashamed, promoting a ghost-written, soon forgotten book.
We know shame to be

an acutely uncomfortable even painful feeling. We

experience it when we realize that it has become apparent to others that we have
ignored or violated a standard of behavior, disappointed a social expectation, or
transgressed a social or moral norm. Shame, at least in some cultures, comprises a
rather large affective chunk of moral experience and can bring about the severest
consequences, but not typically in ours. Because the experience of shame is
potentially so painful one might wonder whether it would be better to live in a
society where there was there was very little of it. What kind of society would a
shameless one be? A view of the social-moral "evolution" of our own society in
the last fifty years or so provides at least the beginnings of an answer to such a
question. From a traditionalist standpoint, the need for a person to be subjected,
potentially, to the experience of shame, as an effect of transgressing a social
norm, is an extremely important one. That experience in the proper context helps
to discourage the formation of dispositions and habits that are generally regarded
as vicious or sinful. This notion has long been regarded as practical wisdom. The
Talmud speaks of the moral necessity of shame.

A sense of shame is a lovely sign in a man. Whoever has a sense of
shame will not sin so quickly; but whoever shows no sense of
shame in his visage, his father surely never stood on Mount Sinai.2
l.n the book of Genesis Adam and Eve first felt shame when they discovered their

nakedness after their initial act of disobedience to God. Shame necessarily
accompanied the moral knowledge of good and evil that they acquired from
eating the forbidden fruit. Shame, as it is represented in our moral and religious
traditions, would seem to be an element in the construction of a civilized order. ln
the book of Proverbs : "He that gathereth in summer is a wise son: but he that
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sleepeth in harvest is a son that causeth shame." Shame dramatically points to
ways of conduct that are harmful or vicious. Also, shame is used to counter
natural inclinations---the son spoken of in Proverbs is probably more inclined to
take it easy and shill, if he can, the hard work of harvest to others- and in that
sense the inducement of it in this context is a fundamentally repressive measure of
natural impulses. The obligations and norms around which stable institutions and
useful social conventions are built are, the traditionalist would argue, reinforced
by guilt and shame. They compose essential elements of the world of individual
autonomy or self-govemance--without them, other less effective and more
coercive external methods would probably have to be employed.
This fundamental connection of shame to the workings of a civilized order
1s a problem for the Roussean personalist who tends to view the process of
civilizing human beings itself as a study primarily in the application of power, the
outcome of which despoils an individual of his innate, natural goodness.
Civilization, recalling Rousseau's passionate declamation against the founding of
the convention of property, imposes a vast order of oppression and inequality.
Shame, of course, can also easily and understandably be viewed as a socialpsychological weapon, an insidious instrument of social control wielded by the
more powerful members of a social group against the weaker more vulnerable
members to assure their continuous submission and compliance. Shame is about
social power, a means for one group to control another. Children are particularly
vulnerable to shame and are the most obvious example of a weaker, more
vulnerable class that is often manipulated by those who attempt to induce it.
Much can be said against shame, and has, particularly by psychologists.
Indeed, a visit to any sizable research library in quest of books and articles on the
subject yields a substantial discovery of materials written primarily by
psychologists who are critical of shame because of the emotional pain it inflicts
upon individuals, its terrible self-tyrannizing effects. Says therapist Michael
Lewis: "A therapist, if prepared to look for shame, will notice that many patients
initiate therapy because of their shame." 3 Lewis suggests that shame is a prime
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cause of psychological impainnent or distress, a major diseconomy, so to speak,
of the whole enterprise of social control. Shame, from the perspective of mental
health and psychotherapy, is often a tool of manipulation used by parents,
teachers, ministers and other institutional authority figures to achieve the
legitimation of the institutions they represent, to preserve their vested power and
authority, and to help ensure that their wards are as much as possible, cooperative
participants in their own subjeetion. Shame is a powerful tool of the oppressor,
one of the many strategies of domination. It enables him to keep the reality of his
coercion well hidden or dissimulated and to make the oppressed function as
accomplices in their own subordination .
The aversion to shame, the characterization of it as self-destructive and
manipulative, is a completely understandable and predictable as a further
development of the personalist outlook with its natural affinity for the healthy,
expanding self. Insofar as it exerts an inhibiting force over the personality, shame
becomes a primary object of exorcism upon which the therapist directs his
energies. The founder of Gestalt therapy, Fritz Pearl, called shame, along with
embarrassment, the ' Quislings of the organisms. "'4 From any perspective, shame,
indeed, functions as a powerful constraint, a fetter on the personality. To avoid its
unpleasant effects, we do things and say things we would prefer, strongly at times,
not to do and to say. Because of the threat of it we keep important portions of
ourselves--0ur emotions, our ideas, our desires--concealed from others, even
those close to us. Al) episode of shame can bring deep humiliation and cause
lasting pain: the desire to avoid it may create severe inhibitions. Thus, to the
extent that the expression and development of the self becomes the primary goal,
and that authenticity and self-realization are the ultimate moral and social
achievements, then, shame, which is a psychological obstacle to the attainment of
these goals, should be resisted. Shame causes pain, and we should always strive to
reduce or eliminate pain.
John Bradshaw, whose lectures, books and video and audio tapes on
addiction, recovery and spirituality have been extremely popular, has made the
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eradication of what he calls "toxic shame," the center piece of his widely
disseminated therapeutic program. Bradshaw, as a highly successful pop-culture
psychological healer and guru of self-awareness and personal growth, is in many
ways a most representative figure of the personalist-therapeutic ethos of latecentury America. He speaks fluently the language of popular psychology and
adroitly captures its preoccupations with healing and the recondite processes of
acquiring self-esteem. Taking up and absorbing Bradshaw's way of speaking and
conceptualizing can help one bring about a radical conversion of thinking and
orientation whereby one's existence becomes an intense life-long project of selfanalysis and recovery from one or more of the almost innumerable addictions by
which one may be snared.
The eradication of shame is one of the central therapeutic imperatives in
Bradshaw's popular program of psychological healing. The dedication of his book
Healing the Shame That Binds You gives some indication of the large role that

shame plays in Bradshaw' s life and in his work.
To Nancy, my wonderful wife, who heals my toxic shame by
loving me unconditionally. To my long-time friends (who used to
be my children) Brad, Brenda and John. Forgive me for all the
times l 've transferred my shame to you. To my father, Jack. Toxic
shame took your life and robbed us of our time.5
Toxic shame obviously remains at the core of all of Bradshaw's important human
relationships. It is transgenerational -his wife, children and father are all caught
up with it- and it is the ultimate source of the misery and unhappiness (and one
senses that they were considerable) in his life. For Bradshaw, shame permeates
every human relationship. The toxic effects of shame yield to Bradshaw' s unique
therapeutic techniques. Relief from shame brings "healing," a word that Bradshaw
often employs, one so conveniently vague as to convey almost any meaning you
care to bring to it. Healing, as this dedication suggests, is what his wife does for
him on an on-going basis- he is never completely free of this toxic shame-by
attaching, apparently, no conditions to her affections for him and good opinions of
him. This is the culmination of the personalist quest- to enjoy the esteem and
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affirmation of others without the impediments of regular expectations or standards
of conduct, to be completely free to explore and expand the self without nonns
that impose conditions on the evaluation of conduct and whose transgression may
cause pain. Unlike physical healing that at some point culminates in recovery or
restoration, Bradshaw's "healing", it seems, becomes a perpetual and lifelong
project.
That an adult could come to a point where he would need or want
unconditional love is rather remarkable, childish perhaps, but consistent with one
of Bradshaw's main therapeutic prescriptions which is "liberating your lost inner
child." To help those who submit to bis tutelage achieve this life-altering
"liberation" Bradshaw routinely assembles small groups of adults who are
encouraged to entwine themselves intimately and are led through a "therapeutic"
ritual in which they engage in fondling and babble mutual endearments to each
other and, most importantly, cry.
I like to set up small groups (six to eight people) and let one person
sit in the center of the group .... After the group is set, we play
lullaby music and each person in the group communicates one of
the verbal affirmations while touching, stroking or just sitting near
the subject. Those who have been neglected [as children] will start
sobbing when they bear the words they needed to hear, but did not
hear [as children]. If a person was a Lost Child, he will often sob
intensely. These words touch the hole in bis soul. 6
Note the upper case "Lost Child," the designation for an important psychological
construction for Bradshaw, denoting a dysfunctional state in which many adults
are trapped. Only in a society where individuals have surrendered their dignity
and lost their moral and spiritual bearings could the practice of purposely
reducing adult individuals to weepy, self-pitying creatures who seek to emulate
small children be widely regarded as salutary, beneficial, or enhancing. What
strength of character, resiliency, or fortitude can be expected from people who are
given to whimpering and lamenting about the deprivations they suffered from
childhood? What achievements and monuments could we expect from people who
pursue such a tortuous, prostrating process of conjuring suffering out of their
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pasts and re-living their psychic injuries?
Bradshaw does speak of something he calls "healthy shame," but like
much of his working vocabulary, the words can designate almost anything he or
his patients like, which is probably one big reason why his work has been so
popular. This is appropriate for the personalist who generally embraces liberation:
being bound or confined by precise meanings of words is simply one more
constraint from which one may strive to be liberated.
Our healthy shame, which is a feeling of our core boundary and
limitedness, never allows us to believe we know it all. Our healthy
shame is nourishing in that it moves us to seek new information
and to learn new things. 7
Nothing here could be remotely associated with the traditional sense of
shame; no talk of inhibitions; no convicted sense of wrong doing; just more selfexpansion and self-discovery. Being a motivating force for acquiring information
and engaging in learning are probably not what most people typically understand
by

the

mechanism of shame.

Bradshaw

equates healthy shame with

"nourishment," a remarkable piece of pseudo-psychological conjuring. Shame
becomes "healthy" by making it something other than shame, by connecting it
with a "growth" metaphor so that it is consistent with his ruling impulse toward
self-expansion, development, and the breakdown of inhibition.
The experience of shame is incompatible with the essential subjectivity of
the personalist ethical or spiritual orientation. "What is spirituality?" asks
Bradshaw.
I believe it has to do with our life-style. I believe that life is everunfolding and growing. So spirituality is about expansion and
growth.8
Spirituality becomes something identified by that vacuous label of 1960svintage, "life-style," something which amounts to "expansion and growth"-more
vacuity; expansion.from what and growth into what? Bradshaw never ventures to
say because he cannot. Be whatever you want to be. Concentrate on dispelling
whatever shame might visit you and feel good about it; and expect others to
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dispense their approval on you as you reciprocate. With the unfolding, developing
self as both an ideal and the primary reference point of value, an emotion like
shame creates nothing but problems. This is because anyone who attempts to
apply it as a means for reprobating forms of disreputable conduct finds himself
appealing to an external standard, some norm that has been established by
tradition or long term practice, the observance of which may well be inimical to
the expression or creative expansion of self.
Bradshaw's quest for a recovery of the lost inner-child and the selfabsorption of his therapeutic program represent the culmination of a decades-long
effort to dismantle traditional constraints. Thirty years earlier, Carl Rogers, in the
development of his "client-centered" psychology, argued that the emotive
experience of the individual should establish itself as an absolute primacy of
moral authority. This carries enormous implications for an affective phenomenon
like shame which has so much potential moral impact and which is so strongly
and intricately tied to traditionally established norms and other sources of
externally established moral authority.
It is easy to see why client-centered therapy would be intent on reducing

shame as a social force. Affirms Rogers:
Experience is for me the highest authority. No other person 's ideas,
and none of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my own
experience. 9
All genuine values, Rogers here appears to be arguing, emanate from

direct, personal experience. Hence, these life-guiding values are fully selfreferential and completely self-authenticating. Moreover, and even more
remarkable, he also seems to be affirming that the kind of experience that counts,
that is "authoritative," is an emotional experience unmediated by reflective
thought. Even "my own ideas," not to mention those of others, must be secondary
to these primary emotions I feel. Natural inclinations and emotions, the sorts of
things that shame often works against, are primary. Thus, from the perspective of
anyone with an affinity for Rogers' psychotherapeutic program of selfaffirmation, the experience of shame should be fiercely resisted since it is most
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often caused by a self-recognjtion that one has failed to conform to some external
(false or irrelevant) norm or source of authority- someone else's ideas of right
and wrong, proper and improper- and thus must be viewed as potentially
tyrannical and oppressive of self. The self-emoting subject becomes for Rogers
and his clients the ultimate determination of value.
The personalist views shame as a detrimental, debilitating emotion
because it is activated by external, interpersonal processes of judgment or
evaluation and because its effects are punitive. Shame comprises an essential
working element of the outmoded virtue-model that governed human conduct,
that is, shame is connected with the traditional moralist perspective that views
human behavior as a phenomenon that involves free choice-making and requires
responsibility relative to the choices that are made. In our common, daily life,
much of which we are not even completely aware, we find ourselves entangled in
a web of obligations and expectations over which we do not exercise complete
control and in which we must participate. Complex systems of obligation bind us
at many levels, from the manners and etiquette we employ, to our business
dealings, friendships, to the levels of law and basic morality. When we violate the
norms- sometimes informal, sometimes formal, we often pay some penalty for
the transgression. The dynamic is basic and straightforward: one violates the
norm, one is held up for that failure, experiences the pain of guilt and shame and
then attempts to make atonement. All ofthis, of course, presupposes a structure of
norms and values behind which lies some generally acknowledged source of
authority.
But if what we have traditionally called vice or sin is more appropriately
understood as an affliction or disability, caused by unfortunate events, (if vice is
converted to illness) then the infliction of shame (like punishment) is, indeed, just
the gratuitous addition of another layer of pain added on to those arising from
what are dysfunctional or pathological states of personality. One cannot help
being ill or disabled; such a state is not something that one usually wants or
intends to bring about. Sympathy and understanding not disapprobation, as noted
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above, are the normal and fitting responses that illness should evoke from the
observer. Why should people be ashamed of what they do if they cannot help
doing it?
In our contemporary setting, where dysfunction and social disability seem

to be almost natural, expected states of character or personality, we now
encounter what seems to be a conscious effort to rid ourselves of shame. This
indeed is one of the effects o(the growing dominance of the therapeutic approach
for dealing with misconduct of all kinds and the increasing subjectivity of social
norms. This effort to rid ourselves of shame, at least from a casual observation of
public behavior, appears to have been highly successful in the sense that many of
those fai lings and shortcomings in social life that used to give rise to shame no
longer seem to do so.
The extinction of shame seems to be the most conspicuous in public life
where, with increasing frequency, we observe prominent and famous people who
flaunt the system and transgress the rules and appear to suffer little consequence
in the way of public opprobrium. Says psychologist Donald Nathanson:
Perhaps it is the devaluation of the affect shame that has allowed
our culture to slip into its current ' narcissistic' preoccupation with
exposure.10
Because the norms themselves have been weakened or diluted, little expectation
of that deflating, humbling feeling of shame in transgressing them can or ought to
be expected. It becomes increasingly difficult to find wrong doers who either
express shame or appear to feel any: we live in a time, increasingly, of
shamelessness as there seems to be nothing for anyone to be ashamed of.
Public shamelessness is probably inevitable. Norms and values exert much
weaker claims over conduct because of their immersion in subjectivity and
because of the medicalizing of so much human behavior. The increasing
subjectivity of social and moral norms and the growing doubt about the authority
of any such norms cut deeply away the confidence any of us may have in
applying sanctions against those who violate them. Medicalizing vice effectively
divorces wrong doing

from

considerations

of character

and

personal
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responsibility; wrongdoing becomes an impersonal, morally neutral matter and
thus completely shameless. James Twitchell has noted that the "group most
threatened by the absence of shame has been the most willing to countenance its
effacement." 11 That "group," the American middle class, has made a dramatic
turnabout and embraced behavior that was once regarded as obscene, vulgar,
irresponsible, and ultimately, shameful just a generation ago, including out of
wedlock childbearing, bankruptcy, and welfare. The therapeutic community, with
its persistent efforts to de-stigmatize many forms of behavior, has been the
midwife that ushered into the moral world this turnabout.
ln the past, when the conduct of a person who malingered, or stole, or

cheated or mistreated or betrayed someone was exposed, he would attempt to
retire, withdraw or hid from public view in order to escape whatever expressions
of outrage or contempt might be rightfully vented against him. This resort to
shameful retreat into hiding, especially for public figures, has diminished
significantly for at least two reasons. First, the willingness of the public to accept
or at least tolerate higher levels of deviancy has risen significantly. Senator
Patrick Moynihan called this phenomenon a collective act of "defining deviancy
down" which is, in effect, the steady lowering of our moral expectations of human
beings such that acts that used to horrify us and bring severe consequences upon
the perpetrators, no longer d

the intolerable has become quite tolerable. Thus,

what was once outrageous has become routine and the expected. What used to
provoke outrage and shock us, such as multiple murders- Moynihan uses the
example of the St. Valentine' s massacre which was shocking world wide-are
now common weekend occurrences in large cities. The kinds of behavior that in
the past we did not tolerate, we now do. The effects of vicious behavior have
become so routine and have been so trivialized that we now just take them for
granted and thus accept them as normal. The abnormal, the offensive, becomes
the norm and no longer offends. We shrug off and casually accept what our
predecessors vehemently eschewed and harshly punished. 12
Second, and in some ways even more significant, deviancy itself has
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become a rich source of material for feeding the ever expanding amusement
industry. The purveyors of amusement need to find new ways to maximize the
shock that contributes to the intensity of amusement. For it is the shock itself, the
arousal of those strong emotions in reaction to contemplating the outrageous, the
horrible and the perverse, that makes the experience of them so amusing and of
such intense interest. In a restless, rapidly changing society such as ours in which
norms of conduct are immersed in doubt and ambiguity and are continually being
challenged and revised, deviancy is a curiously ambiguous phenomenon, at once
both repellent and attractive. It repels because it represents the transgression of a
rule or principle that for at least some people still establishes a boundary of
human decency or a standard of integrity or a rule of fair play. Yet, the powerful
attraction of deviancy for many derives from the fact that breaking the rules
provides a means for rolling back conventional and largely arbitrary boundaries of
the unacceptable. One can also increase one' s opportunities for self assertion and
at the same time decrease personal accountability.
Self-assertion has become an important pursuit in our early-twenty-firstcentury therapeutic America, and it bas been increasingly divorced from
conventional limits and restraints. This in turn makes the efforts at self-assertion
even more open-ended, impetuous, relentless and unrestrained. Even if we cannot
fully assert ourselves, there are many individuals who do, and they have become
objects of intense public attention and infatuation. We buy their ghost-written
books. We watch them interviewed on television and follow the gossip about their
lives. Rule-breaking, convention-shattering, and various forms of defiance and
incivility have been artfully taken up and made into careers by those we now call
"trash celebrities," individuals who are "in demand" because they defiantly flaunt
the rules and scorn the conventions. Deviancy expands the far edges of normal
behavior and opens the personal horizon for new levels of excitement and
unexplored areas of self-expression.
Who would deny that public shamelessness is in much greater abundance
than even a few short years ago? For the prominent or famous who now get
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"caught," the potential amusement-value that the stories of once shameful ,
despicable actions provide makes for lucrative book contracts, magazine
interviews and television talk show appearances- various avenues of mass
publicity which provide the opportunity to turn what was once shameful conduct
into cash. A huge market of voyeurism exists. Nothing is too sordid, corrupt,
perverted or disgusting to deter the impresarios who package the stories for public
consumption. The trials, for example, of celebrities accused of crimes are public
spectacles, opportunities for the captains of the amusement industry to expand
their offerings. These "trials" spin off a succession of parasite celebrities-television commentators, pundits and "experts" who predict, speculate and "add
value" to the legal proceedings in the form of glib, amusing opinion, and
conjecture overlaid with bogus moralizing and psychologizing.
The criminal trials are so much longer and protracted than they used to be
because they are now scenes of amusement. Recall the astonishing length of the
0 . J. Simpson trial, the circus antics of the participants, and the extraordinary
amount of media attention that was lavished upon anyone remotely connected
with the proceedings. At the beginning of the last century, the assassin ofa United
States President, President McKinley, was tried and dispatched in a couple of
months. Imagine the length of time now it would take to conclude a trial and carry
out the sentence of a murderer of a major public official. The many years that
would unfold would also be polluted with movies, television shows and endless
commentary and speculation about the event. The lawyers and judges presiding
over the circus would themselves acquire celebrityhood. They would write books,
make television appearances, grant interviews, and visit university campuses.
There is another reason that trials are now so prolonged. With the rise of
the many victim classes produced by societal inequities, guilt itself has become so
much

more

problematic- theoretical,

and

practically

contentious. The

establishment of legal guilt is no longer a process that can be readily
accomplished by common sense exercised by ordinary people: it has become a
complex, contentious theoretical process involving the professional mediation and
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interpretation of experience by many different kinds of experts.
For the non-prominent shameless, the opportunities to cash in are not as
plentiful, but the celebrities set the standard for shameless behavior, and they
actually seem to benefit from the voyeuristic interest of the general public in their
misdeeds. They conduct their personal lives with few restraints and the shocking
things they do become just more material for the amusement industry, although
the boundaries of indecency are so indistinct and expansive that it is more
difficult than it used to be to shock anyone.
Bookstores are clogged with the ghost written productions of current and
has-been celebrities- actors, rock stars, athletes- who trace out in tedious detail
their prodigious practices of fornication and drug and alcohol intoxication and
other forms of self-indulgence, personal treachery, and criminality.
The amusement-oriented media routinely feature the excesses and antics
of movie actors, rock stars, multi-millionaire athletes and other professional
celebrities who engage in lewdness, assault, drunken rampages, drug use, rape,
and other various forms of criminality and perversity. They appear disposed to
feel little shame. They incur no opprobrium and often pay no serious penalties.
lndeed the preferential treatment they often receive seems to be equaled only by
those who came from the ranks of hered.itary aristocracy i.n an earlier age. Judges
confer with their expensive lawyers and "punish" them with counseling or rehab
programs. Coached by public relations-savvy handlers, they feign a bit of
contrition while their publicists invent the excuses. If they are bona fide trash
celebrities, the predictable response is arrogant posturing and an outpouring of
abuse. And on· it goes. The standards of public accountability and responsibility
have profoundly shifted over the last fifty years such that we now look for causes
which ultimately become excuses for the bad things that people do. When you can
brandish a good excuse, especially if it is recited in a contemporary victimization
jargon, you need not feel shame for anything that you do, no matter how
despicable. Moreover, no one should be too judgmental or expect you to feel bad.
The disappearance of shame is also reflected in a near extinction of any
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standards of personal morality or integrity that might bind our political leaders.
When, as it seems to be now, almost no misconduct, unethical behavior or sordid
dealing will arouse shame upon exposure, the range of choices in self-expressive
iniquity are expanding like television cable channels and suburban shopping
malls.
One can grasp how wide this chasm of permissible perversity has opened
over the last forty years by speculating what the reaction of the public might have
been to the sexual conduct of John Kennedy had it become widely known during
the time he was in office. This is an interesting historical hypothetical to ponder in
light of the revelations of President Clinton's scandalous conduct in the Oval
Office as the century was drawing to a close. For Kennedy, a World War II hero
who assumed office in 1961 , it is now apparent, with the stories and reports that
have appeared in countess books and articles, that fidelity in marriage, or
faithfulness of most any kind for that matter, was a meaningless notion to him,
and that he was utterly lacking in any standards of probity or sexual morality. He
was, to put it in the blunt language of an earlier era, a complete and unregenerate
lecher. Over the years biographers, journalists and historians have uncovered and
revealed the staggering dimensions of his womanizing. 13 During his Presidency,
the Washington Press corps properly looked the other way. The public never
knew anything about of it until years after his assassination, even though some of
the dallying had occurred in the White House. Had the details of his appalling
philandering and profligacy been revealed during his tenure in office, he would
have been driven in disgrace from public life. There can be little doubt of this. He
had won the Presidency by the narrowest of margins, and his apotheosis with the
assistance of the intellectual class was achieved only after his assassination. Even
if the public would have been inclined to forgive his regular faithlessness to his
wife, the sheer recklessness of his conduct, and the wanton disregard for the
Office of the Presidency that such conduct implied would have guaranteed his
rapid departure from office. The standards of propriety and the expectations of
moral character and decency for occupants of high office were substantially
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higher, even as recently as forty years ago.
Judging by the most minimal standards of probity and personal integrity,
President Clinton appears to have achieved great success in his confessed
aspiration to emulate the hero of his boyhood, John Kennedy. Several decades
later, Clinton's appalling course of sexual adventuring became common
knowledge during his time in office-indeed the ludicrous sex scandal conducted
with a young intern that Jed to his impeachment will be how we all best remember
him. The public had some intimation of what this man's character might be like in

the 1992 primary campaign when one of his former Little Rock mistresses, in
pursuit of her own fifteen minutes of fame, went public and divulged the seamy
details of her "relationship" with Clinton during his Governorship in Arkansas.
With the assistance of his wife, he was able to lie convincingly at the time and
spin his way out of the damage to his ambitions. The full extent of his lecherous
proclivities did not emerge into public view until well into his second term.
Accused of cavorting with one of the White House interns of half his age, and
after months of lying, dissimulating and obstructing the inquiry, he was finally
forced to admit, in his words, to an " inappropriate relationship," the detai ls of
which might, without much embellishment, be easily scripted into a porno short
for the Playboy Channel.
Yet, in contrast with what we can easily imagine the outcry would have
been a generation earlier if John Kennedy had been caught in such an act, the
extensive details of the President's faithless and reckless conduct appear to have
met with a large yawn of indifference by the American people. To the practices of
what the President's apologists have called his "private morality" the public did
indeed seem disinclined to make any severe moral judgments, that is, to be
judgmental of the man they twice elected to the highest office. If a modem day
Rip Van Winkle, who nodded off in front of the tube in the early sixties, suddenly
awoke in the late 1990s and had turned on a fairly typical television evening news
program that covered President Clinton' s sexual antics, along with the detailed
technical discussion of fellatio, its fine legal implications and the interpretation of
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its political significance, he would, no doubt, be astonished.
Equally remarkable, and revelatory of our times, was the conduct of the
President himself. He appeared to feel little if any shame. His consummate skills
as a lawyer emerged as he quibbled over legal definitions and adroitly deflected
blame by attacking and defaming his accusers. No Agnew-like retreat from high
national office in shame for this former Governor. In spite of the revelations to the
entire country of his wholesale mendacity, his betrayal of the confidence of
friends and associates, his public humiliation of his wife and daughter, this man
went shamelessly about his business. He moved back and forth between, on the
one hand, feigned weepy performances at staged media events riddled with his
psycho-babble about " healing," and, on the other, oozing with phony indignation
like some seedy entrenched bureaucrat caught with his hand in the till, for whom
the only sure method for removal from his position would be to change the locks
to the office and buy him his bus ticket home.
What little remorse he demonstrated came from the counsel of his
handlers and pollsters and seemed to be orchestrated merely for effect. His
regrets, one gathered, appeared to be aroused primarily because he was caught.
Indeed the emotion that seemed dominant in the President's self-presentation was
resentment directed at those who brought the evidence to light. His political
survival of the scandal was an enormous piece of irony, the ultimate expression of
post modern morality where the focus of the event became, not conduct of the
accused, but rather the hypocrisy of the accusers and the reaction of public to
their corrupted motives. Public morality has become so immersed in subj ectivity

and consequently so invertebrate that no one is supposed to pass judgment on
anyone. Why pretend that the "inappropriateness" the President confessed to
mattered? What is appropriate and inappropriate is all a matter of context anyway.
This scandalous set of events near the end of the twentieth century in many ways
is emblematic of our time--the complete shamelessness of a shameful acting man
occupying the highest office of the land, abetted a by powerful coterie of media,
amusement and political celebrities, with an indifferent public looking on. This
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scandal, the behavior of the man caught in it, and the general public reaction
represent a profound culmination of our post-World War Il era where toleration is
the ultimate value.
Shame's natural impulse is to cover up. Such impulses conflict directly
with the modus operandi of our organs of mass culture, particularly television.
Television thrives and grows by exposing things, moving ever deeper into once
forbidden terra incognita, m"aking those things that were once matters of shame
now subjects for public contemplation and, ultimately amusement. The heavily
hyped two -hour prime time television interview with President Clinton' s former
intern, who, with obvious enjoyment and excitement, discussed the intimate
details of her trysts \vith the President as well as confessing to affairs with other
married men and an abortion- all quite shamelessly- illustrates the point. Why
was she discussing these very private matters on prime time television before
millions of people? She had become a celebrity, and talking about yourself on
television is what a celebrity does. The television interview was a prelude to an
international book-promotion tour. Such brazen, shameless conduct would have
been completely unthinkable even as recently as forty years ago.
These amusement-confession rituals serve to shrink severely the sphere of
shameful conduct. Deviancy becomes routine and defined further down.
Eventually almost nothing can be regarded as shameful. From this shrinking of
the realm of deviancy arises a growing disparity between what people do and the
characterizations of it in any traditional terms. Thus, Mr. Clinton during the
period of the controversial events surrounding his behavior could with a straight
face declare the observance of "Moral Character Week."

The collapse of public shame is simply the reflection and the consequence of the
destruction of the objective standards of morality over the last thirty or forty years
by the forces of personalism. Shame arises and makes its effects deeply felt when
we confidently hold our conduct up against a shared norm or standard: shame
requires the existence of a moral community whose members share a moral
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vocabulary and consistently apply the words and concepts lo their conduct.
But it would be difficult to say that there now exists anything in early
twenty-first-century America that even remotely resembles a moral community.
The appeal to moral principles as a way of guiding our lives has dissolved into a
process of sorting out which personal and subjective inclinations may be deemed
"appropriate," and there is no shared moral vocabulary which can be consistently
applied to anything. We are in danger of living our lives nihilistically- judging,
acting, affirming, according to nothing. Nothing exists, including religion, around
which such a type of community could be constructed and maintained. The only
possible central mediating value that can come into play is toleration. Toleration
is absolutely essential precisely because no other principle or norm can be
affirmed or established. But this affirmation provides no basis for a moral
community and solves nothing: for the question raised earlier remains-what
conduct we will not tolerate? And if not, why not? What principles are there to
appeal to? The near impossibility of answering questions like this is one more
reflection of the desolation of our times.
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Chapter Six
Total Entertainment:
The Rise of the Amusement State
Religions give men a general habit of conducting themselves with a
view to eternity; in this respect they are not less useful to happiness
in this life than to felicity hereafter, and this is one of their chief
political characteristics.
Alexis de Tocqueville

Edward Gibbon recognized how amusement, when raised to a ruling passion,
enervated people, rendered them soft and lazy, and made them indifferent to
everything but their present condition, and thus easi ly managed and readi ly
compliant. Copious amusement and opportunities for diversion to the masses
enable aspiring tyrants to fasten the chains with less trouble and little interference.
The public games were one of Augustus's tools for completing the
destruction of the Roman republic, clearing away the remains of its austere
republican virtue, and for the expansion of his dictatorship near the end of the first
century B.C.
The people of Rome, viewing with a secret pleasure the
humiliation of the aristocracy, demanded only bread and public
shows, and were supplied with both by the liberal hand of
Augustus. 1

246

Desolation 's March

This is Gibbon' s recipe for tyranny- " bread and public shows," the first century
analog to junk food and sitcoms. Two ingredients are at work here, Gibbon
asserts: envy, which seeks the destruction of almost any form of hierarchy, and
amusement, which when it becomes all consuming, makes people into docile,
manageable creatures who will vegetate contentedly and leave the ruling elites
free to enlarge the scope of whatever programs and enterprises that will gratify
their particular appetites and ambitions. Arnusement in heavy doses softens us up.
Like a narcotic, it incapacitates us and diverts our interests and energies from
more serious matters.
In the second half of the twentieth century a confluence of three cultural

developments, unique in human history, has brought us to a stage where the
prevailing human preoccupation is amusing ourselves. First, compared with our
ancestors, we lead relatively work-free lives. We do not have to spend the
majority of our waking moments eking out our subsistence. Moreover, the work
that nearly all of us actually do is not physically grueling labor.
The growing preoccupation with amusement changes how we think about
work and what it means for us. Work itself begins to take on the characteristics of
amusement and entertainment. Work in many ways has lost its primacy in relation
to consumption. Richard Weaver has written :
that the more a man has to indulge in, the less disposed he is to
endure the discipline of toil- that is to say, the less willing he is to
produce that which is to be consumed. Labor ceases to be
functional in life; it becomes something that is grudgingly traded
for that competence, or that superfluity, to which everyone has a
' right' .2
Second, cable television and computer technology have given us an
infinite capacity for the vicarious experience of the spectacle. We now have at our
immediate disposal and at little cost, movies, sports, theater, television shows, and
concerts of any sort to cater to every personal inclination. We can amuse
ourselves almost everywhere: in our homes, cars, boats, campsites, workplaces. In
short, we--including people of even modest means- possess a nearly limitless set
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of choices for amusement and diversion, in almost any place we like at any time
we choose, that would have been inconceivable a hundred years ago even for the
richest and most powerful individuals.
The third, and I think the most important reason, has to do with the nature
of personalism and its war on traditional institutions and the primacy of selfdiscovery. Traditional institutions such as the church and family offer their
members a vision of reality and a connectedness to a larger objectively defined
order that gives meaning to their lives. What life is all about, what one's place and
destiny in the world are--all of these essential human ends- or purposequestions---are interpreted through and mediated by the structures and purposes of
the institutions themselves. As the spirit of traditional institutions ebbs away
imperceptibly and is irretrievably lost, and as these institutions come increasingly
to exist in remote, abstract and depersonalized forms, that fixity and
connectedness that came from the institutions and their capacity to give meaning
and direction to life dissipate. Those ends- or purpose-questions fall heavily and
open-ended entirely upon the individual. There is little or no institutional help
with these kinds of questions. The questions, as well as the answers, become
entirely self-chosen and self-proclaimed- indeed, the utter primacy of selfassertion seems to be inevitabl

but to what purposes and effects? It is

impossible now, opines Arnold Gehlen,
to identify standards of value valid for everybody, and this is what
engenders the inferiority complex- the social role someone plays
is no longer unquestionably accepted as valued by some other
group.3
Gehlen is just one of many observers of modem life to recognize how relentless is
its subjectivity and how it takes a toll on individuals by fragmenting and
dissolving the systems of belief that tie people together in communities.
Amusement contributes to that fragmentation. It nurtures our subjectivism.
For I alone can say authoritatively what amuses me, what makes me laugh or cry,
what will successfully divert me from my cares and anxieties. Amusement has for
its main purposes the stimulation of the senses and imagination. It affords
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diversion from the oppression of daily routines and cares, and offers excitement.

If it does not provide any of these, it fails. Modem man, stripped of the nurturing,
interconnected institutions, his belief in a transcendental reality ruptured, still
must have something to fill the teleological void that has been left by the death of
bis gods. Amusement fills the void: it has become an end in itself, an ersatz
religion with innumerable enticements and, most importantly, invincible
subjectivity.
This conjunction of technical, economic and social developments brings
us to a unique historical point: life in the total amusement society. Life unfolds as
a quest for fun. Amusement reigns! The quest for amusement unleashed becomes
the controlling passion of all of conscious life. Life itself becomes a continuous
diversion, a diversion from itself. The art ofliving has thus become the mastery of
the technology of escape. We now have all of the essential ingredients easily at
our disposal to make our lives, if we so care, into the ceaseless pursuit of
amusement. And many of us do. Watching television alone consumes huge
amounts of the average American family's time-hours per day. Spending the
entire evening before the television is routine for many families . With the advance
of cable, satellite, and digital technology, the sheer numbers of programs from
which to choos

the convenience, the possibilities for the most personalized

levels of consumer amusement-satisfaction- are staggering and growing.
Supplementing the programming of the television network is the movie
industry. With the advent of VCRs, DVD, and cable television, one can consume
movies of all kinds twenty-four hours per day. The possibilities for electronically
viewing sports events and spectacles of every conceivable type are enormous and
there are countless other sources of diversion and escape.
It is important, though, to make a distinction between being entertained or

being amused and amusing one's self. The latter is active and involves the
exertion and even creative engagement of one's facu lties. Important and valuable
achievements may emerge from such activities. The former, however, is
essentially a passive process: one submits oneself to the experience of a pre-
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packaged program that experts design to provide diversion or escape. Passive
amusement makes no demands-one simply digests what is placed before him.
Much television watching is the perfect model of this kind of passive, inert
amusement. "Neither preparation nor study is required to enjoy [it) ; [it] lays hold
on you in the midst of your prejudice and ignorance.'.4 Tocqueville wrote this
over one hundred and fifty years ago referring to the great appeal of the theater to
Americans. But the obser-iation is even more applicable today to television. Neil
Postman has pointed out that television viewing is not and never will be a skill or
discipline or ability that one develops and refines: no one ever becomes better at
watching television the way they do for example with reading, or mathematics or
playing a musical instrument or playing a sport.
Watching television requires no skills and develops no skills. That
is why there is no such thing as remedial television- watching. That
is also why you are not better today at watching television than you
were five years ago, or ten.5
This is most certainly the case. History is replete with people who have
educated and distinguished themselves through the disciplined reading of books
and journals and the study of mathematics and technical subjects. It is safe, I
believe, to say that no one anywhere has educated or distinguished himself or
herself through the watching of television.
The world of television is dominated by celebrities, and it the perfect
medium for the easy creation of celebrity-hood. Celebrities dominate electronic
amusement. Celebrity-hood is an inexplicable phenomenon- but its qualities
generate a powerful, immediate appeal. Celebrity status and novelty go hand-inhand. To become a celebrity status one must usually defy or resist conventional
norms or expectations. The conventional is dull, predictable, boring- not
amusing. One who becomes a celebrity can, with virtual immunity, break rules,
set trends, stand outside of institutions and treat them with casual indifference or
even open contempt.
Celebrities play by their own "personal" rules. Until recently, the last
thirty years or so, there was least a tentative balance between the "dangerous"
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attractiveness of the ways of celebrities for the middle class and the personal
destructiveness that the non-conformity could bring. The "life-style" of the
celebrity class was a life of daring, rule-breaking, libidinal adventure in invidious
contrast to the middle classes' "slavery" to convention, to safe, conservative
values that usually had some religious basis. We could look enviously at the some
of the movie stars of mid-century like Errol Flynn, Lana Turner, or Robert
Mitchum, the social rebels who broke the rules and defied the conventions and
seemed to have lots of fun doing it. But for the most part the middle class did not
emulate them-there were unhappy consequences that often followed. There was
still a set of forces--the religious, moral principles and norms- that competed
effectively against the enticements of a celebrity antinomianism and held us more
or less in tow, that is, helped us stay married, loyal to our spouses, watchful over
our children, out of jail, sober and solvent.
The sixties greatly assisted in dismantling these constraining and
conserving forces. The dilution of traditional religion and the descent into
paganism and barbarism- the latter symbolized by the shirtless, tattooed,
drunken, obscenity-spewing rock musician "entertaining" our young and
impressionable daughters and sons--assisted our immersion into a complete
amusement society that is always "celebrating" something.
One cannot begin to fathom how amusement functions m our society
without considering how intricately is its connection to the lives of the amusement
provider, i.e., celebrities. The ersatz religion of amusement offers many and
varied rites of adulation, practices, and ceremonies that pay homage to its own
gods, ones that are often glitzy and beautiful. The fascination and absorption with
celebrities seem to have plunged us into the recrudescence of an almost primitive
pagan polytheism, a world where flawed inferior deities flit capriciously about
and generally foul things up. Most of their free time seems to be spent having
affairs, getting divorced, arrested or addicted. These activities are assiduously
tracked by the professional gossips in the media and are a major source of
amusement.
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Celebrity-hood embraces people with varying degrees of permanence and
for reasons that often have nothing to do with talent or ability. At the apex of
celebrity-hood are the movie and television stars and the professional athletes.
They are beautiful and athletic. Their names and faces are everywhere. They are
the objects of intense scrutiny with an "industry" that caters to the seemingly
powerful need to engage in the widespread rituals of"celebrity worship."
Parasite celebrities, impresarios like Barbara Walters and Larry King,
generously assist celebrity worship with electronic forums, and the "personal"
interviews through which the celebrity "reveals" himself or herself to members of
the television audience. The interviews themselves resemble a strange variation of
the

stereotyped contemporary therapist-patient encounter.

The therapist-

interviewer gently and empathetically, but persistently, urges the celebrity-patient
to talk about those secret inner feelings and to make an insightful selfinterpretation of those feelings and the experiences that gave rise to them. But the
real therapeutic beneficiaries of these celebrity interviews conducted on television
are, of course, the members of the audience, eagerly but passively awaiting the
epiphany. The interview' s purpose is to provide an opportunity for all of us to
peer into the psyche of a celebrity- a revelation with a therapeutic-voyeuristic
thrust. This is the source of the appeal to millions of people. There is great irony
with this. The draw of such exchanges for the audience derives from the "talent"
of the interviewer to create a casual, informal, relaxed setting in which a personal
and supposedly moving human exchange takes place--an achievement of warm
and friendly if scripted intimacy, in front of millions of strangers. This exchange
often will tum on the discussion of matters deeply intimate or private to the
celebrity. Here at play in the center of the amusement industry is of all things, the
"honesty" Rousseau invented- tell all about yourself to everyone. The therapistinterviewer and celebrity-patient both, of course, know that they are, respectively,
asking and answering the questions with the outside world looking on. The
celebrity interview, with all of its contrived spontaneity, phony intimacy, and selfrevelation manufactured for maximum effect, thus has turned out to be one of our
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popular electronic-rites of celebrity worship, a uniquely modem television genre
of mass amusement via celebrity adulation--0ne that adroitly combines television
theatrics with light trappings of psycho-therapy.
Amusement as a dominating influence m our daily routines ts a new
phenomenon- four or five decades in the making. For hours, people sit and stare,
often ingesting chips, popcorn, candy and soda pop--not by coincidence sold in
ample packages at the video store-and mentally digest the formulaic productions
churned out by the amusement industry. The American plague of obesityobesity rates have doubled in the last thirty years--comes in part with inordinate
television watching, given the physical passivity and gluttony that accompanies it.
Obesity grows at alarming rates. But its intrusion is so completely
understandable. Rampant obesity is the physical consequence of a remarkably
new dimension of our amusement ethos--"amusement eating." Amusement
eating does not take place around the ceremony of traditional meals that sustain
social relationships and nourish the body. One engages in amusement eating
neither to alleviate hunger nor to assist with social connections: it is amusement in
its own ri ght, pursued to combat boredom. Amusement eating often accompanies
escapist activities like television and movie watching. The "snack food" aisle at
most supermarkets purposely segregates the popular amusement foods, such as
chips, candy, cheezos, pretzels, soda pop, etc., conveniently packaged food that is
high in empty calories. Even the portions are larger-Coca-Cola many years ago
was vended in six and a half ounce bottles. Amusement food tends to make
people fat rather than healthy. We eat anywhere as we now seek amusement
everywhere- in cars, at work, in the classroom, among many other places. The
traditional social constraints surrounding eating have diminished just as other
social constraints have yield to self-pursuing personalism. The actual activity of
eating has come to resemble the instinctual-biological behavior of animals. We
simply "graze" whenever we encounter food.
Out of amusement eating, like amusement in general, arises a curious
symbiosis. Amusement naturally pushes us toward excess: fun is good, the more
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the better- who is to make "value judgments" about what limits should be
imposed? But the excess puts us into debilitated straits from which we frequently
need to be rescued . Amusement begets therapy. The amused need the therapists;
the therapists help the amused. Dieting is the therapeutic antidote to amusement
eating.
Amusement eating, naturally, creates the need to diet. The diet industry is
an enterprise into which Americans feed millions of dollars-the weight loss
industry, made up of clinics and treatment centers, programs, counselingnecessary to contend with obesity. Amusement eaters, as one might expect, are
not disciplined in their ingestion of food. Because amusement in general is
good-the more the better- amusement eating therefore must be good. It turns
out in fact to be irresistible for many. Amusement eaters need others to help them
try to reduce the acquired bulk, to engage in self-exploration in order to
"understand" why they overeat. Whenever Oprah achieves one of her major
"slimming" feats, millions of her viewers learn even more about her personal
battle with obesity and all of its psychological underpinnings. This understanding
is, of course, self-understanding, another facet of personalism with its
concentration on the subjective self. The therapy to overcome obesity can itself
become a peculiar form of amusement and diversion. Jn the Kingdom of
Amusement, one kind of diversion can be conquered only by another kind.
Grotesque ironies flow out of the mix of amusement eating and television
watching. Americans indulge themselves daily for hours contemplating the svelte,
beautiful celebrities on television, during which they ingest the amusement food
made irresistible by the slick television commercials, steadily making their way to
obesity and unwieldy corpulence. The imagery that captures and exalts the
glamour, sexuality, and beauty that is so much the allure of television for the
viewers serves in the end to magnify their own grossness- amusement that holds
the seeds of self-loathing. Yet, for those turned fat by amusement eating,
television, the origin and stimulus for so much of the consumption, becomes the
prime purveyor of weight loss programs, fad diets and exercise equipment.
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Network television programming is formulaic and hopelessly stultifying-

sit-coms, dramas, news, soap operas and game shows. Movies come in
homogenized, pre-sorted categories- romantic comedy, action film, horror film,
martial arts and some others. They are predictable and designed to be so. The
romantic comedies make us "feel good"- that is how they promoted. Action
movies fabricate vicarious excitement for imaginary escape from a heavily
regulated, meaningless world. All the genres are predictable. They evoke the
kinds of moods and feelings we want- wherever and whenever we want them.
The underlying themes and even the ideology are standard: the films not only
entertain but also purvey the latest pieties of the elite. 6 In submitting to the usual
fair of prograrnrned amusement, the minds, like the sitting, food-ingesting bodies
they are connected with, have little work to do or effort to exert- in it goes; out it
goes, most of it quickly forgotten because it is all pretty much the same.
Everything is fine and no complaints start dropping as long as the stimulation
patterns hold up to standard expectations and the satisfaction levels are high.
One of the most remarkable, late-twentieth-century stories of disappearing
self-restraint that is directly related to the ascendance of amusement is the
complete normalization in our society of gambling. Until the last twenty-five
years or so, outside of a few amusement "sin" capitals such as Las Vegas and
Atlantic City, gambling was illegal almost everywhere in the country. Beginning
about three decades ago--with a heavy assist along the way from the 1988 Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act- gambling in some form has been legalized in all of the
fifty states except for Utah and Hawaii.7 Gaming, as it is now called, is a multibillion dollar industry. This kind of money makes it a dead serious source of
amusement. The states do not merely permit gambling, but also often run and
aggressively promote it-especially lotteries. The standard defense of Statesponsored vice is that the revenues support public goods like education. The
hypocrisy and absurdity of this rationalization is outrageous and laughable,
another official piece of propaganda produced by the amusement state that no one
even pretends to believe anymore. It simply has become a cliche that has been
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reflexively parroted long enough so that no one will bother to consider its obvious
falsity . Even in states like Mississippi, where there still remain some residues of
conservative religious sentiment and practice, gambling has become legal and
flourishes.
This phenomenon is a turnabout of an astonishing nature, considering the
long-standing, widespread, strongly disapproving moral and social attitudes
toward gambling. Our PUritan tradition helped to carry us for a long time in
resisting the allure of games of chance, but no longer. The onslaught of progambling legalization and the aggressive marketing of it to the middle class as
harmless amusement- an easy sell, it turns out- has given an explicit, formal
ratification to what is the social reality of a virtual collapse of another long
standing norm of self-restraint.
Americans regarded gambling for generations as a dangerous, seductive
vice, another possible moral sinkhole into which the weak of character, especially,
were in perennial danger of tumbling. Much of its associations were with the
underworld, with loan sharks, alcoholics, hoodlums and prostitutes. Its attraction
was mainly for people who disdained middle class habits and virtues, people who
did not like to work, who wanted to get something for nothing.
The social and religious attitudes toward gambling of the past were highly
censorious. The enticement of gambling like that of sex is mysterious, dangerous
and forbidding. The urge for both seems to be aroused by powerful, irrational
impulses and, one might be inclined to argue, should, in some ways, be attended
by strong counter-valing norms which discourage the activity and deter
individuals if possible from destroying themselves from the excesses. The
opponents of legalized gambling point to the statistics which spell out how this
vice chews large holes through peoples ' lives: how much of a moral toll gambling
takes upon people, especially the poor, how devastating it is on families, its
ruination of countless lives, its close linkages with many other vices and with
organized crime and prostitution.
But in a society in which amusement has risen to the supreme value, no
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one should be surprised that gambling, with its enormous potential for
amusement, for exhilaration and for stimulation, has almost overnight become a
large cog in the national amusement machine. Gambling is now "gaming"another life-style expanding act of de-stigmatization that enables the proponents
of legalized gambling to rid it of some of the unwholesome associations that have
long been in place. "Gaming" is a linguistic nod in the direction of the
normalization of gambling, a clever euphemism that works by happy, positive
associations. Gambling is just a game like any other game (softball, golf,
pinochle, croquet), and games, everyone knows, are good and healthy and
wholesome, and most importantly, amusing and fun. Why should our moralistic
preconceptions of the past inhibit the pursuit of a good time?
A melancholy irony of the late-twentieth-century rush to normalize
gambling is the resulting predictable symbiosis: an escalation.of debilitating selfindulgent conduct rationalized as self-fulfillment; a demand for therapists to tend
to the debilitated. Gaming spawns one more class of addict-victims who have
become, through their own indulgence, incapable of managing their own lives and
acting responsibly, and who require the talking fix, replete with support groups,
counseling, and heavy doses of "recovery'' argot- "people who need people."
The comparisons with amusement eating are obvious. Compulsive gamblers
compose yet another collection of psychically wounded clientele for the mental
health industry to attend to, another plot on its map of professional expansion, one
more medical "disability" for which "reasonable accommodation" under ADA
will be thrashed out in the courts. The American Psychiatric Association declares
that compulsive gambling is an illness- another disease by physician ukase-and
regards it " ... as an addiction to gambling akin to alcoholism or drug addiction.',s
The primacy of amusement in contemporary society marks an important
reversal of affairs, a departure from an order where we entertained ourselves in
order to divert ourselves from work: now we work to pursue amusement. A key
element of that change has been the erosion of the traditional practice of delayed
gratification. What we have now shaken off- its remnants were in place fifty
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are the confines that delayed gratification imposed upon us. Max

Weber noted the important connection between certain views of work and certain
religious ideas. Religious ideas and ideals oriented people toward thinking about
work and its place in their lives in a particular way. Deferral is natural because for
a person who believes that he participates in a divine plan, his effo s go beyond
immediate material objects. The practice of deferral is what contributes, over the
long course, to his spiritUal well-being. It is ethical because it does not digress
from what is truly important, valuable and right, and helps to keep him on course.
Work develops character, that is, is assists in developing certain habits and
dispositions that are good for the person and good for the community.
How foreign this is to the amusement mentality that is locked into the
immediate present. Tocqueville, a century and a half ago wrote that,
When men once have allowed themselves to think no more of what
is to befall them after life, they readily lapse into that complete and
brutal indifference to futurity which is but too conformable to
some propensities ofmankind.9
Each successive moment, each unfolding event, is an opportunity for or source of
fresh stimulation, a new piece of pleasure, a unique adventure. Deferral makes
sense only as part of a strategy to m.aximize pleasure. You take as much as you
can while you can. Such an approach exhausts, to a great extent, the future. This
is Tocqueville's point.
As soon as they have lost the habit of placing their chief hopes
upon remote events, they naturally seek to gratify without delay
their smallest desires; and no sooner do they despair of living
forever, than they are disposed to act as if they were to exist but for
a single day.10
You use up your time, which is what the personalist, who is preoccupied with
self-actualization, would urge.
Americans save far less than they did forty or fifty years ago. Why? Their
orientation is toward the present: there are more opportunities for amusement and
there is more encouragement to pursue it. The past reminds us of our
commitments and obligations. The past has the potential to become a constraint
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on our future conduct, and, with its potential linkages of obligation, may prevent
us from doing what we would enjoy in the present. 11 By permanently lodging
ourselves in the present, we can slip out of annoying obligations and dodge
constraints with their linkages to the past. If we conduct our lives as if they are
supposed to be enjoyed for just the present moment, it is much easier to lie or
distort or mislead, and with fewer unhappy consequences. No one will remember
our obligations and thus they will not bind us. Words can easily come to mean
something quite different today than they did yesterday or they will tomorrow,
and that should not bother or trouble us very much because yesterday is not
relevant to our current interests. Past inconsistencies need not embarrass us, nor
must we even account for them. We need not ask to be forgiven for past wrong.
The past simply is not important.
II

The devaluation of the past has helped destroy what was at mid-century a
tenaciously held distinction between high and low culture. Certain objects of art,
literature, philosophy and religion, we generally agreed, were more intrinsically
valuable, more worthy of admiration, contemplation and study than others. The
works of Plato, Aristotle, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton and Beethoven contained
elements, supposedly, of wisdom or understanding or beauty or some other
treasured universal aspect of reality with an end uring value. To be "educated" one
was, with the assistance of the initiated, to make a contemplative encounter with
these sources, and absorb their uplifting qualities. To these great works, we
ascribed a life transforming power. To be seriously and permanently affected by
such contact was the real mark, the indelible signature, as it were, of high culture
and serious education. The popular, ephemeral stuff was lowbrow and for the
vulgar, the masses.
The distinction between low and high culture in large part long rested
upon a perception and understanding of an enduring value of certain things
persisting across time--some aspects or objects of human · concern, "higher"
things, that were part of an order of reality that transcended the experience of the
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immediate. All was not ephemera! Earlier civili zed orders bad always made these
important distinctions: for medieval Christianity, God was eternal and
transcendent: for the Enlightenment and modem man there was the discovery of
an objective order of truth and justice, or beauty that symbolized these values and
represented some locus of permanence that we, immersed in the flux, could
identify and use to fix our course.
Christianity is a · religion of the book. Its permanence, its truths had
actually been written down. Sacred texts revealed them to us and thus constituted
a real, enduring fixture of moral truth. How can such a notion be sustained in
today's hyper-modem world that is enthralled with revolutionary change? Not
only is the notion of revelation wholly indigestible to people who live in a world
where the ultimate epistemological authority is modem science, but the notion of
authority surrounding a privileged interpretation, or an ecclesiastical hierarchy
that might interpret a revealed text is nearly impossible now for anyone to believe.
Also, the advent of electronic publication and the emergence of electronic books
have changed our basic notion of what a " text" really is- something unstable and
ephemeral, purposely created for endless alterations.
A hierarchy of values has to be incomprehensible to a person who operates
in a relativized moral world. This i~ particularly the case with the young, now
coming out of a third generation since the Second World War, where television
saturates life and is the fundamental media for its interpretation. As television
tightens its grip on all aspects of our culture, the value of the past becomes its
usefulness in bolstering current ideological trends, or in functioning as one more
specialized venue of amusement. The past becomes a source of material to be
used for the production of

nostalgi~heaply

purchased emotion. The

proliferation of "oldies" radio stations in the 1980s was a commercial response to
a vast nostalgia market enabling the graying, and now more affluent, baby
boomers to groove away in the eternal present of the Beach Boys, the Beatles and
the Supremes. Only what immediately stimulates is important- any hierarchies of
value and meaning can make no sense. 12
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If the culture measures everything by its capacity to produce pleasure and

arnusement- Now!- then there can be no such thing as high and low culture;
high or low relative to what? There is not even any conceivable way to argue for
it because the basis for making comparisons becomes what appeals to the
stimulation-craving self. Bentham was right: pushpin is every bit as good as
poetry; MTV equals Mozart. They are equal in value because they are equal as
competitors in the amusement industry, each appealing to a different market
niche. There can be no arguable distinction in worth or value between the plays of
Shakespeare and the sit-corns of prime time television. A hierarchy of value only
exists if it is located and established within a differentiated chain of being.
Axiology recapitulates ontology: the structure and order of what we value reflects

the way we comprehend the structure of reality.
The changes in the humanities side of college and university curricula
over the last thirty or forty years further illustrate this point. The canon of great
works of literature, philosophy, and history, among others, is under attack.
European males, mostly, produced the canon. It is thus highly exclusive-few
women, few minorities. It is argued that those at the colleges and universities who
are subjected to it and who are not male or of European origin are in effect
culturally disenfranchised. The contributions of their poets, philosophers,
scientists, and literati were ignored, a process in itself that is inherently racist and
sexist. The exclusiveness of the canon merely increases the alienation and feelings
of powerlessness.
In the 1960s, the New Left radicals charged that the traditional curriculum

was "irrelevant"- the Puritan Milton could not compete with the revolutionary
Che. In the 1990s the postrnodemists charged that the traditional curriculum failed
to be "inclusive"- Milton was, like the rest of the members of the canon, white,
male and dead, but worst of all, Puritan. In both cases, the consequence is a
complete descent into immediacy and ephemera. No objects of knowledge or
study can transcend any moment in time, or exist as a permanent source of value
or truth. A relevant curriculum expresses current political or social anxieties; the
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traditional canon was defective because it supposedly did not apply to
contemporary concerns. Inclusiveness is important because the honor or esteem
associated with being an object of study in a university curriculum, like other
social goods, must be distributed equally- to every group must go an equal share
or at least some portion judged sufficient to extinguish any possibilities for
invidious comparisons. The production of self-esteem is a driving consideration.
The university curriculum defines what the university values. When
gender and racial sensitivity are the most pressing moral imperatives, as they are
now, the dominance of the curriculum by works of white males is an intolerable
affront. The long exalted cultural stature of white males as enduring sources of
wisdom is another piece of the Eurocentric fraud that the post modernists can,
with the application of the tools of social critique, show to be simply a reflection
of their political dominance. Their works, however, remain as objects of study but
primarily for purposes of inflicting condign moral deflation. The postmodernists
unmask these men as propagators of virulent ideologies, apologists of oppression,
cultural symbols of white male hegemony. Aristotle was a sexist. Jefferson was a
slave owner. Mark Twain was a racist. Their exalted place in the canon is
amounts to an accident, an arbitrary arrangement of social power. Once the power
is stripped away nothing of value or permanence remains. The canon itself exists
merely as an artifact of cultural imperialism, one more strategy of domination to
be exposed.
The deflation of these fraudulent "greats" throws them into the great
democratic mixing bowl of popular culture. Comic books, sit-corns and rock
music take their rightful place as objects of cerebration along with Shakespeare,
John Donne and J. S. Bach. The curriculum, thoroughly democratized, no longer
possesses an underlying hierarchy of value. It is driven by fads and particular
political agendas. The curriculum of the typical university increasingly seems to
have the character of a shopping mall, a haven of consumer choice. The courses
are absorbing for the moment as our fancies strike us but easy to forget and of
little effect, another cooption of our institutions by amusement.
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The practice of delayed gratification took root in religious aspirations,

particularly those of our Calvinist and Puritan ancestors. Puritanism, with all the
harsh imagery it conjures up of repression of natural impulses and severity of
manners, represents the horrifying ultimate in delayed gratification, which is why
the accusation of being "puritanical" is such a stinging insult in a society in which
any reservation about restraint in the pursuit of amusement, the expansion of the
"real" self, or the gratification of impulse is hardly conceivable. For the Puritan,
human existence was a travail, a hard preparation for an eternity with God, and an
arduous journey through a life long minefield of moral trials and fleshly
temptations. The old hymn, "Work, for the Night is Coming" captures the
religious ethos of a former time when work was regarded as part of a moral
preparation for a spiritual attainment, when amusement was not an overriding
preoccupation. In a pre-modem world of material scarcity, this was a particularly
important disposition to inculcate for survival purposes.
In a society where work is central to survival, one resorts to amusement to
obtain rest and diversion sufficient to return to work refreshed. Amusement must
always remain subordinate to work. One relaxes in order to work and to be
productive, which is more than simply one's job, but also includes one' s
obligations, all of those things that fit together in creating purposes for living.
Amusement, however, is always immediate, a complete end in itself. When it is a
lesser part of life, when it is subsumed under larger purposes, it remains useful as
a diversion from work and the stress and fatigue that work brings.
The traditional subordination of leisure to work, however, is yet another
instance of hierarchy that bas become loathsome to a personalist. Work as a
higher sphere imposes more rigorous standards of conduct, more extensive norms,
greater formal structure than leisure and is more demanding and constraining. A
work-oriented society necessitates role differentiations, requires unique levels of
subordination and special sets of obligations. Failure or poor performance carries
sanctions. Young people usually must be gently coerced into the culture of work.
It is not always, and cannot always, be joyous, interesting and expressive of self.
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Sometimes it is boring and tedious.
Perhaps one way to see just how profound the difference is between an
amusement-oriented society and a work-oriented society is to consider the
contrasting perspectives on time in each and what the implications are of those
perspectives.
''The now," what is immediate to experience, is most important where the
quest for amusement prevails. One can arouse the past only through the agency of
memory, but memory is oddly selective, less intense, less stimulating than the
direct, open, intense experience of the present. The future or anything more th.an
the near future is difficult to entertain with the intensity and vivacity of the
present. When we think about the perception of time in this emotive way, it is
apparent why an amusement-oriented society such as ours is also so completely
absorbed with youth. The young tend to live in the present moment, yet with a
sense of timelessness.

Jn a work-oriented society people acutely feel the passage of time. Work
itself is measured and compensated in relation to discrete units of time-hourly
wage, days of vacation, annual salary, retirement at age sixty-five are common
examples. The present becomes the least important part of the temporal spectrum
for those who are work-oriented. The past remains important and relevant. ft
carries with it memory, experience, training, learning- valuable preparation for
executing the tasks immediately at hand. The past contains the evidence that
points to potential success in the future . The future presents for us all the objects
of planning and organizing and the realization of achievement. We work for the
future, often the very distant future. We want our children and their children to be
better and to be better off than we were. We want to leave the world a better place
than when we entered it. Jn a work-oriented society, we venerate and respect the
elderly and we honor age rather than youth because it embodies experience,
wisdom and hard won achievement.
In a youth-oriented, amusement-driven society it is hard to imagine how
anything or anyone could be venerated since you can only venerate what is of
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deep and pem1anenl value. In order for that to happen there must be a sense that
there are things that exist of a permanent enduring value.
Amusement, when elevated to the highest pursuit, becomes incompatible
with decision-making, governing and choice-making, activities that are done best
by individuals who have accumulated experience and have been able to learn
from it. Why? Amusement focuses primarily on the visual, the emotions, and
upon a particular experience occurring right now. It defies the rules that confine
and regulate it. Those for whom the pursuit of amusement is dominant in their
lives are naturally suspicious of authority, particularly the authority that age,
hierarchy, or tradition represents. Such authority appears arbitrary and
unnecessary. Here again is personalism at work exemplified in the impulses to
evade constraint and the subjectivity and ultimate skepticism of, and resentment
for, authority. In an amusement-oriented society, youth is prized because youth
embodies and employs all of those qualities that intensify the enjoyment of the
present such as physical beauty and physical strength, and intense sexuality.
Death does not exist for the a-temporal world of youth because death is the
ultimate sign of our temporal existence, and the chief reminder that the time of
our youth is short and our existence brief and vulnerable.
Work in the modem world also often puts one into a complex
organizational

hierarchy. Bosses

exist.

They

regularly assign tasks to

subordinates, give orders or directions, and evaluate the performance of others
and dispense compensation. To step into the world of work is to enter a definite,
explicit order of inequality reflected in differentiated levels of skill, experience,
training and abilities. Anyone who works in an organization must confront and
endure the various power relationships, formal and informal, that establish and
define the levels and extent of subordination. As it is in any power relationship,
there is always potential for abuso--some get more than they deserve, others less;
some get promoted when they should get fired and vice versa. The bosses
sometimes are idiots.
Traditional norms of self-restraint have crumbled away. Values have
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become increasingly subjective (more personal and less interpersonal). Thus there
are fewer informal and mutually self-regulatory means available to us in the
workplace that are useful in helping to guide conduct, maintain civil relationships
and promote basic standards of decency. The regulation of the workplace has by
necessity become more subject to the formal, technical and highly complex
processes of litigation. Legal and bureaucratic regulation now governs the
workplace. This expansion of formal regulation further increases our dependency
upon both legal-bureaucratic experts as well as the technologists of psycho-social
techniques, whom we need to deal with the deficits of self-esteem and to interpret
a social reality full of impersonal conflict and ideological dissonance.
The reign of amusement achieves the personalist ideal of unfettered selfexpression and freedom from constraint. The personalist fiercely resists the
subordination of leisure to work, just as he resents subordination and inequality of
any kind. Any subordination reflects hierarchy and presupposes the existence of
some objective state of affairs that justifies the unequal relationship, and hence an
objective judgment that attributes a greater good to a certain kind of activity or
state of affairs. This is an affront to the subjectivity of the personalist who affirms
the perfect equality and equivalence of all moral and aesthetic choices. The
personalist will passionately defend . for public consumption almost anything, no
matter how offensive, crude, vulgar or tasteless. Why? Because the banning of
anything means that the disapproval behind the banning appeals to authority and
lays claim to a norm with objective validity. Photographic depictions of sodomy
or a porno flick like "Debbie Does Dallas" are for the personalist just as much
works of art, deserving protection as such, as the productions of Michelangelo and
Shakespeare. The personal, subjective act of self-expression is far more important
than the content of what is expressed- the exposure of self is something on which
the personalist puts the highest premium, a harkening back to the exhibitionism of
Rousseau.
Amusement relentlessly expands and imperceptibly absorbs work. The
passion for amusement grows. And as that cluster of personal experiences and

266

Desolation ' s March

dispositions that emanate from the state of being amused become more
important- having fun, being relaxed, being uninhibited- the way we conduct
ourselves at work is becoming much the same as when we amuse ourselves-casual, informal, relaxed, and personal. In the workplace this is obvious in the
manner of dress, the style, and content of conversation. Banks, for example, were
once formal work places. One now finds the tellers wearing shorts and tee-shirts,
chewing gum and listening to their favorite radio station, and exchanging personal
anecdotes and reflections among themselves while they conduct business. The
atmosphere may have been directly transported out of a teenager's bedroom. This
creeping informality reflects both a more ready compliance with the demands of
comfort and a reluctance to subordinate personal and private inclinations to norms
that rely upon distinctions between private and public spaces and conduct. Again,
the movement is for the expansion of personal space and against an imposition of
a hierarchy of any kind of values. This tendency toward the casual seems to be to
make ''being at work" indistinguishable from "being at home" where we can
listen to our favorite music, wear whatever we want, be free and open in our
conversation and the idiom in which it is expressed, and exert for our convenience
a much less rigorous discipline over our feelings, expressions and actions. Why
mus t we be anything, ever and anywhere, but our real and genuine selves ?

Personalism has set itself toward the extinction of social formality.
The increased informality pushes inexorably on with the modem process
of social leveling, best symbolized perhaps by the growth of public nakedness.
Clothing, like other social conventions, should be shed at will, so the personalist
argues. We cease to observe differentiations of conduct in the different roles we
play because we believe that there are no defensible or compelling differentiations
of value, no expectations or requirements that formal differences should be in
place or be observed or enforced. It has become harder to defend things like
prescriptions for dress (how does one defend a dress code?) and limitations on
public behavior. No longer do we respect these differentiations because there is
no differentiated value structure in place to support them.
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Ill

Amusement is ephemeral by nature. What 1s interesting, captivating and
stimulating today quickly turns stale. "Who Wants Yesterday' s papers; Who
wants yesterday's Girl?," a memorable line from a 1960s popular song of the
Rolling Stones conveys this notion well. News, sex, love, whatever you are
engaged in, if it is not current, then toss it away. Amusement, when it achieves its
purpose, produces noveity, immediacy and stimulation. Ephemera, which is the
business of the amusement industry to produce, exists and reproduces itself,
paradoxically, in a unending production of words and images that occupy us
constantly and take up time that might otherwise be used for thinking or even rest.
In this never ending stream of words and images discontinuity prevails- the quest
for diversion rules.
Modem life is beset with inflation. Inflation permeates the activity of
business, education, and government. In the offices, schools and universities alone
verbiage proliferates- managerial, educational and technical jargon, memos,
position papers, reports, executive summaries, e-mail, list-serves and web pages.
The meetings, seminars, retreats, workshops, conferences and clinics multiply,
which in tum augrnent the gushing torrents of information in the form of minutes,
proceedings, news-letters, articles, strategic plans, mission, vision and goal
statements. The spiraling multiplicity of it, its sheer magnitude and the incapacity
of any individual to read, comprehend and remember more than a tiny fraction of
it, is a depressing indication of the relative worthlessness and insignificance of
any particular piece of it. More is said. Less of it has meaning. Little of it is
interesting. None of it endures. This production of valueless cant takes place at
many levels of our daily experience. Ordinary conversation has imperceptibly
changed under inflationary pressure. Consider how greatly cell phones have
inflated conversation and, with the instruction of personal conversations into
public arenas, further eroded the formality of public spaces. Inflation, as historian
John Lukacs has observed, devalues everything it touches, not just money.

Contemporary conversation has been transformed by this inflation of
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words. This transformation refl ects a massive, collective devaluation at the core
of language. The devaluation of the words becomes obvious when you listen to
people trying to express themselves. This is particularly the case with young
people who are saturated from an early age by the vacuous language of
advertising and psycho-babble emitted from television. They regularly converse
in a vague, emotive idiom whose lexicon bulges with meaningless "filler" and
"pause" words and phrases that pad the sentences. Here is segment from a
conversion I recently overheard of two students as I walked across a university
campus. This "style" of conversation, I would venture, is not untypical of the way
young people often talk today. I have italicized the words that neither add content
to the message nor have any grammatical function .
You know, I think before you like spaz out you should
really like, wait and see if Shawn like calls tonight or whatever.
Well ... yesterday, he was like, you know, really super-pissed
at me, and all I really did was like, you know, ask him about his
stupid test that he like didn't even study for. He like totally blew up
at me ... and I was just like... uhh ...oh wow, Shawn, I'm not going to
take this shit from you anymore! I mean, I was, like, really.. .Oh
God, you know.. .l mean like I don't really need this at all. I have
just been like totally freaked out by this.
The ever present " like"s and "you know"s are key contributors to word inflation.
They have no grammatical or communicative function . These words simply string
out the sentences, erase silence, and make each word worth less and each sentence
less meaningful, expressive or informative. These "filler" words also reveal the
relentless creeping of subjectivity into our mentality. Such "filler" words build
into conversation an almost automatic, reflexive hesitancy and indirection of
expression. And that is what one would expect from a self-oriented, subjectivized
mentality that disdains moral or aesthetic "judgmental" declarations. One often
notices a lack of confidence in making precise affirmations. Affirmations must be
hedged in words that deflect their force or meaning. The superfluous and
ubiquitous "like" almost always appears just before or after the verb--its effect as
a filler word is to soften the action or deflate the power of the verb and, in a way,
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to infuse the expression with passivity, hesitation or uncertainty. The " likes,"
"you knows" and "whatevers" are devices that enable the speaker to beg for
interpretation: they are weak and nervous verbal gestures that betray the
uncertainty and confusion of modern life. One can thus emit many words, occupy
time and engage the attention of others without really saying much or affirming
anything.
The constantly resorted-to toilet words ("pissed-off' and "shit") also numb
and degrade the conversation. The bloated and scatological patois that passes for
the informal conversion often heard today is torpid and inarticulate-precise
meaning, subtle distinctions and tonal nuances are rarely attempted, much less
understood. This we owe, I would speculate, to the reign of amusement, to the
immersion by so many in the visual, action world of television and the movies
where exposure to constant movement and a relentless bombardment of
stimulating images reduces the actual importance or significance of words. We
see the concomitant diminution of whatever interests there might be in developing
the subtleties of the written and spoken language. Norms that stress the
importance of precision and the logical relations of words simply have no
application or value. The great prol.iferation of scatological and obscene language
in movies and on television shows how much language has become devalued.
At the colleges and universities postmodern scholars produce an explosion
of indecipherable chatter, often government subsidized. Publication in academia
establishes credentials and with the publication somewhere of virtually every
thought that has ripened in some professorial brain, no matter how half-baked,
insipid or stupid, academic credentials have proliferated. And like anything else
inflated- the inflated grades given out for example-they are diminished in value
and mean less. An "A" in a course means less and tells us less about the student
who received it today than one who received it fifty years ago. Career
advancement- promotion, tenure, grants, reduced teaching loads, etc. -revolves
around a sophisticated game where one says something in print and then finds
someone else in the club to weigh in with descriptors like "revolutionary,"

270

Desolation 's March

"growid breaking," "monumental," "a towering achievement" or other such
superlatives, so overworked and over-applied that they do not mean anything.
Not surprising then is that so much churned out of the verbal mills turns out to be
sterile, j argon-ridden and dreadfully dull. Here is the Dean of Deconstruction,
Jacques Derrida, attempting to clarify the dense prose of the German philosopher
Martin Heidegger.
To come to recognize, not within but on the horizon of the
Heideggerian paths, and yet in them, that the sense of being is not
a transcendental or trans-epochal signified (even if it was always
dissimulated within the epoch) but already, in a truly unheard of
sense, a determined signifying trace, is to affirm that within the
decisive concept of ontico-ontological difference, all is not to be
thought at one go; entity and being, ontic and ontological "onticoontological," are, in an original style, derivative with regard to
difference; and with respect to what I shall later call differance,
Tegard to difference; an economic concept designating the
production of differing/deferring.13
Trying to decipher swollen, contorted sentences like this is what one must do in
order to make it through almost every paragraph of this entire opus, a desolate
expanse of over 300 pages. The following might be one of the more lucid
passages of the work, where Derrida attempts to unpack the meaning of his
"science of writing," grammatology.
On what conditions is a grarnmatology possible? Its fundamental
condition is certainly the undoing [sollicitation] of logocentrism.
But this condition of possibility turns into a condition of
impossibility. In fact it risks destroying the concept of science as
well. Graphematics or grarnmatography ought no longer to be
presented as sciences; their goal should be exorbitant differance
when compared to grammatological knowledge. 14
To determine whether substance or insight inhabits these pronowicements
requires greater hermeneutical skills than I offer. Given the ultra-skeptical,
subjectivist thrust of Derrida' s writing and the doubt it attempts to shed on the
possibilities for knowing anything, slogging through the bogs of such bleak,
unreadable prose hardly seems worth the effort. However, Derrida has been

Tota.I Entertainment:
The Rise of the Amusement State

27 1

prolific, and his books fill a large portion of the 'D 's in the college bookstores.
Moreover, he has spawned scores of emu.lators-less origina.1, equa.lly dense and,
believe it or not, even more unreadable. Many teach in literature departments,
gender studies programs, theology, and other disciplines most suitable for
ideologica.I conquest, the region of academe where the manipu.lation of
rebarbative and impenetrable jargon is what is encouraged and rewarded.
The publishing enterprise in academe in some ways resembles a "pyramid
scheme," at least in many of the humanities disciplines. Presiding over this empire
of literary criticism, social critique, and philosophical deconstruction is an
aristocracy of luminaries like Derrida and Michel Foucault. They disgorge an
effluvia of books and articles of adversarial ideology and invective. Their many
epigones trickle the "wisdom" down to the less gifted. These postrnodernists reside
at the top of the academic heap, occupy chairs at the best universities, and shine as
the stars of social critique. A few even achieve genuine celebrity status. Jean Paul
Sartre, though not a member of the professoriate, was one of the best examples of a
celebrity intellectual. He may have been the first rea.I "hip" intellectual-<:ertain.ly
the first philosopher to dispense his wisdom in a Play boy magazine interview.
Sartre cast the post-World War ll mold for avant-garde intellectuals. Many lesser
talents followed the intellectual trends he set. The evi ls of capitalism he piously
denounced, especia.IJy the crass American incarnations of it. He sneered at
everything bourgeois, and duly slobbered praise over any left-wing bully,
including Castro, who could manage a successful coup and murder or exile the
middle class dolts he so much despised. As the avatar of radical chic, Sartre could
boast of the possession of a celebrity-intellectual mistress, the equally a11 courant
enemy of anything and everything bourgeois and capitalist, Simone de Beauvoir.
For all of her vanguard feminism and excoriation of patriarchy, she long and
dutifully endured the relentless womanizing that helped feed Sartre' s colossal
vanity and egotism and otherwise functioned as his lifelong doormat.
The intellectual stars look down upon the second tier theorists and socialcritique specialists who toil away at the mills of intellectual resentment. Much of
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the argumentation that specialists of the lower tier produce is interpretation of the
lucubration of the first tier manufactures. This kind of writing with its
impenetrable jargon and near complete opacity is generated deliberately, and not
for entirely theoretical reasons. Someone must be available and willing to read the
unreadable books and articles and proclaim in alJ of the official organs of
publication their revolutionary significance. Interpreters must be on hand to
unpack the dense meanings and disclose truths which always threaten to
deconstruct into something different. The demand for specialized interpretation
and reinterpretation of this unstable reality means stable employment for
ideologues. These people make up an industry of prolific scribblers who,
ironically, seem to despise writing. Much of the prose is untainted by common
sense and untouched by the facts of the world : it is self contained, that is, it is
produced by and for the club members, the jargon wielders, and primarily serves
their interest by providing excuses for trips to conferences to read papers,
securing tenure, promotion, lighter teaching loads and grants. Much of it would be
unintelligible and of no interest to even the most intelligent person from the
outside. Here is an example from the lower tiers. From the Feminist Review,
author Pippa Brush makes a contribution to the advance of gender studies in her
article "Metaphors of Inscription: Discipline, Plasticity and the Rhetoric of
Choice." Even the title is so opaque that only the initiated few would have any
idea of what it was about, much less care to read it.
The body becomes malleable and alterable, its surface inscribed
with gender, appropriate behavior, standards of- for example-femininity, etc. The constitution of the body comes to rest in its
inscription; the body becomes the text which is written upon it. In
'Nietzsche, genealogy, history' Foucault refers to the search for an
origin: 'The origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the point where
the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of a
fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.' ...
To expose the body which has been imprinted, to reach the origin,
the text of palimpsest, is the task of genealogy. This process must
assume the pre-existence of a body before the text: the body/origin
on which these inscriptions have taken place, the pre-inscriptive
body. 15
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This is how one emulates the French post modem masters. Tedious,
indecipherable and hopelessly dull, it lurches along with all of the obligatory
references to Foucault, Derrida, Lacan or some other over-quoted post modem
critic. It is written for the initiates, the club insiders who manipulate the jargon
and conduct their revolutionary rituals of mutual admiration. Whatever any of it
may mean, the writing has not made it clear. Verbal smog of this sort abounds in
academic publication, particularly in the Humanities where the norms of exacting
evidence, rigorous argumentation and proof have been in decline for decades.
Alan Sokal, a physicist, in the late 1990s created an academic scandal
when he composed a jargon-ridden, nonsensical spoof, a deliberate parody of
post-modem writing in which he argued for the relativistic, culturally determined
nature of natural science. He submitted it to the editors of a post modem journal
of cultural criticism, Social Text and they published it as a serious scholarly
article, eager to have a physicist in their ranks announcing the relativism of
science. After the article appeared in print, Sokal publicly announced the hoax.
Imagine the embarrassment to the editors who, through this incident, revealed
their arrogance and ignorance and exposed their journal for what it really was- an
academic joke. Sokal's hoax helped to disclose the fact that at least some of what
passes for serious philosophical and social thought in the post modem annals of
deconstruction is heavily driven by ideological impulses mostly of a left-wing,
Marxist kind, that are hostile to traditional institutions and impervious to logic
and facts.
What is to be made of the solemn activity of these professional social
critics and theorists? These labors might be thought of as a special genre of
amusement- humor from the adversarial class- an activity that is itself a
sophisticated form of diversion from the constraints of reality. This rarefied
amusement of social critique derives from the exhilaration that comes from
exercising one's moralistic, destructive capacities-Revolution for the Hell of Itagain, the ghost of Abbie Hoffman. When the society that you live in is rotten and
unredeemable, and you happen to be one of the "morally superior," then you can
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act any way you choose.
It is difficult to view the university any longer as a community, in any real

sense of the term, of scholars who are bound by intellectual norms and scholarly
traditions. The modem university still remains as the chief source of advance in
science, technology in medicine---but as an institution with a mission of
acculturation? What ideals does it uphold? What culture does it strengthen? It has
become a theater for the airing of grievances and the acting out of personalist
hostilities. Who could say with any confidence what the early twenty-first century
American _university is about and what it is supposed to stand for. The adversarial
class expresses its nihilism in interminable ideological quarrels, heretical disputes
and power struggles, intellectual hobbyism, or careerism. The production of
arcana that is supposed to amount to a social critique of our modem society helps
to fill up time and provide diversion and amusement or to occupy an institutional
void, to serve a bureaucratic requirement- something to make someone feel good
or useful, as if they are doing something that really matters. The promotion and
adulation of revolutionary change has become so predictable and commonplace
that revolution itself has become a dull, predictable and insipid affair.
Journalism in America has succumbed to amusement. News and
entertainment increasingly blur and mingle. Actors commonly are political
advocates: politicians increasingly make appearances on entertainment programs
and do commercials. A former U.S. Senate Majority Leader and Presidential
candidate shills for Viagra; a former Vice-President and Presidential candidate
hosts Saturday Night Live. The network news anchormen like Dan Rather, Tom
Brokaw and Peter Jennings have transmogrified into celebrities in their own right,
personalities who perform for audiences and reap the rewards of celebrityhoodfame, popularity, phenomenal salaries and uncritical adulation.
The reading of newspapers continues to decline, particularly among the
young, and newspapers themselves in their format and content reflect the
dominance of the electronic media. The news, for the most part, comes in
electronic format with a heavy visual impact. The marketing and editorial
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machines of the vast amusement syndicates manufacture and "package" the
presentation of current events in an amusement format to accommodate the short
attention spans. The electronic news expands second hand experience and
mediates firsthand experience. Thus, one watches on television someone else, for
example, play baseball or tennis or perform in a beauty pageant and listens to
professional announcers comment upon, explain and interpret the spectacle for the
observer. The interpretation overshadows the event itself. The obse.rver
encounters a highly sophisticated and complex process of mediation which
includes not only the expertise and skill of the commentators, but the massive,
complex technology behind the presentation as well. Professional mediators
impose an elaborate, sophisticated set of interpretive categories upon whole
realms of experience-politics, art, religion, sports, etc. -and with great skill
purvey those interpretations for public consumption. This is done, as Arnold
Gehlen notes, by the "vast imposing processes arising from the economic, social
and political superstructures." 16
The organs of the information industry shape much of our secondhand
experience. The watching of television-sit-corns, dramas, sports contests, news,
all of it

ngulfs us in second hand experience. The amusement syndicates filter

facts, emotions and events through their ideological apparatus and present them so
as to makes us feel, think and act in certain ways. Advertising is the obvious case
in point since its purpose is to get us to buy things. The news we watch requires
extremely sophisticated mediation. The media professionals interpret all the facts
beginning, of course, with the selection of what events are to count as
newsworthy. Ultimately the purpose is to get us to think in a certain way about the
mediated events we experience.
News, like everything else on television, is a consumer product.
Consumption of the "news"-product is simply a measure of those who watch. The
"price" the consumer pays is his time and the irritation of enduring the
commercials. The news runs from the "soft," celebrity-oriented, anecdotal human
interest stories, to the "hard" news of federal deficits, Supreme Court decisions,
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and international crises. Friendly "personalities" read the news and compete, like
their pure-amusement colleagues in sit-com- and talk-show-land, for audience
market share. Thirty years ago the three major television networks presented socalled national news once or twice a day for half an hour. Now, news
programming is available anytime. We can have news whenever we desire. Entire
television cable networks devote themselves to it.
Schools subject our children to a customized version of the newsChannel One-justified because it keeps them "informed" of current events. But

what they see on Channel One is much the same of what they see at home.
Channel One, whether one thinks it promotes education or not, is more television,

more pre-packaged visual stimulation designed by professional marketers. It will
make only a feather-light demand upon active or critical capacities or occupy a
student's attention for more th.an a few minutes.
Television mediates more than print journalism because it requires more
selectivity in the presentation due to constraints of time, and because narration
accompanies the visual presentation. Channel One is nothing more than
amusement for a young captive audience. The news presenters are themselves
young people. The ultimate aim is to acculturate our youth, to expand the viewing
habits of the home and keep children and teenagers immersed in television.
Channel One has insinuated itself into the classroom and serves further to

entrench the cultural dominance of television, the medium through which the
major events of our lives are interpreted.
The "news" must amuse. This is obvious from the way the media present
major events, like elections, disasters and wars. The twenty-four hour television
coverage by CNN of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 included an endless succession
of briefings, news conferences, expert analysis, commentators, reporters,
participants and "reactions" from everyone, no matter how banal, redundant or
foolish, and even comments from small children about their impressions and
thoughts about the war. How much of this was valuable information or insightful
observation? Little of it stayed in the memory. Almost everything that could be
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said about the event from anyone who could st.and or sit upri ght before a video
camera-no matter how trivial , pointless or stupid-was said and transmitted by
the television networks for someone else to contemplate momentarily and then
immediately forget because there was no reason or need for anyone to have said it
or for anyone to have known it in the first place. This television rendition of the
Gulf War was a grotesque and telling example of a vast enterprise of words and
images that are manu(actured entirely for the purposes of filling up large blocks
of our precious life-substance, time. The presentation had few purposes other than
to amuse, and yet even for that purpose there was so much inflation of material
and thus, like any inflated commodity, it becomes worth less and less.
The news is another "viewing" choice among a wide range of diversions
that the electronic media offer. As with the other programs, its essential purpose is
to fill up time slots for the revenue produced by the advertising. The character of
the programming has always been voyeuristic and sensationalist, a permutation of
the prurience of the sit-corns. Like those sit-corns the material is equally
ephemeral, forgotten as soon as it is over- nothing to remember from one day to
the next.
Material for television news at the " local" level is six-alarm fires, multiple
murders, and variant forms or ordinary human catastrophes- the driving force is
voyeurism. The stories are often billed as "news you need to know ." No one
explains why you need to know it. Not knowing it has absolutely no effect on
your life. The lead story will usually be a local tragedy, often a killing. Quickly
you are at the scene following the movement of the bodies into the ambulance,
ensconced in rubber bags. Police and onJookers mill about, and with luck, the
"Action Ten" News Team camera crew grabs a few close-ups of family or friends,
horror struck and in anguish ready to be prompted by the plucky, usually young,
"reporter" who extracts a sobbing sentence or two. A clue may be coaxed from
the stoic policemen on the scene. With the "inside" revelations imparted you are
instantly transported back to the studio for a two-minute discussion with some
local "expert" on the trauma of impotence or to glean the latest wisdom
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compressed into ninety seconds about teen pregnancy. The significance and value
of any of these topics that fill in the short time slots between commercials, topics
that are supposed to be so important to you as to talce up your precious time, you
can assess by a simple test: try to remember a day or two after the five o'clock or
ten o'clock broadcast what it was about. It is above all forgettable, ephemera,
dispensed to fill that allotment of time you sit in front of the box. It is in its
essence amusement, nothing more. Local television reporting is defined by a
ludicrous orientation towards on-the-scene intrusive, voyeuristic presentation of
personal tragedy. The effect is ambiguous- banal, pollyannaish chit-chat
interspersed with reports on such incongruously juxtaposed events as a mass
murder at the local Burger King and a jump rope contest for charity by some
fourth-graders at the Catholic grade school.
At the national level the format is the same. The "journalists" are more
polished, better dressed and usually better looking. The stories are bigger and
more titillating, or more pathetic. A major flood or hurricane provides more griefstricken people to pan on the cameras. An airline wreck affords video clips with
more rubber body bags. An emerging sex scandal in the Federal government may
snare a congressman or now and then, a President. These, in turn, provide copious
material for the late-night talk-show comedians.
The presentation of the news is more explicit and graphic than it ever used
to b

more explicit discussion about sex and violence, more visuals of corpses

and scenes of carnage and destruction. The greater explicitness is the natural
result of the underlying amusement character of the news. In order for programs
to draw viewers they must exert a constant escalation of raw, sexually explicit
programming: yesterday's shock becomes tomorrow's yawn. The limits must thus
always be exceeded, barriers of taste broken down. Seldom, however, is any event
or issue pursued in any long term fashion- both the medium and the advertisingdriven mode of television malce a careful, balanced and thoughtful presentation
and interpretation of any event almost impossible. What was presented with such
fanfare today quickly slips into oblivion tomorrow.
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Grief in an electronic format is uniquely entertaining. Tragedies make up
the major news items both for the local and the national networks. Tragedies offer
rich imagery, and provide emotional opportunities-grief-stricken people on
video cameras makes for easy viewer empathy and can cheaply arouse the intense
emotions of the observers munching on their Happy Meals. A couple of sniffles
and a tear or two across the six o'clock hour for those stricken families of the
airplane-wreck victims· or the third world refugees and then it' s off to hours of
sitcoms, sports, or an action movie on HBO. "Grief amusement" also enables the
experts in the therapeutic industry to integrate further into the amusement
industry. They take advantage of the opportunities to explore with the viewers the
emotional and psychological rewards of grief amusement events. In the
aftermaths of major tragedies, the news-amusement purveyors test their emoting
skills and then move into the therapeutic enterprise of exploring and interpreting
our

emotions: interviews with the relatives and friends of victims of tragedies

enable them to share their intimate feelings and thoughts with miIJions of
strangers, then the foIJow up with maudlin commentary. Thus, for the low cost of
sitting through a few commercials, themselves designed to amuse, the experience
can be briefly entertaining for the viewers and of commercial value to the
producers.
When one moves from the news to more obvious and explicit amusement
of television, we have the unique phenomenon of the celebrity talk show. These
shows feature a host-celebrity (parasite celebrity) whose fame is entirely based on
the amusement that interviewing and kibbutzing with current celebrities produces.
They sit and talk casually, mostly about themselves, what they do and think. Chitchat, jokes, and mental offal flows out into viewer-land, bounces onto the rubes
on the couches and slides onto the floor along with the potato chip crumbs. These
shows help feed an appetite for minutiae in the lives of celebrities that is nearly
limitless- what they think, who they sleep with, their latest arrests, their most
recent addictions, their current crusades, what they wear, eat, drink, all of it
important because miIJions of people are listening to it. A huge electronic and
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paper publishing industry is devoted to providing the craving public with all the
details of their highly disordered lives. They dominate the talk shows. They are
everywhere and their influence is enormous.
Talk shows for the voyeur are now common. They explicitly present every
facet of human perversity and invent new ones. One can only expect a continuous
escalation in the levels of rawness and vulgarity as the shock at every new step
becomes routine. The celebrity, late-night talk shows are decades old, but in
recent years, since the norms for presenting and discussing sexual matters on the
public airways have collapsed, we now have a new type of amusement:
individuals from the dregs are recruited and brought into television studios, and in
front of live audiences where they are encouraged to discuss in lurid detail their
sexual excesses and to brag about their perversions. To what effect? The forms of
debasement must be constantly expanded to shock and stimulate the voyeur, in
order, ultimately, to keep the viewer coming back. Moreover, the debasement
occurs during the day when the parents are at work and many children are home
watching and absorbing what they see, immersed in an exploitative, debased
presentation of human sexuality. Human perversity and degradation is the
substance of diversion, of this kind of "amusement" offered daily to millions of
Americans.
The outlook of personalism has made its aggressive assent, and where the
technology of electronic communication is so sophisticated and productive, it is
no surprise that amusement has come to be the ruling passion of the latetwentieth-century American soul. The unfettered pursuit of amusement follows
naturally from a near religious-like embrace of a conception of self and a notion
of how that self equates its exploration, affirmation and expansion with moral
achievement. Personalism "celebrates" the subjective, resists traditional forms of
authority, and eschews objective standards of conduct. Personalism, as we have
seen with two notable 1960s purveyors and practitioners of it, Carl Rogers the
psychotherapist and Abbie Hoffman the student radical, makes the emotive,
"authentic" self the ultimate arbiter of value. "No other person's ideas, and none
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of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my own experience," says Rogers; "I am
the Revolution," proclaims Hoffman.

Such is the subjective ethos in which we are now immersed. The adoption of an
outlook which turns inward and affirms the absolute centrality of self in the moral
universe brings in its wake a dissolution of moral communities. This dissolution
must open a moral-social void. An individual has nowhere to go to find meaning
and certitude other than into the recesses of his own self; and the self, ironically,
in our sophisticated modem setting is always an anxious, unstable center of
uncertainty, contracting, expanding and endlessly mutating, forever incomplete.
In the aftermath of this dissolution, the arts of amusement help to fill the moralsocial void. The modem, electronic varieties of amusement, with their great
technical power, relatively low cost, and cultural pervasiveness are particularly
suitable forces to take up full occupation of the modem, liberated self. For in
amusement are all of the possibilities for recreation in the most literal sense of recreating of one's self. As it has come to be increasingly viewed as a therapeutic
object, the self requires an enrichment of experience and a freeing from the guiltand shame-inducing constraints. The Amusement Behemoth, fully unleashed in
our time, is now engaged in sweeping aside those constraints.
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Chapter Seven
Desolation
So many things are being talked about, it would surpass
the intellectual capacity of a Leibniz. But we don't even
notice; we have changed. There's no longer a whole man
confronting a whole world, only a human something
moving about in a general culture-medium.
Robert Musil

The passage from the mid- to the end of the twentieth-century lies under a
melancholy shade. We march along a dark and twisting road of modem life that
leaves behind the remnants of the traditions of Christianity and the
Enlightenment. The road leads into uncharted regions of a techno-assisted
barbarism. This barbarism thrives on a cancerous, unremitting nihilism (no
enduring beliefs in or attachments to anything), resentment (unwillingness to
accept responsibility--0thers are to blame; I was abused, misunderstood,
marginalized) and self-indulgence (no inhibitions or constraints must thwart selfexpression).
The preoccupation with amusement is so pervasive and the technologies
for its delivery are so powerful and irresistible that the "management" of the
presentation of violence and sexuality by the amusement industry has become an
overriding social and political issue. Of course, the problem is inevitable! Sex
and violence make up the infrastructure of the amusement industry. The more
quickly children can be initiated and immersed in these essentials, the sooner
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they take up the amusement pursuits and habits of their elders.
What kinds of morally benighted creatures can we expect to emerge after
a childhood dedicated to constant diversion, after immersion in amusement built
around the themes of violence, mindless self-assertion and degradation? It is
difficult to fathom, but one is justified in the anticipation that our society may be
populated by nihilists for whom principles or constraints will be foreign notions.
Modem nihilism, though, seems to lie somewhere between the Charybdis
of the unfettered quest for amusement and the Scylla of victirnbood. Both are
built around fixations upon the subjective self. Amusement makes us feel good:
the victim bas found "another" to blame for his failure to feel good about
himself. Michael · Polanyi has spoken eloquently of the modem purveyors of
resentment who seek redress through officially sanctioned forms of victimhood,
and he links that quest to the growing nihilism of our time.
A new destructive scepticism is linked here to a new passionate
social conscience; an utter disbelief in the spirit of man in coupled
with extravagant moral demands. We see at work here the form of
action what has already dealt so many shattering blows to the
modem world; the chisel of scepticism driven by the hammer of
social passion. 1
In The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire where Gibbon makes his

General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West, he confronts
the uneasiness which he suspects may have beset the thoughtful reader of his
work. Is it possible that the current civilized order (modem Europe) can fall
precipitously into barbarism as did ancient Rome? Is decline for a civilized order
inevitable?
Yet the experience of four thousand years should enlarge our
hopes, and diminish our apprehensions: we cannot determine to
what height the human species may aspire in their advances toward
human perfection; but it may safely be presumed, that no people,
unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse into their original
barbarism. 2
Irony pervades Gibbon's prose. This seeming piece of glib reassurance is no
exception. Little exists in the 3000 pages of The Decline and Fall that gives the
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reader hope for human perfection. The contemplation of events since Gibbon
wrote offers little cause for optimism. Contemplating the work of many of our
twentieth-century revolutionaries and social engineers only confirms our
uneasiness and apprehension for the millennium ahead. We cannot indeed
determine to "what height the human species may aspire" in that quest for
perfection. The aspirations are unlimited, but Gibbon's portrayal of fifteen
hundred years of the fruits of that· quest is full of degeneracy and weakness. All
that Gibbon can really promise is that the human race will not fall into its state of
"original barbarism." Barbarisms of new and various sorts, it would seem, are
always possible and probably much more dreadful, equipped as they are with
modem technology. The mechanized death camps of twentieth-century Europe
quickly come to mind. The barbarians that attacked the Roman empire came from
without, and perhaps Gibbon himself failed to recognize fully all of the
possibilities for the metamorphosis of that barbarian within. Germany in the early
twentieth century was one of the most civilized countries in the world.
We are now beset with a new, techno-assisted barbarism. This barbarism
is a unique product of our own tirne--self-indulgent, arrogant, moralistic and
ferociously litigious. And, it is immersed in and stimulated by an astonishing
variety of electronically-assisted forms of amusement. The self-indulgent and
litigious character of our times is what one would expect in a society in which it is
impossible to affirm any objective norms or to share standards of restraint.
Litigation becomes the primary mechanism for mediating social conflict and
disagreement. Lawsuits fill the social void, a void once occupied by mutually
accepted norms.
Personalism corrodes norms of self-restraint. Restraint for the personalist
is equivalent to repression. Personal responsibility functions as a euphemism for
the duping effects of false consciousness. The oppressed internalize the crippling
norms and remain unaware that conformity to them only serves the interests of the
oppressors, who invent and purvey them for that very purpose.
This notion of repression was a well-worked theme of the 1960s radical
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criticism of capitalist America. The Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse in Eros
and Civilization convicted the West of practicing a dehumanizing repression

which rationalized restraint because it u.ltimately served the goal of profit. Eros
and Civilization was widely read and often quoted by campus radicals. Even sex,

Marcuse argued, was converted by capitalism into an activity ruled by an
acquisitive system of constraints. Western sexual morality equates "normal"
sexuality with some exterior standard of utility, which ultimately denies the good
of sexuality as something engaged in for its own sake. Sex, like everything else in
capitalist, Western society, he says, gets reduced to utility (exchange value) and
whatever conduct does not well serve the exchange process get shunted aside or
stigmatized as perverse.
In a repressive order, which enforces the equation between the
normal, socially useful and good, the manifestations of pleasure for
its own sake must appear fleurs du mat. Against a society which
employs sexuality as a means for a useful end, the perversions
uphold sexuality, as an end it itself; they thus place themselves
outside the dominion of the performance principle and challenge
its foundations. 3
Marcuse is correct about the foundational challenge to our traditional
institutions- repressive ones, in his view- mounted by those who would reject a
system of restraining rules over an activity such as sex with so many potential
moral and social consequences. Societies have always put restraints on sexuality.
Societies have always used sex for social ends and maintained proscriptions of
behavior centered on notions of perversion and the like. With this critique of sex
in America, Marcuse continues to grind the Roussean axe. He pits corrupt, powerpreserving, individual-devouring institutions against innately benign, natural
human impulses. Marcuse's America when he wrote this in the middle century
years was a "repressive order'' in his estimation even in comparison with the
Soviet Union and China where all the State resources were put in the service of
imposing the most rigid, stifling ideological conformity on the people, and slave
labor was a normal way of life for many millions of people. Marcuse's personal
choice of residence was in the repressive United States.
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It is difficult now, though, to imagine what "repression," sexual or

otherwise, remains in the hedonistic, nihilistic early twenty-first-century America.
It will not be found in any of the arenas of popular culture, and we can find little

enforcement anywhere of sexual norms or standards of conduct. We do not

observe anything resembling repression exerted upon the conduct of our political
leaders or evident in the lives of the celebrities whose comings and goings are so
important to us and so much the focus of the amusement industry. Their sexual
antics make them more interesting- the kinkier and more unconventional , the
more amusing. What the absence now of Marcuse's much ballyhooed repression
of sexuality by society, immersed in personalism, really means, morally and
socially, may be debatable. However, in looking about even the most sanguine
individual should wonder if some repression might not be a good thing.
As the quest for amusement and diversion pervades and increasingly
dominates our popular culture, the immersion in a timeless present ultimately
eviscerates our ideals. Enduring ideals have anchors in the past, constrain us in
the present and guide us toward the future. We are in danger of becoming a
people with no core or character, reflective surfaces of the mfrrors of the most
recent preoccupations of an amusement-focused mass media and a mass culture of
the eternal now.
The decline of virtue, the loss of constancy and fidelity, and the
medicalization of morality make it difficult to hold ourselves responsible for our
past conduct and to measure ourselves against ideals that can at the same time
inspire and humble us. The past, what we might remember, learn from, and
morally ground ourselves in, has instead become for those bound by the
amusement ethos a means for stimulating present feelings of nostalgia.
For the therapist, the past exists as a fertile source of diagnostic data. The
past merely holds the psychological material or behavioral evidence to be
extracted, analyzed, dissected, and therapeutically interpreted, then regurgitated in
a current counseling or "recovery" jargon suitable for the manufacture of selfexcuse or self-re-invention or pleas for pity.
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Former drug addicts and alcoholics form the cadres of drug- and alcohol-

abuse counselors. In this now familiar trajectory, one moves from being an addict
to talking about being an addict- the self-absorption simply continues, though in
a somewhat different venue. Yet, addiction and all of the moral and personal
turbulence that arises from it remains the central focus and enduring
preoccupation. The expertise of the ex-addict- that which qualifies an ex-abuser
for dispensing advice and assistance to current abusers---lies in his capacity to
fathom and interpret his own subjective experience of addiction which, in tum,
creates that empathetic base for communication with other addicts. 'I know, from
personal experience, what you are going through.' This is a predictable dynamic
of a constantly enlarging therapeutic model of social reality.
Because of the growth of the therapeutic mentality, we find countless
numbers of people who are in a state of "recovery." Recovered ' x' s are
commonplace. Substitute for 'x' any of the myriad addictions that take their toll.
Thus it does not strike us as strange, even perverse, to install routinely those who
have conspicuously failed to manage their own lives in positions where they guide
and counsel others who have become incapable of functioning as they ought.
The twenty-first century promises an expansion in scope, intensity and in
variation of the personali st-inspired, techno-assisted barbarism that began
unfolding in the previous century. The salient features of this barbarism are an
ultra-skepticism that destroys the possibility of acting according to principle, and
a medicalized model of morality which eschews responsibility and moral
character, and chums out a ceaseless proliferation of resentful, litigation-prone
victims. This barbarism is also immersed in an insipid nihilism which is expressed
in a perpetual quest for novelty and ever-increasing stimulation, and a casual
toleration for almost everything as long as there are neither expectations for
enduring commitments nor promises to bind . Overturning the feckless status quo,
that is, revolution, is the means of choice for fulfilling this quest.
This new barbarism bristles with spectacular ironies. Most striking is that
the pursuit of absolute equality creates an expansive, priestly order of privileged
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experts who run the new, improved society, those Orwellian pigs who are "more
equal than the others." The quest for equality, in practice, yields profound
inequalities. "Science means specialism and specialism means oligarchy,"
observed Chesterton. 4 Experts and specialists are privileged. They constitute an
oligarchy, an elite of k:nowers. The quest for equality, thus, ironically, produces a
vast growing order of inequality presided over by the experts, the medicalized
moralists and specialty therapists with acute sensitivity to life-style nuances. By
exchanging virtue for health, morality, which has always been the business of
everyone, becomes the determination of the specially trained, the experts on selfesteem, self-worth, a healthy psyche, or whatever it may happen to be called at
the moment. The moral world thus gradually, steadily moves toward oligarchythe rule of the few over the many. Moral wisdom and insight is possessed by the
experts of the psyche, who dispense them to the rest of us, arrogantly and at a
high cost. Instead of the equality we envisioned for everyone, our individual
personal conduct becomes the object of management by elites who alone possess
the technology of behavior control. This is one of the more remarkable
unintended consequences in the modem world.
The medicalization of morality overturns our moral world- one in which
every individual was presumed to be capable of understanding the basic principles
of right and wrong and assuming responsibility for the decisions he makesmaking it into an moral oligarchy, a region occupied by experts, a class of elites
who interpret the human condition and attempt to translate their prescriptions for
its improvement into social policy.
Two types of experts make up the world we now inhabit. The first is
composed of technologists, scientists, engineers, medical researchers, etc. They
develop the elaborate theoretical apparatuses. They write the computer programs,
build the complex machinery, design the systems, make the medical discoveries
and advances, and create the increasingly sophisticated technology that helps
make our everyday world increasingly complex and, ironically, mysterious and
unfathomable to most non-experts. Technology at the same time frees us (from
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lhe time-consuming tasks we once did manually} and yet increases our daily
dependency on the technology and on the technologists who create and maintain
it.
The second class of experts is the most powerful. It is composed of the
medical moralists who represent and do the bidding of the elites of the amusement
state. These experts help us manage our increasingly complex but fragmented,
meaningless lives. They are the educational bureaucrats, therapists, weight loss
experts, eating disorder specialists, substance abuse counselors, relationship
counselors and other professional managers and helpers who produce, interpret
and control the human technology of coping, personal adjustment and selfexploration. The "help" often comes to us as mandatory (in lieu of punishment),
courtesy of the amusement state--these professional moralists must have a
captive clientele upon which to practice and refine their techniques and ultimately
to justify their professional existence. They are the counselors, who preside over
the myriad support groups, who guide us through the childhood traumas, the premarital counseling, marriage crises, then the divorces, and all the multi-variant
" relationship" crises that follow as we make our way to the grave. They handle
the children who cannot handle the divorces. Also, they help us deal with lhe
many types of abusers who surround us, wean us from our myriad addictions, be
they to substances, e.g., alcohol or drugs, or compulsive behavior such as
overeating, gambling, compulsive shopping or rampant sexual promiscuity.
Twenty-first century Americans spend much of their free time pursuing
amusement. Does the life of amusement provide stability and purpose? Are those
immersed in it happy and satisfied with their lives? More than likely perpetual
amusement produces anxiety, boredom and personal frustration . Addictions,
dependencies and internal conflicts inevitably arise from the experience of the
inherent emptiness of a life caught up in diversion.
The medical moralists have become the linchpins of the courts, the
criminal justice system and the prisons. They administer therapy assiduously to
the deeply warped personalities of the child molesters, rapists, professional drug
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dealers and other phyla of criminals and social predators. They are also comprised
of the sensitivity trainers, the disability experts and the cross-culture advisors who
initiate us into the mysteries of getting along in a "multicultural" world (necessary
to avoid being successfully sued- law suits now the specter hanging over
institutions). Common sense, common decency and the principles of fair play no
longer suffice. Experts, on racism, sexism, homophobia, agism, disabLisrn, and
other "isms" must be in place to fathom, interpret and bridge all of these
"differences" between the different groups and facilitate the many "healing"
processes that must take place. They are the professional educators whose main
task is to raise the self-esteem of our children, provide them with condoms cum
instruction, and obviate the effects of whatever ignorance they might
inadvertently absorb from parents who might still be mired in the obsolete throes
of traditional religious beliefs. They are also the government advisors and
bureaucrats and social workers whose jobs are to design and implement the social
programs that will make us safer, more secure and comfortable, able to engage in
guilt-free amusement.
The amorphous, directionless and open-ended subjectivity of social life
heightens our extensive dependence on the therapeutic oligarchs and amusement
moguls who constantly broaden the scope of therapy and expand the range and
application of amusement. Thus, our unwitting, bovine subjection to their
ideological proclivities increases with a depressing inevitability. As we participate
haplessly in the stripping away of our spiritual resources and discount the
importance of character and virtue in our lives, we surrender the moral capacities
that might help us withstand the vicissitudes of modem life to these mandarins:
they are eager to tell us what to believe, what to think and not to think about, and
most importantly for them, what to feel, and what to value. They are happy to "be
there," whenever we need them to help us sort out our inner feelings, interpret our
moods, and help us make the "appropriate" adjustments to our attitudes and
expectations whenever boredom, frustration or anxiety threaten.
With the detachment of individuals from shared beliefs in an enduring
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objective order comes an imperceptible shift away from principles, obligations
and measuring one's self against ethical ideals to the primacy of effecting a
satisfying or reassuring interpretation of the self. James Nolan Jr. has
characterized the therapeutic ethos most aptly as "conspicuous self-referencing."5
I recently saw a promotional poster for a local blood drive on a university
campus that provides a perfect illustration of this: "Feel good about yourself, give
blood," the poster urged. No appeal was made to anything other than the self and
the seeming reflexive need to feel good- not to be good or to do something for
others. I concluded that if many of us in this locale already felt good about
ourselves then the blood drive would have been in jeopardy. But this contingency,
of course, never dawned on the promoters. Why should it have? The quest for
feeling good is assumed to be a life long, ongoing, routine process. We all need to
feel better about ourselves no matter how good we already feel. Self-esteem is
permanently deficient. We can never feel good enough about ourselves because
the modem self is insatiable in its craving for affirmation and development, or
perhaps even worse, so inchoate in its constitution that it can never achieve
wholeness or integrity.
This assumption is deeply buried in this common way of appealing to
people for good deeds. Reflexive self-referencing is not only conspicuous, it is
relentless as well . The "business" (literally and figuratively) of exploring the
feelings and all of their nuances and permutations becomes the highest priority.
And, psychologists and the like are the supreme technologists of self-exploration.
To conduct our interpersonal affairs appropriately we are required to cultivate
sensitivity. This involves not simply affirming the value and ensuring the practice
of the general protocols of politeness and kindness and mutual respect, but rather
constantly absorbing an acute, ever-shifting awareness of ourselves and "others"

in their unique but fleeting appearances. And, in order to achieve this genuine but
elusive interior awareness, we must call upon the specialists of the psyche, the
talking experts, who can facilitate it. Because this subjective, ever-shifting
awareness that we must achieve of both others and ourselves is so unstable,
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illusive and protean, we constantly require the attention and assistance of these
experts, and in ever expanding capacities.
Leszek Kolakowski in an essay, "The Revenge of the Sacred in Secular
Culture," describes the twentieth-century descent into nihilism . He suggests, in a
poignant and profound passage, what the drive to eliminate all hierarchical forms
of value and understanding means for practical daily living.
We live in a world in which all our inherited forms and distinctions
have come under violent attack; they are attacked in the name of
homogeneity, which is held up as an ideal with the aid of vague
equations purporting lo show that all difference means hierarchy,
and all hierarchy means oppression....6
This is precisely what feminist-deconstructionist Luce Irigaray, quoted above, is
about in her assertion that logical precision and clarity of thought represents a
"phallocratic" imposition which should be resisted by turning " everything upside
down, inside out, back to front" , and by overthrowing "syntax by suspending its
eternally teleological order." All order must be obliterated as it somehow reflects
traditional hierarchy which oppresses and limits. Kolakowski, however, points to
the effects, with Orwellian overtones, that such an overturning of our traditions
has had upon our ability to comprehend reality and to give order to our
experience.
Sometimes it seems as if all the words and signs that make up the
basic system of distinctions are dissolving before our eyes; as if all
the barriers between opposing concepts are gradually being torn
down. There is no longer any clear distinction, in political life,
between war and peace, sovereignty and servitude, invasion and
liberation, equality and despotism. Nor is there a clear-cut dividing
line between executioner and victim, between man and woman,
between the generations, between crime and heroism, law and
arbitrary violence, victory and defeat, right and left, reason and
madness, doctor and patient, teacher and pupil, art and buffoonery,
knowledge and ignorance. From a world in which all these words
picked out and identified certain objects, certain well-defined
qualities and situations, arranged in opposing pairs, we have
entered another world, in which our system of opposition and
classification, has ceased to apply.7
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Written in 1973, thirty years later the course of this juggernaut of conceptual
dissolution looms over us. It is easy to produce instance after instance of the
tearing down of the barriers of these fundamental "opposing concepts" cited by
Kolakowsi. Consider as an example, this grotesque piece of moral and intellectual
dishonesty, quite typical of the tergiversation long carried out by our adversarial
intellectual class. It is Norman Mailer's odious glorification of a young hoodlum
who murders a middle-age shop owner.
For one murders not only a weak fifty-year-old man but an
institution as well [private property]. ... The hoodlum is therefore
daring the unknown, and no matter how brutal the act it is not
altogether cowardly. 8
(Incidentally, this piece comes from a book entitled, appropriately enough,

Advertisements for Myself.) The act Mailer re-describes for the reader is, of
course, cowardly by any common definition or understanding of the term, among
other things. But Mailer by ideological legerdemain converts a common piece of
thuggery and brutality into something representative of an abstraction for which

he has an affinity. The writing is after all, an advertisement for himse/fsomething radical and hence affirmative. Thus, a base criminal act becomes a
brave adventure into the "unknown," a striking out at a repressive institution,
private property. Acts of robbery and murder in Mailer' s writing dissolve "before
our eyes" into heroism. Ordinary criminality gives birth to revolution, the
twentieth century prescription for social progress. Mailer's advertisement for
himself is an astonishing regurgitation of Rousseau' s primal resentment.
This

psycho-sociological

contrivance

obliterates

many

seemingly

inviolable "dividing lines." It is just one small instance of a vast anarchical
process that has for years been generally ravaging our thought and judgment such
that we now are disposed to call anything whatever we feel like calling it,
feel strongly enough, or

if it happens to

if we

suit some generous or noble purpose in

our minds. Such pseudo-moral venting then makes us feel good-like real moral
revolutionaries or iconoclasts. Feeling good about ourselves is ultimately the
object of this moralizing. Morality is just another piece of the conspicuous self-
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referencing mentioned above. The process begins and ends with the subjective
self. Moralizing in this vein is one more norm-destroying exercise to achieve the
personalist goal of self-affirmation- the example cited above is indeed by the
author's own admission a piece of self-advertisement.
Liberated thus from our "inherited forms and distinctions," heaps of trash
dumped into prestigious art galleries by "social activists" can be denominated
"art" because they reflect someone's moral outrage. Retreat from Vietnam is
called "peace with honor" by our President. Assault and robbery committed by
members of oppressed classes are elevated to "acts of resistance." Arsonists,
looters and pillagers of shops from Los Angeles in 1995 are now in the same
category as the Warsaw Poles who resisted the Nazis in 1944-freedom fighters.
Rioters are pronounced to be the victims of oppression and their acts blows of
affirmation against a repressive order. Differences between men and women are,
indeed, complete and utter manifestations of socially constructed reality that
reflect nothing more than the arrangements of social power. Real moral and social
differences are nearly impossible to assert because the confidence required to
make them has been eroded by skepticism and relativism and by the corruption of
language that attempts to express them. What is said and intended on one day
becomes different the next, depending upon what happens to be the needs, wants
or inclinations of the present moment.
Kolakowski 's observations suggest that the tearing down of these
categories makes the possibility of acting according to moral principle impossible.
One who acknowledges the claim of a moral principle binds himself morally and
logically. That is, ifhe wishes to uphold the principle, he must decide to do or not
do what the application of the principle orders or forbids. The words that
articulate the principle and the ideas behind them must have a stability of
reference and solidity of meaning. One who acts according to principles knows
that real, practical consequences follow from those principled acts. In order to act
by principle one must give preference to one set of ends over another and in the
course of that decision must be able to distinguish in some durable, predictable
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way good and bad consequences. With this melt-down of fundamental
distinctions, lamented by Kolakowsi, it becomes obviously harder to do this:
almost any human action, no matter how base or reprehensible, can be
rationalized or excused because the moral categories for evaluating it become
extremely flexible.
Another effect that the tearing down of fixed moral categories and
concepts and the undermining of objectively-determined, shared belief has upon
i.ndividuals is to dispose them toward the use of power in purely cynical and
opportunistic modes. Those in power are marked by the "frequent repudiation of
categorial pledges," as H.L. Mencken said of Franklin Roosevelt. 9 Edward
Gibbon's concise summation of the character and personality of the late second
century A.D. emperor, Severus, is applicable to many of the members of our own
ruling classes:
He promised only to betray, he flattered only to ruin; and however
he might occasionally bind himself with oaths and treaties, his
conscience, obsequious to his interest, always released him from
the inconvenient obligation. 10
With no enduring, external ideals to link the power to and limit and define its
application, the exercise of power becomes a cynical and nihilistic game.
Whatever ideals that may have claimed anyone's allegiance have been hollowed
into the most brittle, fragile shell : the language that expresses them is pressed into
service only during some tedious ceremony in an increasingly perfunctory and
meaningless fashion. Those in power still boorishly wield the phrases and
opportunistically invoke the symbols but they are completely without substance-no one listens carefully and few, if any, believe any of it.
No more spectacular late-twentieth-century example of this evisceration of
ideals and hollowing out of symbols exists for us to contemplate carefully and
learn from than those last decades of our post-World War II rival empire, the
Soviet Union where no one, not even the communist power elite, believed in the
promises or principles of the officially imposed social ideology. Communism in
the 1970s and 1980s had become an ideological corpse: the stench was so
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overpowering that the putrefying body finally had to be disposed of. ' From each
according to his ability; to each according to his needs', the withering away of the
state, full equality- no one any longer took the German Prophet' s promises
seriously. The bloody, repressive reign of his priestly dialecticians was over. All
that was left of a once powerful and energizing system of ideas and the future of
the classless society were the venal and corrupt manipulations by the party
apparatchiks, third-rate gangsters, and political hacks in bankrupt, impoverished
countries trying to hold on to the power that operated beneath the empty words.
In our own country whatever tribute might still be paid to self-reliance,
individual freedom and truth by the political and cultural elites has become empty
and meaningless insofar as it affects any of their programs or policies. Where
these values still operate it is in spite of and not because of the elites who enlarge
the entitlements, design the amusement packages which make up the popular
culture, and advance the ethos of the therapeutic culture--security, diversion, and
continuous self-reinvention and self-repair. In the amusement state where each
individual is caught up in the subjective pursuit of individual pleasures or the
therapeutic reconstruction of the self, it is nearly impossible for any central
guiding ideal to exert a serious effect or much iniluence. 11
Part of the reason for this is that politics itself has been co-opted by the
amusement medium, television. Television focuses almost exclusively on the
visual presentation of the personalities of those who both seek and possess power.
Individual style and all those particular, sometimes indefinable qualities that make
powerful affective impressions (looks, being likeable, appearance of sincerity,
appearing presidential, etc.) become more important and determinant of success

than the more abstract considerations such as the implications of political ideas
that are espoused, consistency and principle, or even character and integrity. A
homely, perhaps dull person contesting for office with a dynamic, attractive one,
especially on television, loses, no matter how much better the former's ideas,
arguments and strength of character.
Television works against formal institutions like political parties that
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represent political platforms or programs precisely because these things cannot
easily be visually represented. They are impersonal, and therefore represent
something more enduring and important than a single individual, namely policies,
principles and ideas that have application and meaning beyond the immediate
moment. The successful political leader, more than ever before, has to be the
master of the visual medium (television), the manipulator of immediate
impressions. Television dominates the institution of politics in America. Thus, all
political issues and ideas are pushed toward the personal and immediate-a
natural feature of amusement- which makes it easier for those in power to abuse
the power they have and exercise it arbitrarily. They make or break themselves on
their style, on their individual presentations of self. Those in power find
themselves less constrained by principles and promises. One can promise virtually
anything because the subjectivity in which we are all immersed makes the
language of the promise infinitely elastic. The promise maker can never be held
to account.
The amusement state thus undermines the traditional institutions of
representative government which have always been suspicious of power and have
attempted to limit it by making its exercise conform to constitutional principles.
Principles impose limits. A medium like television makes the imposition of limits
difficult because images conquer principles. The powerful emotions aroused by
the images of a video displaying an event close up, such as the mangled bodies of
soldiers- as if we were there ourselves- will be more determinant of opinions
and decisions about the waging of the war that produced the casualties than an
abstract appeal to a constitutional principle or even a prudential maxim of
collective self-interest.
Television interprets the world. We are on the cusp of being a
plebiscitarian dictatorship where media-adroit demagogues measure the pulse of
people through the latest polls, focus groups, and other statistical opinion
sampling devices, and respond by tailoring policies and bending to current
prevailing inclinations. Long-term consequences, issues of constitutionality, and
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the rule of law get pushed aside as irrelevant considerations. Such a mode of
"governing" in an amusement oriented society makes it difficult if not impossible
for political leaders to make decisions and to act as leaders in any principled way.
Resentment remains one of the most salient, distinguishing features of the
new barbarism. Moreover, resentment has been a core element of our modem,
ideologue-tyrants like Hitler, Stalin, Castro, and Pol Pot. They were immersed in
it and it was an essential tool that they adroitly used to consolidate support for
their programs of murder and slavery. Frederick Hayek has made the highly
relevant observation in this regard that it is easier to create consensus around what
people dislike than what they like---hence, the affinity of resentment and modem
despotism.
The engines of resentment stoked by our social critics, the masters of
J'acuse, have brought about the destruction of "civilized" dispute-a long

evolving convention that has provided the means to disagree, profoundly disagree
even, about fundamental ideas, issues, beliefs and yet maintain mutual respect,
even amity. The West has its exemplars of civilized dispute-Socrates, Erasmus,
Hurne, Gibbon and our own Founding Fathers. The Federalist Papers are a model
of how civilized dispute is conducted.
Civilized dispute like all civilized activity appeals to principles and
respects limits. Beneath the art of civilized disputation lies a crucial assumption:
that there is a common aspect of humanity adhering in different individuals and
groups that is the basis for conversation and mutual respect. The conduct of
civilized dispute is incompatible with the nurturing of resentment which shuts
down conversation. Resentment is always hateful and corrosive. It tears down
respect and eats away at any feelings or attachments that individuals in its grip
might develop for general principle. Civilized dispute has never aimed for the
destruction of the disputants. It operates with the naive, old-fashioned idea that
there is an objective reality from which truth can be determined or discovered or
approximated and that disputes and differences of opinion should always be
governed by those ends. Those who are committed to making dispute civilized
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embrace a humility that comes from a profotmd sense of human fallibility and
limitation. Individuals who engage in civilized dispute possess a common end that
must override their particular apologetic ambitions, polemical aims or political
goals. That common end is the determination of the truth or the realization of the
good and the practice of common decency.
The new barbarism, however, thrives on resentment. Its practitioners
emphatically deny the reality of such overriding truth or moral good: any
standards, such as they might be, must be relative to class, race, culture or some
particular kind of collective difference. Dispute, for the new barbarian, cannot and
should not be civilized; its primary tool is abuse. The conduct of dispute must be a
form of total war, aiming at the annihilation of the opponent.
Lenin, assured of his own infallible grasp on the nature of reality, was
perhaps the most resentful figure of world historical significance. Not by
coincidence, he developed and mastered the twentieth-century prototype for
uncivilized dispute which has had many emulators- no one was more
accomplished in it than he was. Lenin's rhetoric was a potent and poisonous
mixture of vituperation, calumny and vengefulness. Lenin' s enemy, always, was
not falsity or error, but his opponents. Dispute was not advanced by reasoned,
respectful arguments but by ad hominem assault, by abuse. This type of dispute
proceeded by the unveiling or the invention of corrupted motives and intentions of
one's opponents. The destruction of their character was the goal. Lenin's
aspiration, as Richard Pipes notes, was not victorious competition with his rivals
but their "liquidation." 12 "Liquidation" was one of his favorite prescriptions for
those who competed with him for power. Competition of most sorts usually
involves adhering to a pre-established set of rules. Lenin cared nothing about
rules. He scorned them. His confidence in his own infallibility remained
unlimited. He had no use for principles and disdained anyone who did. His sole
object was the possession of power to implement his programs, and when he
could he destroyed and eliminated anyone, with any means, who opposed him. Of
Lenin's view of political dispute Alain Besanr,:on wrote:
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Politics aims for the common good. But in Leninism the social
matter polarized into classes does not form a political community.
There is no common good and there is no friendship either. There
is hatred and war. 13
Lenin saw naked self-interest and personal corruption beneath everyone's
actions. Only he himself was immune. Here was another dimension of his moral
and intellectual arrogance: it was permeated with a Manichean view of privileged
knowledge on one side, ignorance and evil on the other. Lenin was also
profoundly cynical: his opponents never really meant what they said. They were
hopelessly corrupt and unsalvageable. In quest of power Lenin proceeded by
vituperation and vilification; when he had it, by physical extermination.
The death of civilized dispute is connected with the growth of
personalism, particularly personalism's triumph over traditional institutions. The
personalist cannot conceive of civilized dispute. The notion is fraudulent and
disingenuous. Why? Because social institutions always represent vested interests.
Remember, as Polanyi observes, there is "utter disbelief in the spirit of man."
Dispute or argumentation by its nature is for the personalist steeped in selfinterest and seeks to defend privilege. One may sincerely believe that he is
arguing from principle, but ultimately the arguer is defending a practice of
inequality, a status-quo arrangement that rests upon power and domination. Thus,
"bad faith" or " false consciousness" shapes the character of the traditionalist. All
moral concepts are in some manner attenuated by considerations of class, race or
gender.
For Nicholas Bukharin, the Bolsheviks ' chief intellectual and theoretician,
ethics was simply a "fetishism" of the values of class.14 Bukharin, like many of
his revolution-launching comrades, was washed over by the blood-bath of Stalin's
voracious purges of the 1930s, yet his view of ethics and morality has
unfortunately survived and seeped deeper into our own thinking than we may
realize. In fact it dominates much of our current perspective.
So we now find ourselves confronted by bourgeois morality and male
logic. Every moral, ethical or social concept that might have some claim to

302

Desolation's March

universal applicatio

morality, logic, justice

issolves into a corrupted

particularity of some tribe. Argumentation becomes with this particularized view,
not logical or empirical demonstration or refutation, not persuasion, but verbal
warfare that exposes and unmasks the enemy. Conversation becomes impossible
because the goal is the launching of a successful attack on the motives of one's
opponents, of showing his irresistible connection with corrupting privilege. All
moral discourse becomes either a form of attack or defense, but ironically with a
tragic futility because there are no common assumptions which can propel the
discourse; and there is no universally shared moral vocabulary. Verbal argument
constitutes just one more form of warfare, often a prelude to or surrogate of
physical warfare and attempted annihilation.
Resentment is one of our powerful social corrosives; so too is vulgarity.
Vulgarity is a powerful weapon in the personalist's anti-authoritarian arsenal, an
effective means of assault on traditional institutions. With the recognition of
authority comes respectful distance. This distance can be created by language,
thus an aspect of care in the words one chooses and the verbal protocols one
follows. A young man speaks and acts differently around his mother and father
than when he is with his friends. These differences are signs or manifestations of
respect. In the practice of vulgarity, that care and distance that respect is intended
to create is broken down. Protocols are cast aside as irrelevant or hypocriticalone acts and talks however one f eels like acting and talking, without any
tempering of respect for any figure of authority or without any consideration of
social norms or conventions, without observing respectful distance. Vulgarity
erases the social distance that creates the boundaries for social roles. Vulgarity
propels the descent into the purely personal.
The new barbarians assiduously infiltrate vulgarity into all of our public
spaces. Constraints on public expression or display vanish--the descent into
vulgarity is nearly complete. Turn on the television or the radio. Watch a movie.
Go to a professional baseball or football game. Stand in a public place and
observe young people loudly, unselfconsciously emitting streams of obscenity in
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the presence of the young and the elderly. Walk down the halls of a high school
when the classes are changing: listen to children on the playground. Eavesdrop on
college students talking. Look at the T-shirts people wear in public ("Shit
happens"), the bumper stickers on the cars ("Don't like my driving? Call 1-800
Eat shit! ")
We are light years from those repressive, "conformist'' 1950s when that
stuffy middle class morality forbade the use the word "pregnant" on television,
and when even married couples on television were portrayed as sleeping in
separate beds. Now the sit-corns feature such themes as masturbation,
menstruation and nose picking, and in "prime time" for the edification of our
children. The material presented is increasingly raw and gross because it is
necessary, always, to assault the sensibilities, to move, both in content and style,
into the new and forbidden. Robert Pattison has called this part of our destruction
of civility as the "triumph of vulgarity" in his book of that title. 15 Crudeness,
coarse expression and vulgarity have risen to such pervasive levels and have
become widely accepted because the sanctions against them have crumbled. The
standards that were in place, even recently, no longer have any force. The
sanctions have disappeared because they would have to appeal to commonly
accepted norms or standards: conformity to them would involve dimensions of
self-restraint, which we have now learned, are phony or hypocritical or repressive
and are linked to someone else's notion of right and wrong.
Lenny Bruce, another one of our 1960s Roussean pioneers in breaking
down the hypocritical old order, was much heralded by the personalists. His life
was a harbinger of the pervasive vulgarity that would later come to define popular
mass culture. In pre-Bruce times, dirty words, foul and course language were
confined to locker rooms, barracks and other such places; in our contemporary,
electronic-amusement oriented society, billingsgate has become a staple of
television, the movies and popular music- it pervades modern life. Along with
the Free Speech advocates at Berkeley, this talented antinomian contributed in his
own unique, creative way to the eradication of the conventional restraints of
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" respectable" language and all of its middle class hypocrisy. He was successful,
and like many of the 1960s anti-establishment heroes, his "shocking" routines
now would barely stir an embarrassed giggle from a parochial school-girl: the
language from any co-ed dorm or elementary school playground now would
probably make Bruce blush.
Like many of the personalist heroes of the 1960s, behind Bruce's "moral"
crusade was a personal character of reckless self-indulgence and dissipation and a
personality of self-absorption, disorder and self-destruction. Even his manner of
death symbolized the destruction of inhibition that was accomplished by the
1960s: ravaged by personal excesses, debauches and degradation, his naked
corpse was found sprawled out on his bathroom floor at the age of forty. He had
apparently pitched himself off the toilet in the throes of a spasm from an overdose
of narcotics with which he had just injected himself.
A pervasive, expanding vulgarity in our society is, indeed, one of the
understandable effects of the personalist attack on traditional institutions. In a
society that mounts a conscious, concerted effort to democratize all human
relationships, to remove hierarchical distinctions, it is to be expected that
language would come to reflect both the underlying assumption of relativity and
the inevitable vulgarizing effects of equalizing.
The great classical historian, Gilbert Murray, in 1925, wrote these
lamenting words about the effects of Christianity upon the once great moral
system of classical Greek culture.
It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so
much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and
enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures, but rather, by means of a
burning faith, by contempt for the world and its standards, by
ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his
unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins.16
How curiously and ironically applicable these thoughts are to our own time if they
are recast to capture the emotive character of personalism with its "contempt" for
the past and for tradition and its spurning of norms and standards. The growing
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medicalizing of our outlook of human behavior and the pervasiveness of therapy
as the means for dealing with human adversity and natural human frailties have us
now thinking of ourselves as creatures prone to damage from our surroundings
and our associations, creatures constantly in need of psychic repair and entitled to
professional assistance in making those on-going repairs.
Thus, Murray's lament might now be paraphrased to read something like
the following: the aim of the self-fulfilled person is not so much "to live justly, to
help the society to which he belongs and enj oy the esteem of his fellow
creatures"...etc., but rather to be provided with copious applications of the
therapeutic arts in a never ending quest to render functional his dysfunctional
personality and to establish a solid claim to social victimhood. To be a certified
victim means that the responsibility for one' s shortcomings can be assigned
elsewhere. Seeking the esteem of one's fellow creatures, which involves some
appeal to fixed standards or persisting ideals, has been displaced by an inward
turning effort to produce an illusive sense of self-esteem.
A "good society" now means one in which every individual, no matter
what he does or what he becomes, is entitled to " feel good about himself," with
professional attention if needed to achieve it. Life for an individual in the latetwentieth century therapeutic society becomes a continuous, professionally
assisted project of psychological self-repair, of searching for unconditional
approval, of blaming the society rather than helping the society to which he
belongs and castigating the traditional institutions for the low self-esteem which
he experiences. The aim of a person, in fact, is less to be " good," that is, to
establish a solid character, than it is to be relieved of guilt, whether it be the guilt
the oppressor comes to feel for inflicting his inequities on others or the guilt of the
oppressor's victim. The idea of goodness has become so self-defined, subjectively
oriented, and emotively conditioned, so removed from any objective standards,
that we have become a nation of moral solipsists.
It is hardly surprising that in such a society resentment, particularly

intellectually driven resentment, has become such a growing, powerful force. The
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stripping away of personal, individual responsibility- turning individuals into the
social-psychological products of impersonal forces

ncourages them to think of

the things that befall them, even the consequences of their own decisions and
actions, as the fault of someone else. The explanation for one's misdeeds or
shortcomings becomes a professionally guided project that culminates in the
affixing of blame on others or on impersonal forces. In a society where excusemaking and the expansion of victimhood become the function of social theorizing
it is hard to see how people can ever hope to live justly and help the society in
which they live.

As the new millennium unfolds, what kind of people are we likely to become?
More importantly, what kind of people will our children be and what kind of
social world will they find themselves living in? Unhappily, it appears to be one
where people will be more inclined to take seriously what sociologists,
psychologists, and other "experts" say- no matter how ludicrous, self-serving or
contrary to common sense. As the therapeutic ethos takes a greater bold, more
people will expect psychiatrists, counselors and support groups to be able to cure
them of their manias, addictions, and compulsions and to make them "feel good
about themselves." As they sink into the permanent condition of patienthood,
people will increasingly rely on the wisdom and benevolence of government
policy makers and bureaucrats who work to expand the scope and authority of the
State in its restructuring of society as a fully therapeutic arena. The prevailing
religion will be a cluster of twelve-step programs, and the retreat to childhood will
be considered as personal growth. This new social world will be a dualistic one
inhabited by official benevolence dispensers and benevolence recipients.
The seeming inevitable expansion of the medicalization of morality where
more of what we used to call sin or vice is characterized as illness makes the
promise of "patienthood" to virtually anyone who is capable of formulating the
expression, 'it wasn't my fault, I was x'. Substitute for 'x' any traumatic event or
state of deprivation you like. We will approach the gates of universal patienthood.
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Dependency on others will just be a natural part of adulthood- adulthood and
childhood in fact will be hard to distinguish. Adults will become indistinguishable
from children as we continue our practices of dressing like them, talking like
them, and expecting, as do children, others to take care of us.
With the primacy of passive amusement, we will contemplate the
continual enlargement of that class of people for whom the consequences of their
own behavior, whether it is drinking, eating, gambling, or shopping too much,
copulating indiscriminately, render them patients, passive entities who cannot
contribute to society and require others to tend to them, make excuses for them,
and to contribute vast energies to their maintenance. They will enter into
therapeutic custody and become the wards of those whose job it is to protect
individuals from the consequences of their behavior. The alcoholic, the drug
addict, the compulsive eater and gambler--such individuals, of course, require
others to tend to them, to counsel them and to follow up with their treatment and
care-taking and to oversee the "recovery" process. Recovery, to be successful,
requires talking- the assemblage of groups to talk and discuss and analyze their
afflictions.
Thus we can foresee more addictions, more recovering addicts, and more
talk about addictions. The immersion of individuals in passive amusement will
produce, not surprisingly, passive people who will not be expected to contribute
to society but will rather be recipients of its largess and holders of entitlements.
They will also be prone to the affliction of copious levels of festering, implacable
resentment when the entitlements do not expand as rapidly as their expectations.
With the specter of universal patienthood haunting us, it might be
worthwhile finally to recall Edward Gibbon' s nostalgic reference to the Roman
Republic and what he called the "ancient model of freedom ." This was the model
that also inspired our own Republican founding fathers as they waged their own
revolution, not for the hell of it, but with great reluctance and deep conviction.
Gibbon's freedom is that prized by people who view themselves as citizens,
spoken of above-people who disdain the dependency and the passivity of
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patienthood, a condition into which we now seem with little resistance to find
ourselves sinlcing. Gibbon writes of the Romans who watched their ancient
freedom dissipate late in the third century as Rome increasingly took on the
character of a military empire. The Roman senate, once the center of Republican
power and authority, no longer ruled.
The authority of the senate expired with Probus; nor was the
repentance of the soldiers displayed by the same dutiful regard for
the civil power, which they had testified after the unfortunate death
of Aurelian. The election of Carns was decided without expecting
the approbation of the senate ... and the Romans, deprived of fower
and freedom, asserted their privilege of licentious murmurs .1
Gibbon's observation turns grey and melancholy, and like many of them
reverberates uncomfortably for an early-twenty-first-century American reader
who, in a reflective moment, might be inclined to think of himself as a resident of
a decadent empire, once a republic. A people who prized freedom and
independence, of a sudden, find themselves reduced to the sorry status of
uninhibited complainers, producers, as Gibbon calls it, of "licentious murmurs."
These words capture a dismal, impotent and pathetic scene, one which, however,
should give us pause: what can there be left for a people to do when they sink into
self-absorption, when they give themselves over to amusement and diversion, and
when they come to wear with a predictable docility the mantle ofpatienthood? To
await the next judgment of the experts? To petition for more treatment? To lament
their increasing helplessness? To blame others for their inadequacies? To
murmur?
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